R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME FOUR

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

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DISPUTATION XXI

ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS OTHER OPERATION, WHICH IS CONSERVATION

Having previously elucidated the first emanation of all created things from the First Cause, it now remains for us to speak concerning that quasi-continuous or indeed perpetual dependence which creatures maintain upon this same First Cause for their being and activity. Conversely stated, we must treat of that influx or governance which the same First Cause exercises with respect to the effects it has created, so that these might continue to subsist and act according to their proper natures. For the whole of divine governance —which proceeds from divine providence as its source—reduces itself to these two principal heads: conservation and cooperation or concursus. In the present disputation we shall speak concerning the former of these; in the following disputation, concerning the latter. With respect to conservation, two questions especially must be considered and resolved: namely, what constitutes its necessity, and in what manner it is to be distinguished from creation or production itself.

SECTION I
WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY NATURAL REASON THAT CREATED BEINGS ALWAYS DEPEND IN THEIR BEING UPON THE ACTUAL INFLUX OF THE FIRST CAUSE

1. Reasons for doubting. First, it may seem that creatures do not depend in this way. Before a thing receives being, it is not surprising if it depends upon another in its coming-to-be; since it does not have being of itself, it cannot have it until it receives it from another, which is the thing's being made. But once a thing has received being, there is no further reason why it must continue to depend upon another's actual influx; for such an actual influx would be as it were a continuous—or rather a repeated—bestowal of the same being. This not only does not appear necessary, but even superfluous. Any given thing will retain the being once given to it even if it is not given again, provided it is not taken away. No being deprives itself of its own being; therefore, if being is once given, it will, so far as it depends on itself, retain it perpetually, even if it is not actually conferred further, so long as it is not positively taken away by some contrary action. And this is confirmed especially in incorruptible beings, which are necessary beings and of themselves; being belongs to them per se. Therefore they do not need actual conservation in order to be, because even if conservation ceased, no cause—at least outside of God—could exercise an action upon them by which it would deprive them of their being; nor would they deprive themselves of it, since that would conflict with their very nature. The same line of reasoning applies to corruptible beings as well, at least when they are not destroyed by contrary agents.

2. Second, at least it may seem that this cannot be proved by natural reason. Neither from God's power nor from the creature's indigence can the point be sufficiently established. The first part is proved thus: it seems rather to belong to God's power that he can make such effects as, once produced, remain in their being even if the agent's operation ceases—just as it belongs to the skill and power of a human artisan to make a building so firm that it can last perpetually after the artisan's work is finished. Therefore, this does not conflict with God's omnipotence, nor can the opposite be concluded from it. The second part is proved from the prior argument: the creature's indigence seems to consist solely in this, that it cannot have being unless it is given by another—not in this, that it cannot retain it unless it is continually given. And this is confirmed. If there were some universal imperfection of the creature on account of which it required this conservation, it would be especially because it does not participate in God's being with the equality or perfection with which being is in God. But this reasoning has no force: first, because even if the creature's being were independent in this way, it would not thereby be equal; it would still be inferior in infinitely many other respects. Second, the converse does not follow: if an effect's being is inferior in perfection to the being of its cause, it does not therefore follow that it must also be dependent in act; for with secondary causes we observe the opposite. Gold, for example, is produced by the sun with a certain less perfect being, and yet it does not depend upon the sun for its conservation. And heat is preserved even when the action of fire ceases, although it does not attain to the perfection of the fire's heat. And a house externally is of a very different and inferior kind compared with the artisan's idea of the house, and yet it remains after the artisan's influx has ceased. Why, then, may the same not be said of the effects of the First Cause? Or what special reason can be assigned in their case?

3. Among theologians there is no diversity of opinion on this matter. Those, however, who deny that God operates immediately in

every action of a creature will undoubtedly be compelled to deny that every created thing—or every being by participation—depends immediately upon God's actual influx; for what does not depend in fieri will not depend in esse. The false foundation of that opinion will be discussed in the following disputation. For now, although we shall chiefly treat of effects that are immediately created and produced by God, nevertheless, in order to make the discussion universal—for the same reason applies to all—we shall suppose that all things are made immediately by God, although not always by him alone. Again, those who deny that the creation of things can be proved by natural reason will all the more deny that the necessity of conservation can be proved. But that foundation has already been refuted by us. Still, even granted the demonstration of the necessity of creation, it is not easy to prove the necessity of conservation.

Resolution of the Question

4. It must be said, nevertheless, that all beings outside God depend in their being upon the divine conservation. This assertion, under these terms, is most certain and a matter of faith. It is frequently handed down by the Fathers of the Church, especially by St. Augustine, Genesis ad litteram IV, c. 12, where, treating the words of Genesis 2, "God rested on the seventh day from all the work that he had done," he says they are to be understood of rest from new works to be brought forth from nothing, not of rest from governing and conserving what had been created. Otherwise, he says, "they would immediately fall away. For the power of the Creator, the power of him who is omnipotent and who upholds all things, is the cause of subsistence for every creature. If this power were ever to cease from ruling the things that have been created, their kind would cease at once, and every nature would collapse." Nor, he continues, "is it as when someone builds a house, then departs, and his work stands even when he ceases and goes away; so too the world could not stand for

the twinkling of an eye if God withdrew from it the governance of itself." He does not prove this by reason there, but confirms it by testimonies of Scripture: Acts 17: "In him we live and move and have our being"; Wisdom 7: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things; she reaches everywhere"; and ch. 8: "She reaches mightily from one end to the other and disposes all things sweetly"; John 5: "My Father is working until now." Expounding these words, the same Augustine, Genesis ad litteram V, c. 20, says: "Let us so believe, or, if we can, even understand, that God works even now such that, if his operation were withdrawn from the things created by him, they would perish"; and he repeats the same in book IX, c. 15.

5. The same truth is taught by St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 2 on Theology, q. 36, where, solving the sixth objection, he explains that the above-cited words of John 5 are said with regard to the governance and conservation of things; and by St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 3: "The very structure of created things, their conservation and governance, teach us that God is the one who has bound together this whole mass of things, who defends and preserves it, and who continually provides for it." And St. Gregory the Great, Moralia XVI, c. 18: "It is one thing to be, another to be principally, another to be mutably, and another to be immutably. For all these things exist, yet they do not exist principally, because they do not subsist in themselves; and unless they were held by the hand of the One who governs, they could not exist at all…. For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would tend back to nothing unless the Maker of all held it with the hand of governance." In this way those words of Job 23 are understood: "God alone is"—that is, principally and without dependence upon another. In this sense it is thought that Exodus 3 says, "I am who am." Hence in Homily 17 on Ezekiel: "God incomprehensibly rules the things he incomprehensibly created…. He is within and without; he is beneath and above—above by ruling, beneath by sustaining, within by filling, without by encompassing. He so encompasses as to penetrate; he so presides as to

sustain; he is thus within as to bear; he bears so as to preside." In these words he seems to allude to Hebrews 1: "He upholds all things by the word of his power"; for to uphold seems to be the same as to conserve. This is said more explicitly in Wisdom 11: "How could anything endure if you did not will it? Or be preserved unless called into being by you?" Finally, St. Anselm, Monologion c. 12: "It can be doubted only by an irrational mind that all things that were made flourish through the selfsame One who sustains them and persevere as long as they are through the One by whose making they have being from nothing. Just as nothing has been made except through his creative presence, so nothing flourishes except through his preserving power," which he pursues in c. 13, tacitly applying what is said in Romans 11: "From him and through him and in him are all things," and Colossians 1: "In him all things hold together." By these and similar expressions of Scripture it is signified that the conservation of things rests in God—that is, in the divine power and efficacy.

6. The conclusion can be demonstrated by natural reason. From these authorities it is sufficiently clear that this truth is certain and infallible; it must be added that it can be proved, and even demonstrated, by adequate reason. St. John Damascene and St. Anselm taught this more explicitly: by the same reasoning by which it is proved that God is the creator of all things, it is also proved that he is their conserver. This consequence, however, neither seems evident from the terms nor altogether easy. St. Thomas tacitly proves it in Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1, and more extensively at q. 104, a. 1, where he develops a long and very metaphysical line of argument, which admits various difficulties that Cajetan diligently treats there. The sum of the whole argument is this: God is the cause of creatures not only with respect to their coming-to-be (fieri), but also with respect to their being (esse) directly and per se primarily. Now when an effect depends upon its cause with respect to its being directly and per se primarily, it depends not only in its being-made but also in its being-preserved. Therefore all things thus depend upon God.

7. In order to understand the meaning of the whole antecedent, one can at once object that the major seems to beg the question and to assume what must be proved. For what else can it mean for an effect to "depend for its being upon a cause," except to "depend for its preservation"? To say that God is the cause of a thing's coming-to-be and of its being is the same as to say that God is the cause of its being-made and of its being-preserved. Therefore what had to be proved is presupposed. Otherwise the division of causes would be useless: some being causes of the coming-to-be of their effects, others causes of the very being. For there is no cause that properly, per se, and directly produces the very fieri which is not per se and directly the cause of the esse; for the fieri terminates per se to that esse; indeed, the esse cannot be primarily caused otherwise than through the fieri. Thus, in the first instant in which God creates a thing, he is the cause of its esse because he is the cause of its fieri. Similarly, when fire generates fire by causing generation, it gives esse to the generated fire and thus is the cause of its esse. Therefore, in order that the cause in fieri may be distinguished from the cause of esse, it is necessary to understand by esse the permanence-in-being, and to include under fieri the esse insofar as it exists together with the fieri. But in this way to be the cause of the esse—that is, of permanence-in-being—is to be the cause of preservation. Hence what must be proved is assumed.

8. The reply is that this distinction is not to be understood in the sense the objection presumes; St. Thomas himself and Cajetan make this clear, although somewhat obscurely. I take the matter to be understood thus: that effect is said to be "from a cause in fieri" which does not require such a cause simply and absolutely in order to be, but only in order to be by such an action or production; that effect, however, is said to be "from a cause directly according to esse" which, in order simply and absolutely to be, requires such a cause. Thus, for example, Adam is said to be from God according to fieri and esse, because he necessarily requires such a cause in order to be; but Abel is said to be from Adam according to fieri, because absolutely speaking

he does not need that cause in order to be—he could have existed by God alone—but only in order to be produced in that manner, namely by natural generation. You will say: by the same reasoning Adam will be said to be from God only as to fieri, because he could have been from another parent by natural generation. I reply by denying the consequence: he could not have been from another without being from God. And in this sense St. Thomas rightly says there that no effect which receives form and esse from an agent according to the same ratio in which they are in the cause depends upon that cause according to its esse, but only according to fieri. For otherwise the effect, by reason of its form, would essentially require such a cause; but this cannot be, because if the agent's form is supposed to be of the same species, it would require the same cause essentially; thus it would demand to be caused by itself, which is a contradiction. From this it is rightly concluded that only that agent which is of a higher order, and which does not communicate to the effect its own form or nature or being of the same order, but rather some inferior participation of it, can be the cause of its effects not only with respect to fieri but also with respect to esse.

9. According to this interpretation, the sense of the major proposition assumed is easy, and its truth is very well known: God is the cause of his effects in such a way that, from their intrinsic nature and intrinsic necessity, they require such a cause in order to be; for, as we have said above, they depend essentially upon him. The a priori reason is that the First Cause alone is ipsum esse per essentiam; every other being is a participation of that being, and therefore by intrinsic necessity requires the influx of ipsum esse per essentiam in order to be. This reason seems not only to prove that God is the cause of his effects directly according to their esse, but also that only God is in this way the cause of other beings; for no being is so produced by another created cause that it absolutely and simply requires that cause in order to receive esse. It could exist by the influx of God alone without another cause, though not conversely.

10. This is indeed true, speaking simply and of absolute necessity. Nevertheless, according to a kind of participation and according to the order of nature, certain equivocal causes are said to be per se causes of their effects directly according to the effects' esse, because the form of such an effect, in its whole latitude, depends per se and primarily upon such a cause, and can be produced by it according to its whole species, and according to the order of nature it requires to be so produced. Thus the sun is the cause of light—under "sun" including whatever participates its nature as to the property of light. For Aristotle says in De anima II that fire illumines insofar as it participates the nature of the heavens. And conversely, light as such, according to its nature, requires such a cause in order to be, according to the natural order of causes, although absolutely it could be produced by God. Therefore, God—either alone or above all—is the cause of his effects not only with respect to fieri but also with respect to esse directly and per se primarily.

11. From this it is also easy to see the sense of the minor proposition assumed: namely, that a cause of an effect not only according to fieri but also according to esse is also a cause of that effect with respect to being-preserved. The meaning is that whenever an effect proceeds from a cause in such a way that, simply and absolutely, it requires that cause in order to be, it depends not only upon the cause's actual influx in order first to receive being, but also in order to endure and persevere in it—that is, it depends upon the cause for preservation. Of this proposition, thus stated, I draw two proofs from St. Thomas. The first is: when something is the cause of an effect in fieri, the fieri cannot remain if the action of such a cause ceases. Therefore, when something is the cause of an effect directly and per se primarily according to its esse, the esse of that effect cannot remain if the cause's action ceases—which is to depend for preservation upon that cause. This consequence rests only upon a kind of parity and proportion, and thus is not so evident. One might say that the dependence of fieri upon the action of the cause is more immediate

than that of esse, because esse always depends by means of an action, whereas fieri depends immediately upon the action itself, since it is not distinguished from the action. Nevertheless, the consequence is excellent; for it matters little whether the dependence is equally immediate in the said sense—namely, by another action or by itself—provided it is equally essential. The participated esse depends as essentially upon esse per essentiam as any fieri depends upon its agent; therefore it cannot remain without actual dependence or action.

12. This is confirmed and clarified: if such an esse, by its very nature, requires the influx of the First Agent in order to exist at any time in reality, then whenever it exists it requires the same influx, because it is always the same, and whatever belongs to it per se and primarily belongs to it always. Finally, I confirm: either "permanence-in-being" is something over and above esse itself—as some have thought—or it is nothing other than esse itself standing in the same way. If the first (though false) were granted, it would still necessarily follow that that permanence must be from God, because nothing, in whatever way it is, can be without him. But if the second—which is true—is supposed, the earlier reasoning stands: whatever such an esse, by intrinsic and absolute necessity, requires in order first to be, it requires in order to remain so long as it is; for it is always the same, standing in the same way.

13. Another proof of the claim from St. Thomas. The other proof—indeed a posteriori and from a sign—is, in my judgment, most evident to a well-disposed understanding. We see that light depends upon the sun in its coming-to-be and in its conservation, because the sun is a cause of a higher order and, by a kind of participation, is the cause of light not only according to fieri but also according to esse, as was explained. But every created being depends much more essentially upon God than light depends upon the sun, and the creature's participation in the divine being is far more inferior than the

light's participation in the sun's brightness. Therefore it depends all the more upon him for its preservation.

14. Final proof of the conclusion. We can fashion a final argument as follows. We can understand that all things depend upon God for enduring in being in two ways: first, permissively (so to speak), in that they remain in being so long as they are permitted by God to remain—that is, they are not deprived of their being by him by whom they could be deprived; second, positively, that is, through his actual influx into them. I argue now: it is evident that all things depend upon or are conserved by God at least in the first way; but they cannot depend upon him in that way unless they also depend upon him in the latter; therefore, and so forth. The major is proved: it belongs to God's omnipotence that he is able to reduce to nothing the things he has created, if he wills; therefore, that they be conserved in being requires at least his permission, which can consist only in his not willing to reduce them to nothing, since he can. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is plain from the very terms; for God would not be the perfect Lord of all things if he could not dispose of them as he wills. The minor is proved: first, because there are many things that cannot be deprived of being by any contrary action—as an angel and other simple entities; and second, because every positive action necessarily tends toward some being; thus, if God always needed some action in order to destroy things, he could not annihilate them. Therefore, that he may be able to do this, it is necessary that by the mere withdrawal of his action or influx he can annihilate them. But this could not occur unless, insofar as it lies in them, they depend for their being and preservation upon such influx and action; therefore, and so on.

15. The ancient philosophers recognized the dependence of creatures upon God even in their conservation. Justin Martyr indicates this in his Exhortation to the Greeks; Agostino Steuco (Eugubinus) confirms it at greater length, De perenni philosophia I, c. 26, and in book III almost throughout; it is taken from Plato's Timaeus, and from Aristotle—or under his name—in the book De

mundo ad Alexandrum, and De divina sapientia XII according to the Egyptians, c. 19, where it is said: "From him are perpetuity, place, and time; by his beneficence they remain. And just as the center of a circle is in itself, yet the lines drawn from it to the circumference, the circumference itself, and the points exist in the same center; so likewise all natures, whether of intellect or of sense, consist and are confirmed in the First Agent." Later, inquiring how all things are said to remain in the first craftsman when form remains in matter, matter in form, and an affection in its subject, he replies that beyond these modes there is another in which a thing is said to remain in another as in an agent—for example, light in the luminous body, a ray in that from which it emanates, and finally any simple essence in its efficient cause. Hermes Trismegistus, in the Asclepius, also calls God the Mind that preserves all things, in whom all live and subsist. Seneca too, in De consolatione ad Polybium, calls God the cause of causes who keeps and rules all; and he has much relevant in the book De providentia. Finally, the theologians so judge this truth to be natural, and they commend it with other reasons and explain it with examples —as can be seen in St. Bonaventure (In I Sent., dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1), in Gregory of Rimini (In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 3), Alexander of Hales (Summa I, q. 10, memb. 2–3), Hervaeus (tract. De aeternitate mundi, q. 6), and others whom I shall mention in the next section.

Replies to the Reasons for Doubting

16. To the first reason for doubt, the reply is clear from what has been said. The same indigence present in the creature's esse in the first instant in which it is made—such that it cannot be without another's action—is present in it so long as it remains in being. For since by reason of its esse, precisely as such, the creature needs the divine influx in order to be, so long as it is it needs that same influx. Nor can this conservation properly be called a repeated bestowal of the same esse; rather, just as esse itself is not a repeated being but one

being that remains the same, so too the influx by which a thing is conserved is the same—or the same bestowal of the same esse—as we shall explain more fully in the next section. Nor is this influx superfluous; without it created things would not suffice to support themselves in being. Therefore, when this influx fails, they would immediately be reduced to nothing—not because created things would deprive themselves of their being (that is repugnant), but because they would be deprived of it by the Author of their being, not by a contrary action, but by the suspension of the action necessary for their being. And in this regard the case is the same for incorruptible beings; for although, as to their intrinsic potency and with respect to natural agents, they are said to be necessary beings, nevertheless not so with respect to the extrinsic power of God, upon whom they always and continually depend for their being. Hence, although they are said to exist per se with respect to the intrinsic cause—because they have in themselves, not by a distinct form but by themselves, the being in which they subsist, which is most true of immaterial substances—still with respect to the extrinsic cause it does not belong to them to exist per se, but rather through a superior cause and dependently upon it.

17. To the second reason: from both considerations proposed there this truth can be sufficiently gathered. First, it belongs to the amplitude of divine power that nothing is, nor can be for a moment, without its influx. Likewise, it belongs to the same power to have full dominion over all created things and the intrinsic ability to annihilate them by suspending its influx. Accordingly, in a human artisan—or even in univocal natural agents—that they can produce effects which remain in being after their action ceases is not a perfection simply, but only on the supposition of some imperfection, namely in the artisan, that he cannot bring something into being according to its proper esse and entity, but only according to a certain form and figure arising from the arrangement and order of such things. Given that imperfection, it does indeed belong to the artisan's skill to compose things out of such materials, and in such an order and disposition, that they cohere firmly

and are stable. In a natural agent, by contrast, it is presupposed, for example, that in itself it is a univocal agent—which does not belong to perfection simply; other things being equal, an agent is much more excellent which of itself is of a higher order than the effect and contains it eminently. Yet, on the supposition of that imperfection—that the cause is of the same order and ratio as the effect—there will belong to the perfection of that order (not simply) the ability to produce an effect equally perfect and lasting. Again, the necessity of conservation is sufficiently gathered from the imperfection of created being; for if it were such as to be able, even for a moment, to remain without the actual influx of the First Cause, then even in the first moment—or in eternity itself—it could be without such influx, and by its intrinsic nature it would not require dependence upon another, which is proper to infinitely perfect being.

18. As for the examples adduced there: although not every inequality of an effect to its cause suffices for the effect to depend for conservation, nevertheless that inequality which exists between esse per essentiam and esse per participationem, or between independent being and that which is essentially dependent, suffices so that the latter cannot be conserved without the influx of the former. But in those examples it is asked of us to explain when an effect depends for conservation upon a created cause. This we shall more conveniently clarify in Section III.

SECTION II

WHAT KIND OF ACTION CONSERVATION IS, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM CREATION

1. On this question the first opinion is that of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet I, q. 7), who asserts that in every case of the production and the conservation of things two actions intervene: one by which a thing acquires being, and another by which it is conserved in being; of

these, the former precedes and the latter follows. He repeats the same in Quodlibet IX, q. 1, and the view is taken up by Peter Auriol and Gregory of Rimini, whom I shall cite below. The basis seems to be that the action by which being is conferred upon a thing is sudden and indivisible and lacks duration or permanence; therefore it passes away at once, and there succeeds to it the action by which the thing is conserved in being, for conservation is a permanent action. This is confirmed, first, because if the same action by which a thing is made also conserved it, then for as long as it exists it would be in a certain continual "becoming," since the first fieri would endure continuously. But the consequence seems highly absurd—namely, that a substantial and permanent thing is in continual flux. It is confirmed, second, because we often see a thing produced by one cause and conserved by another; therefore in that case it is necessary to distinguish conservation from production, and thus they are always distinguished. Finally, they confirm this by appealing to St. Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul c. 8, where he writes of God in this way: "This incorporeal power and nature, the maker of the whole universe, holds the whole by a present power; for he did not make and then depart, leaving the effect he made;" and below: "That efficient power cannot fail to watch over what it has made, nor allow it to be without the form by which it is, in whatever way it is; for what is not of itself, if it is deserted by him through whom it is, assuredly will not be." Capreolus relates other arguments for this opinion out of Auriol (In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 2, in arg. contr. 3) and Gregory (to be cited below), but I pass them over, since they have no special difficulty.

2. The second opinion is that conservation is not a different action from creation according to the thing or according to any real mode, but is distinguished only by a certain connotation or included negation, that is, by a distinction of reason; for "creation" signifies the effecting of a thing while connoting that it did not previously exist, whereas "conservation" signifies the same effecting while connoting that the thing had already existed before. This is the view of St.

Thomas (ST I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4; De potentia q. 3, a. 3, ad 6; q. 5, a. 1, ad 2), and it is commonly followed by the Thomists: Hervaeus (De aeternitate mundi, q. 1), Aegidius (De ente et essentia, q. 7), Ferrariensis on Contra gentiles III, c. 65, and Capreolus (cited above), who explicitly reports it against Henry and Bernard of Auvergne (Quodlibet I, q. 7). Taken in itself, this opinion is true; yet, to explain it more fully, a certain distinction must be made.

Resolution of the Question

3. First assertion. Sometimes a thing is conserved by precisely the same cause by which it is made; sometimes by different causes—either because the effect was produced by one cause with the help or concurrence of another while the conservation is by a single cause alone, or conversely, because the production was by one while many concur for conservation. I say, first: when the conservation is by the very same agent and with the very same concurrence of the material cause—or even with the very same independence from a material cause—then conservation is not another action than production or creation, save by reason only (ratione tantum), that is, by connotation and relation. Hence, if we compare creation and conservation formally and per se under the same respect and with the same agent and the same mode, then they are one and the same action. This is proved because there is no sufficient principle for distinguishing those actions; therefore, if distinct actions be posited without a cause, they are asserted gratuitously. Who could believe that the sun or a lamp illumines this air by one action when it is first applied and by another thereafter? What could have intervened to interrupt or stop the first action and then begin another? Again, the first action would then have to endure only for an instant of our time; for by what rationale could it endure any longer, if not forever? The subsequent action, therefore, would either endure for only another similar instant—so that two instants immediately contiguous would be needed—or it would

endure for the whole subsequent time during which the thing is conserved; and then, by an equal or greater reason, the same must be said of the first action. Thus that superfluous multiplication of actions is avoided. Add that the "second" action would have to be initiated by the last non-being, which is contrary to the nature of such actions. Likewise, in the blessed vision, for example, would there be one action by which the blessed first see God and another by which they then persevere in the vision of God? Then the first action would not itself be beatitude, nor in itself perpetual—an absurdity. Indeed, to admit this in any bodily vision, and likewise in every act of understanding and willing, is beyond all reason and contrary to all experience, as far as experience can enter here. It is scarcely possible for a human being to persevere only for an instant in the vital act he exercises. It would also be strange that, in a natural agent (for example, sight), the action should be varied with no change in the principle, or in the object, or in the patient, or in the effect; and similarly, that in a free agent the action should be multiplied without any new exercise of liberty. Finally, an action has its unity from its terminus and its principle, or also from the patient if it bears upon it; but production and conservation have in every respect the same terminus. Therefore, if the principle is the same, as we are supposing, the action we are discussing will be the same; for creation has no subject, and proportionally the same holds for the action and conservation that take place ex subiecto if the patient is likewise the same.

4. You will object that actions are commonly distinguished by a difference of time, and therefore Aristotle requires unity of time for unity of motion. But creation and conservation occur at different times—or at least creation occurs in the first instant, and conservation in all the subsequent time. I reply that, in Aristotle's view, the same continuous time suffices for the motion to be the same, and consequently for the action to be the same. In the present case, however, the instant in which creation occurs is continuously conjoined to the subsequent time in which conservation endures—

"continuously," I say, in the way in which an indivisible terminus can be immediately joined to a divisible thing. This suffices for the action to be one. Hence St. Thomas often says that conservation is as it were a continued creation. This is not to be understood of proper continuity, but of our manner of conceiving—namely, of the co-existence of an indivisible with a true continuous succession. For proper continuity exists only in the divisible; creation and conservation, however, are one action if we regard the indivisible terminus and the indivisible reception of being. There is no succession in the terminus, because it is an indivisible substantial being; nor in its acquisition, because the whole is acquired at once and the whole is conserved at once. Therefore, when we say that production and conservation endure through one continuous time, this must be understood of the extrinsic time with which that action co-exists. If there be any intrinsic "duration" of the action, it is more fittingly one indivisible instant or aevum, which wholly begins in the first instant and wholly perseveres throughout the subsequent time and in each of its parts and instants.

5. Hence the argument given above is strengthened. Conservation is one action, insofar as it endures through the whole time after the first instant and in all the instants of continuous time; therefore it is also one action together with the production or creation which is at the first instant. The consequence is clear, because there is no greater reason to distinguish between the first instant and the immediately following time than there is to distinguish between any instant of a continuum and the part of time that succeeds it. Unless, perchance, one imagines a real intrinsic succession in conservation—which is false and, in my judgment, improbable—and even then, the same argument remains: conservation is said to be one action in the very way in which it is said to be one, namely by continuity; therefore, by no less reason it must be said to be one with creation, since creation is joined to the last terminus just as the parts of the continuum are joined to one another, as a terminating point truly unites with a line

and in its own way, together with the parts, constitutes one whole—just as a continuous point does.

6. An objection is resolved in this way. Someone will say: if God were to annihilate an angel and afterwards create him again, then the act of creating would be a different act merely because it is done at a different time; therefore creation and conservation, which are at different times, will be different actions. I answer that the same argument could be made about conservation corresponding to the prior and the later time or instant—namely, that it is not one and the same action, but is multiplied without end in the succession of all the instants or parts of time. The consequence can therefore be denied, because in that case the actions would be interrupted and discrete; here, however, there is one continuous action. Still better, we should say that the antecedent is not necessary. For God could reproduce the angel by the very same numerical action by which he first created him; it is no more difficult to elicit the very same numerical action again than to produce the very same numerical effect—something I have explained at greater length elsewhere. Yet God could also, if he willed, use a different action to reproduce the same numerical effect, as I have noted above; and thus I did not say the antecedent is false, but uncertain, since it depends on God's free will. For all that, I do not deny that God could, if he willed, vary the action in a thing's creation and conservation, and even within conservation itself as it unfolds over different parts of our time; I say only that this would be superfluous and not connatural, given the identity of terminus and principle—especially when the action is not interrupted.

7. What sort and what degree of distinction there is between creation and conservation. From what has been said it is easy to understand the distinction of reason between creation and conservation. That some distinction intervenes is shown by the very difference of ways of speaking: a thing is not said to be "conserved" in the first instant in which it is created, nor "created" in the subsequent time during which it is conserved. Therefore some difference

intervenes at least in reason between the two; and this is nothing other than what was said above: "creation," by the force of that word, connotes the negation of prior being, whereas "conservation" by contrast connotes the possession of the same being previously had. That this difference is only a difference of reason seems evident in itself. And it is easily seen by a like consideration of the very terminus: the created effect, as existing in the first instant, or as existing throughout all the following time, can be distinguished only by reason; therefore the same holds for the indivisible action, and different names are imposed to signify the action under these different respects and connotations. Sometimes, however, the action is conceived or signified without those respects, indifferently; and then it is said indifferently both of production and of conservation—just as we say that the sun illumines the air both in the first instant and throughout the whole time during which the light lasts. In this sense also we say that "the Father works even until now" (John 5), as St. Augustine explains in Genesis ad litteram IV, c. 12, and as the other Fathers cited above also say. From these points the whole conclusion is sufficiently clear. Why I added its final part will be evident from the next conclusion.

8. Second assertion. I say, second, that sometimes conservation is another action than production on the side of the formal term—namely, when the thing produced and the thing conserved are considered under different formal respects or under a different relation to a subject. For example, in the mystery of the Eucharist quantity is conserved numerically the same, both as it was in the matter of the bread and as it is when separated from the bread. Therefore it was produced by one action from the matter of the bread, but it is conserved when separated by another action. The reason is that the prior action was an eduction from the potency of matter, or a co-creation with matter, or a co-production together with the bread, according to the various opinions; the later action, however, is without any subject (ex nullo subiecto), and in reality is the same as creation—

only it is not so called because the thing already pre-existed. From this it is understood incidentally that this manner of distinguishing production and conservation—namely, as one proceeding by way of eduction and the other by way of creation, or conversely—cannot occur naturally, but only by miracle or supernatural work. For the form of water produced by an action dependent upon a subject cannot naturally be either produced or conserved independently of a subject. For the same reason, if an accident produced in one subject should be transmuted into another and be conserved in it, the action by which it is conserved in the other subject would be distinct from that by which it was produced in the former; for it would be, as it were, a new eduction and a new dependence upon a distinct cause. Nevertheless, such a transference cannot be natural, because an accident cannot naturally migrate from subject to subject.

9. Distinction between creation and conservation arising from a change in the efficient cause. There is another way in which conservation can be distinguished from production on the side of the principle: for example, when fire is produced by fire and is afterward conserved by God alone; or when water is heated by the sun or by fire and then, the sun being removed, it is conserved by God—or by some other cause. Then the conserving action is distinct from the producing action. This is easily seen, because the prior action ceased—since it was the action of the fire—and the effect nevertheless remains; therefore there is now a new action by which God alone conserves that effect. Indeed it can happen that the prior action was successive, while conservation is indivisible and permanent, because by conservation nothing new is gained by parts, but what was gained little by little is conserved all at once and indivisibly; I speak of pure conservation, which proceeds without increase. Finally, the reason is that an action, since by its very self it depends upon the agent, cannot vary its dependence or relation to the agent without the action's varying. Therefore, if light is produced by one lamp and conserved by another, the conservation is an action distinct from the production;

and universally, the same holds whenever the conserver is distinct from the producer.

10. From this it is gathered incidentally that this mode of distinction does not have place naturally in creation and the conservation corresponding to it, because naturally a thing cannot be created, nor can what is created be conserved, except by God alone. It is otherwise supernaturally: if God were to create a thing through a created instrument and afterward conserve it by himself alone—or conversely—then the action would be distinct for the same reason. I said that the comparison to be made is between conservation corresponding to creation, because the comparison must be made formally and per se whenever one inquires about the distinction between production and conservation. For if someone compares the conservation of fire in matter with creation simply, it is clear that these are different actions. Likewise one must stand within the action and causality of the efficient cause; for if someone compares the creation of matter, say, with conservation as it is in a certain way "from the form" (that is, by dependence upon a subject), he is not comparing like with like.

11. From this, finally, it is understood why in the present assertion I said that the distinction between conservation and production is accidental and material, whereas in the earlier assertion I spoke of identity per se and formal. For the distinction I have explained here is not between "conservation" and "production" as such (from the fact that one is conservation and the other production), but from the fact that the one is from one cause and the other from a different cause. The same distinction would obtain between two productions, or even between two conservations, if the same diversity of principles intervened. Therefore, production and conservation as such do not of themselves have this diversity, but rather identity—if they are compared formally and precisely.

Replies to the Arguments

12. The arguments for the first opinion scarcely need a reply. We deny that creation, of necessity, lasts only for an instant of our time, speaking of the thing; for it lasts as long as conservation remains. Speaking of the name and its connotation, however, creation is said to last only for an instant, because only for that instant does it connote the negation of a prior existence. We are always speaking of creation that is accompanied by a novelty of being, as I explained in the preceding disputation. To the first confirmation I reply: when a permanent thing is said to be "in a certain continual becoming," the expression is equivocal. To be always "in becoming," taken strictly, signifies to be in a certain continual transition and succession; in that sense the proposition is false, nor does it follow from the opinion set out above, as is evident. There is, however, another sense: namely, that so long as it exists, the creature actually depends upon the First Cause and always receives its being from him by the same actual influx by which it was created. In that sense the proposition is true, though it is improper speech, because fieri strictly connotes some newness of being. The second confirmation proves the second conclusion proposed by us—namely, that conservation is distinct when there is diversity of agents. As for the words of St. Augustine, they either do not make to the point or at most confirm the same conclusion.

SECTION III

WHETHER ALL THINGS DEPEND ON GOD ALONE IN BEING CONSERVED

1. We have said that it pertains to the efficacy of the first cause to conserve all things in being; it follows that we should declare whether this is proper to it, and consequently we will explain the common division of causes into those upon which effects depend only in becoming (in fieri), or also in being conserved. And we will

investigate the root of this diversity, whether it is sufficient that the cause be univocal, or equivocal, or, if this is not enough, what that root might be.

The Sense of the Question is Explained

2. One thing can depend upon another in its conservation under various titles. But first of all it must be noted from St. Thomas, I, q. 104, a. 1 and 2, that one thing being conserved by another can be understood in various ways, namely, per se or per accidens. Those things are said to conserve a thing per accidens which protect it from contraries, either by resisting them or by removing them. And in this way it is certain that God conserves one creature by means of another; for an angel can easily conserve a man by turning away a stone, fire, etc.; concerning which there is no question, because this is not so much conservation as another local change, or alteration, from which it follows accidentally that the thing, which already existed, is not corrupted, and thus is conserved. But conservation per se can be subdivided; for one is direct and immediate, which consists in the persevering influx of that very being which was communicated through production; but another is conservation that is only mediate or remote, which consists in the influx of certain dispositions or forms which are necessary for the thing to be conserved in being. And the former St. Thomas, above, ad 1, seems to call principal conservation, but the latter secondary. Concerning this latter mode of conservation, therefore, there is no question, because it is certain that in this way certain creatures are conserved through others; for thus Aristotle said, XII Metaphysics, text. 34, that heaven and the sun conserve these inferior things by their divine motion. And the reason is that this mode of conservation consists only in the production of certain qualities or forms. Hence, just as one creature acts upon another, so also it can act upon the qualities consonant with its nature, by which it is fittingly conserved.

3. Here two things are to be considered: one is that conservation is properly said of that which is through efficiency, in the way we now speak of it, yet it extends to other genera of causes, especially material and formal, in the way that form is conserved through matter, and matter in its own way through form, and the composite through material dispositions. For this reason, therefore, it can be said that matter is conserved through intermediate secondary causes, because, although they do not immediately influence being into it, nevertheless they induce forms into it through which it is mediately conserved. And for a similar reason, one who produces connatural dispositions will be said to conserve the subject, in the way that the sun conserves living things by fostering their natural heat. The other thing to be observed is that conservation is sometimes attributed to the individual, sometimes indeed to the species, in the way that the species is said to be conserved through the continuous generation of individuals, which is also improper conservation, for it is rather a succession of generations. Hence neither is this our discourse, because it is established that these generations occur through intermediate secondary causes. Our discourse is therefore about the most proper conservation through direct and immediate continuous influx of being itself into the same singular thing.

Resolution of the Question

4. I say therefore first: no created substance depends in being conserved as to its substantial being upon a created cause. Capreolus noted this, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4 against the third conclusion, from St. Thomas, q. 5 de Potent., a. 1, ad 7. And this can be shown both by induction and by reason; for in incorruptible things which are made through creation, the matter is most clear, as St. Thomas noted, III, q. 13, a. 2, because the conservation of these things occurs through the same persevering action by which they are created. Likewise, because that action by which they are conserved is not from matter,

since either the things which are conserved through it do not have matter, but are simple, or if they have it, such influx is simultaneously terminated immediately to the being of the matter itself; and therefore, for the same reason that the creation of these things is proper to God himself, so also is their conservation. Which is also true of the prime matter of generable things; for we have already said that the conservation which is through form is mediate and improper. Especially if it is true that form does not concur properly and a priori to the conservation of matter, but only a posteriori and quasi dispositively, as was touched upon above.

5. Furthermore, corruptible substances especially do not depend in being conserved upon created immaterial substances; for these cannot per se effect the eduction of forms from the potency of matter; therefore neither conservation: for it is the same reason concerning conservation. Likewise they do not depend in being conserved upon univocal generators, as experience establishes. And the reason is that they receive their forms perfectly according to species. Likewise, because otherwise one individual of one species according to its being would express an essential or at least connatural relationship of dependence in being itself upon another individual of the same species, and thus either one would have to proceed to infinity, or necessarily stop at some one or some things which would not be conserved in a connatural way; but both alternatives are plainly false, as is evident. Again, neither from an equivocal generator, if that also is a generated substance, as experience also establishes; for although a horse generates a mule, the generated does not depend in being conserved upon the generator. And in these and similar cases perhaps the reason is that these generations are in some way per accidens, and therefore the effect by reason of its being does not express an intrinsic dependence upon such a cause, but only by reason of such becoming. We will immediately treat another general reason.

6. St. Thomas's reason for the conclusion is explained. Finally, these generable substances can be compared to celestial and

incorruptible composite substances. And thus some think that inferior substances depend in being conserved upon heaven, which Fonseca indicates as probable without proof, c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2, lib. V Metaphysics. But St. Thomas denies this above. He gives a rather obscure reason in these words: "The action of a corporeal agent does not extend beyond motion, and therefore it is an instrument of the first agent in the eduction of forms from potency to act, which is through motion; but not in their conservation, except insofar as from some motion dispositions are retained in matter, by which matter is made proper to the form. For thus through the motion of celestial bodies inferior things are conserved in being." This reason can be explained in two ways: first, that corporeal agents do not attain the eduction of forms immediately, but only dispositively, and therefore they cannot be the proper cause of conservation. But this sense is against the principles of St. Thomas and against his mind in that place. For according to that sense, form would depend in conservation just as in eduction upon the celestial body, which nevertheless St. Thomas denies. Then it remains difficult why in that instrumental way, in which a corporeal agent through motion is the cause of the eduction of substantial form, it could not also be the cause of its conservation. The second sense therefore seems to be that heaven, because it does not act upon the inferior except through intermediate accidents, only instrumentally attains the effection of substantial form, and therefore only has this efficiency as long as the prior alteration lasts, because an instrument only acts toward the effect of the principal agent through its own prior action; therefore, when the motion of alteration ceases, the action of heaven concerning the substance itself ceases. But such things are conserved when alteration ceases, although they are not generated except through that mediation; and therefore they do not depend in being conserved upon heaven, as they depend in becoming.

7. And in this sense the reason is probable, which can be further declared and confirmed thus, because a created substance does not effect another except through intermediate accidents as

instruments; but no substance by its nature depends in its being and conservation upon the efficiency of accidents; indeed in general no effect more noble than the instrument seems to depend per se in being conserved upon the action of the instrument, although it sometimes depends in becoming, because such an agent is not apt for effecting such an effect except through the medium of an instrument; as, although an intelligible species is made through a phantasm as instrument, it does not depend upon it in being conserved, and so with others. And the reason seems to be that relationship to a less noble instrument cannot be founded in the intrinsic nature and need of the effect itself, but at most in the nature or will of the agent, because either it is not sufficient or does not wish to act without such an instrument. Hence here the distinction of St. Thomas fits very well, as explained by us above concerning the cause of becoming only, or also of being itself. For whenever a cause acts a perfect effect through the medium of an imperfect instrument, it is the cause of its becoming, but not indeed of its being, because it is not probable that such an effect from the force of its being considered absolutely demands such a cause in order to be, but at most in order to be made by such a genus of production. And therefore such an effect never depends upon such a cause in being conserved. Because therefore heaven effects no inferior substance except in this way, namely, through accidents, which are less noble instruments than substantial effects, therefore, although these substances are sometimes made by the heavens, they nevertheless do not depend upon them in being conserved.

8. This can be shown thirdly in this way, because the elements, according to their substances, do not depend in being conserved upon the heavens; therefore neither can mixed bodies depend; therefore no corruptible substances thus depend upon heaven, because these are nothing but either simple or mixed. The antecedent is proved, both by experience, for fire or water, properly speaking, is equally conserved in the absence or presence of the sun,

and however the influence of heaven may be changed; and from origin, because the heavens and elements were equally created first; hence the elements per se and by their nature do not depend in becoming upon heaven, but either they are first made through creation, or afterwards one is apt to generate its like; therefore neither do they depend in being conserved. But the first consequence is proved from parity of reason, or even a fortiori, because the forms of mixed bodies are more perfect and equally permanent in themselves. Which experience also confirms, because, although gold is generated by the sun, it is conserved without the presence or actual influence of the sun, and so with others. Therefore no substance is found which immediately and directly depends in its being upon another created substance. Nor do I find a reason which would even probably suggest the opposite, to which it would be necessary to respond.

9. Which accidents depend in being conserved upon their causes, which do not. I say second: accidents do not always depend in being conserved upon their causes even when equivocal. For in univocal causes the matter is manifest, both by experience and by the reason made above, which universally proves that an effect never depends upon a univocal cause or one of the same nature in being, but only in becoming. But concerning an effect made by an equivocal cause, it is evident in heat made by the sun; for it remains when its influx ceases, and the same is true of other first qualities which are made by the moon and other stars. But we will immediately investigate the reason.

10. I say third: certain accidents depend in becoming and being conserved upon created equivocal causes. This conclusion also is established by experience; for thus light depends upon the sun or another luminous body, intentional species of external senses upon objects, vital acts upon potencies, and in general motion upon something actually moving. And thus it happens that only these effects do not depend upon God alone in being conserved. But I say "alone," because they also depend immediately upon him in being conserved;

for in the way that every operation of a creature is also immediately from God, as we will say below, this conservation also which is accomplished through a creature is also immediately from God; for it is the same reason, since this conservation is a certain operation or efficiency. And thus in this there is no difficulty.

11. But there is great difficulty in giving the reason for this dependence; for it is not sufficiently given from the fact that the cause is equivocal and the effect imperfectly participates the virtue of the cause; for it is established from the preceding assertion that this reason does not suffice in other equivocal effects. Hence it is also difficult to assign the reason why certain equivocal effects of created causes do not depend upon others in conserving, but others do depend. St. Thomas touched upon this difficulty, I, q. 84, a. 1, where he tacitly asks why heated water retains heat when the action of fire ceases, but air does not retain light when the action of the sun ceases. And he only responds: "Because the matter of water is receptive of the heat of fire according to the same nature as it is in fire; but air is not receptive of light according to the same nature as it is in the sun." But this reason does not seem sufficient, because the argument can be changed; for light caused by fire in air is not conserved when the action of fire ceases, but heat caused by the sun is conserved; and yet air is receptive of light according to the same nature as it is in fire, and is not receptive of heat according to the same nature as it is in the sun. Then I inquire what it is for some quality to be received in the patient according to the same nature as it is in the agent; for it can have two senses: The prior is that to be received according to the same nature is the same as being of the same species; and thus the reason does not conclude, both because heat made by the sun is not of the same species, and also because it is probable that air is receptive of light according to the same nature as it is in the sun; especially according to the same St. Thomas, who I, q. 67, a. 3, from this proves that the light of the sun is not a substantial form because in air it is an accident. This

reason would not be efficacious unless it supposed that the light of air and the light of the sun are of the same nature.

12. The other sense is that for a quality to be received according to the same nature is the same as being produced conjoined in the patient to the same radical principle, that is, to the same substantial form as it was in the agent, which sense St. Thomas indicates more, when he says: "Air is not naturally disposed to receive light according to the same nature according to which it is in the sun," and he explains: "So that it would receive the form of the sun, which is the principle of light"; hence he concludes: "And therefore, because it does not have a root in air, light immediately ceases when the action of the sun ceases." And he explains the same sense more in the said q. 67, a. 3, ad 1, where he says that quality follows substantial form, and therefore, as the subject relates to the reception of substantial form, so it relates to the reception and retention of quality. Hence he concludes, if substantial form is received with the quality, then it is received firmly and without dependence in being conserved upon the created agent; but if it is received imperfectly, that is, by disposing and preparing matter for such a form, then it is also conserved for some time when the action of the agent ceases, but easily cast off; but if the quality is neither received with form nor disposes to form, it does not remain at all when the action of the extrinsic agent ceases. From this sense, therefore, such a reason is concluded; for because heat, whether produced by fire or by the sun, always disposes to the form of fire, therefore it does not entirely depend in being conserved upon such an agent; but the light of air formally and per se does not dispose to any substantial form, whether made by the sun or made by fire; for air illuminated by whatever source, if it were not heated, would not be disposed to the form of fire, and therefore entirely depends in being conserved.

13. But even explained in this way that discourse does not seem efficacious. First, because it is not universal; for the act of knowledge depends in becoming and being conserved upon the agent,

but habit does not thus depend; yet neither disposes to substantial form. Then intelligible species made by the agent intellect do not depend in being conserved upon it, and yet they do not dispose to substantial form. Furthermore, figure, heat, and other similar qualities do not dispose to substantial form and are permanent qualities, which do not depend upon any cause conserving effectively. Finally, that qualities dispose to form or do not dispose seems irrelevant for depending upon their agent in being conserved.

14. Why motion depends upon the agent in being conserved. Others therefore think the reason should be given only from the intrinsic nature of such qualities or effects, because evidently they are such that they essentially or connaturally include dependence upon such a cause. This reason needs explanation, lest the whole matter seem to be referred to the hidden nature of the thing, which is not so much to give a reason as to confess ignorance of it. For it is true that this dependence is founded in some special condition or nature of such effects; and I think it does not arise from the same root in all, but according to the nature of each effect the reason for such dependence should be sought in it. And so in motion the reason is easily given why it always depends upon an actual agent, because evidently its being is not so much being as becoming; because therefore becoming cannot be without acting, therefore neither motion without a mover. And this reason proves concerning all dependence insofar as it is such; for it is either a certain becoming or it is conservation itself. And therefore through itself it essentially or intrinsically depends upon the agent, and such dependence upon such an agent.

15. Why immanent acts. And hence also the reason is easily given concerning immanent acts, if, as many wish, they are only actions and not qualities; for every action through itself is essential dependence upon the agent. But, because every action has its term, and every dependence is the dependence of something, therefore as we more truly suppose these acts to be certain qualities depending upon their potencies. And the reason is very well given from the

nature of such qualities; for they are essentially vital acts, which for informing require a faculty influencing into them, hence, because they naturally cannot be except by actually informing their proximate and intrinsic principle, therefore also they naturally cannot be except that they actually are from it. This reason ceases in habits, and otherwise habits imitate potencies; for they are with them principles of acting, and are given for disposing and helping the potencies themselves; and therefore by their nature they are permanent and independent from the actual efficiency of the potencies themselves.

16. Which intentional species depend in being conserved upon agents, which do not. But concerning intentional species the reason cannot be given from their general nature, since we see that some depend in being conserved upon their proximate agents, but others not at all. And therefore the reason can be given either from final cause, because some are instituted for knowing only in the presence of objects, but others so that they may be retained in memory, or further from these diverse ends it can be understood that species of external senses are very imperfect, and are quasi instruments conjoined to their objects, and therefore by their nature depend upon their action in being and being conserved; but other species, whether sensible or intelligible, are of more perfect nature, and therefore are more independent.

17. The same question is treated concerning physical qualities. But concerning other physical qualities, about which alone St. Thomas seems to have spoken in the cited places, his reasons are probable; for these qualities either dispose to form or follow upon it. Those which dispose, because by their nature they precede form, therefore they can at least in a remiss being precede such form, and consequently also they can remain without it; but those which follow upon form cannot be unless they either remain intrinsically from it or depend upon an agent having such form actually. We can add furthermore another general reason, that qualities of one species never depend in being conserved upon qualities of the same species, for the

reason made above concerning univocal causes. And therefore it is very probable that light and the light of the sun differ in species. But a quality which is sometimes made by another superior and distinct in species is sometimes such that, properly speaking, it can be made by another of the same species. And then, although it is sometimes made by a superior quality, it does not depend upon it in being conserved. Because since by its nature it does not seek emanation from that superior cause in order to be, there is no reason why it should depend upon it in being conserved, although it is made by it, according to the doctrine given in sect. 1, explaining the reason for doubting. And hence it is that heat, although made through the action of the sun, is conserved without its action, because it is naturally disposed to be made by another heat. But when a quality is such that in an alien subject it can never naturally be made, except by a superior quality existing connaturally in a superior agent, then it is a sign that it depends upon the agent in being conserved, because, just as it absolutely needs that emanation in order to be, so it requires similar influx in order to remain in being; and therefore light in air is not conserved without the presence of the sun or another which agrees with the sun in the nature of light. And this reason, although under other words, Cajetan indicated defending the reason of St. Thomas, I, q. 104, a. 1, dub. ult., and it can be applied to all effects, both substantial and accidental.

The First Arising Doubt

18. But still two difficulties remain: The first is because every quality depends on some proximate agent in its coming to be and in being conserved; hence also in the case of heat, when the action of fire ceases, God applies another action by which He alone conserves such heat, as we said above, which action is such that it is equivalent to the action which fire had with the common concurrence of God; hence that action would per se be sufficient to produce that heat, if it were

not already produced, because through that action alone God gives being to such heat as a sufficient cause of that being. Therefore, whenever the action of a proximate cause ceases, the effect cannot be conserved unless God supplies the activity of such a cause; therefore either every effect depends in being conserved on its proximate cause, or none does, because if in every proximate cause God wishes to supply its absence, the effect will never depend in being conserved on such a cause. Or finally, a reason must be given why God conducts Himself in some effects such that when proximate causes cease He Himself continues (so to speak) their conservation, while in others He does not do likewise. Or why the nature of the thing requires that one effect be said to depend on its proximate cause in being conserved, and not another.

19. It is resolved. To this difficulty, it can be answered by denying that God applies as much efficacy to conserve without fire the heat produced by fire as would suffice to produce heat without fire, if it were applied from the beginning, but only that power which God applies to concur with fire suffices afterwards to conserve the heat produced by fire. And because similar efficacy would not suffice to conserve without the sun the light produced by the sun, therefore the best reason is given why when fire is removed God continues (so to speak) the conservative concurrence of heat, but when the sun is removed He does not continue the conservative concurrence of light. For if, when the proximate agent is removed, it were always necessary for God to apply greater power, no reason could be given why that greater activity should be owed to the effect, or certainly why it should be owed more to one than to another; just as we correctly understand why the rational soul is conserved by God when separated from the body, but not the soul of a horse, because indeed the same activity of God, which suffices to conserve the rational soul united to the body, suffices to conserve it when separated, which is not so in the soul of a horse. But truly, if to conserve the rational soul outside the body it were necessary for God to apply a greater concurrence by which He

would supply the lack of the conjoined body, no reason could be given why such greater concurrence should be owed to the rational soul, or why it should not also be owed to the soul of a horse; for He could also conserve that outside the body by applying greater concurrence.

20. But this response neither takes a true foundation nor satisfies from it. For first, it seems impossible that God by His power alone should conserve a form in matter, whether that be heat or any other material form, and yet that there should not intervene there a dependence or action that is total and per se sufficient to give being to such a form, if from the beginning and other things being equal it were to be induced into such matter. For, as has been shown, conservative action is not per se distinct from productive action; but that action in the character of conservation is total and complete, and from a sufficient power; therefore it is per se sufficient for the production of that form, if it were not supposed to be already produced. Likewise, because heat, for example, cannot have or retain being except as given by an intrinsic cause sufficient to give such being and operating as such. And in this respect the same reasoning applies to the first instant in which being is received and to any other in which it is conserved, as is evident from the discourse made in section 1. But as long as a form is conserved, it retains its whole being; therefore it receives that from some cause, as per se sufficient to give such being; but it receives that for that instant from God alone in the character of efficient cause, for we suppose it to be effectively conserved by Him alone; therefore God then acts as a per se sufficient and total cause, not now only in the genus of first cause, as when He concurred with fire heating, but simply in the genus of efficient cause even proximate; therefore He applies greater efficacy to such conservation than to the production which was made through the medium of fire.

21. Add that the prior concurrence and action, at least in the production of the whole heat, was made successively, but conservation perseveres wholly at once through the mode of indivisible action; therefore it is done in another way and from greater efficacy. Finally, if

in heat we were to admit that it is conserved by God alone without greater concurrence than He applied with fire, why could not light be conserved in the same way in the absence of the sun through equal concurrence? Or, if it can be, why is this not owed to it just as to heat? Therefore the same difficulty remains, even when the other principle is admitted. And the reason which is given in that opinion will have place even if we suppose (which is true) that God conserves each thing through complete and total activity of it, in the sense explained, when He conserves it by Himself alone.

22. Therefore the reason for the difference, which is required in that difficulty, must be taken from the principle established in section 1, that sometimes an effect flows from its cause by reason of its being considered absolutely and precisely, but sometimes only by reason of such a coming to be, which coming to be nevertheless is not adequate to such being, either simply or according to the connatural order. Therefore when an effect flows from its second cause in the prior way, then it does not require to be conserved by God in the absence of its cause. But when it flows in the posterior way, conservation is owed by reason of the being itself already received, because since such being per se does not express an order to another cause, it connaturally requires to be conserved by any cause, even by the first, to whom it belongs to conserve whatever has been made according to the connatural mode. But it is otherwise when the order to the proximate cause is entirely per se from the force of such being; for then to change that order would not be connatural, nor could it be owed to the thing having such being. Hence heat (and the same is true of any similar form) does not require to come to be and receive being from another heat, or another similar proximate agent, by reason of its being precisely considered, because no form which can per se come to be from a univocal agent expresses per se dependence on another from the force of its being, as has also been proven above; but only regarding coming to be does this dependence intervene from the order of natural causes, which does not extend to the conservation of

all things. And therefore heat is of itself indifferent to being conserved by any universal agent; and this is owed to it from the force of its being, after it has once received that. But light is such a form, which from the force of its being requires emanation from light as connatural to it, hence it cannot be produced by a univocal agent; and therefore without any emanation it is not naturally owed to it to be conserved by the superior cause alone. And in every other similar quality depending in being conserved on a proximate agent, there will be found some natural property from which it is permitted to conjecture that such a form from the force of its being requires emanation from such a proximate cause, as has been declared above and is most evident in vital acts. And in every material form (so that by this we may respond to a certain example to the contrary put forward above) such a mode of entity is found that from its nature it requires an efficient cause as operating from a presupposed subject, and therefore it does not require to be conserved by God outside the subject. Which happens otherwise in the rational soul, which for receiving being does not require action from a subject, and therefore separation from the body does not prevent it from naturally requiring to be conserved; therefore that example is not similar, and thus it seems the whole proposed difficulty is satisfied.

Another Doubt to be Noted

23. The second difficulty is whether between dependence of an effect in coming to be only, or in being conserved simply, there is given some middle dependence, according to which a form indeed remains for some time when the action of the agent ceases, but gradually fails and finally perishes completely, if the action of the agent is not repeated. For St. Thomas, in the cited places, seems to think thus about accidental forms which dispose toward substantial forms and before they arrive at the perfect grade, in which they are joined to their forms, the action of the agent desists: For then (says St. Thomas) the

quality remains for some time, but not always, as is evident in heated water, which returns to its nature. And he gives the reason according to the principles declared above, because such an accidental form is conserved by reason of the substantial form; if therefore the action reaches to the production of the substantial form, the disposition will be conserved simply and always; but if the action remains only inchoate, the disposition will be able to be conserved for some time, nevertheless not always. A second example can be about habits, which do not so depend in being conserved on acts that they immediately perish when the act ceases; according to the opinion of some, however, they so depend that through the cessation alone from acts they are gradually diminished, and if it is great, they are completely corrupted. A third example, and more difficult for me, is about the impetus impressed on a stone thrown upward; for it does not immediately cease to be as soon as the activity of the thrower ceases, as is evident per se; for it is impressed for this purpose that it should remain for some time after the contact of the impeller; and yet afterwards it gradually ceases to be by itself without any action of a contrary agent, and is finally consumed.

24. It is explained. Nevertheless this mode of dependence is most difficult for me to understand, because when the action of the agent ceases the dependence of the effect on it ceases, because action and dependence are the same, and only differ in the connoted relations, as has often been said; therefore if when dependence is removed the thing made still remains in its being, either for one instant, as much as is from the force of the lack of such dependence, it will remain perpetually, if it is not destroyed from elsewhere. The consequence is evident, because there is no greater reason for one instant than for any time. Which I declare secondly thus; for if when the action of the agent ceases the form made is conserved for some time, therefore for that time that form no longer receives being from that agent by whom it had been made; therefore it is necessary that it be conserved in that time through another action of a superior agent

per se sufficient to influence that being, according to what was just said in the proximate difficulty; therefore from the force of that action, speaking per se, it will be conserved for any time, nor can a reason be given why that action of the superior agent should per se cease. Thirdly, even if someone should imagine that other conservative action, speaking per se, ought to have ceased, no reason can be given why it should cease by parts or gradually, because this is nothing other than that form being successively corrupted; but no natural cause can be given of this succession. For just as a form does not come to be successively as to intensification, except when it is made by one contrary with the resistance of another, so it does not cease successively, except when it is corrupted through the action of a contrary agent, itself resisting; but when it is corrupted through the cessation of the agent cause, it ceases by reason of such cessation; if therefore the agent has entirely ceased from its action regarding the whole form and all its grades, who can cease successively? Or why will one grade cease before another, since the action of the agent has ceased equally in all? But if some succession is going to be, the prior grades should cease first, because the action of the agent had ceased first regarding them, if it had produced them successively; but this cannot happen, since the prior ones are the foundation of the posterior ones.

25. These reasons therefore seem to prove that there is no middle between a cause in coming to be only or entirely in being; for if the cause is such that when its action ceases the effect cannot subsist even for a moment, that is the proper cause of the effect in being and being conserved; but if the cause is such that when the action ceases the effect can subsist for a moment, it can also always, as much as is from the force of such a cause; and therefore that is only the cause of its coming to be. And thus those two members are distinguished by immediate contradictory opposition, in which no middle can be found.

26. By what the heat left in water after the action of fire is corrupted. Whether habit is diminished through cessation of act. From the examples brought forward to the contrary, the first two are very easy. For heat in water, when the action of fire ceases, is corrupted through positive action by its contrary, itself resisting, and therefore it gradually perishes. But if we were to imagine either that in water the natural emanation of cold from its form is impeded, or that heat of six degrees, for example, is produced in a neutral subject, from which there would be no contrary action, when the action of fire ceases, then that heat would always remain in the same subject, nor would it cease to be from itself; for, although it is an imperfect disposition to the form of fire, nevertheless, because it simply does not depend on it in being conserved, it could thus always remain, if it were not corrupted from elsewhere. The second example also assumes something false; for through the cessation alone of an act per se a habit is neither corrupted nor diminished, but only by contrary causes which intervene on that occasion, as St. Thomas declared, I-II, q. 54, a. 3, where in the solution to the first he declares that heat ceases through the cessation of what heats in no other way, and tacitly expounds what we have cited from the first part.

27. What is the cause of the diminution of impetus in projectiles. The third example is indeed difficult, for experience itself seems to teach that that impulse is gradually diminished, because from this it comes about that the motion of the projectile is also gradually slackened and languishes. On the other hand, no action of a contrary agent appears, by which it is corrupted. For either that would be the intrinsic form or the gravity of the projectile, and this is not so, because neither is gravity active of another quality, nor is it itself intensified through emanation, just as cold in water, because gravity had not been remitted through the impression of impetus. Or it would be remitted by the resisting medium and impelling in the contrary direction, and this also cannot be said, both because before the projectile begins to be impelled in the contrary direction, the impetus

begins to be remitted, and also because if one impetus were not corrupted except by a contrary, the stone could not cast off all impetus from itself; it is therefore necessary that it be taken away through pure privation. Therefore many deny what this difficulty supposes, namely that impetus is a quality impressed on the projectile, but only the contact of the thrower as it were continued through parts of the medium, as Aristotle seems to have taught at the end of the Physics. Nor are others lacking who think that the very gravity of the projectile itself is the instrument which the thrower uses through mediate contact to impel where he wishes. But these things are also uncertain to me, because I scarcely understand that motion without an impressed quality, as philosophers now more frequently teach. But concerning the mode of corruption of that quality, the philosophers themselves who posit it say nothing, nor do I find anything that satisfies me. We can only say that, although impetus is not corrupted through the proper action of a contrary, nevertheless it ceases in the manner of those qualities which are thus corrupted, because it ceases with a contrary resisting or struggling against it. And so, because that quality is in a contrary and resisting subject to its activity, for which alone that quality is impressed through the mode of an instrument, therefore it does not require to be always conserved there, and because otherwise the subject always resists it and its action, the nature of such a thing requires that there be gradually ceased from its conservation. Nevertheless this is not on account of middle dependence on its agent, but on account of the peculiar nature and constitution of such a quality.

DISPUTATION XXII

ON THE FIRST CAUSE AND ITS OTHER ACTION, WHICH IS COOPERATION OR CONCURRENCE WITH SECONDARY CAUSES

Concerning the concurrence of the first cause with secondary causes for their actions, few things are found to have been said by Aristotle or other philosophers; but this matter is copiously disputed by theologians. And insofar as it can be known by natural reason, it is proper to this place. In this matter, first it must be seen what the necessity of this concurrence is; then what it is; afterwards how it is related to the action of the secondary cause; and finally we shall see whether secondary or created causes have among themselves this kind of subordination, or only to God.

SECTION I

WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN BY NATURAL REASON THAT GOD OPERATES THROUGH HIMSELF AND IMMEDIATELY IN THE ACTIONS OF ALL CREATURES

Section I

1. I said in the title "through himself and immediately," because, from what was said in the preceding disputation, it is constant and certain that, at least remotely and accidentally, divine influence is necessary for the action of any created cause, because at least it is necessary that God conserve in being the creature which operates something; but he who gives being also gives operation, at least remotely and accidentally.

The First Opinion Denying This is Proposed & Argued

2. Reasons for the aforesaid opinion. First. There have not been lacking theologians who denied that God concurs through himself and immediately to the actions of secondary causes. The principal defender of this error is considered to be Durandus, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and dist. 37, q 1, although that opinion was more ancient; for Albert, Henry, and others refer to it. Indeed, St. Augustine, V Genes. ad litter., c. 20, says these words: "There are those who think that only the world itself was made by God, but that other things are now made by the world itself as he ordered and commanded, but that God himself operates nothing." The foundation is that the necessity of this cooperation cannot be established by any sufficient reason, and therefore it should not be asserted, because God does not employ superfluous and hardly necessary concurrence. The antecedent is proven first, because secondary causes are not instruments, but principal causes; for they operate by their own power, and not through any extrinsic motion, whence sometimes they are univocal and make effects similar to themselves; when indeed they are equivocal, they are more perfect and noble causes; therefore they operate with sufficient power; therefore they do not need the help of a superior cause. The consequence is clear, because for producing an effect, power equal to it suffices, or certainly a nobler one.

3. Second. Secondly, God could have made a creature operating an effect proportionate to itself without the help of another; for why does this involve contradiction? No contradiction or repugnance appears; nor is it against divine perfection or power, but rather indicates more the power of God. For, just as it belonged to divine power not only to make creatures, but also to communicate to them a similar power of making, so the same power of God would be shown more if he could communicate to his creatures this complete and entirely integral power of acting; and such it would be if it did not need the help of another for acting. But if God can do this, whence is it established that he has not already done it? Or if he were to do it, in what other way would he do it than by giving the creature power equal to or greater than what is necessary for the effect? But this he has already done.

4. Third. Thirdly, it cannot happen that two agents immediately concur to the same action, unless each of them is imperfect and only partial, which should not be said of God; therefore he does not concur with the creature immediately to its action. The major premise is clear, because either one of those causes acts through the other, or neither does. If the first, it follows that the one which acts through the other does not act immediately, but only through the mediation of the other, and since the creature cannot be said to act through God, God will act through the creature, and thus we are accustomed to speak frequently, namely, that God operates through secondary causes or by means of secondary causes. The best sense of this manner of speaking is that God has given power of operating to secondary causes, and conserves them, and has as it were established them to operate in his place. If, however, the second is said, namely that neither of these causes, that is, neither the first nor the second, operates through the other, it plainly follows that each is imperfect, both because each would act only as a partial cause, and also because without subordination and as if by chance they would come together to act.

5. Fourth. Fourthly, because concerning some created things it is necessary to confess that they are not immediately from God; therefore by parity of reasoning the same should be said about all things which proceed from secondary causes operating with principal power. The consequence holds by parity of reasoning, and the antecedent is proven, first in every action of a creature, insofar as it is action, as for example, the heating of fire; for although we grant that heat, as heat, is immediately from God, nevertheless this cannot be said of the heating of fire as such, because it involves open contradiction. For action, or such action as such, namely the heating of fire, expresses an essential relation to this agent, namely fire; therefore it is impossible for that action, insofar as it is such, to be immediately from God; and yet that action is something in the nature of things distinct from heat; therefore. Secondly, this seems to be said for a special reason concerning free actions, because, if they were immediately from the first cause, they could not be free to the secondary cause itself, both because the first cause, since it is more powerful, would carry the second with it wherever it willed, and the second would not have in its hand and power the influence of the first cause so that it could operate when it willed. Thirdly, there is a most special reason concerning free sinful actions; for it is indecorous to attribute them to the first cause as operating through itself and immediately. A fourth example we can bring forward concerning the effects or causalities of other causes; for these are not immediately from God as from the first cause, as is established, because the modes of causing, especially formal and material, cannot be exercised by the first cause; if therefore matter and form in their genus are sufficient for their own proper causality, why will not any efficient cause be so in its own?

The True Opinion

6. The second opinion is that God acts through himself and immediately in every action of a creature, and that this influence of his is simply necessary in order that a creature effect anything. And this is the true opinion, which is to be more fully explained and confirmed by us. First, therefore, we say that it is so certain that God influences immediately and through himself in every action of a creature, that to deny it is erroneous in faith. This is proven first from the common consensus of the scholastics, who think about this truth as about a Catholic dogma, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 5, and in I-II, q. 109, and III cont. Gent., c. 70; Cajetan and Ferrariensis, there; Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, to the arguments against the second conclusion; Alexander, I p., q. 9, memb. 2, ad 2; Albert, In II, dist. 35, a. 7, where he says thus: "The other opinion has almost ceased from the court, and is reputed heretical by many of the moderns." Likewise Gregory, there, q. 1, a. 3; Scotus, In II, dist. 1 and 37, q. unica; Bonaventure, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1, where he says this opinion should be held without any ambiguity; the same, In I, dist. 45, a. 2, q. 2; Hervaeus, tract. de Aeternitate mundi, q. 1. Secondly, the same can be proven from the common consensus of the saints, who teach this truth as contained in the divine Scriptures, whom, because this is not our office, I shall briefly indicate. Augustine therefore, when he had related those thinking the contrary in the place cited above, adds: "Against these is brought forward that saying of the Lord: 'My Father works until now'"1. And below: "Then, because he works not only great and principal things, but also these earthly and lowest things, thus the Apostle says: 'You sow a naked grain, but God gives a body as he wills, and to each seed its proper body.'" The same Augustine proves the same thing extensively, in Ep. 146 to Consentius, where he adduces other testimonies of Scripture, such as that: "Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you," Jeremiah 1; and that: "If God so clothes the

[1] Joan., 5, ubi lege eumdem Aug., tract. I; Cyrill., et Chrys., et Nazianz., quos ibi refert Tolet. Similia testimonia sunt Iob, 10; II Machab. 7; Ps. 144 et 146. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 599.

grass of the field, which today is and tomorrow is cast into the furnace," Luke 13. The same Augustine, lib. IV Genes. ad litter., c. 12, where he adduces that from Acts 17: "In him we live and move"; and lib. IX, c. 15, he adduces that from I Corinthians: "Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but he who gives the increase, God." Prosper, Sentent., 281. Likewise Gregory, XVI lib. Moral., c. 18: "All things (he says) which have been created, can neither subsist nor be moved through themselves; but they subsist insofar as they have received that they should be, they are moved insofar as they are disposed by hidden instinct." And the rest of the Fathers, wherever they treat of divine providence, suppose this truth as most certain.

7. Secondly, it must be said that this truth can be sufficiently proven by natural reason. And first it seems evidently inferred from what was said about conservation, so that for this reason also it is held almost as certain in faith that God immediately effects all things as that he conserves them. The first inference is proven first because, if not all things are immediately made by God, therefore neither are they immediately conserved, because things stand in the same relation to being as to becoming. For neither can the being of a thing depend on an adequate cause more after it has been made than when it was being made. Likewise, because if a cause depends on God in being, therefore so does the effect, because each is a being by participation; therefore, just as the cause depends in the instant in which it acts, so the effect in the instant in which it is made, because also in that instant each is a being by participation; therefore every effect of a secondary cause depends on God in becoming, and consequently a secondary cause can do nothing without the concurrence of God. Finally, because otherwise it follows that sometimes things would not even mediately depend on God in being conserved; for if heat produced by fire depends on God only through the mediation of the fire producing it, when the action of fire ceases it will no longer depend in any way. Perhaps Durandus will respond that the effects of secondary causes, as long as they are made or conserved by them, are only made or

conserved mediately by God, but when the action of the secondary cause ceases, then God alone immediately conserves the effect, even if it was immediately produced by the secondary cause alone, because no created thing can either have or retain being without some efficient cause; and therefore, as long as the secondary cause immediately effects, that suffices; but when that ceases, in order that the thing remain in being it is necessary that God effect by conserving, just as we also say, when the secondary cause ceases, the first applies greater force and efficacy.

8. But first, according to this response, the truth demonstrated above about God's conservation is limited to immediate conservation or to mediate, which is alien to all sound doctrine. Otherwise, when God is said to be creator of all things, it could be limited that he is so mediately or immediately. Then, supposing that opinion, it is not said consequently that, when the action of fire ceases, God begins to conserve heat, both because, if heat does not depend on God in operating, why should it depend in being?; and also because heat produced does not depend in its being on the heat producing it by reason of being itself, but by reason of such becoming, as was declared and proven above; therefore, although the action of heating fire may cease, there is no reason why the action of a superior cause should be necessary in order that that being be conserved. Especially because, according to that opinion, heat, in order to be absolutely and simply, does not depend essentially on God, but at most remotely and accidentally; but the necessity of conservative action arises from the intrinsic and absolute dependence which a thing has on such a cause in order to have being, as was explained above.

9. And hence the first inference is proven secondly, because if God does not influence immediately in every action of a creature, therefore the created action itself, in order to be, does not essentially require through itself the influence of God, although it too is some participation of being; therefore there is no reason why the form which is made through such action should require for its conservation

the actual influence of the first cause, because neither does it require this by reason of its becoming, according to that opinion, since the becoming itself is not immediately from God; nor by reason of its being, especially from the fact that it is participated being; but this reason is not considered sufficient in the action itself, according to that opinion; therefore neither will it be sufficient in the form or term of the action.

10. Thirdly, the same deduction can be made thus, because created beings depend on God no less insofar as they are agents than insofar as they are beings, because they are subordinated to God no less in one respect than in the other, and just as they are beings by participation, so also they are agents; but insofar as they are beings, they are entirely dependent on God intrinsically and essentially; therefore they depend similarly insofar as they are agents; therefore while they act, they depend not only because they are conserved in being by God, but also because in the very acting they require through themselves and immediately the influence of God. And this is what Aristotle sometimes says, that in agents subordinated through themselves, the lower cannot act without the influence of the higher, lib. II Metaph., c. 2, VII Phys., c. 1, and lib. VIII, c. 5.

11. Fourthly, the same argumentation from conservation to cooperation can be confirmed by proportional reasoning; for, just as God can deprive a created thing of its being through the sole negation of action, so he can deprive a created thing of its natural action through the sole negation of concurrence; therefore, just as from the former power the immediate dependence in being is evidently gathered, so from the latter the immediate dependence in the action itself is gathered. The antecedent (to confess the truth) is not evident by any natural experiment; but from supernatural effects it is sufficiently evident; for God deprived the Babylonian fire of its action, with no external impediment; therefore he did this through subtraction of concurrence; for in what other way could it have been done? And this is signified in Wisdom 11, when it is said that fire

forgot its own power, because clearly it could not exercise it without God. And this is through itself very consonant with divine power, that he should have in his hand the actions of all, just as he has the being of all.

12. A fifth reason is very probable, because a secondary cause cannot determine itself to an effect in the individual and in particular, because its faculty is always indifferent to many individuals, and is not sufficiently determined by the subject and circumstances; therefore the cooperation of the first cause is necessary, which by its will can determine it to a singular effect. Concerning the foundation of this reason, what was said above in disp. V, when the principle of individuation was treated, can be seen.

13. Lastly, there is an excellent reason because this mode of acting in all things and with all agents pertains to the amplitude of divine power, and on God's part supposes perfection without imperfection; but on the part of the creature, whether we consider the secondary cause, or the action, or its effect, although it expresses imperfection, nevertheless that is absorbed in the very concept of creature or participated being insofar as it is such, as the reasons given declare. And otherwise, in this way there is a perfect and essential subordination between first and second cause, and there is nothing that is repugnant, as will easily be clear from the solutions of the arguments; therefore this general influence should not be denied to God. Whence neither does it seem to have been entirely ignored by the philosophers, as we touched upon concerning Aristotle's mind in the 3rd reason; and in the book On Causes, which is considered to be either Aristotle's or Proclus's, there are various propositions by which this truth is signified, which we shall treat in what follows. Plato also for this reason called secondary causes instruments of the first, because they depend on its concurrence in acting, as is taken from Damascus, in his Philosophy, c. 9; and Simplicius, II Phys., text. 29, and others. Trismegistus is also referred to, in Dialog. Crater., saying that God, present everywhere, always acts all things; and other similar

things. And Philo of Alexandria, in the book That the World is Incorruptible, saying that God assists all parts of the world by cooperating.

The Foundations of the First Opinion are Resolved

14. To the first argument the antecedent is denied; for the reasons given sufficiently declare the necessity of this concurrence. Nor do we therefore deny that created agents are principal in their own order, as was declared above in the divisions of efficient cause. But it does not follow, if they are principal causes, that they are also independent in acting, because much greater perfection is required for this latter than for that former, as is evident through itself. When therefore it is said that power equal to the effect suffices for acting, first we can respond that it suffices in the nature of proximate cause2, but not simply. Then we say it suffices with due proportion; for, just as the power itself is dependent, so it suffices for such action, but not independently; and therefore besides it, it is necessary that the first cause influence, on which all things essentially depend. But someone will infer: therefore whenever any form depends on its cause in being conserved, it also depends in operating. It is responded that this must be said in the last section of this disputation; now the consequence is denied, because from a created cause there is not dependence so essential and quasi-transcendental as from the uncreated.

15. To the second it is responded that it involves contradiction that a creature be powerful for acting independently of the creator, both on the part of the created cause itself, which necessarily has power of acting commensurate and proportioned to its being, and on the part of the effect or action flowing from it; for, since those are beings by participation, they essentially depend on the first being. Wherefore, just as it does not pertain to divine power to

[2] proximae, 1960; primae, 1605 (M. Sonn. Paris 1605). "No tiene sentido la sustitución de proximae por primae." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 603.

produce a being independent of itself in being, so neither to produce an agent independent of itself in acting; indeed both equally are repugnant to divine perfection and to the imperfection of the creature, as has been sufficiently declared.

How God Immediately Concurs

16. The third argument is entirely about the mode of speaking rather than about the thing. And first, in it is inquired whether God should be said to act immediately to the action of a secondary cause. And indeed from what has been said it is plainly established that it must necessarily be confessed that God influences immediately in some way, and also mediately in some way. For he acts mediately insofar as he gives and conserves the power of acting to the secondary cause which proximately acts. And in this way it is true that he acts through it, and that he created it for this purpose, that he might communicate the office of acting with it; but he acts immediately because also the first cause itself through itself and by its power influences such action or effect. But because mediate and immediate influence seem to involve some repugnance between themselves, therefore certain theologians distinguish concerning immediate action by immediacy of power or immediacy of supposit, and affirm that God acts by immediacy of power in all actions of creatures, but not by immediacy of supposit. Thus thinks Ferrariensis, III cont. Gent., c. 70, whose mode of speaking certain modern Thomists imitate. And St. Thomas seems to favor this in that c. 70; for responding to the first reason to the contrary, he says: "It is not inconvenient that one action proceed from a lower agent and from God, and from each immediately, because the one is in one way and the other in another way." But the reason is that it is repugnant for two to operate immediately by immediacy of supposit; but the secondary cause acts immediately by immediacy of supposit; therefore the first does not act immediately in that action. The major premise is clear, because to act

immediately by immediacy of supposit is that between the supposit acting and the effect no other supposit intervenes.

17. Nevertheless, this distinction is not necessary in the present matter, and that mode of speaking is not to be approved, because it does not clarify the thing, and is so equivocal that it can induce an erroneous sense. For in created things those are said to act by immediacy of power, and not of supposit, which touch the patient or effect through power diffused from themselves, but not through their supposit, which it is wrong to attribute to God. Simply therefore it must be said that God acts with all created agents by immediacy of power and supposit. And since we agreed in the former part, concerning the latter it must be noted that a supposit can be said immediate either in acting or in existing or in local distance. As, for example, if the opinion of Scotus were true, that the sun immediately generates gold in the earth through its substantial form, it would indeed act by immediacy of supposit or immediacy of action, as I may say, because action would immediately proceed from that supposit, but it would not act by immediacy of supposit in existing3 or in place, because it would be far distant from its effect.

18. God therefore necessarily acts wherever he acts through immediacy of the supposit locally or in being, both because through his immensity he is necessarily present everywhere, and also because action proceeds per se and immediately, not only from created power, which can be called a kind of power diffused from God, but also from uncreated power, which is in God himself. But an agent that operates in this way through its own power is necessarily present there where it operates. Hence for this reason God is said to be in all things through essence and through power; and therefore also from the action of God, supposital presence is best inferred, as was said above.

19. Again, if there is discussion about immediacy of the supposit in acting, God is also a supposit immediately acting in the action of a creature. I prove this first from the reason just given; for

[3] essendo, 1960; alit. agendo. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 605.

that action does not proceed immediately only from power diffused from God, which is created, for this would be to fall into the opinion of Durandus; therefore it proceeds immediately from uncreated power existing in God himself; therefore he also acts through immediacy of the supposit. The consequence is clear, both because then the supposit is said to act immediately as the principle which acts when through power inherent to itself it so acts that from that power action proceeds immediately as from a principle by which; and also because the divine supposit is its own power; therefore action cannot proceed immediately from power without proceeding immediately from the supposit, as St. Thomas concludes, In I, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. Second, between God and action, as it is from him, no other supposit mediates; therefore that action is from God through immediacy of the supposit. You will say that between the primary cause and the effect a secondary cause mediates. It is answered that, speaking formally and properly, the antecedent is false, because it is one thing for a secondary cause to cooperate with the primary, another thing to mediate between the primary and the effect. The first is true, but the second is false, considering the primary cause according to this relation according to which it per se influences the effect, because as such that action expresses a relation or dependence to the primary cause as immediately and per se as to the secondary.

20. Therefore, to act immediately through immediacy of the supposit does not exclude the partnership of another acting supposit; otherwise, if two lamps produce the same light, neither would act through immediacy of the supposit; indeed, neither would a secondary cause act in this way because it does not act without the partnership of the divine supposit. But if you say that God acts as a superior and universal cause, but the creature as an inferior and particular one, and that through that immediacy of the supposit the partnership of any supposit is not excluded, but only of that which is inferior and subordinated in acting, which Ferrariensis seems to intend, this is strictly speaking false (although perhaps we labor in

equivocation), because being an immediate supposit in acting does not exclude subordination and subjection of another, but only mediation in acting. Indeed, this immediacy of the supposit in acting under one aspect does not exclude that under another it might act mediately, concurring to action in two ways, as St. Thomas declared about this very concurrence, I, q. 105, a. 1. Nor do the words quoted from III cont. Gent. oppose this, for when St. Thomas says "in one way and another" he does not understand immediacy of the supposit or power, but action, as made from a secondary cause dependently, or from the primary independently.

21. Hence it is also established that, although God, insofar as he gives the power of acting to the secondary cause and conserves it, and institutes it for acting, can be said to act through it, nevertheless, insofar as he immediately cooperates with the creature, he does not properly act through it, but through himself and through his own power and virtue. Nor does any imperfection follow from this of those things that are inferred in that argument from the fact that each cause, primary and secondary, concurs immediately through itself to the effect. For the first general inconvenience was that such agents would be imperfect. However, the consequence is denied, but only that will be imperfect which from intrinsic condition and nature needs the help of another, which therefore properly depends on another in acting; but the other will not be imperfect; for, as St. Thomas rightly said, III cont. Gent., c. 70, it comes not from insufficiency of power, but from the immensity of his goodness itself that he has communicated the power of acting to creatures, and therefore wills to produce such effects not through himself alone, but with them.

22. Another inconvenience was that such agents would be partial. But if this is understood on the part of the effect, it does not follow, because part of the effect is not made by one cause and part by another, but the whole effect is from each in its own kind, as St. Thomas notes above. But if it is understood on the part of the cause, there can be a certain diversity in the manner of speaking; for some

concede the consequence, because considering absolutely the integral effective causality necessary for that effect, neither of those causes applies the whole of it, but from the concurrence of both arises integral causality; and therefore they are said to concur partially on the part of the cause; which is not an imperfection in God, because, as we have said, this is not from insufficiency, but from his goodness. But others think the consequence should be denied, because since those two causes are of different orders, they are not properly said to compose one total cause, but each is an integral cause in its own order. This manner of speaking, because it is both more common and more apt for indicating the inequality and subordination of these causes, seems more to be approved.

23. The third inconvenience was that such causes would come together to act without subordination and as if by chance. However, this does not follow, for since one depends on another, subordination is not lacking. Indeed, sometimes there is usually subordination with some mutual dependence; for an instrument, especially when conjoined, depends in acting on the principal agent, as a pen depends on the writer; yet the writer himself also depends in some way on the pen, insofar as he cannot write without it. And that dependence can be called a priori, because it is from a moving principle, but this a posteriori, for the contrary reason; always, however, that which depends on another a priori is subordinated to it. In the present case therefore, the secondary cause depends on the primary a priori and essentially, because it is insufficient by itself to do anything without its help, but the primary cause properly does not depend on the secondary, neither a priori nor a posteriori, because, although according to that mode of acting by which it accommodates itself to concur with the secondary cause, it cannot alone effect such an effect, nevertheless it is absolutely entirely independent and powerful to effect by itself alone all the being that it effects through the secondary cause. Therefore between these causes there is not only subordination, but also most essential and most perfect subordination.

But when the primary cause always acts from certain knowledge and its will, and according to the order instituted by itself, it cannot be said to come together with the secondary cause to act by chance, but by supreme providence.

How God Concurs with Material, Formal, & Final Causes

24. Fonseca's Opinion. To the fourth reason, it is denied that there is anything in things that is a true and real being that is not immediately from God. But to the first three examples, it must be denied that any action, whether natural or free, good or bad, insofar as it is real action, is without the primary immediately concurring; concerning which much must be said in what follows. But truly concerning the fourth example Fonseca wove a lengthy disputation, V Metaph., q. 12, contending that God is the primary cause in every genus, immediately concurring with the secondary to its effect or causality. But one thing in this matter seems to me most clear and needing scarcely any discussion; another, however, I do not grasp at all, which Fonseca seems to have intended in that whole question.

25. The first of these is that God, by effecting, immediately concurs with all causes to their causalities. In which sense not only secondary efficient causes, but also material and formal, are subordinated to God and depend on him not only in being, but also in causing. Which is nothing other than that when matter causes, God not only concurs by conserving the matter, but also by effecting the very causality of matter, whatever that may be, and also by effecting the effect of matter, giving effectively that being which matter gives materially; and the same is proportionally true of form, indeed also of the end, insofar as its causality can be something real, as we shall see below. And the reason is evident from what has been said, because whatever is real must be immediately from God's efficiency; therefore both the causalities and effects of all causes are necessarily

immediately from God's efficiency. In which sense can rightly be understood of every secondary cause what is said in the lib. de Caus., in princ.: The primary cause helps the secondary upon its operation.

26. But the other thing is that God not only as primary efficient cause, but also as primary material cause and as primary formal cause, concurs with matter and form to all their causalities, so that those causalities, even as they are from God, are formally diverse from the effective. I omit formal4 and exemplary causality; for in these this is probable, as I shall explain below in their proper places. In the said sense therefore speaks the said author, who explains this of matter and form, not insofar as they compose the composite, for in this way the imperfection they include is so clear that it is evident that that mode of causing cannot be formally attributed to God, but of the causalities that matter and form mutually exercise among themselves, while matter sustains in being the form depending on it, or the subject sustains accidents, and conversely form contains matter in being; for these causalities, taken per se and absolutely, do not include imperfection on account of which they cannot formally belong to God.

27. Which he confirms by other reasons, but all, except the last, prove only our first assertion. But the last is because God by himself alone supplies these causalities of matter and form, as is evident in the quantity of the Eucharist; and we have said that God can conserve matter without form; but he cannot through effective causality alone supply the causalities of such causes; therefore, while he supplies the causality of matter in the conservation of quantity, he retains the same genus of causality; therefore he can also concur within that genus with matter to such causality. The minor, in which is the force of the argument, he proves because the causality of one genus is neither formally nor virtually contained in another genus. And God himself, although he eminently contains all causalities,

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[4] formalem, 1960; alit. efficientem. "formalem está sustituida por efficientem en algunas ediciones." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 610.

nevertheless cannot, insofar as he has the nature of one cause, exercise the genus or nature of another. Likewise, because one cause cannot supply the place of another unless by exercising the office that the other exercised. Furthermore, because if God sustained accidents without matter and did not supply its office, there would be given in the nature of things an effect in act without a cause in act. Then, because if God conserved, for example, the form of heaven without matter, by efficient concurrence alone, either that would be the same as before, and this cannot be, both because through the same concurrence only the same can be made, and also because now the causality of matter concerning that form would be supplied by no causality; or it is through a new effective concurrence, and this cannot be, because concerning the same effect no new efficiency can be added to the old, or creative concurrence to creative.

28. The Aforesaid Opinion is Disproven. If anyone, however, considers what we have said above about the causality of matter and form, he will immediately understand the difficulty of this opinion and will dissent from it, not only because it is new and beyond received dogmas about God, but also because it is false and supported by weak foundations. For first, none of the theologians or philosophers attributes to God according to propriety any other genus of causality except efficient, final, or exemplary, as is evident from those things that St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 44, and which are treated there. But I say according to propriety, for according to metaphor it is sometimes attributed to God that he is as if the form of all things, and that he vivifies all things, or even that he sustains and is the foundation of all things, in which way Dionysius[5] sometimes seems to speak, who is vainly twisted to another sense. This is so true that theologians for this reason deny that the divine Word exercises any proper causality by terminating humanity, because since it cannot be effective, in that it is not common to all persons, they evidently judged that none follows; for that it is neither final nor exemplary was self-evident. A similar

[5] In VIII, IX et X de Divinis nominibus.

argument is that, besides the goodness by which God has the power of causing finally, and the ideas through which he has the power of causing exemplarily, we do not acknowledge in God any other power of causing ad extra, except omnipotence, which is only effective power, whether that is executive power rationally distinct from will and intellect, or one of those, or all together. Therefore to add to God another power of causing ad extra, sustaining, for example, form besides efficiency, is unheard of. Which nevertheless in that opinion, speaking consistently, is necessarily admitted.

29. Moreover I argue by reason, because every causality of matter (and the same is true of the causality of form) formally includes imperfection. And the reason is because neither in the composite nor in the form does matter cause anything except through intrinsic and formal union of one to another, not merely as through a condition only required, but as through the very formal causality itself, as was proved above; but God cannot cause through formal union in this way, as is self-evident; therefore neither can he concur through proper and formal causality of that genus; but by the very fact that causality is not made through union, it is neither material nor formal, and therefore it can in no way happen, as we also said above, that matter cause form not united to itself. Finally, that mode of God's causing ad extra can scarcely be conceived without efficiency, because neither in the effect is there anything with respect to God except its being and action, nor does it depend on God except through action, nor does action as action express a relation except to the efficient, although, as ordered to such a term or such a form, it can regard final or exemplary cause; what therefore is that other causality which is called sustentation? Clearly it is something fictitious and least necessary. For divine causality is most amply contained in those three modes. Nor because every cause gives being must the mode of any cause be formally attributed to God; otherwise, because matter and form also give being to the composite, God would have to give being within the same genus of material and formal cause, which is most absurd. From

this therefore that every cause gives being can only be inferred that God immediately gives that being, either in that or a higher mode. Likewise, from the fact that every secondary cause depends on God not only in being, but also in causing, it does not follow that it depends in the same genus of cause, but either in that or in a nobler one, that is, the effective.

30. The Foundation of the Aforesaid Opinion is Overturned. To the last reason therefore to the contrary, the minor is denied; for God can by effecting supply, concerning form, the sustentation of matter or subject. To the first proof it is responded that God through his power of acting contains eminently the effects of other causes, and can in his perfect way cause what others cause in their imperfect ways, without them, where essential dependence does not intervene, as exists between composite and matter or form. Nor therefore do we say that God through eminential containment of matter exercises the causality of matter, but supplies something by effecting what matter would cause by subjecting itself. Hence to the second proof it is responded that, although one created cause cannot supply the office of another except within the same genus, God nevertheless can in another, where special repugnance does not intervene. Nor therefore is an effect in act given without a cause in act, but with the genus of cause changed. To the last proof it is responded that when an accident is conserved without a subject, this happens through new efficiency, not by adding it to the old, but by changing one into another. Hence if the form of heaven were conserved without matter, this would indeed happen through an influx creative from its genus; but the prior would not remain, because it was not properly creative, but co-creative of form and having some agreement with the eductive. Whether truly in the same way one must philosophize about matter conserved without form, has been treated at length above.

SECTION II
WHETHER THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FIRST CAUSE WITH THE SECOND IS SOMETHING BY WAY OF PRINCIPLE OR ACTION

1. Since it has been shown that this concurrence of which we are treating proceeds from the first cause, or belongs to it insofar as it is efficient, it is evident that it can be nothing other than action or a principle of action, understanding under the principle of action both the principle per se and every condition prerequisite for acting; for besides these things, nothing is found in an efficient cause, as efficient, that could have the nature of concurrence. For we suppose that neither the agent subject as such is the concurrence, nor the effect as such. For the subject is like the first principle acting, while the effect is the ultimate term of the effecting; but concurrence denotes something by way of influx or tendency from the agent subject to the term.

The First Opinion Is Proposed

2. Three ways of speaking about this question can therefore exist: The first is that such concurrence is something by way of a principle per se. This can be understood in two ways: in one way, that such a principle is in God himself. And this, when rightly explained, can have a true meaning; yet we do not speak of it now in this sense. For God concurs with the creature through his will toward its action. Hence the very volition of God can in its order be called the concurrence of God with the creature, which is called by some the concurrence ad intra; but the act of God's will is in its way a principle per se of every action ad extra, a principle (I say) per se, either by reason of itself or by reason of the executive power which it applies to acting, either according to reality or also according to reason,

according to various ways of thinking about God's executive power. Thus therefore God's concurrence ad intra will be something by way of a principle of action, not in the creature, but in God himself. But now we do not speak of concurrence in this sense, but insofar as it is something flowing from God and received in the creature, and concurrence in the strict sense does not signify something ad intra, but ad extra. Therefore this opinion is understood in another way, that concurrence is a certain thing flowing from the first cause and received in the second, completing it ultimately and determining it to effect such an effect. And for this reason this concurrence is said to be by way of principle, because it is the power of acting of the second cause, or at least formally completes it. And on account of this power all second causes are said to act in virtue of the first, as is often said in the book On Causes; and conversely by reason of the same power the first cause is said to act by immediacy of power, because this power infused into the second cause is the power of the first cause, and action proceeds immediately from it. And this seems to be the entire foundation of this opinion. Nevertheless, I find no assertor of this opinion who has expressly taught it, although those whom we shall immediately cite for the second opinion seem sometimes to favor this one and to speak quite indistinctly.

The Aforementioned Opinion Is Refuted

3. But this opinion is false, and in one sense is equally erroneous as Durandus's opinion denying the actual concurrence of God to the actions of second causes, while in another sense it is merely improbable. Therefore the concurrence of the first cause can be understood in two ways as being a power impressed upon the second as a principle per se of acting. In one way, that the concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature consists in the influx of that power and does not concur more immediately to the action of the second cause itself. And in this sense I say this opinion in reality falls

into Durandus's opinion and is equally false, insofar as it denies the immediate concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature; but insofar as it posits something superfluous and without foundation, it will be more improbable, as I shall show in the other member. Therefore the aforementioned censure is proved, because from that opinion it follows that only the created power is the principle per se of the action and effect of the second cause, while God is only a remote and per accidens principle. But this is the opinion that is reproved in Durandus. The consequence is clear, because a cause that only gives to another the power to act, if it does not otherwise concur to its action, truly concurs only remotely and per accidens, just as fire that heats water does not otherwise concur to the second heating proceeding from the hot water; and the agent intellect that produced the intelligible species will not be said to concur per se to the act of understanding. Finally, in that way Durandus also says God concurs to all actions of creatures, giving to them and conserving the entire power of acting up to its ultimate complement, whatever that may be. For whether that principle of acting is given prior in time, before the creature acts, or in the same instant or time in which it acts, makes no difference. Otherwise, because the sun illuminates in the same instant in which it is created and receives the power of illuminating, it would not need another concurrence besides the infusion of light. Similarly, whether that power is connatural and permanent, or whether it is given extrinsically by God and is quasi-transient (as some speak, and it is nothing other than being dependent on God in becoming and being conserved), matters little so that God, if he acts through that power alone, might per se and immediately influx as first cause. Wherefore, if perhaps some authors in this sense said God acts by immediacy of power and not of subject, they erred greatly, as is evident from what has been said and will be declared more presently.

4. In another way, the concurrence of the first cause can be understood to be by way of principle and infused power, because in the conferring of this power it is as it were begun, yet it does not rest in

it, but proceeds further up to the action of the creature itself, so that not only the power communicated to the second cause, but also the divine and uncreated power itself might immediately influx into that action. And according to this sense it should not be said that concurrence is only something by way of principle, but also something by way of actual influx or action. Then that multiplication of things in such concurrence is improbable, for we speak per se and precisely of the concurrence necessary from the force of the dependence of every effect and action on the first cause. Hence we suppose the second cause has complete power of acting in its order; for if the second cause itself is incomplete and imperfect, it will indeed need a complement of power; yet that need does not arise from the dependence that the second cause has on the first, but from imperfection in the latitude of the second cause. And in this way it is true that sometimes God, at least supernaturally, supplies the imperfection of the second cause by adding the power of acting, which he does especially with us when he infuses supernatural habits; yet this is outside our purpose, because that infusion of power does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to the elevation or perfection of the second cause through the action of the first. Speaking therefore of a second cause perfectly constituted in first act in its order, it is impertinent to add another principle of acting received in it, because, by the very fact that it is something created, it pertains to the order of second causes, and thus principles of acting in the same order are multiplied without cause or necessity. And against this concurrence thus explained the arguments of Durandus made in the preceding section rightly proceed.

5. The Evasion Is Confuted. Perhaps they will say that this power which the first cause gives to the second so that it might concur with it does not pertain to the causality of the second cause as such, but to the causality of the first cause, because it is as it were its proper instrument for concurring with the second, and therefore, although that power is received in the second cause, the second cause does not act through it, but God does, just as although impetus is received in a

thrown stone, the stone does not move itself through it, but he who threw it. Hence, just as the thrower is said to move immediately through the impulse, so also God will be said to concur immediately through this power, which immediacy, speaking per se, is of power, not of subject. And similarly, although the power of the second cause is said to be completed through this power impressed by the first, yet not with a complement pertaining to the order of the second cause, but adding the power necessary on the part of the first cause.

6. Nevertheless this response either returns to the prior sense completely reproved, or says something per se improbable and impertinent; for if that power is so said to be God's instrument that God's action consists in effecting it, but afterwards it alone concurs with the second cause to its action, just as in the example that is adduced the action of the thrower consists in the impression of impetus, but then the motion is from the impetus, if this (I say) is said, we return to the prior sense, and thus it happens that the action of the creature expresses no immediate relation to the uncreated power of God itself as to its principle per se, which was reproved in the preceding section, against Durandus. But if besides the influx of that instrumental power God is also said to immediately influx by his own proper and uncreated power into the action of the second cause, it immediately appears per se how impertinent that instrumental power is which holds itself on God's part, for there the divine power is intimately present through itself, and on account of its eminence is sufficient and proportioned to influx through itself into the action; indeed it must necessarily so influx that any action can be made by the creature; therefore on God's part that instrumental power is not necessary; therefore it contributes nothing to the concurrence of the first cause, which is per se necessary and pertains to the essential subordination of the second cause with respect to the first.

The Second Opinion Is Proposed

7. First Foundation of the Related Opinion. The second opinion is that the concurrence of the first cause is something by way of principle in the second cause itself, ordered to its action, yet not as a principle per se of it, but only as a necessary condition for acting. Thus all seem to think who posit that God's concurrence is concerned with the second cause antecedently to its action, applying it or determining it to action. And this opinion is usually attributed to St. Thomas, in places to be treated below; but undeservedly, as I shall show; Capreolus is also usually cited, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, but equally unreasonably. But Ferrara, II cont. Gent., c. 70, in the beginning, distinguishes in created agents a twofold power of acting: one firm and permanent, which is proper and natural; the other he calls an intention of divine power having incomplete being, and he says this does not belong to things except when they actually operate as instruments of divine power. And at the end of § Ad secundum dubium, he says God immediately acts in all inferior causes a certain participation of himself, with which he simultaneously immediately attains their effects; because the power itself existing in God and his intention produced in inferior causes is received as one power; just as the art (he says) which is in the mind of the artificer and his intention received in the instrument are received as one power. And through this power he says God applies second causes to operating, just as an artificer applies instruments. In which words he seems partly to allude to the prior opinion, partly to this posterior one. But he is moved by no reason to posit this intentional power, but only by a certain testimony of St. Thomas, q. 3 de Pot., a. 7, and some later Thomists have followed this opinion. And they found it on certain received expressions of the ancient philosophers. The first is that second agents do not act unless moved by the first, and in this they constitute the per se subordination between these causes; and thence they conclude that one must arrive at one first agent, not needing motion from another. Thus Aristotle seems to have proceeded, VII Phys., c. 1, and lib. VIII, c. 5; and II Metaph., c. 2, whom St. Thomas always imitates, both in

expounding Aristotle and in other places immediately to be cited, and from Augustine, lib. VIII Genes. ad litter., c. 20, and V de Civ., c. 9. Indeed Sacred Scripture seems to attribute to God the premotion of inferior causes, as Job, 13: "Who changes the heart of princes"; and Prov., 12: "The heart of the King is in the hand of God, and wherever he wills he will turn it"; Jer., 10: "It is not in man his way, and the steps of man will be directed by the Lord." Therefore second causes act when moved by the first; but this motion cannot consist in the very action of the second cause, both because motion is in the thing that is moved, but transient action is not in the agent from whom it is made, and also because this motion precedes action at least by causality, because second agents are moved to this end that they might act, since they cannot act unless moved.

8. The Second. The second principle is that the second cause is applied by the first to acting. This is thought to be taken from the book On Causes, proposition 16, where it is said that divine power is the power of all causes; because, namely, divine power applies the remaining powers to their operations, as Giles explained, Quodl. V, q. 1, and St. Thomas signifies, I, q. 105, a. 5, in the body, and ad 3. For in the body he says the first agent moves the second to acting, and according to this (he says) all things act in virtue of God himself. But in the solution ad 3 he declares this is so because God not only gives and conserves the powers of acting, but also applies them to acting. But the necessity of this application is among others one, because it pertains to the power that regards the universal end to apply inferiors in order to their end; but God is the supreme agent regarding the universal end; therefore he applies inferiors so that they act accommodated to that end. Therefore this application is not the action of the creature; for it is from God alone and precedes the action of the second cause; it is therefore compared to the action of the second cause as its principle.

9. The Third. The third principle is that the first cause excites the second to work; which way of speaking is not as frequent among

ancient authors as the name of motion or application. Yet it seems to have the same force. And it can be declared in this way: that created power when it acts is in some way perfected in itself, because it is better to act than to be entirely without action; but this perfection does not consist in the action itself, especially in transient action, since it is not in the agent itself; therefore it consists in this excitation by which such power is as it were ultimately actuated to acting. But this excitation cannot be from the created power itself, both because it is often not active upon itself, and also because for that efficiency it would also need excitation; it is therefore from the first cause.

10. The Fourth. The fourth and principal principle is that the second cause is determined by the first and per se and necessarily needs such determination. Thus St. Thomas thinks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3, saying: "This very fact that second causes are determined to determinate effects, is theirs from God." But a twofold reason for this necessity can be brought forward; one is universal to all second causes, because, namely, their powers are indifferent to producing various individuals, nor can they determine themselves to this individual rather than to that; nor can any other sufficient determinant be conceived besides the first cause. But this determination is not made except by adding something to the active power itself. The other reason is proper to free will, which of itself is indeterminate, not only to individuals, but also to species and to contrary acts, and therefore needs a predetermining cause, because from an indeterminate agent a determinate effect cannot proceed. And this reason can be extended to universal natural agents, which also are indifferent to several specifically diverse effects, whence they cannot determine themselves to one of them.

11. The Fifth. The fifth principle is that second causes are essentially subordinated to the first cause, as instruments to an artificer, as grave authors frequently speak and particularly St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3, and II cont. Gent., c. 21, a. 4, and indicates in lib. III, c. 70. But this subordination cannot be understood unless the first

cause premoves the second, and the action of the second depends on the motion of the first. Otherwise there would not be subordination, but a certain concomitance of two agents. Nor would the action of the first cause be prior to the action of the second cause; which plainly contradicts the dignity of the first cause and the dependence of the second cause.

12. The Sixth. Sixthly we can argue because this way of the first cause concurring, using the second cause through its motion, and thus perfectly subjecting it to itself, displays a certain greater perfection in the way of acting of the first cause with seconds, and includes no repugnance; therefore it is to be attributed to the first cause. The major is declared in various ways: first, because for this reason there is greater dependence of the second cause on the first, because not only in its effect and action, but also it itself depends in causing on the first; or, as others say, not only the effect or action taken simply; but also this complex thing, that the second cause acts, will be from the first. Or otherwise the first cause will not only make the effect or action of the second cause, but also will make that the second cause makes; which is also often attributed to God in Sacred Scripture, and cannot be understood without that premotion. Again conversely it pertains to the perfection of the first cause that it use seconds for its ends and according to its will, as having supreme dominion over them; for the perfect act of dominion is the full use of the thing that falls under dominion. These are the strongest reasons that can be brought forward for this opinion. Of which the first two seem most to favor this second opinion, but the third and fourth seem to proceed more according to the prior opinion; but the fifth and sixth are indifferent.

The Preceding Opinion Is Refuted

13. But this opinion is not more to be approved than the preceding; nor do I think it was the opinion of St. Thomas or Scotus

or the ancient theologians. To prove this, I note that this posterior opinion also has place according to the two senses declared above[6]. The first is that the concurrence of the first cause is judged to consist wholly and precisely in acting, around the cause itself, that necessary prior condition, whether by the name of motion, or application, or by whatever other name it may be called, so that besides it the first cause has no other efficiency around the effect or action of the second cause. And neither Ferrara nor modern authors seem to have intended this sense, as can be gathered from the last words of Ferrara cited above. And truly such an opinion would be in this sense no less false than Durandus's opinion, because according to this explanation God would not concur per se to the action of the second cause, but only remotely and per accidens, namely by conserving the second cause and effecting in it a certain necessary condition for acting; but this concurrence is per accidens with respect to the effect of the second cause, as is clear in one who applies fire to burning. For if one who gives and conserves the principle per se of acting, and does not concur further, only remotely and per accidens causes the effect flowing from that principle, much more one who gives the required condition for acting; whence one who does both will concur in a twofold way per accidens, yet in no way per se. Concerning this sense therefore it is not necessary to dispute more; rather from it I elicit that, even if we grant that God effects that application or prior condition, the concurrence of the first cause does not consist per se and formally in it; for the first cause through its concurrence is the per se immediate cause, and total in its genus, of the effect and action of the second cause, as was demonstrated in the first section; but through the efficiency of this necessary condition God is not the per se and immediate cause, much less the total cause, of the action or effect of the creature; therefore the concurrence of God does not formally consist in this efficiency.

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[6] this posterior opinion... declared above, 1960; ... according to this posterior opinion have place two senses declared above, ed. J. B. Colosino. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 623.

14. It remains therefore that we examine another sense, namely that the concurrence of the first cause is begun (so to speak) from this motion or application of the second cause, but is consummated in the immediate and per se effecting of the very effect or action of the second cause itself. In which sense we say that opinion discrepancies extremely indeed from Durandus's opinion, but adds something to the truth that is neither necessary nor sufficiently intelligible, and can provide occasion for falling into some error, especially concerning the use of human freedom. But so that we might prove all these things distinctly, we must proceed gradually, declaring and proving the third and true opinion.

Resolution of the Question

15. First conclusion. I say therefore first: divine concurrence, insofar as it is something external (ad extra), is per se essentially something by way of action, or at least by way of a certain becoming that flows immediately from God. I explain the individual parts: for I say "insofar as it is something external" so that I may omit the disputation concerning the very act of God's will, whether it should be called concurrence or not, and whether it should be said to influence by way of action or by way of principle; for regarding this sense, what has been said above concerning creation suffices. And for nearly the same reason I said "or at least by way of a certain becoming," so that, namely, I may abstain from that question whether the action received in the creature is compared to God by way of action or only by way of effect; for although it is more true that it is compared by way of action, as I shall also touch upon in the following section, nevertheless it does not matter for the present. And thus the conclusion, having been explained, is most widely received and most certain to me, and sufficiently proven from what was said in the superior section against Durandus and in this section against the related opinions explained in the first sense.

16. And it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 5, and III cont. Gent., c. 70, insofar as he says that the first cause through its general concurrence influences per se and immediately not only into the effect, but also into the action of the second cause; because not only the effect, but also the action of the second cause has something of participated being, and for that reason it is necessary that it flow immediately and per se from the first being by essence. From this principle the reasoning is thus concluded: God's concurrence is intimately and per se included in the very action of the creature, and per se also and immediately tends toward the same terminus toward which the action of the creature tends; therefore per se and essentially it is something by way of action, or the becoming of that very action, or of the effect of the creature. And it is confirmed; for this concurrence cannot consist in all that or in that alone which is given to the second cause by way of principle so that it may be able to operate; therefore it consists essentially in something that is by way of actual becoming.

17. The antecedent has been proven against the superior opinions, and is again thus declared: given any entity that only concurs by way of principle, it does not imply a contradiction that action or effect does not follow; for God can suspend any created principle of acting, however much applied to acting with all prerequisite conditions, from actual action, and prevent the effect from being made. But truly, given actual concurrence ad extra, it implies a contradiction that action does not follow or that effect does not come to be; therefore it is an evident sign that actual concurrence does not consist per se and essentially in those things that are by way of principle, but in something that is by way of action. The major premise seems evident from the terms themselves, because in them no repugnance or implication of contradiction is involved. And it is certain from faith that God has done this in many powers operating by natural necessity, nor is there greater reason for repugnance in some than in others. Unless perhaps someone might say this is specially

repugnant to the intentional power which they say is impressed by God and is quasi transient or influential, which comes from this: that it has being inseparable from actual operation, just as the power of art impressed on an instrument is inseparable from the operation of art; for Ferrariensis, above, likens that power to this. But certainly, if such power is inseparable from the actual action of the second cause, even by the absolute power of God, this sufficiently declares that it is not a thing distinct from that action, and consequently is not a principle of it, but the actual emanation of it from the first cause. Or conversely, if that power is supposed to be a thing distinct from the action of the second cause and a true principle of it, it is denied without probability that God can bring it about that it exists and action does not flow from it, because power does not depend essentially on the action that flows from it, but conversely, and it is in a thing distinct from action and prior to it; what therefore is repugnant to its being conserved without that action? Likewise, given that power, the immediate influx of God is still necessary for action to follow, which has often been proven; therefore God can suspend that influx, and thus impede the action.

18. Nor does the example of the power of art impressed on an instrument help anything, for that power cannot exist except either as an impetus impressed on the instrument for moving it locally, or as the motion itself. But truly the impetus can be impeded from effecting motion, as the reasons made prove; nor do I see what stands in the way to the contrary. But motion itself cannot be impeded from the actual moving of the instrument, because with respect to that it is not compared as power, but as the very action or becoming. But if from the instrument thus moved some other action distinct from the motion and its terminus is naturally apt to follow, to which the motion of the instrument is compared by way of principle or power, all that action is separable from such motion by divine power, for the same reason. But that, given actual concurrence ad extra, the action of the second cause is not separable, is by common consensus and is evident, because that concurrence is not separable from some terminus and

effect of the first cause; for if it is concurrence ad extra, something outside God is made; but this must necessarily be made by the second cause; otherwise that would not be concurrence with the second cause, but the action of God alone. Whence the very name "concurrence" sufficiently declares the inseparability from the action of the second cause. Therefore concurrence is essentially something by way of action or becoming, as it is from the first cause.

19. Second conclusion. I say secondly: the concurrence of the first cause, beyond that which is by way of action, does not include from intrinsic necessity anything newly impressed upon the second cause itself that would be a principle of its action or a condition necessary for it. I say "newly impressed," because it is certain that the concurrence of the second cause presupposes in it the power of acting given and conserved by the first cause, which we here suppose, and we inquire what beyond that is necessary to be added on the part of the first cause.

20. This conclusion therefore can be taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, a. 1, 2 and 3, where for the actions of second causes he says only two things are required, namely, intrinsic connatural power (for he speaks of natural actions, of which alone is our discourse in this whole disputation) and the concurrence of God, which there he calls the motion or help of God moving; but why he calls it thus, we shall see below. But that by that term he understood nothing else is evident, both because otherwise he would have omitted what is per se and maximally necessary, and also because then not only two, but three things would be necessary for the action of the creature, namely, its power, motion and concurrence. And thus Cajetan seems to have understood it there, saying that help of God moving is his cooperation. Who teaches the same opinion, I, q. 14, a. 13, and q. 19, a. 8, where explaining that axiom: "A second cause does not act unless moved by the first," he says it should be understood not of previous motion, but of motion intrinsically cooperating with the very action. And he adds: "But such is the cooperation of the first cause,

concerning which it is written that it reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly, cooperating with each according to the manner of each." The same is the opinion of Scotus in various places, but especially In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult., where he says the second cause is not said to act in the power of the first because then it would receive something from it, but because it has the order of an inferior to it, and he adds: "From these things it is evident that there is no new influence of the first cause into the second cause properly so called, which would be the creation of something inhering in the second cause, but the influence there is the determinate order of these causes in producing the common effect." The same thinks Almain., tract. I Moral., c. 1; and Gregory, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12, where he declares that God's concurrence consists only in the partial co-efficiency of God, insofar as it is from the essential subordination of the second cause to the first; which I note because from another standpoint he requires for good acts a special premotion of God, concerning which elsewhere; the same, In II, dist. 34, ad 8. Capreolus also, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 cont. 2 concl., where referring to Gregory's opinion, approves it, and says: "S. Thomas agrees, I-II, q. 109, in nearly every article." Gabriel also, In II, dist. 37, a. 3, dub. 2, imitates Gregory. I shall refer to others in the following section.

21. It is proven by reason first, because through this actual concurrence of God by way of action, as has been explained, every essential dependence is preserved, both of the second cause on the first in causing, and of its action in becoming, and also of the effect in all its being. Likewise by reason of this concurrence it is true that the first cause immediately and per se effects all things, and whatever else concerning it as causing all things is either believed by authority or can be proven by reason; therefore it is superfluous to feign anything else. The antecedent is sufficiently evident from what was said in the prior assertion, and more clearly in the solutions of arguments. But the consequent is proven, both because nature abhors whatever is superfluous, as Aristotle also testifies, I de Caelo, c. 4, and in other

places; and also because the reasons made in the preceding section for the opinion of Durandus prove that only that efficiency of the first cause should be joined to the second cause for its action, which per se would be necessary for the essential dependence of every entity or real mode on the first being; and finally because otherwise there would be no end, but given any thing, one could add another, and just as beyond actual concurrence others require motion, others completion of power, someone could postulate those three things, and another according to his judgment could add some fourth thing, as is sufficiently evident per se.

22. The second reason is that nothing can be required as a per se principle, nor even as a necessary condition of a per se principle; therefore in no way; therefore the concurrence of the first cause as such requires nothing by way of principle, but only by way of action. The consequents are clear from sufficient enumeration. The major has been sufficiently proven by refuting the prior opinion. But the minor is to be demonstrated by the same or proportional reasoning. For, just as the second cause in its order can be complete in the power of acting, so it requires certain and determinate conditions necessary in the same order for acting, all of which we suppose it to have when we dispute precisely about the necessity of the concurrence of the first cause. For if any of those is lacking, it will indeed be necessary, if that cause is going to operate, that that condition be first added through the efficiency of the first cause, either alone or with another second cause; but that necessity is not from the force of concurrence or dependence on the first cause, but from a particular defect. Therefore just as a cause complete in power does not need another complement of power, so a cause complete in the conditions prerequisite for acting in its order requires no new condition as a prerequisite. But to say that beyond those conditions known to us, which second causes can acquire per se or through other second causes, they require some other hidden condition, which they can have from the influx of the first cause alone, just as it has been said gratuitously, so it is easily

despised, since it rests on no authority or reason of any weight or moment.

23. Whether and how second causes are applied by the first to acting. The objection is resolved. But further we can positively show that no such condition can be devised by reasoning through those four things that were touched upon in the arguments made above. For first this condition was called the application of the second cause to acting. But we suppose every application known to us already made; but this application consists either in some local motion, or in vital or animal action, as when the final cause is applied through cognition or the motive power through appetite. Whence it happens that, just as this application consists in some real action, so it cannot exist without the efficiency of the first cause, ordinarily indeed through second causes, extraordinarily however through itself. But truly beyond these, what other application could there be? For if it is real efficiency, it will be real motion or change of the second cause. What terminus therefore does it have? Not local, nor of another genus outside quality, as seems evident per se. Nor can it be any quality; for if that quality is given as a power of acting, then it is not only a condition, but a per se principle of action, and the reasons made above return. But if it is given so that it effects nothing, it is irrelevant to acting, nor can a reason be given why it is called a necessary condition. You will say it is necessary to join the second agent to the first, as an instrument to the principal cause. But these and similar things, which can be said in words, cannot be explained in reality, because that conjunction is neither any real union nor more intimate presence, but only a certain new effect, whose function and necessity for the action of the second cause we are investigating.

24. Nor indeed can it be said that the terminus of that change, which is called application, is the very action of the second cause, both because one action is not the terminus of another, as I shall say more broadly in the following section; and also because that application is a change in the second cause itself, but its action is often in what is acted

upon; and finally because that application is said to be a condition previous to action; therefore its terminus is also previous; just as therefore in the second cause there is nothing real that can terminate such change, so neither is there such application that would be something real in it previous to action.

25. In what way the first cause moves the second. In another way that condition was called the motion by which the first cause moves the second to acting. And concerning this motion the same reasoning can be made about what terminus it has, and consequently to what species of motion or change it belongs, because it is necessary that every real motion tend toward something and exist in some species; but such motion is not local, because it is not necessary for second causes to be changed locally whenever they act; concerning motion toward quantity the matter is more certain; but concerning change toward quality the reasoning proceeds in the same way as was made concerning application; but beyond these there is nothing that can be made through that motion, as will easily be evident by reasoning through all genera of beings. Nor indeed can that motion be terminated per se to the very action of the second cause, both for the reasons made concerning application, and also because otherwise that motion would not be a condition prerequisite for that action, but would be an intrinsic way to that action, since that action is said to be the proper and immediate terminus of that motion. From which it will further result that, just as that motion is said to be from the first cause alone, so also its terminus, for the terminus is from the same cause from which is the way; therefore if the action of the second cause is the intrinsic terminus of that motion, it will be from the first cause alone, which involves open repugnance; for how is it the action of the second cause, if it is from the first alone? But if it is said that the action of the second cause is not the intrinsic terminus of that motion, but rather extrinsic or remote, necessarily another intrinsic and proper terminus must be assigned; but that none can be assigned, the reasoning made by us sufficiently shows.

26. How the power of the second cause is excited by the first. Third, that condition was called excitation of power. Which if it is posited to be made through true and real action of the first cause into the second or into its power, some change will be made in the cause through that action, concerning which the whole argumentation just made will proceed. But if that excitation is not through true and real action into the second cause, then nothing is done in the second cause that would have itself by way of principle, which we intend. And moreover it remains to be explained by those authors cited above by us, who require such excitation, how the excitation of power is made without action or through extrinsic denomination, as they call it, and what is the necessity of such excitation arising from the first cause alone, beyond all that which can be arising from the second cause. And so that this may be understood more fully, note that excitation of power to operating is most properly found in powers of the soul, but is extended in some way to some natural powers, which do not act unless their subjects are first altered, as pepper does not heat unless it is ground, and an odorous thing often does not emit odor unless it is first heated.

27. This previous alteration therefore is usually called excitation of power by metaphor; but in truth it is either completion of power through an added quality or application or disposition of the agent so that it may be able to emit from itself some vapor or exhalation through which it acts, as when an odorous thing is rarified through heating, it can more easily exhale odor, and so concerning others. But excitation of the first cause cannot be similar to this natural one through previous alteration, because neither is completion of power always necessary in the second cause, as has been shown, nor also any material disposition; for in many second causes it is not necessary, as is evident in fire heating, sun illuminating, and angel moving heaven, and where it is necessary, it usually happens through other second causes, nor does it pertain to the subordination of the second cause with respect to the first.

28. But excitation of powers of the soul happens in two ways. In one way, by the object, either in the genus of efficient cause, as in cognitive powers, or in the genus of final cause, as in appetitive powers. And by this genus of excitation it is also evident per se that the first cause does not excite the second from the force of general concurrence, because many second causes are not capable of objective excitation; but those that are capable are not always moved by the first cause as by an object. Nor does the first cause from its general office have the function of applying exciting objects except by concurring with second causes. But truly for works of grace God does indeed excite men in a particular way; nevertheless that excitation does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to supplying or helping the imperfection of some second cause; concerning which genus of divine excitation theologians dispute particularly in the matter of grace. In another way excitation happens concerning powers of the soul through a certain quasi-moral efficiency, through the natural sympathy that they have, from the fact that they are rooted in the same essence of the soul, with subordination among themselves, which is also usually called motion or application of one power by another, in which way the motive power existing in muscles is excited or applied through appetite, and the will is said in this way to move all powers of the soul. But neither does this genus of excitation have place in the second cause with respect to the first, both because it intrinsically includes a vital mode of operating, and also because it requires the conjunction of the moving and moved faculty in the same radical principle. And thus all modes of excitation that we can explain or attain seem to be excluded; but to feign some other ineffable one, and to seek faith in it, when neither does Christian faith teach it, nor is reason or necessity of it given, is alien to all reason.

29. A certain mode is objected by which God is said to apply second causes. But someone can say that there is found between the first and second cause a certain sympathy arising not from the rooting of powers in the same essence, but from the essential subjection of the

second cause to the first and the supreme dominion of the first over the second. But such sympathy can consist in this: that, when God wills that the second cause operate, immediately by necessary consequence the second cause acts, not because it receives something in itself from the force of that will, but because it immediately obeys by acting, just as the motive power obeys appetite. Through this will therefore God can be said to apply, move, or excite the second cause to acting. And because that willing of God always intervenes in concurrence with the second cause, therefore the first cause is said to concur by exciting the second cause. Nevertheless this mode of speaking, whether it is true or false, does not pertain to the present question; for here we are dealing only with external and transient concurrence; but that excitation explained in such a way is made only through internal willing. Likewise from the force of that will the second cause receives nothing in itself by way of principle or necessary condition for acting, concerning which we now treat. Therefore, in the way in which we now dispute, no excitation is made in the second cause from the force of the concurrence of the first cause alone. But whether that mode of excitation is true, because it is a difficult and necessary point for the completion of this matter, will be explained in section IV.

30. Fourth, that necessary condition was called determination of the second cause through the action of the first. But this is no more probable than the rest, and arguing generally, if this determination is said to be made through true action of the first cause into the second, the arguments made above return, that that action brings change into the second cause, of which change no terminus can be assigned. But specially, this necessity of such predetermination is null in second causes acting naturally, because those by their nature are determined to one thing; which determination indeed they received from God not through concurrence, but through influx and conservation of such nature. In which sense St. Thomas speaks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3. But formally such causes have this determination from

intrinsic nature. Whence under this consideration the second cause is usually said to determine the concurrence of the first to the species of action, rather than to be determined by it, as St. Thomas seems to speak, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, in the body, and ad 3, and I cont. Gent., c. 66, reason 5, where he says: "Second agents are as it were particularizing and determining the action of the first agent." And it is taken from Dionysius, c. 4 de Divinis nominibus, saying that God's action is from itself indifferent, but is varied from the diversity of subjects and causes. But particular causes are said to determine concurrence, not because they effect something previous for this; for what can they do?; nor because God does not determine it[7] by his will, which we shall declare in section 4; but because this cause by its nature postulates this concurrence rather than another, but God accommodates himself to the nature of each, and therefore this determination is also usually said, as it is from the second cause, to be in the genus of material cause. Therefore in these causes acting naturally that previous condition which was called predetermination is not necessary. But if sometimes these natural agents on account of their universal power of acting have some indifference in the faculty of acting on things specifically diverse, speaking naturally and physically, they are always determined to one effect in species, either from themselves or from the concourse of other causes, either material or co-efficient, as was declared above, disp. XVIII, sect. I.

31. How the second cause is determined by the first to an individual effect. Finally, even if we grant (which is probable) that with regard to the singularity of action or effect the second cause is determined by the first, as the nominalists affirm, and in the above it seemed probable to us, it is not necessary to feign that that determination is made through some action of the first cause into the second, namely by adding something to its power; indeed this can

[7] illum non determinet, 1960 et 1605 (ed. Colosino); alit. illum determinet. "Las demás ediciones leen illum determinet, pero nos parece bien fundada la corrección introducida por la de Colosino." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 635.

scarcely be understood in this way, because even that addition will from itself be indifferent to making several similar individuals; for no thing that has active force in some species is determined from itself to effecting only one individual, as is evident by reasoning through all natural powers. But if someone would make a special exception of this entity or power that the first cause adds to the second, he would assert this gratuitously, and without cause will be implicated in many difficulties. For it will be necessary to confess that as often as the action of a natural agent varies at different times, or around different subjects, those predetermining entities that the second cause receives in itself from the first also vary. And similarly, if fire successively heats, it must also continuously receive something in itself and suffer something by which it is determined to that successive action. Finally, either that mode of determination is superfluous, or it must be confessed that natural faculty is sufficient from itself for the specific nature of the effect, but not for its singularity. But that addition gives force to singularity is not intelligible[8] since in the effect, as it is made in reality, specific and singular nature are not distinguished.

32. It must therefore be said that such determination is sufficiently accomplished through the voluntary predefinition of divine concurrence. Thus fire, for example, is indifferent to producing this or that heat, not indeed negatively or privatively, that is, because it lacks complete power in its genus for either, but positively, because it is sufficiently powerful for both in the nature of a proximate cause and is determined to neither; but God by his will has established to concur with it toward this heat rather than another, and this is sufficient for this particular effect to proceed from fire rather than another. Therefore, such a predetermining condition is not necessary, which would be some thing received in the second cause itself.

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[8] non est intelligibile, 1960; alit. quod est intelligibile. "No tiene sentido, en el presente contexto, la expresión 'quod est inintelligibile', que aparece en otras ediciones." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 636.

33. From what we have said concerning natural agents, it is gathered that such a condition is much less necessary in free second causes by virtue of the subordination and essential dependence of the second cause upon the first. For the dependence of a free cause upon the first cause is of the same nature in this respect as that of a necessary cause. Hence if in a naturally acting cause that dependence is sufficiently preserved through concurrence, which consists in action, it will also be preserved in a free cause. Nor indeed is such a condition necessary in it because of the peculiar mode of acting of the free cause, because although the will, for example, which is a free power, is of itself indifferent, when all requisites are posited, to acting and not acting, nevertheless it is truly as powerful for acting as if it did not have the other faculty; conversely, it is as powerful for not acting as if it could do nothing else. Therefore it has complete power for both and for each individually; therefore, just as other agents, through the power they have toward one thing, can accomplish that with common concurrence without that prior predetermining condition, so a free agent, through the power it has toward several things, can exercise some one of them with common concurrence (we speak of acts contained within the order of nature) without that condition. And so far is the peculiar condition and indifference of freedom from hindering this, that rather in this is placed its excellence and dominion over its own action.

34. Hence, when it is said that an indeterminate faculty cannot effect a determinate act or effect, this has place at most in a power so indifferent to several things that it is of itself incomplete and insufficient for individual things, which as such is more a passive and imperfect indifference than an active and perfect one; on account of which such indifference is usually called negative. But truly, when a power is indifferent through complete force toward both of opposites and through dominion over its own act, it can very well, although in first act it be indeterminate and indifferent, effect a determinate effect or second act, determining itself toward that. For this is its proper

force and power, from which it has that it is free; just as also the divine will is indifferent to several objects or created effects, and itself determines itself to some one of them; for the created will has received a participation of this efficacy and dominion, although far unequal in perfection and mode. For the uncreated will is indifferent to several objects outside itself, but not to several acts of willing or not willing, while the created will is also indifferent to several acts. Then the uncreated will is determined without a new act being added, but the created will through a new act. And finally the uncreated will does not depend upon another in its determination, but the created will depends at least upon the concurrence of the first cause; with this however, just as it can will those things which are proportioned to it, so also it can determine itself toward them.

35. Physical predetermination would necessitate the free cause, both as to exercise and as to specification. Hence I add further that the condition which is called predetermination is not only not necessary for the free cause because of its peculiar mode of acting, but even repugnant to it on account of that cause, if it is to operate freely as to both exercise and specification; for the use of freedom as to both parts would be impeded by such predetermination. This is first declared in the indifference as to specification of the act, for since the first cause alone is said to effect this predetermination, the will is only in passive potency to it; hence with respect to it the will is not free, but is passively or negatively indifferent, just as matter is to other forms; for in passive potency as such there is no freedom, as we have shown above. Therefore it is not in the active and free power of the will to receive this or that determination; since therefore it is determined to only one act, it can effect that one and not another, because it cannot effect that one unless it is determined to it, nor can it bring it about that it is determined to another, but this is in the will of the extrinsic agent alone. Therefore it is never proximately and actively indifferent to several acts, or as to specification of the act. This last consequence is evident, because the will, before receiving this predetermination, is

not perfectly and actively indifferent to either act, because if that predetermination is necessary, without it there is not complete power of acting with all prerequisites for acting, as is necessary for freedom.

36. Nor is it in the power of the will to have this determination, or one rather than another; for what will it do for this, when it can do nothing unless predetermined? Or, if it receives determination to willing an evil object, why will it be imputed to it that it does not receive determination to not willing that? For it cannot be imputed on account of some prior act, both because it can happen that none has preceded, and also because that could not have occurred without another predetermination, concerning which the same difficulty returns. Nor can it be imputed on account of the privation of some act, both because the predetermination to that act is not in its power, and consequently the lack of the act cannot be imputed, because universally the first root of not operating in the will, even when other prerequisites are posited, is that it does not receive this predetermination, for if it received it, it would operate; and also because not always does the lack of a prior due act precede a positive evil act, but simultaneously while one is chosen, another is omitted. And finally in that progression one must not proceed to infinity, but must stop at some first acts, one of which the will voluntarily effects, another it omits. And in those it cannot be explained how passive predetermination to one rather than to another is in the power of the will. If therefore such predetermination were necessary, indifference as to specification of the act would be removed.

37. And thence it is further concluded that indifference as to exercise of the act is also removed. For, as has been declared, if that predetermination is necessary, before it is received it is not in the active and free power of the will to exercise such an act, because it is not yet a proximate power, that is, complete and with all prerequisites for acting; there is also no remote active power (so to speak), because it is not in the power of the will to do something by which that condition or predetermination is applied, but it is only in passive

potency to it, which does not suffice for freedom; all of which has been sufficiently declared and proven. Again, when that condition which is called predetermination is posited in the will, it cannot happen that it does not exercise the act; nor can it resist the determination or motion of it; therefore it never has the power of exercising and not exercising the act; therefore indifference as to exercise, which consists in this power, is removed. The antecedent is certain in that opinion which we attack, for this predetermination is said to pertain to the actual concurrence of God. Hence, just as it is impossible for God to concur with the will and for it not to operate, so it is impossible for the will to receive that predetermination and not proceed to work. And this is evident from the very name of predetermination; for if after receiving predetermination the will can not operate, let us suppose it does not operate; therefore then it still remains indifferent to operating and not operating; therefore it needs predetermination in order to operate, and it was false that it had received predetermination.

38. The response of some to our arguments is refuted. Perhaps someone will say that after accepting predetermination the will can indeed not operate, but he will not admit that it will not operate in fact, because although it can, it never conducts itself thus. But this is frivolous and not said consistently. First indeed, because if it can by true power which suffices for freedom, whence can it be affirmed that that power is never exercised? Second, because the connection between that predetermination and operation is so necessary that it is naturally impossible for this to be separated from that; indeed they themselves say it implies contradiction, just as to be simultaneously determined and indetermined with respect to the same thing, or for an agent to move and a patient not to be moved; therefore there is no power in the will to resist the activity of this predetermination, because there is no power in it for the impossible; therefore it is false that, predetermination being posited, it can not operate. Finally, because if the will can not will that to which it is

predetermined, either this is because it can have the opposite act, and this is not so, as is evident from the proof of the prior part, because now this pertains in some way to indifference as to specification; or this is because it can suspend the act, and this also is not so, because the will cannot resist the efficacy of that predetermination. Nor is that subjected to the use of freedom, but rather subjects it to itself, therefore in neither way is that power in the will, and consequently neither is freedom as to exercise.

39. This is also confirmed from the definition of free power given above, namely, that it is of its nature that, all prerequisites for acting being posited, it can act and not act; for in the present case one necessary condition is said to be predetermination made by the first cause, which being posited the will cannot act and not act, but only act; therefore it acts without freedom as to exercise and from necessity. Nor does it matter that that necessity is from supposition, for that supposition is antecedent to every use of freedom and comes from outside, as has been sufficiently declared; but such supposition, if it brings necessity, induces necessity simply and removes freedom, according to the doctrine of Anselm and others declared above. And therefore Scotus rightly said, In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, § Duo ergo, that the freedom of the will is removed if it is predetermined to one thing by some inherent habit; but by the name of habit must be understood whatever by way of principle or first act precedes the second act; for concerning any such thing there is the same reasoning.

40. Hence finally both parts can be thus confirmed, because for the will indifferent of itself to several things to be physically and intrinsically determined to one of them is nothing other than to will that; therefore such predetermination can neither be a prerequisite for willing, nor can it come entirely from outside from the first cause alone; because willing is not in us without us, and although we might grant that this could happen by absolute power, at least it could not happen that that willing would be free, to which the will would relate itself merely passively. The antecedent is proved, because in the will

there is nothing except either second act or first act, nor can a middle be conceived between these; nor has it been discovered by Aristotle or any other philosopher; therefore either that predetermination is a second act, and we call that willing, under which we also comprehend not willing and similar acts; or it is a first act, and thus either it is subjected to the use of the will, and thus does not predetermine it, as is true of all habits existing in the will, or it subjects it to itself and to its necessary efficacy, and thus impedes the use of its freedom. Add that it is unheard of for there to be in the will a first act which is not its habit; and it cannot be declared by any reasoning for what such a first act is necessary, especially in the order of natural acts, as we now speak.

41. I see that occasion is offered here for treating very many difficulties pertaining to freedom of choice, especially those which are disputed among theologians concerning divine foreknowledge, predefinition, predestination and grace, and concerning that especially which consists in efficacious aid. But we have already stated that in this place we deal with nothing concerning supernatural actions nor concerning the efficacy of grace, but only concerning the general concurrence of the first cause with second causes; to which we deny that predetermination is necessary, or that in free causes it can be brought into harmony with the use of their freedom. Nevertheless, it is true that God has eternal foreknowledge of all things that happen in time; because they do not happen without him acting, and he does not act except what he knows, because he operates through intellect; but he knows nothing from time, but from eternity; but that knowledge does not require physical predetermination of causes, but eternal foreknowledge of all things that are in time. Similarly it is true that God can by his eternal will predefine effects consonant with his providence; he can also move the wills of men where he wills, and when, and how he wills; and thus he can also often confer upon men efficacious aids of grace according to the measure of his will; but these do not pertain to general concurrence. How these things happen

pertains to the supernatural mysteries of theology. This one thing we believe, that for all these things physical predetermination of free choice is not necessary, nor anything similar which would harm the freedom of choice; but concerning these things at another time.

42. Whether without physical determination the subordination of the second cause to the first stands. Fifth, it was said that condition was necessary because of the subordination of the second cause to the first, as if true subordination could not be understood without some impression (so to speak) of the first cause upon the second, which would be as it were its use. Nevertheless the arguments made under the name of motion, application, etc., proceed concerning any real impression, or by whatever other word it might be signified. Then, that this serves nothing for subordination, I show thus: for subordination between the second and first cause can be understood in two ways. One is radical or aptitudinal; which consists only in this, that the second cause is not apt for acting except dependently upon the first cause. But the root of this subordination, on the part of the second cause itself is the essential dependence which it has upon God in its being. But on the part of any effect or action which can flow from the second cause, the root is being a being by participation, which cannot be except from a being by essence. For this subordination therefore that action of the first cause upon the second by which it gives and conserves being and the power of acting is indeed necessary; but that suffices, nor is another necessary per se, because by virtue of this the entire root and cause of that subordination in first act is posited.

43. But the other is subordination in second act. But that this also does not require a new action by which the first cause confers something upon the second by way of actual principle, as they call it, I show in two ways. The first is, because this actual subordination is not an intrinsic denomination in the second cause, properly speaking. This is evident because it consists only in this, that the second cause depends upon the first in acting; if therefore acting as such is not an

intrinsic denomination in the acting cause, dependence in acting as such will not be an intrinsic denomination, but extrinsic, consisting in this that the very action of the second cause depends essentially upon the first cause as upon the first and principal source of its being; therefore in order that the second cause, insofar as it is actually acting, be essentially subordinated to the first, it is not necessary that it receive something new by way of principle in itself, because according to this reasoning it is not subordinated as receiving, but as acting; therefore this subordination is posited in the action itself, insofar as it depends essentially upon the first cause.

44. Second, the same thing is declared, for although we admit that the first cause effects something in the second by way of principle, still the second cause, as affected by that whole principle precisely conceived, is subordinated to the first cause only in first act; therefore in action it is necessary that it be actually subordinated through a new dependence in acting, as has been proven above? Therefore the actual subordination of the agent, as it is agent, does not consist in that previous action, which pertains only to constituting or completing the first act; therefore, although it be supposed to be constituted without that action, through the sole effection and conservation of the cause and its power, the integral actual subordination in acting will still remain.

45. Third, this very thing is declared by examples; for heat, for instance, is subordinated to the form of fire in acting fire, not because it receives something in itself from the form while it acts, besides its own entity, but because of the dependence of the action upon those two principles so constituted among themselves that one is under the other, that is, that it be lower than that, and posterior to that, and depending upon that. Similarly in supernatural things, the sacrament, for example, of baptism is subordinated to Christ in acting, not because in actual action it receives something in itself, according to the more probable opinion. And many similar examples could easily be found. Therefore neither by virtue of subordination is it necessary, or

can it happen, that the concurrence of the first cause consists in something which is given to the second cause by way of first act in the very actual action.

The Foundations of Other Opinions Are Satisfied

46. From those things which we have said in proving our opinion, the foundations of the contrary opinion have been answered by force; yet so that we may declare in what sense the expressions of grave authorities are to be understood, and how those expressions and denominations are preserved with concurrence alone consisting in action, it will be necessary to respond to individual points one by one.

The Axiom Is Explained: "The Second Cause Does Not Act Unless Moved by the First"

47. To the first therefore it is said, first, that axiom "the second cause does not act unless moved by the first," understood in that sense that the cause, besides its being and every connatural power of acting which it has, needs a new motion true and real received in itself in order to act, is false, as has been proven. Nor is it found anywhere delivered by Aristotle in that sense. Hence it is also false that in that principle so understood is founded either the reduction of all motions to the first mover, or of all beings to the first being. For that argumentation is founded either in physical experience and the order of sensible motions or in the proportional dependence of all effects upon their causes, but not in that most hidden premotion, founded on no reasoning. Therefore the physical discourse of Aristotle was that everything which is moved is moved by another, and all motions of lower bodies are in some way reduced to the motion of the heavens, but the heavens themselves are moved by another; and thus, since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at some first mover. But the proportional metaphysical discourse will be that every being which is

not from itself flows from another, and that other, if it is not from itself, is again from another, and since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at a being from itself. And in a proportional way a discourse can be made among agents as such, by virtue of the essential dependence explained by us; for what is not an agent from itself must be reduced to another upon which it relies in acting, until one stops at something which is an agent from itself and relies upon no other. Finally a natural discourse can be made from the sensible motions of the bodies of the universe, through which these corporeal things are so applied to acting or suffering as is necessary for the conservation of the universe; for this is a sign that all these things are governed by one supreme prince; therefore that proposition in the said sense is neither true nor necessary for the aforesaid reductions.

48. Whence the expression concerning the motion of second causes by the first takes its origin. Therefore that proposition contains a certain metaphor and analogy taken from artificial instruments, as Fonseca well noted, lib. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2. For because we see these sensible instruments, which depend upon us in acting and are subordinated to us, do not act unless moved by us, therefore to explain the subordination and essential dependence in acting of second causes upon the first, second causes are said not to act unless moved by the first. But the more proper sense is that they do not act unless aided by the first, or (which is the same thing) as cooperating with the first. Add moreover that it is necessary that the second cause have being given and conserved by the first. And this continuous influx of being itself, or of active power, can be called a kind of continuous motion of the second cause itself by the first. Again, if the second cause needs some new local application or vital excitation for acting, it also has this from the first cause, either operating through second causes, or sometimes from it alone; for it often operates thus, not by virtue of general concurrence, but from some peculiar providence. In this sense Scripture speaks in the testimonies cited there, which therefore are not to the point. And in this sense also it can

be verified in some way that the second cause does not act unless moved; for if it is spiritual, it acts with a previous immanent action which it receives in itself, and thus it is changed; but if it be corporeal, it needs local proximity, which it receives through some motion, either which then occurs, or which has preceded before. Hence some of the cited authorities, especially Augustine, do not say that second causes are moved while they act, or are moved to acting, but that every second cause is so active that it is also passive and moveable by some motion; in which they do not explain some condition which such causes require for acting, but the imperfection and potentiality which they have by their nature. Which is also sufficient for us to understand that one must arrive at some cause which acts in such a way that it can suffer nothing.

This Expression Is Explained: "The Second Cause Is Applied by the First to Acting"

49. To the second, that proposition "The second cause is applied by the first" is to be explained just like that one: "It is moved to acting." And indeed St. Thomas, who seems to have used that expression most, I, q. 105, a. 5, first corrects the very word, because he does not simply call the first cause applying, but as it were applying the second. Then there he makes no mention of another concurrence or motion, but only of that application. Hence what in I-II he called the aid of God moving, in I he called the application of the first cause. And both is nothing other than the actual concurrence itself, lest we say that St. Thomas either was ignorant of this or was silent about it, which is both absurd per se and conflicts with the same St. Thomas, in the said a. 5, ad 2, where from that application he concludes that there is one and the same action of the first and second cause; which is true only because of concurrence by way of action, as will be declared in the following section.

50. Therefore the actual and immediate concurrence of action itself, just as it is called motion by translation, so also it is called application, to signify that it is given by the first cause as by a superior, and is directed and ordered by it to the ends intended by itself, which is a certain kind of application. And this proves the reasoning touched upon in that second argument, and nothing else. And the reasoning of that word or application will be understood more, if we distinguish a twofold application, one previous, as a required condition, concerning which that cannot be understood, as has been shown; the other we can call actual or formal, intimately included in the action itself; for thus, one who begins an action is then said to apply himself to the action; which application is nothing other than the exhibition of that action; therefore in this way the concurrence itself of the first cause is called application; nevertheless that application is not from the first cause alone, but also from the second, with the first aiding, and under this aspect also applying. For under this aspect of application is signified action according to its first emanation from its agent, and therefore, to signify that God concurs to that according to every aspect of it, it is said that God applies the second cause to acting. And these things are sufficient for that expression.

What it Means for a Secondary Cause to Act by Virtue of the Primary Cause

51. Another expression placed in the same argument, namely, that a secondary cause acts by virtue of the primary cause, or that divine power is the power of every acting cause, and other similar expressions which are found in the book On Causes, are explained in the words of St. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 70, where he says thus: "The power of an inferior agent depends upon the power of a superior, insofar as the superior gives to the inferior the power of acting, or conserves it." And below: "It is therefore necessary that the action of an inferior agent be not only from it through its own power, but

through the power of all superior agents; for it acts by virtue of all of them." For to act by virtue is nothing other than to act through power participated from a superior power, and dependently in its action upon the actual influence of that superior. And in the same way divine power is called the power of all causes, because it conserves all and actually assists all. These two things, therefore, are sufficient and are required per se for the truth of similar expressions.

52. It is true that St. Thomas, q. 3 de Potentia, a. 7, adds a third element, namely, the flowing instrumental power which the secondary cause receives from the primary in order to act as its instrument; for he expressly numbers this as distinct from the application and from the efficiency or conservation of the secondary cause itself and its power. I believe, however, that St. Thomas tacitly retracted that doctrine in the Prima Pars, where, treating exquisitely every mode by which the primary cause operates with the secondary, he omitted that power, which he could not have done in the proper and principal place, if he had thought it per se necessary for the concurrence of the primary cause, and similarly in III cont. Gent., c. 70, he makes no mention of it. Nor is the reasoning which he makes in the said a. 7 de Potentia effective. For it is founded on the fact that a secondary cause cannot effect the being of existence except by way of an instrument; which, speaking properly and rigorously about an instrument, is not true, as I shall touch upon in the solution to the fifth objection, and more extensively below, when disputing about the essence of the creature.

53. By what action agents are perfected. To the third objection it is responded that such excitation is fictitious, unless metaphorically the very natural inclination to act is called excitation; but that inclination is not through an action distinct from those by which the secondary cause and its power are conserved and assisted. To the reasoning proposed there, it is responded that created agents, while they act, are not perfected by a perfection distinct from the action itself; nor has any philosopher ever devised any prior

perfection. The action itself, however, is immediately from God himself, yet not from him alone, but together with the secondary cause itself. But if such action is immanent in the agent, it will be its intrinsic perfection; for such an agent has the power to perfect itself, with the due and accommodated concurrence of the primary cause. If, however, the action is transient, the question is whether according to something of itself it remains in the agent, or whether, although it passes entirely into the patient, it is also to be called there a perfection of the agent; about which we shall speak in their proper place, for at present they are irrelevant; for whatever of these is said, the concurrence of the primary cause by way of action suffices for this perfection.

54. Why secondary causes are called instruments of the primary cause. The fourth and fifth arguments, with all that is touched upon in them, have been treated and dispatched while proving the second assertion, except for two points which are suggested in the fifth argument. One is that secondary causes do not act as instruments of the primary cause, which is easy to show, for, although they are sometimes so called to indicate the dependence which they have from the primary cause in operating, nevertheless they are not properly and rigorously instruments, but principal causes in their own order; for they act through proper powers, sufficient in their own order, and produce effects similar to themselves, as St. Thomas noted, q. 24 de Veritat., a. 1, ad 4 and 5; and Scotus, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult.; and above, explaining the divisions of efficient cause, we declared the same. I also omit that in rigorous instruments it is not necessary that, before they act, they receive in themselves from the principal cause something by way of a principle, distinct from their entity, concerning which elsewhere. The other point was about the order of prior and posterior by nature which intervenes between the actions of the primary and secondary cause, about which I shall speak in the following section.

55. In what the perfection of the primary cause concurring with secondary causes consists. To the sixth foundation, the assumption is simply denied, namely that God would concur more perfectly if he concurred by influencing something actual by way of a principle; for greater perfection does not consist in the multiplication of entities, principles or influences, otherwise these would have to be multiplied infinitely; but greater perfection consists in this, that individual things are made in due weight, number and measure. Two things, therefore, pertain to the supreme perfection of the primary cause, as operating and cooperating in and with secondary causes: one is that nothing of power or primary act, or of required condition, which truly is something, should be found in the secondary cause, which is not given and conserved by the primary; the other is that the action of the creature cannot be made without the actual immediate influence of the primary cause. But the multiplication of principles of acting, or of necessary conditions, does not per se pertain to perfection, speaking generally, but such principles are to be added only there, where some special and true cause and necessity, or at least utility, has intervened.

56. How a secondary cause acts from God. To the first proof, therefore, it is responded that it is the same for a secondary cause to depend upon the primary in causing and to depend in its action, or (which is the same) in its causality; for if it depends in its being, and in its whole power, and further in its action and causality, in what else ought it or can it depend? For what is added there about this complex "a secondary cause acting" is nothing new, for a creature to act is nothing other than action to proceed from it. Hence the primary cause, by effecting this action, effects it as proceeding from such a cause. For, although the relation of action to the secondary cause precisely conceived does not regard God as the terminus of that relation, nevertheless, as it is something in reality, it is made by God himself, just as also passion as passion does not regard God, yet it is

made by God; in this way, therefore, for a creature to act is also from God.

57. And the same is true of that expression: "The primary cause makes the secondary cause to make," if the particle "that" denotes nothing other than the conferring of power and physical concurrence necessary for operating. If, however, it denotes a peculiar relation of end, so that it signifies that the primary cause peculiarly intends every action of the secondary cause in particular, this is indeed often true, yet it is not always necessary; for some actions he does not intend, but permits; and then God does not properly make the creature to act in that sense, but permits it to act and cooperates with it as it acts. Hence it does not pertain to the perfection of the primary cause that it concur universally and to all things in that mode, but rather it is beyond his wisdom and goodness. And thus the argument can be turned in the contrary direction, for from the opposite opinion it follows that God universally makes even those who act badly to act; because through his own proper action proceeding from his will alone he determines them to act thus; concerning which reasoning we shall say more in the fourth section. Finally, in another and moral way God is said to make men to act, through illuminations and inspirations, in which way that expression is found in Scripture; yet this does not pertain to the concurrence of the primary cause, but to the order of grace or of special divine providence, the consideration of which is not of this place.

58. How God uses necessary causes. What is finally said in that argument, that it pertains to the perfect dominion of the primary cause to use secondary causes for his own ends, is most true; yet it is falsely and without foundation feigned that this use consists in this, that he always acts around the creature something distinct from it and from its natural power. God can indeed sometimes in this way augment the power of acting, if he wills, or supply whatever may be lacking to the creature; yet, that this is always necessary does not pertain to dominion or convenient use of creatures, but God will use

his creatures more easily, if we understand that he has given them complete powers in their kind and all required conditions, with which, if he himself should wish to add concurrence, they will do what he has decreed; which is to use them for acting.

59. How he uses free causes. Although this mode of using a secondary cause requires something peculiar in a free cause, for that cause, with all prerequisites for acting being posited, and even God's concurrence being prepared in that way which we shall explain in section 4, does not immediately operate one thing determinately, and therefore, if God wishes to use it for some determinate effect, he has a peculiar mode, moral rather than physical, by which he does this. Sometimes properly acting and moving, as in good things, sometimes allowing and permitting, as in evil things. This pertains to that infinite wisdom of God by which he foreknows what a free cause, in whatever occasion and with whatever circumstances, will operate; which to expound further is not of this place. I only advise this, that when God concurs with created will to an evil act, he does not properly use the will for that act (far be it that God should intend that act), but he uses the will thus acting badly for some good, which pertains both to perfect dominion, and to the infinite goodness and wisdom of God.

60. How the action of creatures pertains to God's dominion. From which it is finally understood that the action of creatures does not always pertain to the positive use of God's dominion, but a division must be used; for insofar as that action is from God, it properly pertains to the use of his dominion, because it depends upon his power and freedom; insofar as it is from created will, if it is good and conformed to the will of God, it will also be from the positive use of his dominion, insofar as he commands it or moves toward it; if, however, it is evil, it will be only from negative use, because namely he does not impede it, when he could.

SECTION III
HOW THE CONCURRENCE OF GOD COMPARES TO THE ACTION OF THE SECONDARY CAUSE AND TO ITS SUBJECT

1. The reason for doubting on both sides. Many things are comprehended under this title which are necessary for declaring more precisely what this concurrence of God is, and they can be briefly resolved from what was said in the preceding section, without a multitude of opinions and arguments. The first question is whether the concurrence of God and of the creature are one action or several. For that they are several is indicated both by the multitude of principles and by the order of nature, by which the concurrence of God is considered prior to that of the creature. But that it is one seems to be proven both by the immediate influx of God into the very action of the creature, and by the fact that there is no action to action.

The Action of the Primary & Secondary Cause is One

2. And this latter part is undoubtedly true, and St. Thomas expressly teaches it in I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 2, where he simultaneously responds to the first reason for doubting that we have set forth, saying: "One action does not proceed from two agents (understand: total agents) of the same order, but nothing prevents one and the same action from proceeding from a first and second agent." Add: Indeed, it is necessary, because it depends essentially and immediately from both in their own genus. St. Thomas holds the same in III Cont. Gent., c. 70; and Aegidius in In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 6; and Capreolus there, q. 2, a. 3, ad arg. Durand. cont. 6 concl. Finally, no one who thinks correctly about divine concurrence in the matter dissents from this opinion; nevertheless, so that the diversity that can exist in the mode of

explaining might be understood, I note that there is a twofold opinion concerning the transient action of God.

3. Whether the action by which God concurs is immanent or transient. Some assert that the action of God is never formally transient, but that only the will of God is His action, and that the action which passes into external matter is not compared to God as an action, but as the effect of His action; according to which manner of speaking, the action of God and the action of the creature are distinguished especially as increate and created things. Nevertheless, it is true, even according to this opinion, that the action of the creature immediately flows through itself not only from the secondary cause, but also from the power or internal action of God, whether that action of the creature, in comparison to God, should be called action or His effect, which can pertain to the name. Whence, to remove equivocation, it can be said that in that opinion, the internal concurrence of God is distinguished from the action of the creature, but the external or transient concurrence is the same as the action of the secondary cause, whether it is in that by the mode of action or by the mode of the first effect. The other opinion, which is more true and which we defended above, is that the transient action flowing from God is truly the action of God, but His will rather concurs by the mode of a principle; and thus both in reality and in manner of speaking, it is evident that the action of the primary and secondary cause is one and the same.

4. God is the cause of all effects and actions of creatures. Which I further demonstrate thus: because if in that effect there are two actions, one of God alone and another of the secondary cause, terminated toward one and the same effect, I ask whether the action of the secondary cause is from that alone and not from God per se and immediately. And this can in no way be said; otherwise it follows that the effect is made by the secondary cause from the primary alone, but not the action itself; the consequence is entirely false and falls into the opinion of Durandus treated above. And therefore St. Thomas and

other theologians teach not only that God is the per se and immediate cause in His order of all effects of creatures, but also of all actions; and Scripture also speaks thus, when it attributes all operations and movements of creatures to God; and in John 1 it is said: "Without Him nothing was made"; but the action of a creature as such is something; therefore it is not made without the actual influx of God. And it is clear by reason, because either the action of a creature is not in reality something distinct from its effect, and thus it is necessary that they flow from the same causes, because they are the same; or it is a mode distinct from the effect by the nature of the thing, and thus it has some real nature which must immediately depend on God, by the same or greater reason by which other beings by participation depend; because that being which it has according to its mode is diminished and participated being, and therefore per se dependent on the first being. But if it be said that the action of the secondary cause is not from that alone, but is simultaneously per se and immediately from the primary cause, therefore it is one and the same action of both causes, which we intend; and superfluous is another distinct action which would be from the primary cause alone toward the same effect, because through the prior action it sufficiently flows into that in its order.

5. The action of the secondary cause depends on God through itself. Perhaps it will be said that the action of the secondary cause is also from the primary, nevertheless in a diverse mode; for from the secondary it is immediately through itself, but from the primary it is through another action proper to God alone, also transient and existing outside God; for we speak thus now. But this multiplication of actions is irrelevant and against all philosophical reason; for there is no other action to transient action, especially one also transient; otherwise we will proceed to infinity. For I will ask concerning that prior action which is said to be from God alone, whether it is through another action also transient or through itself. If through another, we will proceed further, and thus to infinity; if

through itself, the same will be said better of the first action, which, just as it flows per se from the secondary cause, so also flows per se from the primary, because there is no repugnance that it flows per se from both, since they are of diverse orders, as St. Thomas said above. Nor can a greater reason be assigned in this, that it proceeds through itself from the primary cause, than in that it proceeds through another action; indeed, this latter much more repugnant, for it is against the nature of action as such to be the term of another action. It remains therefore that the concurrence of God ad extra is nothing other than the very action of the secondary cause, as flowing per se and immediately from the primary.

Whether the Action of the Secondary Cause is From the Action of the Primary

6. And from this another point pertaining to this section is easily resolved, namely, whether the action of the secondary cause can be said to be made, to flow, or to be from the concurrence or action of the primary cause, or conversely whether the action of the primary cause causes the action of the secondary cause. For all authors seem to speak thus, and this seems to pertain to the universal influence of the primary cause. Likewise, the action of the creature is from God; therefore it depends on the action of God. Finally, for this reason the divine action is prior by nature than the action of the creature.

7. But it must be said with Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 Aureoli contra sextam conclusionem, that the action of God can be taken for the immanent act or volition of God Himself, or for the exterior action. In the former mode the arguments made proceed correctly. In which sense not only the action of the secondary cause, but also the transient action of the primary cause, both when it operates with the creature and when it operates alone, proceeds and depends on the internal action of God Himself. And in the same sense seems to be taken what St. Thomas says, In III, dist. 23, q. 3, a. 1, that

the actions of all secondary agents are founded upon the action of the first agent, because all are founded in some way in the divine will. Nevertheless, we said above that this internal act of the will of God does not have the proper nature of action, which expresses flux and tendency toward a term, but rather has the nature of a principle, because either it is the very omnipotence of God, or, if they are distinguished by reason, it has itself as applying the omnipotence of God to acting.

8. But in the latter mode, the exterior action of God and of the creature is one and the same, as we said. And therefore according to that nature the action of the creature cannot properly flow or depend on the action of God, nor conversely can the action of God properly cause the action of the creature, because the same thing does not cause itself nor depend on itself. Likewise, because action, as action, is only the cause of its term, and is not a cause except by the mode of a way; but the action of God is not a way to the action of the creature, but to the effect, nor is action the term of action. To the universal influx of the primary cause therefore it only pertains that every action of the secondary cause proceeds from the will and power of the primary cause itself, not indeed that it proceeds through another external action, but it can proceed through itself immediately from the will or power of God. Whence when the action of the creature is said to depend on the influx or concurrence of God, either concurrence is taken for the immanent and internal act, insofar as it flows into the external action, or the locution should not be taken transitively (so to speak) except according to reason. For it will be said more properly that the action of the creature is also from God, and as such is the very concurrence of God to the action of the secondary cause, from which it is not other according to the thing, but only according to reason or respect.

Whether There is an Order of Nature Between the Action of the Primary & Secondary Cause

9. From this again the third point often touched upon concerning the priority of nature between the action of God and the action of the creature is easily resolved. For first it must be distinguished concerning internal and external action, that we may speak with many, in the sense stated. Second, concerning priority of nature; for there is one which consists in proper causality and dependence of one on another; another, which consists only in some greater dignity, or universality, independence, or other similar property. Comparing therefore the action of the creature to the internal action of God, it is clear that the action of God is prior by nature in both modes, namely, both by dignity and by causality; for in this mode the action of the creature truly depends on the act of God. But in this sense not only the action of the creature as such, but also the very exterior action of God is posterior by nature than the interior action of God, for it is truly caused by that. And in this sense authors almost always speak, when they say that the action of the primary cause is prior by nature to the action of the secondary cause according to causality, as is clear from Capreolus above. Nor does it stand in the way that the action of God in this mode is not only prior by nature, but also by time and eternity to the action of the creature, because in these locutions the internal action of God is not considered according to its absolute entity alone, but as it connotes actual influx into the creature. In which way many say that active creation is ex tempore, even if it is really immanent, because the actual influx which it connotes is temporal; and under that nature also it is said to be prior by nature, even if it is simultaneous in time with the effect.

10. But truly, speaking of external action, both of God and of the creature, thus one cannot be said to be prior by nature than the other by priority of causality, because, as has been shown, since they are one and the same action, true causality cannot intervene between them. Nevertheless, distinguishing according to reason that action, as it is from the primary cause or as it is from the secondary, it can be said

to be by priority and more principally from the primary than from the secondary; and in a similar mode it may be said that the primary cause by priority of nature flows into that action than the secondary. First, because the primary cause is higher, and flows into the effect in a more noble and more independent mode. Second, because the primary cause receives per se first that action under some more universal nature; for the primary cause flows into any effect or action, from this precisely that it participates something of entity; but the secondary cause always flows under some posterior and more determined nature of being. Whence it happens third, that the influx of the primary cause from itself and from its genus is also said to be prior by consequence of subsisting, which Aristotle placed among the priorities of nature; for the influx of the primary cause absolutely does not depend on the secondary cause, but insofar as from its genus it can be without that, but not conversely. And in this mode Cajetan explained this priority or subordination, I, q. 14, a. 13; and Scotus insinuates it, in I, dist. 39, and in II, dist. 37.

11. A certain proposition excerpted from the Book of Causes is explained. And in the same modes is expounded that locution from the Book of Causes, proposition 1, which is such: "The primary cause acts first in the caused and more vehemently enters into it"; where St. Thomas also, in the Commentary, applies the same interpretation, adding from Proclus that the primary cause flows first, because the secondary cause does not act except by its power.

In What Subject is the Concurrence of the Primary Cause

12. The fourth point pertaining to this is whether the concurrence of the primary cause is received in the secondary, or in its effect. This question only has place in transient concurrence; for the immanent is not received in a subject, but is the very subsisting volition of God. Therefore, to abstract from opinions, it must be

formally responded, according to what has been said, that the concurrence of God is in that subject in which the action of the secondary cause is. This is clear, because they are not distinguished in reality; therefore neither can they be distinguished by subject. Wherefore, if every action of the secondary cause is in itself, as some wish, the concurrence of the primary cause will be in the same, and through that will pass to the effect or to the passion or becoming of the effect, in that mode by which (according to that opinion) the agent, through the mediation of the action which it receives in itself, flows the passion into another. According to the more true doctrine, however, which teaches that transient action is in the patient, and immanent in the agent, it must be said that the concurrence of God in transient action is not something received in the secondary cause, but in the patient; but the concurrence to immanent action is received in the agent itself, insofar as its action is received in it. And both parts are sufficiently established from what has been said nor do they contain new difficulty.

SECTION IV

HOW GOD PROVIDES HIS CONCURRENCE TO SECOND CAUSES

1. We have declared thus far whether there exists and what is the concurrence of God with second causes; now it remains for us to explain how God grants or offers this concurrence to second causes. At the same time it will be declared how the first and second cause agree and are joined together for producing the same effect and the same action. Nor is there difficulty in the conjunction as if it were local or through lack of distance or presence of entities; for in this way it is easily understood that God, by reason of his immensity, can be joined to all second causes for operating with them, because he is intimately

present through his essence in all of them and in all their effects and actions.

The Difficulty of the Question is Opened

2. But the difficulty concerns the conjunction for causing one and the same effect and the same action; for when two causes agree for producing the same action, they either concur by chance and contingently, or by design and per se. The former of these modes cannot be attributed to the concurrence of the first cause with the second, both because this is repugnant to the perfection of divine providence and operation; and also because otherwise there would be no per se subordination in the second cause to the first, or every operation of the second cause would occur by chance and per accidens. The latter mode also has difficulty, because if two causes agree by design for the same operation, either this is because both are subordinated to some superior cause which applies them simultaneously, which has no place here, as is evident per se, or because both are by their nature determined to operate thus here and now, which also cannot be said here, because neither is the first cause thus determined by its nature, nor the second cause, at least to an individual effect or action; or because one determines by its peculiar intention the effect and action to be produced, and consequently also determines the other cause to cooperate in the same action. And this mode does not seem to be able to have place here, because neither can the second cause thus determine the first, as seems to be known per se, nor conversely can that mode of acting be attributed to the first cause with respect to the second, both because otherwise the first cause would move and apply the second to act, which we have denied; and also because otherwise the determination of the action would in no way be from the second cause, which all deny; and finally because otherwise the second cause could do nothing else except what it does,

because it has God's concurrence for nothing else, without which it can do nothing.

The Question is Resolved Regarding Natural Causes

3. Why it is said that God concurs with necessarily acting causes through the mode of nature. This difficulty regarding second causes acting naturally can most easily be resolved by noting that, speaking absolutely and simply, God provides this concurrence to second causes by his will; for he acts as an intellectual cause, which cannot be absolutely compelled or necessitated by anyone to act; nevertheless he is said to concur secundum quid through the mode of nature. And this for a double reason; first, because in concurring he accommodates himself to the natures of things and provides to each a concurrence accommodated to its power; second, because after he has decreed to make and conserve second causes, he concurs with them by an infallible law for their operation, which law, if taken absolutely without supposing any particular and definite will of God, does not induce necessity, but is only as it were a certain debt of connaturality. Whence sometimes God dispenses with that law by denying such concurrence. But truly, supposing an efficacious will of God to concur with this cause for this action here and now, then by necessity the action proceeds at such time and place, both from the second cause and from the first; but with respect to the second it is natural necessity; with respect to the first, however, it is only necessity ex suppositione, or of immutability.

4. This therefore being supposed, the mode by which the first cause provides its concurrence to these second causes is easily explained; for God from his eternity, just as he decreed to produce these things and not others, and at this time, and with this order, and with these motions, etc., and not in another way, so also he decreed to concur with the same things for their actions according to their capacity. And because, just as God's knowledge is most distinct and in

particular concerning all things, so also his will decrees all things distinctly and in particular, and descends to individual things according to the capacity and need of each, therefore in providing this concurrence, from eternity he also decreed in particular to concur with this cause at such time, in such place, and concerning such subject, for such action and effect in individual, and at such time for another, and thus concerning all things. But I always say for such action, because determination to one effect in number would not be sufficient, since the same effect can be made through diverse actions in number, or perhaps even in species; but by determining the action, it follows that the effect is necessarily determined; because the same action in number cannot tend to another term except that with which it is identified.

5. That the first cause does not concur by chance with necessarily acting causes. And hence it happens first that the first and second cause agree not by chance, but per se and by design for producing the same action, which arises principally from the mode of operating of the first cause, or from its knowledge and providence. Nor is another motion of the second cause necessary for this, but only this will of God as it were preparing and offering concurrence according to the laws of his divine wisdom and providence. It should be added, however, that this determination of concurrence, as to two things, has its foundation in the nature of the second cause. For first, because it is of such power, therefore God decreed to give concurrence of such species, and as to this, as I noted above, it is said to determine God's concurrence as to its specific nature, not because it absolutely determines God's will to giving such concurrence in species, for thus God alone determines himself voluntarily, but because it is the objective reason demanding such concurrence. Second, in the same way, because such cause is naturally acting, therefore God also absolutely and definitely wills to concur with it. And as to this, the second cause can be said in the same sense to determine the concurrence of the first as to exercise, because by its nature here and

now it determinately demands the exercise of such action. But truly the determination as to this individual action and effect does not seem to be able to be founded in any way in the second cause, for the same in number here and now in this subject is capable of producing several numerically distinct effects, nor does it demand concurrence more for one than for another; and therefore the determination of concurrence and action as to this part is attributed to the first cause alone, as Gregory probably taught, and was said above.

6. Natural causes while they are doing this, even in a divided sense, can do nothing else. Second, it follows from what has been said that these naturally acting causes in that instant or time in which they act, with all things simply considered, can do nothing except that thing in species and in individual which they do. And concerning species indeed the matter is clear, because they have power determined to such effect in species, determined (I say) either simply, as in particular and univocal causes, or at least here and now concerning this matter thus disposed, or with other causes concurring simultaneously. Concerning the individual, however, this is proved by the reason given above, because, although a natural agent has active potency for several effects in individual, nevertheless that potency by itself alone is insufficient without God's concurrence; and therefore, if it does not have that, it will not constitute the thing in proximate potency, but in remote potency for acting; for thus fire deprived of God's concurrence will not be called simply powerful, but rather will be called absolutely powerless for thus heating. Thus therefore, because such causes have only prepared God's concurrence for one effect in number, they can absolutely make only that one, namely with proximate potency, which includes not only the bare faculty of acting, but also all prerequisites for operating.

7. What divine concurrence is required for being able, what for acting. You will say: concurrence is the action itself; but action is not required for being able, but for acting; therefore concurrence is not required for being able. I respond that it is one thing to speak of

concurrence itself in itself and in second act, concerning which the objection proceeds, and as to this it correctly concludes; but it is another thing to speak of concurrence in first act and in proximate application, in which way we say it is required for being able simply; which concurrence does not consist in action, but in divine power or will, as proximately applied and as it were joined at such time with the second cause by virtue of its eternal decree to concur with it; which others also call preparation or offering of concurrence.

8. God's concurrence is manifold according to the variety of second causes. Third, it is inferred in passing from what has been said that God's concurrence is not one and the same with all second causes, but varies according to the diversity of second causes, because God thus concurs with them as he accommodates himself to each according to its need. And therefore, just as he attributes numerically distinct concurrences to numerically diverse effects, so he attributes specifically distinct concurrences to specifically diverse actions. And this is openly confirmed from what was said above, for God's concurrence ad extra is nothing other than the action itself, and tends to the same intrinsic term; therefore according to the variety of actions there will also be various concurrence. Therefore it cannot truly be said that there is the same concurrence of God for all actions of second causes, unless the discourse be either about internal concurrence or the will by which God concurs, or about only proportional identity, as to the mode and general reason for which all second causes need concurrence, namely, because they are beings and agents by participation.

9. God influences an effect differently when acting alone than when acting with a second cause. Indeed, hence it is also permitted to infer in passing that God influences differently with respect to the same effect, if he produces it by himself alone, differently when with a second cause; because when he acts by himself alone, he employs an influence per se sufficient for the effect; therefore when he concurs with a second cause, he accommodates such activity which by itself

alone would not suffice without the second cause, which is manifest from what has been said, because he does not will to act except by that action which is common to the second cause. Although, however, that same effect could be from God alone, and therefore God's influence for such effect absolutely and according to itself can be without the second cause, nevertheless such action, which is from the second cause, cannot be without it, and therefore neither is the concurrence which God provides for such action alone absolutely sufficient for the effect, but only in its genus. The opposite of this seems to be the opinion of Cordub., q. 55, dub. 4; nevertheless, if read attentively, he does not disagree in the matter. Therefore from these things it is sufficiently established how God provides his concurrence to natural agents.

The Difficulty is Treated & Explained in Free Agents

10. However, what we have said involves the greatest difficulty in free agents; for if the first cause determines concurrence for them in the same way as for other agents, they will not be more indifferent in the use of their actions in particular and in proximate power, which includes all prerequisites for acting, than other agents, and thus they will never have the use and exercise of freedom. The antecedent is clarified with regard to both parts, for God as first cause is united through his will to the second cause for cooperation, which will is eternal and precedes the second cause; moreover, it is absolute and efficacious; namely, by which God wills such an effect to be, because God operates externally through this will alone; but this will draws the second cause along with it to operate, so that it cannot resist; therefore from this side the second cause is determined to one thing as to exercise by the first cause, even if it be free. And this is confirmed, for that two free causes might concur by themselves and according to a certain law to one work, the intention and preceding will of one is not sufficient, unless it has efficacy in drawing the other

where it wills; therefore if in the present concurrence only the will of God precedes, by which he efficaciously wills to concur with the second cause to such an effect, so that the effect might follow by itself, it is necessary that will of God have efficacy upon the free second cause, so that it might draw it along with itself to operate; and thus indifference in the exercise of action is removed. Again, when God through that will defines the concurrence to be given, he defines it to one thing only, because he does not will multiple effects, but only one; therefore from this side indifference is also removed as to specification or variety of actions. And it is confirmed, for it was said that the first cause defines its concurrence to an individual and singular effect; which necessity also has place with respect to the free second cause, because it cannot itself choose one individual act before others of the same species.

11. Various opinions of the Doctors. In explaining this difficulty, scholastic Doctors write many things. And some of them seem clearly to admit all that is supposed in the difficulty mentioned about the way in which God through his will provides this concurrence to second causes. This especially seems to be the view of Scotus, In I, dist. 39, § Viso de contingentia, and dist. 41, § Primum istorum, and § Sed contra, and dist. 47, in fine, and Quodl., 14, litter. S, and the Scotists follow, especially Bassol., In I, dist. 38, a. 2, and dist. 39, a. 2; and Maironis, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, and q. 3; Richard also, dist. 38, a. 1, q. 5, seems to suppose the same, while he says that God sufficiently knows all future things in his will. This Durand also asserted there, q. 3, even though otherwise he does not require God's concurrence for the actions of second causes. And many modern Thomists follow this opinion and attribute it to St. Thomas. But in him no mention of it is made in his entire doctrine, nor can they bring forward anything except those things which we treated and explained in section 2, and those things which the same St. Thomas treats concerning the motion of human will by God, I, q. 82, a. 2, q. 104, a. 3 and 4, and q. 105, a. 4, and I-II, q. 9 and 10, especially a. 4, ad 3, and q.

109, in the first articles, especially a. 6, ad 3. But in all these places he never explained that way of giving general concurrence, but at most calls it motion of human will, and often does not speak of it, but of other ways by which God can morally move the will, especially through the aids of grace, which do not pertain to the present matter.

12. How the aforesaid authors adequately meet the proposed difficulty. Supposing this opinion, however, the authors of it respond to the proposed difficulty in two ways. The first is, that will of God by which he determines concurrence to the action of the second cause is from the freedom of the same will, and therefore does not impede, but conserves similar freedom in the second cause, if it otherwise has it. This response has its foundation in the doctrine of Scotus, who, as we saw above, for this reason asserted that if God acted from necessity of nature, he would remove, by the concurrence or motion by which he moves the second cause, its freedom, but now he does not remove it because he acts freely. Nevertheless, this response is not satisfactory; for the freedom of God can confer that he might grant concurrence accommodated to the second cause and its freedom. But if the concurrence or motion is such that, if it were granted by God from necessity of nature, it would necessitate the created will, even if it be given freely by God, it will necessitate it, as I proved above, because if the motion is the same, it has the same effect in the second cause; but the free relation to the first cause will make the action be free for the first cause, but not for the second cause. Thus therefore in the present case it matters little that God freely provides concurrence in the way explained above, for from this it is only obtained that the action be free for God, but not for the second cause itself, because the proposed difficulty seems to show that way of concurring removes its indifference. And it is confirmed, for God can impose necessity on the created will, and nonetheless he will impose it freely; and then the action will be free for God, but necessary for the created will; therefore the relation of freedom to the first cause is not sufficient that the action be free for the second cause, unless the way of moving it

and concurring with it be such that it is accommodated to conserving the use of its freedom; therefore from divine freedom alone the aforesaid difficulty is not sufficiently solved.

13. Another solution of the difficulty. Another response is that God, although he grants defined concurrence to natural and free agents through his will, nevertheless grants it in a different way; for to necessary agents he wills to give concurrence by which they act necessarily, to free ones by which they act freely; and thus God wills not only the action, but also the mode of action; and because divine will is efficacious for both, therefore it provides both simultaneously. And therefore it is said of divine providence that it reaches from end to end mightily and disposes all things sweetly. This response has its foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 2, and other places, where he teaches that it pertains to the efficacy of divine will that what he wills, comes to be, and in the way he wills it. This doctrine, taken so generally, is most certain, nevertheless it is also certain that when God wills something to be done in a certain way, it pertains to his wisdom and efficacy to apply causes accommodated to that mode of operating; for it would be repugnant to himself, if he willed something to be done in such a way and otherwise impeded or removed the causes for that mode of operating. This therefore is what we inquire in the present matter, how when God wills the second cause to act freely and with indifference, he can define his concurrence without contradiction being involved in this. Hence it is not sufficient to say, for the efficacy and sweetness of divine providence, to join those two things; but either it is necessary to explain in what way there is no contradiction in them, which is not done through that response, or another way must be sought by which God can efficaciously and sweetly move the creature so that it both acts and acts freely.

14. The author's response to the preceding difficulty. Because of the difficulty therefore proposed, I judge with many other theologians that the way in which God provides or offers his concurrence to free causes is to be explained differently. This way

differs in two respects from that which we explained in natural agents. First, in determination as to exercise, because namely God, by virtue of that will by which he determines to provide concurrence to the free cause, does not determine absolutely that the free cause exercise that act, nor does he simply will that act to be, but as if with an understood condition he wills that act to be, insofar as it is from himself and from the part of his concurrence, which he determines to provide, and to that by virtue of such will he applies his power, if however the second cause or created will also determines itself to that and influences toward it; for it can always not influence according to its freedom.

15. First reason. And this difference is founded, first, in the different modes of operating connatural to these agents. For natural agents by their nature are determined to the exercise of their actions; and therefore, as I was saying above, the first cause accommodating itself to them absolutely defines concurrence for them; but free agents are not thus determined by their nature to the exercise of their actions; therefore when God gives to each concurrence in a way accommodated to its nature, to these agents also he offers concurrence without complete determination to exercise.

16. Second. Second, this seems to be proven by the argument made; for if God offered concurrence by absolute and efficacious will physically determinative and effective of such an act, it would necessarily draw the second cause along with itself; which necessity would be absolute with respect to such a cause, because, although it would be from some supposition, that nevertheless would be completely antecedent, and so efficacious that the inferior cause could in no way resist it.

17. Third. Third, because, although actual concurrence is not among the prerequisites for acting, but included in action, nevertheless concurrence in first act, or (which is the same) to have concurrence so offered and prepared that it is in man's power to have it if he wills, is one of the necessary prerequisites for acting, as was proven above. Because truly it is not understood in another way how it

might be in man's proximate power to begin his action. Therefore this concurrence ought to be offered in this way and through such a will of the first cause, that, it being so posited, it is still in the power of the second cause freely to operate or not operate with it; because otherwise this indifference with all prerequisites for acting is not saved; which is essential to free action. Therefore it is necessary that it be understood to be offered through a will including a condition, as it has been declared by us. For if it were completely absolute, that offering of concurrence could not not pass to exercise or second act.

18. Fourth. Fourth, this is most necessary on account of evil acts of the created will. For it cannot be said that God from himself, by his absolute will, determines that these acts be done completely by the second cause; otherwise he would not only permit them, but also will them, which is foreign to sound doctrine. Moreover, because otherwise the first root and origin of evil of our will would be reduced to God, for since the will of God is simply prior, it will always determine the created will so that it wills; therefore the created will always wills because God wills it to will; therefore even when it wills evil, it therefore wills because God wills it to will. Therefore the first root of all evil will would be referred back to the divine, which is impious.

19. Nor will he who responds that all these things are true and to be admitted concerning evil will materially, but not formally, that is, insofar as it is evil, give satisfaction. For in the present case one follows from the other, because a free act of created will concerning this object and with these circumstances cannot be had without having concomitant malice; he therefore who wills by absolute will that act to be elicited by the created will concerning this object and with these circumstances, and especially if he so wills that he draws the created will along with himself to exercising that act, clearly wills morally or virtually the malice necessarily connected to the act, and is the root and cause of it. But it is otherwise if God offers concurrence through that will including a condition, as it has been explained by us;

for then he simply does not will the evil act, nor does he determine or draw the created will to its exercise, but only offers concurrence by which he influences the act of the created will, while it itself elicits it. And this is the well-known difference on account of which the just God wills to permit the act of sin, as it is from the created will, which nevertheless as such he cannot will, as the theologians to be cited immediately explain more broadly.

20. Fifth. We can adduce a fifth reason, because God can necessitate the created will; even when it would not suffer necessity from object, intellect, or some intrinsic disposition, as was seen in the preceding; but no way appears by which God can more efficaciously impose necessity as to exercise upon the created will, than by his absolute will efficacious and operative externally, drawing the created will so that it wills what he himself wills it to will. Therefore, conversely, when God wills to concur with the created will in such a way that he does not necessitate it to exercise, he does not give concurrence through a will so absolute and efficacious; therefore he provides it through a will accommodated to the freedom of human will, and therefore including on its part a virtual condition, such as we have explained. And in this way nearly all the ancient theologians explained the way of God's concurring with free cause, whom I shall immediately cite, after the second difference proposed above is first declared.

21. The second distinction in the mode of divine concurrence with free and with necessary causes. There is therefore another distinction between the way in which divine will offers concurrence to natural and to free agents, because to those it provides concurrence only to one act, but to these it offers sufficient concurrence to several acts, insofar as it is from itself, which the difficulty posited above rightly proves. And moreover it can be proven by applying with proportion nearly all the reasons made in the preceding. First, because God provides to each second cause concurrence in a way accommodated to its nature. But this is the nature of free cause, that,

all other prerequisite conditions being posited, it is indifferent to several acts; therefore it ought also to receive in first act concurrence in an indifferent way; therefore, insofar as it is from God's part, concurrence ought to be offered not only to one act, but to several. Second, because otherwise the created will would never be proximately able to produce several acts; therefore it would never be free as to specification of act. The second consequence is clear from what was said above about free cause. But the first inference is clear, because a second cause is not proximately able to produce some effect, unless it has the concurrence of the first cause prepared for that. And therefore a little before we were saying that natural cause is always proximately able to produce only one singular effect, because it has God's concurrence prepared only for that.

22. Third, there is an evident argument, because the created will can will nothing without God's concurrence; therefore unless it somehow has God's concurrence in its power for several acts, it can never simply and proximately elicit any of those acts; but it can never have God's concurrence in its hand and power, unless first and antecedently it has it offered, insofar as it is from God's will, because it is not given, nor can it be given except through God's will. Nor can the created will quasi anticipate the divine will, or effect something by which it draws it to giving general concurrence, because the created will can effect nothing without that concurrence itself. The will therefore in giving concurrence must always precede, nor with respect to it, at least in the first volition, can the created will in some way anticipate the divine. If therefore that divine will is defined to only one act or its concurrence, the created will can effect only that with proximate power, nor does it have concurrence to another in its power, and consequently the same is true of the rest which either follow upon that, or are done by themselves with the same kind of concurrence.

23. Fourth, here also is applied most efficaciously the reason taken from evil acts; for it is incredible that God wills to concur with

man's will here and now to an evil act, and to that alone[9], even insofar as it is from himself. For this cannot be referred back to the will of the sinner himself, because God's will to concur completely precedes the sinner's will, and all free use of it. For I consider a man actually thinking about a depraved object with all circumstances prerequisite so that the will can assent or dissent to it; but it can do neither through a positive act without God's concurrence, and before it does either, it cannot be imputed to it that God wills this or that concerning the concurrence to be given; therefore if God had proposed to concur with it to evil consent and not to another act, this would be from God's will alone, nor could it be imputed to man's will; but how foreign this is to divine goodness, I leave for all to consider.

24. Authors who embrace the aforesaid mode. Hence grave theologians declare God's concurrence with free cause in this way, then especially when they speak of concurrence to the act of sin. And it can be taken from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2, where he says something happens beyond the consequent will of God's good pleasure, although nothing happens against it, which he says on account of evil act; but the consequent will of God is called absolute and efficacious will. And therefore I-II, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3, he says God's will is the universal principle of interior human motion, but the determination to such an evil act is directly from human will. As if he were to say that God from himself offers indifferent concurrence, but it is determined quasi materially from the cooperation of free will. And generally he signifies such to be the motion or concurrence of God with free cause, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 4, and III cont. Gent., c. 73 and 90, and q. 3 de Potent., a, 7, ad 13, and q. 5 de Verit., a. 5, ad 1. Capreolus feels the same, in the places cited above, sect. 2, and especially In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 contra 2 conclus.; Conrad expressly and at length, I-II, q. 79, a. 2, and Soto, I de Natur. et grat., c.

[9] alone, 1960; others read good. "The substitution of alone for good, which some editions present, is completely devoid of sense." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 673.

16, who more expressly than other Thomists, and more generally, says God does not concur with free will through the will of good pleasure, which cannot be resisted, but by another will, which can be resisted; his words are: Whatever God wills by absolute will, and which is called of good pleasure, happens according to that: "Who resists his will?" But when he concurs with free man, he does not will that to happen except with human nature and free will saved, which therefore can resist God.

25. Scotus also, although in the places cited above he seems to think otherwise, nevertheless In II, dist. 37, § Ad solutionem istorum, to declare concurrence to the act of sin, says the second cause has in its power to concause and not to concause with the first; and if it does not concause as it is bound, thence it happens that there is no rectitude in the effect common to both. Where Lychetus expressly declares divine concurrence in this way, and God's will through which it is given, and Maironis also signifies, In II, dist. 43, q. 4. Hence Vega, lib. VI In Trident., c. 7, for this reason says God's general concurrence is immediately in our power, even when we do not operate; and he judges this to be necessary for our freedom. Cordova holds the same, q. 55, dubio 8 and 10, although he speaks less properly about the order of nature between the causality of first and second cause.

26. Nearly all other authors also declare divine concurrence in this way, especially Gregor., In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12; Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 4, and a. 3, dubio 1, and dist. 87, a. 3, dub. 2; Marsil., In I, q. 40, a. 2, part. 1, concl. 4, in fine; Adamus, In III, dist. 14, q. 3, dubio 2; Almain., tract. I Moral., c. 1. There also very much favors Alex. Alens., 1, q. 24, memb. 5, and q. 26, memb. 4, a. 3, and q. 40, memb. 4, ad 3; Bonavent., In II, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad ultimum, and many others, whom I omit for the sake of brevity.

Objections Against the Preceding Doctrine

27. But what can be objected against this way of explaining divine concurrence with free causes will be easily solved from those things which were treated in the preceding. First may be that it follows that a free act happens without absolute and efficacious will of God, which seems repugnant, since all things depend on this will of God. Second, because it follows that a free act happens quasi accidentally or contingently with respect to God, because God from himself does not prescribe what will result from his concurrence, and quasi tends uncertainly to what the created will will have done. Third, hence it seems to follow that God applies his concurrence to these acts only in a general and confused way, namely, to what the created will will have effected; but this seems to be a great imperfection. Fourth, it follows that God does not have perfect providence in particular concerning these free acts, since he does not dispose of them in particular that they be or not be, but only confusedly, leaving the determination in particular to the second cause. Whence further it happens fifth, that the determination of such an act, both as to exercise and as to specification, is to be attributed entirely to the second cause. Sixth, this seems to be repugnant with those things which we said above, that the determination of effect in the individual proceeds in a peculiar way from the predefinition of the first cause; for this is no less necessary in free acts than in others, because when the will loves, it is not in its power to choose this act of love in the individual rather than another which it could make. Seventh, because it follows from what was said, that God's will to concur with created will being posited for its act, it can happen that the act does not follow, even if on the part of the will there is sufficient power and all other requisites; and for the same reason it will happen that God and divine will on their part are related in the same way to the man with whom he does not actually concur and to him with whom he concurs, which is absurd, since he operates something in one which he does not operate in the other.

28. Eighth, it can be directly shown that way is not necessary; for God in his eternity foreknows what the created will will be about

to will on any occasion concerning any object, and with whatever circumstances; therefore God can by absolute will will to give concurrence to that act alone which he foresees it will perform. Nor is it necessary that he offer concurrence to other acts, which he certainly knows will never be future. And for the same reason it is not necessary that he appose any condition tacitly or expressly to his will, since he already foresees that condition which could intervene there will be future, namely, that the created will cooperate. And for the same reason through this mode of concurrence the indifference of freedom is not removed, because both that will of God is posited with some respect to the future cooperation of the will, and God would be prepared to give other concurrence, if the will were going to operate otherwise.

29. To the first objection, it is answered that it is one thing for a free act to occur without an absolute will of God by which He wills that such an act should exist, and another thing entirely that God should not concur in such an act from that absolute will. From our position, therefore, only this latter follows, which we admit as most true, because for God to concur, a will to concur suffices, which, insofar as it pertains to what is held on God's part, is absolute and efficacious, because by virtue of that will God applies His power to concurring, and actually concurs in time according to the purpose of that same will. Nevertheless, because in the object of that will, as is clear from the very word "concurring," the concomitance or cooperation of another is comprehended, therefore on the part of the other a condition is understood without which that will of God will not have an external effect, and therefore from this aspect it can be called conditional. For since the transient action by which God concurs with the created will depends both upon the divine will and upon the created will, in order for God to concur in that action it is not necessary that He absolutely will that action insofar as it proceeds from both principles, but only insofar as it proceeds from Himself, permitting or granting to the other will that it also may have influence,

and consequently understanding the condition of the cooperation of the other will. For thus God conducts Himself regarding evil wills. For this reason Augustine said, in the fifth book of the City of God, chapters 8 and 9, and often elsewhere, that all powers are from God, but not all wills. And the Council of Trent, session VI, canon 6, for the same reason defines that God works these acts only permissively. And from this we clearly gather that, by virtue of general concurrence and the necessary subordination between the first cause and the second cause, the said will to concur on God's part suffices, whatever may be the case regarding whether, concerning good acts, God has another mode of absolute will for special reasons.

30. Whence the other proposition, namely, that a free act occurs without an absolute will of God, does not follow from our position, because, although that will is not necessary for concurrence, God can have it for another reason. And indeed in good acts God has that will, whether it be preceding knowledge by way of predefinition, or subsequent by way of approbation, for this makes no difference to the present matter. Concerning evil acts, however, God does not have that absolute will, because God does not will simply and absolutely that these evils should occur, nor does He take simple pleasure in those which He foresees as future, for this is repugnant to His goodness; although He also does not will absolutely that these acts should not occur, but wills to permit them, as St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3. And after He foresees that they will be future, He takes pleasure in them insofar as they are from Himself, which is only to take pleasure in the concurrence which He provides to them.

31. To the second objection, it is answered by denying the consequence, because God from certain knowledge and His will concurs with the created will in any act of it; and therefore He does not concur with the created will by chance or contingently, but from most wise providence. And although He does not always by absolute will predefine what the created will is going to do, He does not therefore tend toward the uncertain, because He either predefines or

at least permits whatever such a second cause is going to do, and He also sees most clearly and most certainly what it is going to do; and He concurs by His will in that.

32. Whence the third inconvenience is also solved by denying the consequence. For God does not apply His concurrence confusedly, but distinctly and in particular to this or that act voluntarily; always, however, with the condition of free cooperation of that created will being understood. For this condition has place no less in the will to concur distinctly and in particular to such or such an act than in a confused will to concur, which it is not necessary to attribute to God except insofar as it is included in the will to concur in particular to this or that act.

33. Therefore it does not follow in the least what was inferred in the fourth place concerning imperfection or confusion (so to speak) of divine providence; for God provides for all things in particular, but not for all in the same way. Whence concerning good acts which are going to be future, He disposes simply and absolutely that they should be; concerning evil acts, however, although He also disposes in particular, nevertheless not simply and absolutely that they should be, but that they should be permitted; and concerning those insofar as they are already foreseen as future, God disposes how they may either be healed or punished. Thus therefore God has perfect providence concerning all and each in particular, yet accommodated to each one. And for this reason certain grave ancient authors, especially the Greeks[10], deny that these evil acts are from providence, because by that word they peculiarly understand that absolute disposition by which God not only permits, but absolutely wills that something should be; or, as that particle "from providence" sufficiently indicates, they only intend that the root and origin of these evil acts is

[10] Origen., lib. II Periarch., c. 12; Iustin., q. 8 ad Orthodoxos; Chrysost., hom. XII, parte morali; Theodor., lib. V Divin. decr., c. de Provid.; Gregor. Nys., lib. VII Philos., c. 1, et lib. VIII, c. 4; pseudo Nemes, lib. de Nat. homin., c. 39 et seq.; Damas., II de fide, c. 29 et 30.

not from divine providence, nor are such acts to be attributed to it as to their proper cause. It is true that they sometimes extend that manner of speaking to good acts, but then they use that word more strictly for the efficacious predetermination of God which brings necessity to the created will, as St. Thomas explained, I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1.

34. To the fifth objection concerning the determination of the created will, it has already been said above in what way this determination can in some way be attributed to the second cause; for the same mode proportionally has place in the free cause. And by some greater and more peculiar reason it is said to determine itself to its action. Not because it determines itself without the concurrence of God (for its determination is nothing other than its volition, which is evident cannot occur without the concurrence of God), but because the will and power of God, as thus applied to concurring, is as it were indifferent and waiting so that, according to the free use of the will, it may thus cooperate; which is not from imperfection, but from the most wise providence of God accommodating Himself to the second cause. Whence, although simply the concurrence of God is prior by nature, in the manner explained above, nevertheless, in a qualified sense and in its own genus, this determination can be attributed to the second cause in a peculiar way. We speak, however, generally from the force of concurrence, for in other ways or through other aids, God is often the principal cause of every good determination of the will, and especially in those things which are done through grace, concerning which we shall speak elsewhere.

35. To the sixth objection, we concede that the determination of the act or effect, especially as regards the individual, arises from the determination of the divine concurrence. Nor does this conflict with what has been said about concurrence to free acts; for that very determination of concurrence to a singular and individual act can be from a will not entirely absolute in every respect, but including a condition on the part of the free cooperation of human choice. Again,

that concurrence can be offered not only to one individual act of one species, but also to several of diverse species, as to this act of love and to this act of hatred; and thus in individual species the will is determined to such an act in the individual, and nonetheless it remains indifferent, either to using the concurrence or not using it, or to using it in this or that species.

36. To the seventh objection, we concede the first part of the inference, namely that after sufficient concurrence has been offered on God's part, the will can not operate, even in the composite sense. Nor is this a greater inconvenience than that, given God's permission, the will can still not sin; which is true and necessary, because permission regards the power of the cause as disposed toward either of two opposites, as St. Thomas said, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2. Finally, just as, given all prerequisites, the will can operate and not operate, so also, when God's concurrence has been sufficiently offered and prepared, it can not operate with it, because that is one of the prerequisites. I say, however, when transient concurrence has been offered, not when it has been posited in reality, because then it is already impossible in the composite sense that the will should not operate, because such concurrence is not distinguished in reality from its action. In this sense St. Thomas said, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, that if God moves the will, it is impossible that the will should not be moved. For this concurrence is not among the prerequisites to action, but intrinsically included in the action itself.

37. Whence to the other part of the inference the consequence is denied, for God also actually influences the man who actually operates, but not the one who does not operate. And thus God does not relate equally to both as regards external action with respect to God Himself. If, however, the discussion were only about God's will ad intra, by which He offers concurrence, it can happen that on its part it is equal, and that in one it has effect and not in the other, from their freedom, which is no inconvenience, because in God's will itself that condition was included, as has been explained. Whether,

however, in another elective or predefinitive will, or in some aid flowing from it, there is always inequality, it is not ours to dispute.

38. To the eighth objection, it is answered that the conditional foreknowledge which is supposed in it, and which we willingly admit, does not impede the mode of concurring explained by us or give place to another. For, since God foreknows what the created will is going to do, if it is applied with such circumstances, among other conditions this must be posited, namely, if God offers sufficient concurrence, because without it nothing can operate. This sufficient concurrence, however, as included in this conditional, must be such that it is indifferent both to the exercise and to the species of the act; and therefore it should not be absolutely defined to only one act and its exercise. Although therefore God foresees what the will is going to do here and now, if He Himself provides concurrence, it is necessary that He provide it in that manner which the nature of the will itself demands, and which was understood to be included in the aforesaid hypothesis. Because if God were to change the mode of concurrence, the effects would no longer follow in the same way. Therefore that will by which God offers concurrence from itself always remains conditional in virtue, although from foreknowledge it is equivalent to an absolute one, because God foresees that it will have effect with the other will concurring at the same time.

39. And for the same reason, notwithstanding that foreknowledge, God, insofar as it depends on Him, offers concurrence to other acts, although the created will is not going to perform them, so that it may simply be able to accomplish them, nor does it stand with God that it should not accomplish them. Just as God also wills to give sufficient aids to those whom He foreknows will not use such aids well, so that they may simply be able to operate thus; because otherwise it could not in fact be imputed to them that they do not operate, if on account of the said foreknowledge alone they were deprived of such aids. Indeed, this very thing is supposed in that argument, when it is said in it that God is prepared to concur in other

acts if the created will were to do them, for God is not thus prepared except through His will and free determination, not which He would have in that event, for who can judge of that?, but which He now already has. Therefore God offers to free causes His sufficient concurrence not only to those acts which they do or are going to do, but also to those which they could do if they wished.

SECTION V
WHETHER SECONDARY CAUSES DEPEND ESSENTIALLY IN THEIR OPERATION UPON THE FIRST CAUSE ALONE, OR ALSO UPON OTHERS

1. Finally, there remains to be examined in this disputation whether it is proper to the first cause to concur in the aforesaid manner with secondary causes in their operations, and that the others depend upon it, or whether among created causes there is also this dependence and this manner of concurring. Here also occurs an occasion for declaring the common distinction of efficient causes into those which are per se and essentially subordinated, and those which are only per accidens.

The Reason for Doubt

2. For from this division is taken the first reason for doubting in the proposed question, because not only are secondary causes essentially subordinated with respect to the first, but also among the secondary causes themselves, particular causes are subordinated to universal ones; but this essential subordination consists in the aforesaid dependence of the operation of one upon the influence of another; therefore that mode of dependence is not only with respect to the first cause. The major premise seems to be taken from Aristotle,

Metaphysics II, where, proving that there is no infinite process in efficient causes per se ordered, he supposes that not only between two, namely the first and second, but among several there is some subordination. And hence in Physics II, text 26, he says: "The sun and man generate man." And in De Generatione II, text 55, for this reason he calls the sun the author of things to be procreated; and in Problems section XXVI, question 35, he calls it the author and parent of motions. And in section XI, question 5, he says the sun is that which moves all things. And finally in De Generatione II, text 56, and Metaphysics XII, text 34, he says the motion of the heavens is the cause of all generations and corruptions; and in Meteorology I, chapter 9, he attributes this particularly to the motion of the sun. Similarly St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 67, says that inferior bodies act in virtue of celestial bodies. And in book IV, final chapter, he says that the generation and corruption of inferior bodies is caused by the motion of heaven. Finally all philosophers seem to think thus about the causality of the heavens, and therefore they call them universal causes with respect to all inferior things.

Various Senses of the Question

3. In order to reduce this question to certain points, it must be noted that comparison can be made either between causes that are suppositally distinct, which are called causes "as what" (ut quod), or between the powers of the same cause or of the same supposit. Therefore this question is chiefly treated in the former sense, and so we shall speak first about that; but we shall add something about the latter, so that a complete resolution may be had. Next it must be observed that it is one thing to speak of causes concurring partially to the same action in the same order, another thing indeed to speak of causes essentially subordinated, with intrinsic dependence of one upon another in operating. In the former way it is certain that several created causes often concur to the same action or effect; which can

sometimes be per accidens from the fortuitous concourse of causes otherwise per se sufficient; sometimes indeed it can be per se and from the institution of nature. And in this way several stars often concur to one effect, because individually they would not suffice per se. Concerning this mode of partial concourse, therefore, there is no difficulty, indeed perhaps the concourse of the heavens is for the most part to be understood in this way, as I shall say below.

4. In the former sense, therefore, the present question is treated. In which the whole difficulty concerns the dependence of inferior bodies upon celestial bodies. For concerning immaterial substances it is certain that they do not depend per se in operating upon any created agent; because they do not depend upon it in being nor in faculty or power of operating; therefore neither are they subordinated in acting. Again, concerning celestial bodies themselves, for the same reason it is certain that they do not depend per se in their actions upon other created agents, because they do not depend upon them in being; but operation follows being and imitates it. Likewise, because the heavens do not depend per se in their actions upon created intelligences, since neither do they depend upon them in being or in their powers, nor can those intelligences per se effect anything in bodies beyond local motion. You will say: at least through the mediation of motion the action of heaven can depend upon an intelligence. I respond that according to the more true opinion, that motion only serves the action of heaven by way of application to diverse bodies[11]; but that dependence is not per se, but per accidens, as is evident. But if it is true that heaven is an instrument of the moving intelligence for some actions, as regards those there will be essential dependence; yet in reality there are no such actions, as we touched upon above; because neither is there in the intelligence a principal power for effecting such corporeal effects, nor can local motion alone per se serve to communicate this power.

[11] See Soncin., XII Metaph., q. 13.

5. And for nearly the same reason one heaven does not depend upon another per se in its action, because one does not have being[12] nor the power of acting from another. You will say: the heavens do not act except through stars; but these do not act except through light, which they do not have except from the sun; therefore all depend upon the sun in the power of acting, and consequently in action. It is responded first by denying the minor premise, but each star has its own innate and connatural power through which it influences; for just as they have proper forms specifically diverse, so consequently there follow proper powers and faculties specifically diverse. Nor is it credible either that all stars have the power of acting per accidens as something extrinsic and accidentally coming to them, or that the same quality of light, merely from being received in diverse subjects, has such various and diverse effects as diverse stars have; but concerning this elsewhere. And besides, whatever may be the case about this, the action of the moon, for example, when illuminated, will not depend upon the sun, except insofar as the action of heated water depends upon fire, which is not dependence immediately from essential subordination, but only remote dependence, such as exists in every effect with respect to the remote cause which gave the power of operating to the proximate cause.

6. Furthermore, no question remains concerning the dependence of inferior corporeal agents upon intelligences, because from what has been said it is evident a fortiori that they do not depend upon them per se, but at most per accidens, as upon those applying active things to passive things, and even in this way not always nor regularly, except as regards the motion of heaven. Finally, concerning inferior bodies among themselves, it is also clear that they do not have the aforesaid dependence in operating, because none of them is compared to another as universal cause to particular, or has any reason for such dependence.

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[12] neque esse, 1960; alit. om. "En algunas ediciones falta neque esse." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 685

Diverse Opinions Concerning the Difficulty of the Question

7. The whole question, therefore, is reduced to the subordination of inferior bodies with respect to celestial ones. For there are those who think that such essential dependence intervenes between these agents, such that heaven actually influences all actions of inferior bodies. Thus think Javellus, Metaphysics XII, question 13; and Soto, Physics II, question 4, conclusion 1, and In IV, distinction 48, question 2, article 2, where from this principle he says that when the motion of heaven ceases, all action of inferior natural agents would suddenly cease, and all living things would immediately expire their souls, because they cannot live without some motion. Ferrariensis also indicates this, Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 97, § "It should be noted third"; for he says that in the generation of man the creation of the soul is from God, but the dispositions of the body are from the generator and from the motion of heaven per se and immediately.

8. Javellus adduces this reason to prove this (for other authors bring forward none): Every action of generable bodies is necessarily reduced to some ingenerable cause; but this is none other than a celestial body; therefore. The major premise is evident, because just as it is necessary that every motion be reduced to some immovable principle, so every generation to some ingenerable principle. But the minor premise is proved because that ingenerable agent is not a created intelligence, since that cannot immediately transmute matter to form. Nor is it the principle itself, because that does not act per se immediately in these inferior things, but through mediate causes; but here we are treating of a cause immediately concurring in all actions of inferior generators; therefore it is heaven. And it is confirmed from Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 1, saying that the first motion is life, that is, the fount and universal principle of things existing in nature, and thus it is compared to the universe as the motion of the heart to an animal,

which ceasing, all action ceases. Whence the Commentator, De Caelo I, comment 63, says that the principle of life, which is in the orb, is the cause of all life; and he has nearly the same thing in Metaphysics XII, comment 18. It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise the essential order among the parts of the universe is removed, which is against its due constitution, as is gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, final text.

9. The contrary opinion is taken from Scotus, In II, distinction 14, question 3, at the end; and from Richard there, article 2, question 6; and Durandus, ibid., second part of the distinction, question 3; Henry, Quodlibet XI, question 15, and Quodlibet XIV, question 1. For although in this latter place he seems to oppose in part, nevertheless, if rightly understood, he does not oppose, as we shall see. And this opinion seems to me most true; but it requires some explanation.

Complete Resolution of the Question

10. First assertion. I say therefore first: no secondary cause depends per se and intrinsically in acting upon another created agent, but only upon the first cause, namely, as upon a universal agent, immediately influencing in its order the action of the inferior cause. The conclusion is explained first; for we are treating of a secondary cause having in the nature of proximate cause sufficient power for some action or effect. For this must be supposed before all else so that essential subordination may be understood; for if a particular cause is insufficient in its order, and as regards what it lacks is helped by another superior one, there will not therefore be essential subordination in acting, but there will be a concourse of partial causes. This therefore being supposed, the conclusion is proved first, because a secondary cause does not depend in its being upon another created cause; for above we proved that elements and mixed bodies do not depend upon heaven in being conserved. And for the same reason the

intrinsic and connatural powers of these things do not depend upon it; therefore by parity of reason neither do their actions depend from their intrinsic nature upon heaven, and consequently neither upon another created cause; for we have already excluded the others. The final consequence is evident, because operation is proportioned to being itself.

11. You will say: sometimes a form depends in being conserved upon an agent, as light upon the sun; therefore then at least it will also depend in its action upon the immediate influence of the sun. It is responded that even if the whole is conceded, it makes no difference, because it is not inconvenient that some quality depend upon its agent in the aforesaid way in operating. But secondly it is said that the consequent does not follow from the force of the antecedent; for visible species depend in being conserved upon the object, and yet they do not have a new immediate dependence in operating. From the negation therefore of dependence in being we believe independence in operating is best inferred; but not conversely, that from any dependence in being a new and immediate dependence in operating is inferred. Because this often is not possible with respect to a created agent; but with respect to an uncreated agent that consequence is excellent, on account of the essential dependence of all participated entity upon the first being.

12. The second reason, similar to the preceding, is that the effects of these natural agents do not depend per se and essentially in being upon heaven, as was also proved above, because as regards this there is the same reason concerning univocal causes and their effects; therefore neither does the action of such causes depend per se and intrinsically upon heaven. The consequence is evident, because such is the becoming as is the being. And both reasons take their foundation from what was said in section 1, that the dependence of a secondary cause upon the first in its operation is founded in the fact that both the secondary cause and its action and effect are beings by participation, and therefore per se and immediately depend upon being by essence.

But this reason does not have place with respect to another created cause, and that being excluded, none sufficient remains for introducing that kind of dependence; but a multitude of causes is not to be required for some effect without reason and necessity. Whence for this also can avail the reasons by which Durandus, cited above, attempted to remove this dependence from the first cause.

13. The third reason can be that if heaven influences per se and as universal cause in the actions of all inferior things, either it is understood to do this immediately with immediacy of supposit, or only of power; not in the former way, because, as we suppose, no cause acts immediately with immediacy of supposit in a thing distant in place; but heaven is far distant from inferior agents and their actions. But if it acts in the latter way, it is necessary that it do this through a diffused power; for the power inhering in heaven itself is also far distant from inferior causes and their effects, whence it cannot be understood to influence immediately, except insofar as it diffuses some participation of itself through intermediate bodies up to the particular cause proximately acting, and from the power, insofar as it reaches there, action will immediately flow. But truly the influx of this power cannot be universally and generally affirmed with foundation; for who would believe that fire needs a power superadded from heaven in order to heat or illuminate? And wherever it intervenes, it does not pertain to the dependence of a particular cause upon a universal one, but to supplying the insufficiency of the particular cause, as I shall immediately declare.

14. And the reason is clear, because after that power has been impressed by heaven into a body or inferior agent, that composite of innate power and power infused from heaven is the proximate sufficient cause for such action, in which it no longer depends per se upon heaven, but only remotely, insofar as it received the power of acting from it, just as heated water depends in heating upon fire. It is therefore a sign that this is not per se dependence in acting of one cause upon another. And then it is also a sign that if a particular cause

has complete and sufficient power in its order, it will not need (speaking per se) another power influenced from heaven; for that multiplication of powers is superfluous. And this is what we directly intend in this assertion.

15. Second assertion. I say secondly: it often happens that the power of some inferior secondary cause is per se mutilated and imperfect in its order and insufficient for the effect, and for that reason needs the help of another created cause which completes or supplies the power of acting. And in this way inferior bodies need the influx of the heavens for several of their actions, especially for the generations of mixed bodies, and most of all of living things. This conclusion is proved by the arguments of the former opinion; for it cannot be denied that there is some per se order between sublunary and celestial causes; but the former intrinsic and essential dependence being excluded, no other mode of per se subordination between such causes can be understood. It can also easily be declared by induction; for elements per se alone and through their mutual action and reaction cannot suffice for substantial mixture, so that from them and by them a true substantial mixed body is generated, both because neither in any of them nor in all simultaneously is the form of the mixed body formally or eminently, and also because, since elements are transient matter with respect to mixed bodies, the whole active and material force of the generation of the mixed body cannot be in them alone. Therefore a celestial power is necessary which helps to perfect the mixture. Again inanimate mixed bodies, speaking generally, are very weak for generating things similar to themselves, as experience shows. And the reason seems to be that they are both little active, because they have primary qualities broken and remitted, and they are greatly impeded in their action by surrounding bodies and by contrary qualities of patient bodies. On account of this cause, therefore, celestial power was also necessary, which either helps these agents, or certainly effects the generation of these things entirely, as seems to happen in the production of gold and metals.

16. Again concerning vegetable things it is clear how much they depend upon the heavens as regards their generation or growth, which happens in no other way than because through celestial influence they either receive in themselves qualities similar to their qualities in the power of acting, or receive increase or intensification of their qualities, or because the matter from which these living things are generated or nourished is disposed through celestial power so that it can more easily be changed by their action. Again in this way also the generations of animals depend much upon celestial influence, and thus it is excellently understood how the sun and man generate man, because namely human seed has imperfect force unless it is fostered and helped by the heat of the sun to perfect that action. And in this way Henry says above that celestial power influenced into these seeds is necessary by which they are determined to their various actions; for since seed has such varied and multiple action in the organization of the body, particular power does not seem to suffice for this intrinsically, and therefore celestial power is deemed necessary. Which is probable, although it is no less obscure in what way power influenced from heaven, if it is simple in itself and naturally acting, suffices for that variety. But whatever may be the case about this (which was touched upon above), it is evident that the necessity of this celestial influx always arises from the insufficiency of particular power, either to overcome the resistance of matter, or to protect itself from contraries, or to complete the whole disposition as is necessary for perfecting generation.

17. And it is confirmed from the contrary, for where the power of a particular agent is found sufficient for its action, either lesser or no celestial influence is necessary for it, as much as can be gathered from reason or experience. Hence it is that fire generates fire from the same matter in the same way, other things being equal, in whatever aspect or disposition of celestial stars. And in the same way color effects visible species, and sight elicits the act of vision, and the same is true of other vital actions, provided the disposition of organs

is conserved the same and other things are equal. And in this way St. Thomas said, Opusculum 10, article 8, that if a man's living body with the same disposition of members were conserved when the motion of heaven ceases, man could move his hand or tongue in the same way; and in question 5 De Potentia, article 10, ad 8, he says that in that case the motion of the heart would last in man.

How Some Universal Causes Among Created Things May Be Called Such

18. From these things, therefore, it is evident in what sense some universal causes beyond the first can be admitted, and some per se subordination between some secondary causes among themselves, and what in this is proper to the first cause, and what is the difference between it and others. For it is proper to it that every operation depends upon it per se immediately and essentially, so that however great the inferior power may be, without that influx it cannot act, nor can it even be supplied by another agent, nor through any created power even impressed by God himself. But operation of one creature does not depend upon another in this way, as has been declared, and therefore it is proper to God alone to be in this way the universal cause of all actions. Nevertheless, because natural things that are generable and corruptible have imperfect powers for acting, and many have contraries by which they can be impeded from effecting their actions or generations, the continuous succession of which is necessary for the conservation of the universe, therefore the author of nature provided certain superior bodies which would have various powers of acting and through continuous motion would be applied in various ways, so that thus they could also help inferior agents in various ways for their generations or corruptions. And therefore those superior bodies are deservedly called universal causes, because they operate in some way toward the effects of all inferior causes. In which way Dionysius says, De Divinis Nominibus chapter 4: "The ray of the sun contributes to

the generation of sensible bodies and to life itself, moves and nourishes, and increases, and perfects."

19. What kind of subordination exists in inferior agents to superior ones. And in a similar way natural causes per se subordinated to celestial ones are understood according to the order instituted by the author of nature. Not because either the powers or effects of inferior bodies per se and intrinsically signify a relation or dependence upon celestial bodies, but because de facto, according to the order of the universe, they are so instituted under them that they are helped and fostered by them in their actions and powers. But if God had instituted another order, either through himself or through other bodies helping or supplying the defects of inferior agents, equally well and connaturally according to their proper and particular natures these agents would perfect their actions. And for the same reason, if sometimes it happens de facto either that a particular inferior cause is sufficiently helped by another inferior cause, or is per se sufficient for its action, it will be able to exercise that action without the concourse of heaven. And similarly, although the power of an inferior cause is insufficient for perfecting the whole generation, and celestial help is entirely lacking, indeed rather it resists it, and for that reason it cannot perfect generation, nevertheless it effects some alteration or remote disposition, for which such power per se suffices.

Solutions to Opposing Arguments

20. The reason for doubting posited at the beginning therefore remains solved from the aforesaid; for all the sayings of Aristotle and other philosophers about the influx of the heavens and about the dependence of inferior agents upon them are sufficiently understood according to the mode of subordination and dependence explained by us. But to the argument of Javellus it is responded that the action of a generable and corruptible agent does not per se and intrinsically necessarily depend upon another incorruptible agent

beyond the first cause; but if sometimes it depends, it is only when the power of such agent is per se insufficient and is helped from the partnership of a superior incorruptible body. But the proof which Javellus adduces from the immediacy of action is improbable, and rather suggests the opposite; for the first cause acts more immediately in the actions of all corruptible bodies than heaven does. But the other confirmations are solved from what was said about per se subordination, and about the mode in which heaven influences with inferior causes. But what is touched there about the cessation of all inferior actions when the motion of heaven ceases, in that sense is improbable, namely, concerning momentary cessation on account of essential dependence; for the motion of heaven is not per se the cause, but only application to acting. Only therefore could it be said that from that time or moment all would cease, because from then they would begin to be corrupted and fail; concerning which elsewhere. See St. Thomas, who hints at this in the said Opusculum 10, article 23, at the end; and Soncinas treats this more broadly, Metaphysics XII, question 13, with others cited above.

21. How the faculties of the same supposit may happen to be ordered among themselves. Finally from these things the other point touched above only concerning subordinated powers of the same supposit can easily be resolved; for in those it happens that there is essential dependence in acting between several powers, because they are much more connected among themselves than diverse supposits. Always however in such subordination, if it is per se and physical and in the genus of efficient cause, the inferior power is compared as instrumental to the superior to which it is subordinated. And in this way the faculties of the soul depend essentially upon the soul in the operations of life, and an intentional species upon the power in which it exists as in a subject. And to the same is reduced the dependence which in acting a habit has upon the power which it affects. But I said "if it is per se," etc., because the intellect in some way is subordinated to the will in some of its actions, yet not as per se and principally

cooperating, but as only applying and moving to action. And conversely the will is subordinated to the intellect, yet not as co-effecting, but as applying the final cause. Wherever therefore there is per se subordination, some notion of conjoined instrument and principal agent intervenes; under which notion such instrument per se alone is an insufficient principle of such action and effect.

DISPUTATION XXIII

ON FINAL CUASE IN GENERAL

The order of succession among these disputations. Although the final cause is in some way the principal one among all causes and also prior to them, nevertheless its manner of causing is more obscure, and therefore it was almost unknown to the ancient philosophers. Because of this ignorance they fell into other errors concerning the knowledge of natural things, as Aristotle notes in Physics II, chapter 8, and Metaphysics I, and On the Parts of Animals I, at the beginning. For this reason, therefore, although it has been established above that the end ought to be numbered among the four genera of causes, so that we may expound this more fully and resolve the difficulties, it will be necessary to inquire first whether the end is a cause, then how and what it causes, how many kinds of end there are, and what is the manner of causing proper to each.

SECTION I

WHETHER THE END IS A TRUE REAL CAUSE

1. Reasons for doubt. First. The primary reason for doubt is that it belongs to the nature of cause to be a principle, as is evident from the definition we gave above; but the end is not a principle, for it

is rather opposed to principle, as is evident from the very name "end," and as Aristotle signifies in Metaphysics III, text 3.

2. Second. Secondly, it belongs to the nature of real cause to influence the effect per se and really, as was stated above in the definition of cause; but the end does not really influence being into the effect; therefore it is not a cause. The minor is proved, because the end influences either before it exists or after it already exists; not the first, for what does not exist, what real influence can it have, since being is the foundation of all operation and likewise of all causality? Nor can the second be said either, because when the end exists, then the action and causality of the agent ceases; therefore the causality of the end is not necessary then.

3. Third. Thirdly, because nothing can be the real cause of itself; but form, according to Aristotle's testimony, is the end of natural generation by which the form itself comes to be, just as health is the end of healing by which it is acquired; therefore insofar as it is an end, it cannot have the true nature of real cause. You will say that form is the end of generation, which is distinguished from the form itself. But on the contrary, because nothing can be the real cause of the production of a thing unless it is also the cause of the thing produced, since a thing is not caused except through the action by which it comes to be; but form cannot be the real cause of itself; therefore neither of the generation by which the form itself comes to be. Whence it is confirmed, for real cause implies a real relation to the effect; but the end is not capable of such a relation, both because either when it causes it does not have real being, or when it has real being it neither causes nor is distinguished from the effect.

4. Fourth. The fourth and principal reason for doubt is that the end can be considered either in the nature of a moving and attracting principle that draws the agent to act, or in the nature of a term toward which the action tends; for this twofold nature is usually distinguished by philosophers in the object of any power, namely, the moving and terminative object; and the same distinction has place in

the end, which is the object of the will. But under neither nature can the end have the true nature of cause. And first, concerning the nature of term it seems manifest, both because as such it rather has the nature of effect than of cause; and as such it is the last thing of the action, not its origin; finally, as such it does not influence, but rather the influence of other causes tends toward it. Then neither under the other nature of mover can it have the nature of cause; for, as Aristotle holds in On Generation I, text 55, the motion of the end is only metaphorical; it is therefore not true and real; therefore it does not suffice for real causality. And it is confirmed first, because this metaphorical motion of the end is found even in God; for indeed God on account of his goodness, by which his will is metaphorically moved or attracted, communicates himself to creatures, and yet it cannot be said that that end has true causality with respect to God. And it is confirmed secondly, because if the end under this nature alone has the nature of cause, therefore at least with respect to natural agents the end cannot be a real cause, because it cannot move or attract them to love of itself.

5. And hence arises a fifth difficulty, because thereby the whole foundation is overturned on account of which this genus of cause was introduced by philosophers, namely, because natural agents do not operate by chance or fortune, but tend toward determinate ends in their actions. For from this foundation or indication alone it is inferred that natural things have definite terms of their propensities and natural inclinations; for this is sufficient so that they operate determinate effects not by chance, but per se, even if no other genus of causality intervenes. Just as theologians say that the eternal Father per se and definitely tends (so to speak) through generation to such a term, namely to this Son, not from the causality of an end, but from the determination of nature. And in natural things, a stone by natural inclination definitely tends to the lower place, even if that place has no genus of causality concerning that motion, but only the nature of a term toward which the stone has natural propensity. And the same can be said of one operating through elicited appetite, whether from

necessity or freely, namely that it is moved by elicited motion toward an object proposed to it, because such motion is consonant with the natural inclination of the power itself toward such an object, without other causality of that object in such an act; therefore there is no sufficient foundation for us to attribute the true nature of cause to the end.

6. Sixth. The sixth and last difficulty is that it cannot be sufficiently explained what, or concerning what, the end causes. For either it causes something in the agent itself, and this cannot be said universally, because, although in created voluntary agents it can in some way be defended, nevertheless not in natural agents, nor in God, who is an uncreated voluntary agent. Or it causes something in the effect itself, and this has in general the difficulty touched upon above in the third argument, and besides has a special difficulty in created voluntary agents, because the whole causality of the end, whatever it may be, seems to be exercised around the wills of such agents; but around their effects only remotely and accidentally; and therefore the effects will not have a proper final cause.

Resolution of the Question

7. Nevertheless, the certain conclusion must be established that the end is a true, proper, and real cause. This is a received doctrine and as it were a first principle in philosophy and theology; Aristotle taught this in Metaphysics II, chapter 3, and book XI, chapter 1, and Physics II, chapter 1 and following; and before him Plato had taught it in the Phaedo where he reports Socrates to the same opinion; indeed he wants only the end to be cause, perhaps by antonomasia, that is, the first and principal one, of which we will speak below in the comparison of causes. The reason can be taken primarily from the common way of speaking about end and about cause; for the end is said to be that on account of which something is made or exists; for in this way Aristotle everywhere describes the end; but it is evident that

the particle "on account of" signifies causality; for each thing is said to have being on account of its cause; therefore it is a sign that the end has the nature of cause. Furthermore, the efficient cause, unless it acts rashly, must act for the sake of something; therefore the effect itself of the efficient cause, so that it can per se be made by it, intrinsically requires that it be made for the sake of something; therefore such an effect just as it per se depends on the efficient as that from which it is made, so in its genus it per se depends on something for whose sake it is made; but that is the end; therefore it per se depends on the end; therefore conversely the end is the true cause of that thing which is made on account of the end.

8. But in this matter it is not so much necessary to multiply reasons as to expound the matter, so that difficulties may be resolved and the causality of the end, which is obscure, may be declared; for this is what the difficulties posited at the beginning tend toward, not so that the certain thing may be called into doubt. But so that this may be done more distinctly, let us distinguish three agents acting on account of an end. The first and supreme is the uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. In the second and middle order are created intellectual agents, among which men are better known to us, and therefore we will always speak of them, although the same reasoning applies to created intelligences. In the third and lowest order are natural agents or those lacking intellect, although among them there is some difference between those that have sense and appetite and the rest, which we will also indicate in its proper place. Therefore the causality of the end, although it has place in its own way in the actions of all these agents, nevertheless it is better known to us in created intellectual agents, and it has a certain greater propriety and special mode, and therefore we will particularly declare this causality of the end in them and resolve the difficulties arising concerning it; but afterwards we will speak of other agents. Therefore that in created agents acting through intellect and will there is causality of the end, sufficient argument is taken from human actions. For it is evident to us

by experience that we intend, when we operate in a human way, that is, freely and rationally, a certain end toward which we direct our actions and on account of which we choose means; therefore we are moved by the end, both to love or intention of itself, and to choosing and executing means on account of it; but this motion is something in the nature of things; for it is not something imaginary or feigned by the intellect; and it is some genus of causality, since it is the origin of real operations; therefore the end is a true and real cause. And hence it is also incidentally evident that this causality has place especially in intellectual agents, because they especially can know the end and means, and the order of one to the other, and the proper nature of each.

The Reasons for Doubt are Resolved

9. The arguments made at the beginning partly demand proper difficulties pertaining to God and to the lowest natural agents, partly they press those things that can be treated concerning cause; but these are all those things that are treated concerning other causes, as Cajetan hinted, I, q. 5, a. 4, and II-II, q. 17, a. 5, namely, what things can cause finally, through what or what is their reason of causing, either as principal reason, or as proximate. Likewise what is the necessary condition, what the effect; in what finally its causality consists, which here is the most obscure of all. Lest therefore we involve and confuse all these things, they must be treated distinctly in the following sections; therefore the exact solution of the arguments must be awaited until the end of the disputation. Now we will run through them individually in a cursory manner.

10. First. The end is truly a principle. To the first we deny the minor, namely, that the end is not a principle; for in the way that it is first in something, it has the nature of principle; but the end is first in intention, although it is last in execution. But Aristotle, in the cited place Metaphysics III, does not oppose the end to every principle, but

to the principle of motion, by which he understands the efficient cause, which he distinguishes from the final.

11. To the second the minor is denied, namely, that the end does not influence really; but to the proof the common response is that the end influences when it does not exist in reality, but only in apprehension or knowledge. But distinction is needed, both on the part of the end and on the part of the effect or action that the end causes. For, as I will say in the next section, one end is that for whose sake the action is made, another truly is that to which the end is acquired; likewise one is the formal end, such as the vision of God, and another the objective, such as God himself; likewise the end can cause desire for itself, or it can also cause rest, or delight, all of which we will soon declare. Therefore the end "to which" does not cause unless when it exists; for the end "to which" is said to be the agent itself, insofar as it operates on account of itself or for its own benefit, which it cannot do unless it exists. Likewise the objective end can also be supposed existing when it causes finally, such as God, on account of seeing whom we are moved to act well. Again the formal end, or the attainment of the intended end does not cause delight or enjoyment of itself unless when it exists, because delight is only of a possessed good; but if it be of hope for it, then hope itself has the nature of imperfect attainment. Therefore in all these cases that argument does not proceed, because with the objective end or the end "to which" existing (which for the sake of clarity could be called subjective), inquiry does not cease nor the causality of the end, unless there is also present the attainment of the end, and with this obtained, although motion toward the end ceases in the mode of desire, nevertheless not in the mode of rest and delight. Therefore only concerning the formal end or attainment of the end is it true, speaking per se, that it causes desire for itself when it does not exist in reality, and concerning this it has been correctly responded that it suffices that it be in apprehension and judgment of the intellect, because its motion is intentional and (so to

speak) animal, through sympathy and consonance of the powers of the soul, namely intellect and will.

12. What it is that the end causes. The third argument asks what the end causes, and specially touches the difficulty how form is the end of natural generation, which pertains to the difficulty about natural agents to be treated below, and therefore it is now briefly said that the end causes desire for itself or another similar affect toward itself, and thus does not cause itself immediately, but something distinct from itself. And hence it is also evident to the confirmation, that on this part it does not contradict that the relation of cause in the end be real; for there is sufficient distinction between it and such an effect, and when the end itself does not exist in reality distinct from its effect we will speak in section III.

13. But whether from another consideration it contradicts that that relation be real, namely, from the fact that the end itself does not have real being while it causes, is a doubtful and controversial matter. Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 3, and Javellus, q. 6, say that the objective being that the end has in the intellect suffices for it to be really related to the effect; but this is difficult to believe; for that objective being posits nothing of reality in the end itself, but only an extrinsic denomination from the act that is really in the intellect; but that act is not really related to the effect of the final cause, because it does not concur per se to it, as I will say below. Therefore those respond better who deny that a real relation in the cause follows upon every real causality; for it is not necessary from the force of causality, if other conditions do not concur, as is evident in God's effective causality. Whence I add, even if the end exists while it causes, it is not really related to its effect, because in its mode of causing it is of a certain superior nature, because it is in no way ordered to the effect, but the effect to it. Therefore, even if on the part of the effect a real relation is admitted here, which is probable, especially when the effect is ordered to the end not only by extrinsic denomination, but by intrinsic disposition according to what we will declare below,

nevertheless that relation is to be judged non-mutual; for the effect can be related to the end, insofar as it depends on it; whence, just as for this dependence it suffices that the end preexist in the mind, so also it will suffice for real transcendental disposition, although predicamental perhaps is not except to an end actually existing; however, because the end causes as entirely unmoved and not ordered to its effect, therefore it is not necessary that on its part the relation be real. For just as Aristotle said that knowledge is really related to the knowable, not conversely, so we can say concerning appetite and the appetible; for the reasoning is the same, and likewise it is the same concerning the appetible and the end.

14. Why the motion of the end is called metaphorical. In the fourth argument many things are touched pertaining to God and to natural agents; now, with those omitted, we concede that causality belongs to the end as it has the nature of principle, and consequently as it has the nature of mover. But its motion is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but because it does not happen through effective influence, nor through intentional and animal motion, and therefore nothing prevents its causality from being true and proper.

15. To the fifth, whatever may be the case concerning natural agents, about which we will respond later, the mode of operating of created intellectual beings cannot be understood without causality of the end, because they are truly attracted and moved by the end to operate, and although they themselves have natural propensity to objects or ends toward which they are moved through their proper vital acts, nevertheless that natural propensity cannot operate in its genus, that is, effectively, unless the end is sufficiently applied and concurring as a cause in its genus, and thus the determination of operation, or destination to a certain goal, which is perceived in intellectual agents, manifestly proceeds not from natural inclination alone, but from causality of the end. To the sixth, as far as this place allows, it has been sufficiently explained what, or concerning what, the

end causes; but we will give the complete treatment of this matter below.

SECTION II
THE MULTIPLE TYPES OF END

1. Before we proceed further to explain the other matters we have proposed concerning the causality of the end, it is necessary to explain various divisions or rather the significations of the term, so that we may distinctly understand what is under discussion.

First Division of End: "Of Which" & "For Which"

2. The first and celebrated division of end is therefore into the end "of which" (cuius) and the end "for which" (cui), which is taken from Aristotle, On the Soul II, chapter 4, where Argyropoulos translates it as the end "by which" (quo) and "for which" (cui); but the former words are more conformable to the Greek and better declare the intention. For the end "of which" is said to be that for the sake of attaining which a person is moved or operates, as health is in the case of healing; the end "for which" is said to be that for which another end is procured, as man is in the intention of health. For although man is healed for the sake of health, he nevertheless seeks that very health for himself and for his own benefit.

3. It can be asked which of these has the proper nature of an end. Some indeed attribute this only to the end "for which," which is the opinion of Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, following Ockham, In II, q. 3, a. 1; and the same is held by Henry, Quodl. II, q. 1. And it is proved thus: for that is properly an end in which the intention of the agent comes to rest; for other things seem rather to have the nature of means. But the intention comes to rest only in the end for which other things are procured; for all things are ordered to that end. Hence, just as a means is loved only insofar as it is proportioned to the end, so the

end "of which" is loved only insofar as it is proportioned and suitable to the end "for which." Therefore [the end "for which" is the proper end]. And this is confirmed: for an end ought to be loved with the love of friendship or at least of benevolence, because it ought to be loved for its own sake. But only the end "for which" is thus loved; for the end "of which" is loved for another, which is called the end "for which." And thus the love of the end "of which" is of concupiscence, while that of the other is of friendship or benevolence. And therefore the end "for which" is loved simply, but the end "of which" only in a certain respect, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26, a. 4, who says that that is loved simply for which good is loved; but this good, which is loved for another, is loved only in a certain respect.

4. On the other hand, it appears that only the end "of which" properly has the nature of final cause. For Aristotle, wherever he defines this cause, explains its nature by this, that it is that for the sake of which something comes to be, as is evident in Physics II, chapters 3 and 7, and Metaphysics V, chapter 2. And for this reason he says that the end is first in intention and last in execution, and similarly he says that form is the end of generation, not the generator itself. And this is declared by reason, because he for whom another end is acquired or sought is only the subject which is perfected or actuated by another thing which is intended as an end. For example, man is the subject of health or of the beatific vision, which is the end of our operations. This relation therefore is not properly an end, but of another nature. For no one would properly say that man is the end of the beatific vision, but rather that the vision is the end of man; for a thing exists for the sake of its operation as for an end. And this is confirmed: for in the end "of which" is comprehended, as I shall say below, the object of operation, as God is with respect to the beatific vision. Hence man loves not only the vision of God for himself, but also God himself with the love of concupiscence pertaining to hope, as theologians teach. But it cannot be said that man is the end of God because he is that for whom God is

loved. Therefore, that proper nature of end is not explained by that particle "for which."

5. Resolution. Nevertheless, it must be said that the proper nature of end can be preserved in both of these, and sometimes they are so conjoined that from both there coalesces one integral end. This is consonant with Aristotle in the cited place from On the Soul. And it is proved by reason, for each of these ends can of itself excite the will and be loved or intended by it on account of its goodness. For thus when man seeks health, he loves himself, for whom he wills health on account of his own benefit and perfection, which he appetites of itself on account of the supreme conjunction or rather identity which it has with him. Similarly, he loves and intends health on account of the perfection of health itself, in which there is a great difference between a means and the end "of which." For a means, for example a potion, is lovable only insofar as it is useful for health; but health itself is loved for its own sake, because it of itself perfects the man for whom it is loved. Hence it comes about that this whole thing, a healthy man, is the integral and adequate end of that action, in which the aforesaid two ends are included, as if composing one integral end. Thus also a power is said to exist for the sake of operation as for the end for the sake of which it comes to be, although also the operation is truly for the sake of the power itself, namely so that it might perfect it and constitute it in ultimate act. So that it may deservedly be said that the integral end is the power as perfectly actuated, which others express thus: a power exists not so much for the sake of operation as for the sake of itself operating. And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these diverse relations should mutually be one the end of the other and conversely. For thus the intellect exists for the sake of the vision of God and the vision also exists for the sake of the intellect, so that it might perfect it. Nor is this inconvenient, both on account of the diverse relations, and because the intention of the agent is carried as if adequately to the composite from both with the mutual relation of the components among themselves, in which way matter exists for

the sake of form, and form also exists in some way for the sake of matter; but the whole is what is of itself first and adequately intended. Although the end "for which" and "of which" can be thus compared to each other, this is nevertheless not always necessary, as I shall immediately declare.

6. A Small Question Following from the Preceding Resolution. Someone will further ask, granted that each of them is properly an end, which of them is more principal. I respond that the comparison can be made either in the nature of being, or in the nature of causing. In the former way, it is not of itself necessary that one of these ends should always be a more perfect being; for sometimes the end "for which" is a nobler thing, as when man operates for the sake of acquiring health for himself; sometimes the converse happens, as when the same man operates for the sake of acquiring God for himself, who is far nobler. And the reason is that sometimes a thing or supposit more perfectly intends to acquire another perfection for itself, although lesser, for which it suffices that such a subject comport itself more perfectly with such a form than without it, although if it be compared precisely to the same form, it is something more perfect. Sometimes however a thing is perfected by conjunction to something more perfect, as man by conjunction to God, and then a less perfect thing can very well operate for the sake of another more perfect thing so that it might have and possess it insofar as it is able, in which way also matter appetites form, and if it could operate something for the sake of attaining it, it would do so. Under which consideration form has the nature of end "of which," and matter of end "for which," which is less perfect than form.

7. But if those two are compared in the latter way, namely in the nature of cause and end, the same seems to be asked what is more principal as what is more loved and more intended. And surely the reasons made previously seem to persuade that the end "for which" is more loved, because it is loved more by reason of itself, and the motion of the will rests more in it. Only that example about the love of

concupiscence and the intention of attaining God insofar as he is our good seems to stand in the way. For we cannot say that by that act we love ourselves more than God; otherwise that love would be inordinate. Nor can we say that that intention rests principally in us rather than in God; otherwise we would absolutely be the ultimate end of that intention and not God, and thus the intention would also be inordinate.

8. Therefore distinction or limitation is needed; for in particular goods, which are chiefly or even entirely loved for the benefit of the lover, or so that they might perfect him, or under some other relation to him, it is true that the end "for which" is more principally loved and is the more principal end. And this is proved by the reasons made previously. Which can be confirmed, for often such a particular good which is the end "of which" presupposes absolute love of that person for whom it is loved, and love of it is born from that love. For thus man sometimes loves himself with proper love of benevolence and from that afterward loves health for himself. And hence it also often happens that such particular goods are loved as means and useful to other ends suitable to the lover himself. It is therefore a sign that with respect to these ends, the end "for which" itself is more principal and more beloved. But when the end "of which" is the supreme good and ultimate end, if it is loved and intended in an orderly way, it must always retain the more principal nature of end and more draw the intention of the operator to itself. Because since it is the ultimate end simply, it cannot be so referred to another under some relation of end that it would rest principally in another. And thus, when man intends to attain God, although he is in some way the end for whom that good is sought, nevertheless man absolutely rather orders himself to that end, for he wills to be conjoined to the good as to his ultimate end. Whence it comes about that, although in that motion and tendency with respect to means and operation man is properly said to be the end "for which," nevertheless with respect to God himself, who is principally sought, he is not so much to be called

an end as a subject which is ordered to attaining that end. Although I do not deny that he can also be called the end "for which"; for he truly has that relation, but so that it is understood that he is rather ordered to another objective and ultimate end, than that he orders that end to himself.

Second Division of End into Operation & Thing Made

9. Secondly, end is usually divided into that which is operation only and that which results from operation or toward which action tends as toward a thing made. Aristotle touched on this division in Ethics I and Magna Moralia I, chapter 3. And as far as pertains to the formal nature of end, it seems to be a material division taken from things which exercise this causality, rather than from variation in causing. Nevertheless, for understanding authors, especially various places in Aristotle, and for explaining other divisions and especially for declaring the ends of diverse things and maximally of man, it is necessary. Examples therefore of each member are easy, both in works of art and of nature. For the end of healing is health, of building is a house, of generation is the thing generated, and so of others. But of playing the cithara there is no other end than citharization itself, and of contemplation nothing but contemplation itself. Although in the second member it must be noted that even in those actions the terminus can be philosophically distinguished from the action; for the terminus is always some quality; but action is the way or tendency of that quality. Nevertheless, because the terminus of this action is such that it does not last except while it is being made, because in being made and being conserved it depends on the actual motion or influx of the power, therefore as far as pertains to the nature of end, no distinction is made between action as action and as terminus. But in actions of the former kind the intended end is the thing made, which remains when the action ceases. From which it is also understood that this division is given only concerning the end "of which"; for the end

"for which" is neither action, nor is it made by action, but is rather presupposed to action, since it is the agent itself.

Third Division of End, namely of Action or of Thing Made

10. And hence arose the third division of end into end of action and end of thing made or generated. This is taken from Aristotle, partly Physics II, chapter 7, partly On the Heavens II, chapter 3. For in the former place he says that form is the end of generation; in the latter he says that each thing, and so also form itself or the thing generated, exists for the sake of its operation. And thus it happens (as is also taken from Averroes, On the Heavens IV, text 22) that the thing generated is the end of generation, and the operation for the sake of which the thing is generated is also an end, proximately indeed and immediately of the thing generated itself, but remotely and mediately of generation itself. In this division only two things occur to be noted: one is that when Aristotle says form is the end of generation, under form he comprehends the whole composite or the thing itself generated; for generation exists maximally for the sake of that. Nevertheless, because the thing generated does not come to be except by inducing form into matter, therefore he explained the end of generation through form. And what Aristotle said about generation is to be understood of every action, both natural and artificial, by which some thing comes to be so as to remain, and it can also be extended to creation; for also the thing which is created is the proximate end of that action.

11. The other thing to be observed is that the end of the thing generated is commonly considered to be some operation for the sake of which the thing comes to be, as the vision of God with respect to man or illumination with respect to the sun. Nevertheless, so that we might comprehend every end of the thing generated, by operation it is necessary to understand every use to which the thing generated is

ordered. For the end of matter, which is a certain thing generated or created, is not some proper operation, but nevertheless its causality, namely the sustaining of form, or such composition of substance. Similarly the end of a house is habitation, which is not an operation, but a certain protection and as it were extrinsic information of the inhabitants, and so of others. And according to this mode it happens not only that with respect to the thing generated there is given an end which is an operation, for the sake of which the thing itself is generated, but also that with respect to one operation there is given another which is its end. For thus citharization exists for the sake of delight and speech for the sake of understanding. For one operation can concur to another, either objectively, or effectively, or at least as a necessary or useful condition for another operation, and therefore it can be ordered to that as to an end.

Fourth Division into Objective & Formal End

12. Fourth, from these divisions, especially from the second, arises another, by which end is divided into objective and formal. For, as we said, sometimes the end is an operation; but this operation, especially if it is immanent, besides the act itself requires an object about which it is concerned, as contemplation, which is the end of man, is concerned with some thing or truth worthy of contemplation, for the sake of which in some way contemplation itself exists, because through it [the object] is as it were compared and possessed according to a mode proportioned to it. And in this sense theologians distinguish, in the end of man, vision and God seen, and they call vision the formal end, which they also call the end "by which" (quo), and the attainment of the end; but they call God the objective end, or the end "which" (qui), because he is compared through the formal end. Thus it is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 8, and q. 3, a. 7, and q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, where he notes that these are not so much two ends as one, because neither can the object be attained except through the act,

nor can the act be made except about the object, and therefore the motion and intention of the agent is toward both by way of one, and thus they complete one final cause. Although in the way that they are diverse things, they can be compared among themselves and one ordered to the other. And in this way almost the whole doctrine which was delivered concerning the first can be applied to this division.

Fifth Division of End into That Which is Made & That Which is Obtained

13. And hence it further happens (which can be the fifth division) that the end "of which" sometimes is presupposed to the operation of the agent and is intended not as to be effected, but as to be obtained, which is true of the objective end, and in this way God is the end of our actions, and this extends to all things which are presupposed as objects or matter about which, as riches are the end of the avaricious person, not to be produced but to be acquired, even if they already exist. Sometimes however the end is not presupposed, but is made by the action of the agent, whether "to be made" is said properly for the thing made, or broadly, as can also be said of action. And in this way the vision of God is the end of man, and in general every operation, or terminus made through it, is an end not preexisting, but subsequent to the intention of the agent. And St. Thomas taught this division in terms in Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 18, and it is taken from the doctrine of Aristotle, partly Physics II and Metaphysics V, where he makes mention especially of that end which is made by the action of the agent; partly On the Heavens II, text 64, and Metaphysics XII, text 36, where he says God is the end for the sake of which other things act; but it is established that God is not an end which is made by the action of the agent, but which is presupposed to the actions of all agents.

Sixth Division into Ultimate & Non-Ultimate End

14. Sixth, end is divided into proximate and remote and ultimate. This division is frequent among authors, and has its foundation in Aristotle, in the cited places, and in Metaphysics II, chapter 2, where he shows that there is no infinite regress in ends. Nevertheless it can seem to someone that that division involves a repugnance with the thing divided; for it is of the nature of end to be ultimate, as the name itself indicates. And because it is of the nature of end to be loved for its own sake and other things for its sake, and consequently that it itself is not loved for the sake of other things; for then it would not be an end, but a means. Therefore end is not rightly divided into proximate and remote or ultimate. So that the division may be understood, two relations can be distinguished in final cause: the prior is that by which an end is said to be loved for its own sake; the latter, insofar as other things are loved for its sake and it itself is the reason for loving those things. Under the former relation therefore every end, if it is considered precisely insofar as it is an end, has the nature of ultimate, as the reason made shows; for in that which is said to be loved for its own sake is included the negation of love for the sake of another; in which negation the nature of ultimate is consummated. Nevertheless it happens that, although some object is loved for its own sake and on account of its goodness, nevertheless either by its nature or from the intention of the operator it is referred and tends to a further end, as when someone performs alms-giving both because it is an honest action under the aspect of mercy, and because it is accommodated to satisfying God for sins. Then therefore one end is ordered to another, although under that relation by which it is ordered it does not have the nature of end, but of means. That end therefore, which is immediately loved for its own sake, is called proximate end; but another end to which the other is ordered, is called remote; and if the intention of the operator rests in that, it will also be ultimate; but if that is ordered to a further end, it will be only remote,

not however ultimate; but because it is not possible to proceed to infinity, it will be necessary to rest in some that is ultimate.

15. And thus the necessity of the aforesaid division is easily established; for, because the intention of the agent must necessarily be concerned immediately with some end, because otherwise it would never begin, therefore it is necessary that there be some proximate end; for that is the one which the agent proximately and immediately intends by such an act or intention. But it is not simply necessary that besides the proximate end there be given a remote one, because the intention of the agent can rest in one end; nevertheless, because it can also tend to a further end, therefore besides the proximate there can be given a remote end. And similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary, because there is no infinite regress, it is nevertheless not necessary that the ultimate end should always be distinct from the proximate; for if the will rests in only one end, which it can do, that will be at once proximate and ultimate, at least negatively, that is, after which there is no other. But when there are several subordinated ends, then it is necessary that these ends be distinct. And hence it happens that, although it may happen that several means are subordinated among themselves, so that the first is for the sake of the second and the second for the sake of the third and so on up to the end which is loved for its own sake, if nevertheless none of those means is loved for its own sake, but purely as a means for the sake of another, none of them has the nature of proximate or remote end under the aforesaid relation; but that end to which the whole series of means is ordered, although it seems remote in the nature of object willed and material, nevertheless in the nature of end it is proximate or first toward which as toward an end the will tends, and it will also be ultimate, if it is not ordered to another end.

16. But if we consider the end under another relation, namely insofar as something is chosen or made for its sake, thus it is easier to distinguish those three natures of ends, not only in things which are appetited for their own sake, but also in things which are pure means

which are chosen for the sake of another. For when several means subordinated among themselves are chosen for one end, it is necessary that there be given a first and ultimate means, both in order of intention and in order of execution; for in neither order can there be infinite regress; otherwise either choice or execution would never begin. But that is called the first means in order of intention which is immediate to the end and which is first chosen after the intention of the end, and that same is ultimate in execution. Conversely however that means which is last in order of choosing, is first in execution; for where choice ends, thence execution begins, so that gradually through means one may arrive at attainment of the end. This means therefore which is first in execution and ultimate in choice has no nature of end, because it is not loved for its own sake, since it is only a means, nor is anything else loved for its sake, since choice is finished in it. Nevertheless the second means already has the nature of proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. But the third means has the nature of remote end with respect to the first means, and thus one can proceed through several ends more or less remote until one rests in the ultimate, which is always necessary, since one cannot proceed to infinity. And thus that division is sufficiently established as far as pertains to the exposition of terms; but some questions which arise from it will be treated more conveniently in the course of the disputation, especially two, namely whether means participate in some way in the causality of end, and whether it is necessary to constitute some ultimate end, where we shall also declare various acceptations of ultimate end, and whether it has proper and per se causality insofar as it is ultimate or remote end.

SECTION III

WHAT EFFECTS THE FINAL CAUSE HAS

1. Before we speak about the manner of causation of the end, it seems we should discuss its effects, so that we may proceed from

those things that are better known to us. And since, as I said above, we are now considering the final cause with respect to created will, through which intellectual agents operate for the sake of an end, we can consider two kinds of effects of this cause: some are within the will itself, and these are acts or affections elicited by it; others are outside the will, and these are effects that proceed outside it from its efficacy or command or motion through its proper acts.

2. It is therefore certain in the first place that final cause, as we now consider it, causes per se primarily and especially some act or affection in the will itself. This is accepted by the consensus of all, and can be sufficiently shown by the arguments by which in section 1 we demonstrated that final cause exists; for we arrive at knowledge of causes through effects; but through no effects do we so know the causality of the end as through those which it has regarding human will, which it allures by its metaphorical motion so that it both loves the end itself and seeks it through suitable means, until it attains it and rests in it.

First Difficulty: On the Causality of the End Regarding Internal Acts of the Will

3. The difficulty, however, is whether all acts that intervene in this progression are from the end as from a proper cause in its own genus, or not all, but some of them, and which ones they are. But in order that the nature of the difficulty may be perceived, it is necessary to distinguish the several acts that intervene in this matter. Some tend directly toward the end, either according to itself absolutely, like simple volition of it or love, or as to be attained through means, like intention, and these acts precede not only the attainment of the end, but also the choice of means. Others are acts that immediately concern means, although by reason of the end, and of this kind properly is choice, which is preceded by consultation and inquiry about means, which, insofar as it is necessary or useful for inquiring

about the end, is reduced to means, and insofar as it is voluntary, falls under choice in some way or is referred back to it. And these two genera of acts are said to pertain to the order of intention, because they precede not only the attainment of the end, but also the execution of means. After the order of intention follows the order of execution, in which similarly two other genera of acts can be distinguished: for some concern the execution of means, through their use which they call active. Others concern the end as already attained and possessed, namely, enjoyment or joy, which is also called rest of the soul, and in that state love can also endure.

4. There is therefore concerning these acts a first general difficulty, because the end is only the cause of means; but none of these acts is truly and properly a means to obtaining the end; therefore none of them is caused by the end. The major premise is evident from the definition of the end; for it is that for the sake of which something is done, which properly befits means alone. Then there is a special and greater difficulty about acts that concern the end; for in no way are they for the sake of the end; therefore they are not effects of the end. The antecedent is clear, because that is for the sake of the end which proceeds from love or intention of the end; for to be for the sake of something indicates an ordering to the end arising from some prior act; but intention of the end does not arise from another intention, nor love from love, otherwise there would be a process to infinity; therefore. Whence, just as assent to a conclusion is from principles, but assent to a principle is not from a principle, so will of a means can be from an end and for the sake of an end; but will of an end is not so. Third, the difficulty is increased in those acts that concern an end already attained; for the end does not cause after it has been obtained; for its causality consists in motion; but when the end is attained the mind already rests; therefore all motion ceases; therefore also the causality of the end. Whence Aristotle, I De Generatione, text. 55, says that when the end is obtained action ceases; but when action ceases

the causality of the end also ceases, because where there is no efficient cause, there cannot be a final cause either, as we shall teach below.

Resolution of the First Difficulty

5. To begin from clearer matters, it must be said first that the use or execution of means is per se and properly the effect of final cause. About this conclusion there is no controversy nor reason for doubt, because this act not only proceeds from affection and intention of the end, but can also truly and properly be said to be a means to the end. Because, although by the name of use and execution of the end we understand here not only external use or execution, but also the internal act by which the will applies members or instruments to executing the means, nevertheless that whole action, as it includes both the commanding act and the commanded act, is truly and properly said to be a means to the end; therefore it is also most properly an effect of the end. And it is confirmed, for choice is about means; but when means are such that they ought to be exercised through active use of the will, that active use itself also falls under choice; for that whole human action which coalesces from internal and external act is chosen as a means; therefore also the internal act of the will, by which the execution of an external means is immediately accomplished, has the nature of a means to the end; therefore it is also an effect of the end itself.

6. I say second: choice of means is truly and properly an effect of final cause. It is proved first, because that act is most properly for the sake of the end; but the causality of the end is especially declared by these words; therefore that act is from the causality of the end. Second, that act proceeds from intention of the end and from reason ordering the means to the end; but the causality of the end seems to consist especially in these; therefore. Third, such an act depends essentially on the end, because it would not concern means except by reason of the end; indeed the very means chosen are not effects of the

end except as means through choice; therefore it is much more necessary that choice itself be an effect of the end. And these arguments almost equally confirm the preceding assertion.

7. Nor does the first reason for doubt posited in the beginning stand against these assertions. First, because not only means are for the sake of the end, but whatever depends essentially on the end and proceeds from love of it. Then because choice itself can not inappropriately be called a means to the end. This can be explained from what we said above treating of formally free power, namely, that an act elicited by it is intrinsically voluntary or willed by way of act; therefore choice itself, since it is an act elicited by the will, is also intrinsically willed; but it is not willed except for the sake of attaining the end, because, just as the thing that is chosen is chosen for the sake of the end, so choice itself is exercised for the sake of the end. As one who chooses almsgiving to make satisfaction for sins refers to that end not only the almsgiving itself which he chooses, but also the very volition by which he chooses it; for that choice is necessary for that end, and in it is found that goodness and utility which is found in a means compared to the intended end. And it is confirmed first, for consultation is about means to the end, and if it happens that the will actually and formally wills to consult, which often occurs, that volition is truly of the same means to the end, because one wills to consult for no other reason than to prepare for himself a way to obtaining the end; therefore similarly, if by proper and reflexive will one wills here and now to choose, as one also can, by that act one wills choice as a certain means, because one also wills it for the sake of the end, just like consultation; therefore also when one does not do this by a distinct and reflexive act, choice itself, in the way that it is intrinsically willed, is intrinsically a certain means to the end, by reason of which it is willed; therefore it is truly and properly an effect of the end.

8. I say third: acts that concern the end itself, and precede or can precede by order of intention its attainment, are truly and properly effects of the end. Concerning this conclusion I find some diversity

among authors; for some admit it about the act of intention or desire, but not about the first act of love or simple volition. And the reason can be that desire or intention supposes love of the end and proceeds from it, and therefore can be caused by the end through mediation of love of itself, and most properly will be said to be for the sake of the end or by reason of the end, and therefore can be effects of the end. But love does not suppose another act or love of the end from which it proceeds, and therefore is not from love of the end; nor is it formally for the sake of the end, as far as concerns the direction of the will itself; therefore it is not an effect of the end in the genus of final cause, but only in the genus of object, efficient or specifying, according to various opinions. And Ferrariensis seems to hold this view, I Contra Gentiles, c. 75; for he says that although the thing which is an end can be loved without ordering anything to it, nevertheless it does not exercise the causality of an end until something is loved for its sake, and he is founded on the words of St. Thomas there saying that the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake. Nevertheless St. Thomas there does not say this is the adequate causality of the end, but that this pertains to the causality of the end. Others however admit the conclusion about all these acts, yet with a certain moderation, namely, that these acts are indeed effects of the end, but not so properly or not so perfectly as the former ones, which can be taken from Gabriel, In II, dist. 38, notab. 2; and Gregory, whom he cites there, a. 1.

9. Others nevertheless simply affirm that the end is properly the final cause of these acts, like Henry, II p. Summae, a. 46, q. 6. And in this sense the assertion is posited, which I take from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, where he simply says all human acts are for the sake of an end and consequently are effects of the end; for these two are convertible, just like being from an agent and being an effect of an agent, including under effect the action itself. But indeed these acts about which we now treat are truly human acts; for they proceed from

man as he is rational; indeed they are also free at least for the state of this life, as was proved above, disp. XVIII, sect. 3; therefore.

10. And from this the first argument can be formed; for man insofar as he exercises these actions, even the first love of the end, operates for the sake of an end, and does not operate as moved by another into the end, but as immediately and directly moved by the end itself, according to its proper and formal nature; therefore these acts are for the sake of the end, as caused from the proper motion of the end as end; therefore they are effects of the end as finally causing. The consequences are evident, because the most proper causality of the end is through the said motion. The major premise is also clear, because that action does not happen rashly and by chance, but tends toward a definite goal by design; from this we conclude that some action is for the sake of an end. The minor premise is also sufficiently clear, because in any of those acts man operates allured and attracted by a known end, not in any way, but insofar as it is some good to be loved for its own sake, which is a certain proper relation and formal nature of an end, and by virtue of this cognition man so operates in that action that he directs and moves himself toward such an end and toward its formal goodness. And this argument is taken from St. Thomas, said a. 1, where he proves a human act to be for the sake of an end in no other way than because it is from an object of the will under the aspect of an end, that is, as it exercises the proper causality of an end; and III Contra Gentiles, c. 2, reason 5; thus he says: Concerning agents through intellect there is no doubt that they act for the sake of an end, for they act preconceiving through intellect what they attain through action, and from such preconception they act. But these words can be applied also to simple love of the end itself.

11. Second, this is further declared in love itself; for it can be considered in two ways: first, as it directly tends toward the object; second, as it falls back on itself by virtual reflection, namely, in that way in which I was saying above that such acts are intrinsically voluntary. In the former consideration it is caused by the goodness of

the object, as known and moving the appetite to love such a thing for the sake of its goodness, and thus it is truly caused by the object as by an end, not indeed as by an end extrinsic to the thing willed, but as by the proper and intrinsic end of the very act of love, which tends toward it. And for the same reason such an act is said truly and properly to be for the sake of an end, not as for the sake of an extrinsic reason for willing, but because it is for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, and from its proper motion. In which (whatever others say) there is the same nature in love and intention; for intention also is not for the sake of an end that is an extrinsic reason for willing, but because it tends toward an end for its own sake and for the sake of its intrinsic goodness; but that difference, that intention supposes a prior act of love, is irrelevant to the present matter, as we shall immediately declare. Finally, from the common way of speaking it is established that we truly and properly are said to love an end for its own sake, or for the sake of its goodness, for thus we love God; but this particle "for the sake of," attributed to the end with propriety, declares its causality; therefore these expressions are true because of the causality of the end regarding such an act. Whence for this reason also, when we love God above all things, we are said to love him as ultimate end, because he truly exercises regarding our love the proper causality of ultimate end, and such an act does not tend toward another end, nor is it excited except by the supreme goodness of such an end, proposed to the will itself.

12. Also in the latter consideration including virtual reflection, it is most clearly established that such an act is for the sake of an end, because even if it can be loved for the sake of its honesty (which is not outside the nature of final causation), nevertheless it is truly loved for the sake of the object toward which it directly tends as toward an end, in almost the same way as we were saying above about choice. Although in choice there appears more of a certain nature of means to an end than in love, because love is not so ordered to attaining the end as choice is. In which there also seems to be some

difference between desire or intention and love of the end; for desire, since by its nature it supposes the lack of an attained end, is in some way a means to attaining it, indeed it is like a certain beginning of inquiry for it, which is true of intention with the same or greater reason; but love by its nature does not suppose lack of attainment of the end, and in this respect can less participate in the nature of means. But this difference does not prevent love itself from being truly caused by the end, because, as I was saying above, this causality is not limited to means alone, but extends to every act that is truly for the sake of an end and from its proper motion. Especially since also love when it precedes attainment of the end, insofar as it excites and moves to seeking it, can be said to be a most useful means to attaining it. I add finally that love by its nature abstracting from this or that state of the lover tends toward an end, so as to unite and join the lover; whence insofar as love itself is virtually or formally loved, it is loved for the sake of this end; therefore it is loved for the sake of the end which it has as object; therefore it is caused by the same end.

13. This can be confirmed very well from the doctrine of St. Thomas, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 2, where he says that since the object of the will is an end, this very thing which is to will, and any other act of the will is nothing other than to order something toward an end, and therefore necessarily supposes some objective end toward which it is ordered. It can also be added from Capreolus, In I, dist. 1, q. 1, ad 1, contra 3 conclusionem, that this love, because it precedes attainment of the end, is ordered as toward an end into the attainment and enjoyment of the very thing loved, and in this way can also be an effect of final cause. And in the discourse of that article and solutions of arguments he says and gathers many things from the doctrine of St. Thomas that can contribute to confirming this view. Finally this love can also be ordered toward the lover himself, as toward an end for whom, insofar as it perfects him and unites him in some way to his objective end; therefore from this aspect also it can be an effect of final cause.

14. I say fourth: acts of the will that concern an end already attained can and should also be numbered among the effects of final cause. It is proved, for these acts can only be either love, or joy, concerning which it is disputed whether they are distinct acts as they concern an end already obtained, which Capreolus treats at length, cit. loco; now let us speak of them as distinct, whether they differ in reality or in reason. Therefore an act of love, as such, is of the same nature regarding an end that is loved for its own sake, whether that end is already possessed or not; therefore, if love in itself, or which precedes attainment of the end is an effect of final cause, also that love which remains, the end being already attained, is an effect of the same end. The consequence is clear, because love is caused in the same way in both states by the known object alluring the will so that it loves it for its own sake and for the sake of its goodness. And thus St. Thomas, I-II, q. 23, a. 4, and q. 26, a. 2, in the same way attributes to the causality of the end or good object the love of it in both states, indeed also delight, as I shall say immediately. Whence also all the arguments by which we proved the first volition or love toward the end to be an effect of final cause prove the same about ultimate love, especially since it is probable that it is always the same and can persevere.

15. Concerning joy, however, insofar as it is something distinct from love, there seems to be some reason for doubt, both because it is like a certain passion necessarily following possession of the beloved end, and also because it is like the ultimate rest of the soul to which other things are ordered, even love itself, but it itself is not ordered to anything else, and thus it does not seem to have an end by which it can be caused. But nevertheless the assertion posited is proved also about this act; for truly joy is not a mere passion, but is a vital act elicited by the will itself and caused in its genus by a per se good object, and proposed by reason, and inviting the will, so that it rests and rejoices in it and in its possession for the sake of its goodness; but this causality of the object is none other than final, as to this mode of motion, whatever may be the case whether efficient

causality also intervenes among those acts from elsewhere, which is irrelevant to the present question. And it is confirmed first, for delight itself by nature is ordered as toward an end into the very action to which it follows, as a certain perfection and beauty of it, and so as to contribute to its constancy and facility; therefore also delight which follows from an attained end is ordered to the very attainment of the end, as to an end which it perfects and strengthens in its own way; therefore if the delight is intellectual and follows from that end perfectly known and proposed to the will, it will be caused by it in the genus of end. Whence, although delight is said to be something ultimate in the way of generation, nevertheless in the order of ends according to themselves it is not simply ultimate, although sometimes it can be taken by one who desires as his ultimate end. And then delight itself is also ordered to the very one who receives the delight as to an end for whom, and from this aspect it can be an effect of final cause.

16. Nor do the arguments made before press against this and the preceding conclusion. For to the first it has already been answered that not only means are effects of final cause, but every act that contributes to an end or is ordered to it, either as means, or as perfection of its possession; and finally whatever is from the proper motion of an end preconceived and proposed according to the proper nature of a good to be loved for its own sake. To the second, we deny that these acts are not for the sake of an end, for we truly love God for his own sake, and we take delight in God for his own sake. Nor is it necessary for this that an act, because it is caused by an end or is said to be for the sake of an end, be caused from prior love of the end, but it suffices that it be caused from the goodness of the end itself alluring the will. Although delight, insofar as it is an act distinct from love, is truly caused from love; for someone delights in a possessed end, because he loves it; but that causality, insofar as it is between acts, pertains more to a certain mode of efficiency or natural resultance than to final causality which we now investigate. This therefore is more

to be considered from the relation of the act to the object or end and from the peculiar way in which an intellectual thing is moved by an end to such acts. To the third it is answered that although delight is called rest, nevertheless it is not in a dead way (so to speak), as natural rest is, which consists in mere lack of motion, but it is vital rest, which is not without internal action; nevertheless because that is not for obtaining and seeking the end, but for enjoying an end already possessed, therefore it is called rest of the soul. Insofar therefore as it is a proper act and true action, it can be an effect of the end. But what Aristotle says, that motion or action ceases when the end is attained, must be understood of the motion by which one tends toward attainment of the end, not indeed of the internal action by which one rests in the end. Indeed St. Thomas adds, In IV, dist. 48, q. 2, a. 2, ad primam rationem in oppositum, that then motion ceases when the end is obtained, when such motion does not accompany the end itself or its attainment; just as heaven attains its end through its motion, nevertheless it does not cease, because that motion is necessary for that end; thus therefore internal action of love or delight does not cease when the end is attained, because it accompanies such an end and is necessary for its perfection, and therefore with respect to such action the causality of the end does not cease.

17. Here however a theological difficulty arose, especially from the last conclusion, for from this it follows that love itself and beatific enjoyment are truly and properly caused by God seen, or by the vision of him in the genus of final cause, and consequently those acts are truly and properly for the sake of an end, which seems inconvenient, since the acts are simply necessary. But because the matter is theological, I respond briefly by conceding that those acts are from the causality of an end; for all the arguments made above prove this equally. Nor does anything stand in the way because they are necessary, indeed in what precedes I said the necessity of that love comes from God clearly seen as ultimate end, whose supreme goodness is so powerful in causing even in that genus, that it

completely subjects the will to itself. Finally that necessity does not come from imperfection or from an irrational way of operating, but rather from supreme perfection, both of the ultimate end itself, and also of the mode of applying it through rational or intellectual cognition most perfect for moving the will, and therefore nothing prevents that motion of the will, however necessary, from being from the proper causality of an end. But whether it suffices that that necessary love be called a human act or not, is treated by theologians, and pertains more to moral philosophy than to metaphysics.

On the External Effects of Final Cause

18. We have spoken thus far about the effects which the final cause produces within the very will of the agent cause acting from purpose; now it remains to speak about the effects which proceed externally from such a cause, that is, outside the human will itself, so that under these effects are comprehended both the acts of all other faculties of man himself, namely the intellect, the senses, etc., and also external effects, if there are any, which result through these actions. In this matter there are two things that are certain and beyond controversy. One is that all natural actions which man exercises without command or motion of the will are not effects of final cause in that special way in which we now speak; of this kind are all actions of the vegetative soul, insofar as they are merely natural, and acts of the senses or even of the intellect, insofar as they sometimes precede the motion of the will. And the reason is that the causality of the end, insofar as it properly concerns agents acting from purpose, which move themselves toward an end, is primarily and per se about the will, and presupposes sufficient application of such a cause through the intellect; but in those actions which do not proceed from motion of the will, man is not thus moved from an end, but acts in the manner of other natural agents; therefore. Hence such a mode of acting per se does not require proper and rational knowledge of the end itself.

Indeed, even in the intellect itself, the knowledge or apprehension of the end itself, if it is natural and in no way from the will, does not proceed from knowledge of the end, but is itself the knowledge of the end, and therefore does not proceed from the causality of the end, as such, insofar as it is proper to agents acting from purpose. Which I always add for this reason, because in these natural acts man operates for the sake of an end just like other natural agents, concerning which we shall see later what it is in them to operate for the sake of an end, and what kind of causality of the end can exist in them. And in this assertion thus explained, no difficulty remains.

19. Second, it is certain that all actions and their effects which proceed from the command and motion of created will operating for the sake of an end are effects of final cause. This is proved first from the way of speaking and thinking of everyone, for when a man walks for the sake of obtaining health, such walking is considered to be an effect of health preconceived and intended, and therefore it is said to be most properly for the sake of an end, not from the direction of some extrinsic agent, but of the operator himself, who for this reason is called an agent from purpose; and the same is true of all similar things. And when through these actions some permanent terminus is made in actual being, that also is considered an effect of the preconceived end, either in becoming while it is actually being made, or in actual being when it afterwards remains; in which way Aristotle said that instruments are for the sake of an end, and similarly houses and other artificial things are effects of some preconceived end. The reason, moreover, is that the end moves to all these actions; therefore all are its effects. Likewise such actions, insofar as they are done by man, depend essentially on the end as causing, because they cannot otherwise be done by man; therefore they are effects of the end. Likewise those actions are means by which the intended end is obtained; but the end not only causes intention or choice, but also the execution of means; indeed in this its causality seems most to shine forth.

20. You will say: sometimes the action commanded by the will is not a means, but the very end intended, according to a certain division given above, that the end is sometimes a thing acted upon, sometimes the very action itself, such as playing the lyre, or contemplation; therefore then at least it will not be action for the sake of an end, even if it proceeds from the will; therefore it will not be caused by the end. It is answered, as we have already noted above, that there is no action which, if properly taken as it is action, does not have some intrinsic terminus for the sake of which it is done, as playing the lyre itself, insofar as it is a certain motion, produces a certain proportionate sound, which is a certain quality artfully composed, and in this way every action is in some way a means to its terminus, and for that reason can be caused by that as by an end. If we speak of the terminus itself, or it is comprehended under the action by way of unity, thus it is not properly a means, supposing that it is the ultimate end in its series; nevertheless nonetheless, although it may be the end of which, it can have an end for which; for playing the lyre as it is done by man is for the sake of the operator himself; or if such an act is a formal end, it can be for the sake of an objective end, as contemplation is for the sake of truth itself. And thus always every action, which is commanded by the will, is an effect of some preconceived end.

21. Concerning this latter assertion, however, two things occur that need to be briefly explained. The first is touched upon above, in section 1, because from what has been said it follows that the same thing is the cause of itself, which seems absurd. And the consequence is evident first because an operation commanded by the will is often a true final cause, which when apprehended moves to its own execution, and not only to desire or intention; therefore the execution of that operation is an effect of the same operation apprehended through the mode of an end; but that execution is nothing other than the very operation itself; therefore. Next, because the attainment of the end (whether it consists in operation, or in the mere inherence of some form, or in another similar relation) is the

ultimate effect of final cause, as the end of cure is health, not in any way, but as inhering in me and affecting me, and this is the ultimate thing that is caused from the force of that intention, and the same is proportionally true in other cases. But the first end which moves and causes up to this effect is the very attainment of the end as apprehended; therefore it causes itself.

22. It is answered first that there is no inconvenience in conceding this whole thing, because in final cause there does not intervene that repugnance which exists in efficient cause, so that it cannot be the cause of itself, because it does not require real preexistence for causing, but intentional suffices, by means of apprehension; since therefore the end causes before it has existence in act, it is not surprising that it can in its own genus contribute to its own existence. And thus we concede that the same thing according to diverse conditions of existing can cause itself, for existing intentionally it causes itself to exist really. Nor is this different from what is said in the common axiom, that what is first in intention is last in execution; or what Aristotle also said, that form and end converge in the same numerically, although form and efficient can only converge in the same specifically. For form, or its formal effect, is the effect of the agent and as such is also the effect of the end which excited the agent to operate, and which is nothing other than the form itself. Next we add that there is no attainment of an end which is not in some way for the sake of an end, either objective, if it has one, or at least for the sake of an end for which, which is always presupposed for final causality, and as such is not its effect; and in this way always the effect of the end, even the ultimate one, is distinguished in some way from the adequate final cause. Finally the attainment of the ultimate end, either simply or in some series, does not cause itself immediately, but proximately causes in the intellectual agent, of whom we now speak, affection and intention and other acts by means of which its causality reaches up to that action by which the end itself is obtained and in

which it consists, and thus something distinct from it always concurs for this kind of causality.

23. But then there occurs another difficulty to be explained that was proposed, namely, what kind of causality of the end exists regarding external actions or things flowing from the motion of the will. For there is in these a special reason for doubt, since internal acts elicited by the will have a real and intrinsic relation to the end itself as to their proper object, either formal and material together, as in intention and other acts which proximately concern the end itself, or formal only, as in the choice of means; and therefore the end itself is rightly understood to excite and move per se and proximately to such acts, and conversely such acts per se and intrinsically depend on the causality of such an end. But acts that are only commanded by the will (and much more their effects) are in no way excited proximately by the end itself, nor do they express an intrinsic relation to the end, but only by extrinsic denomination are they said to be ordered to the end by means of interior acts, as external walking is ordered to health in a merely extrinsic way. From which it seems to follow first that the end is not per se but per accidens the cause of such effects, in the way that one who applies or excites an efficient cause is said to be the cause of the effect caused by that cause, or in the way that a grandfather is the cause of a grandson because he generated his father; for thus the end is the cause of external action only because it generated the internal one. Next it seems to follow that from the force of this causality of the end, there is nothing really good in such external actions and effects, per se speaking, but only extrinsic denomination, which is not sufficient for real causality. The consequence is evident, because from this alone the external act has that it is ordered through an internal means to such an end, which is only extrinsic denomination in the external itself, whose sign is this, for if it should happen that external action were done either for the sake of another end, or by chance and without any end, it would not be changed or diminished in itself and in its entity, nor would the physical action by which it is done be different; therefore it

is a sign that it is not caused per se by that end, but only remotely and per accidens. For in efficient causes, although it may happen that the same effect which is made by one cause can be caused by another, nevertheless, if it is a per se cause, it is necessary that at least the action be diverse, as has been handed down in what precedes; hence if from a change of cause neither the effect nor the action is changed, it is a sign that such a cause neither per se nor immediately influences such an effect; the same therefore, proportion being observed, will be true in the present case.

24. This difficulty demands that we explain what the causality of final cause is, or what it establishes in its effects, which we shall provide in the following section, and at the end of it we shall satisfy the difficulty.

SECTION IV
WHAT THE NATURE OF CAUSING IS, OR IN WHAT THE CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE CONSISTS

1. We do not now inquire into the nature of causing in first act, so to speak, or that which in the final cause is the proximate principle by which it is able to cause in this manner, for we shall speak of this in the following section; but we inquire into the causation itself in second act, namely what it is, and where or in what subject or effect it exists. For this, while it is difficult to explain in other causes, is truly most difficult in this one, because it does not appear what thing, or what real mode this causality could be; and if it is none of these, neither can it be a real causality.

The First Opinion is Examined

2. Some therefore easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, saying that this causality is nothing other than that an action or effect occurs for the sake of an end or on account of the end. For Aristotle explained this causality of the end in no other way than by saying it is that for the sake of which something occurs. Whence Cajetan, II-II, q. 17, a. 5, teaches excellently that, just as in the agent there is the principle of acting which is in it, and the effect, and the causality, which is as it were intermediate between the principle of acting and the effect, so in the end there are those three things: the principle of finalizing, the finalization, and the effect. But he says that finalization is something unnamed, and is only signified through these words "to be that for the sake of which," or "to occur on account of something else," and that this causality cannot be explained further, nor can it be understood what else it is, nor even where it is. For if it is said to be in the will, this is opposed first because this cannot be preserved in God's will, nor in natural agents, which also operate for the sake of an end. And then it must be inquired what that thing is in our will, for either it is something preceding the act elicited by the will itself, and this is not so, according to true and sound doctrine, because nothing is received in the will before the act elicited by it, as has been sufficiently proven above when treating of the concurrence of the first cause. I omit supernatural habits, which are sometimes infused before every act, because they have the place of a power, or complete it and thus do not come into present consideration. Also, because if something were received in the will, it would have to have some efficient principle outside itself, which is none other than the final cause itself; but this as such is not active, otherwise the causalities would be confused. Besides the fact that the end would have efficiency without real being. And therefore Aristotle rightly said, I De Gener., text 55: "The cause for the sake of which other things occur is not active, and health itself is not active except by transference." Nor can that principle be said to be the intellect or its act, because it is improbable that the intellect by itself alone could impress something

on the will, and then it cannot be explained what that thing is. And moreover this is little consonant with the freedom of the will. Or indeed that which is said to be the causality of the end in the will is the very act of the will itself, and this is not so, because this is an effect; but causation ought to be in some way distinct from the effect. It is added moreover, that in commanded acts it will not be possible to explain what this causality is, because in such acts the end itself does not immediately influence anything; much less will it be able to be explained in the effects of God and natural agents.

3. This opinion has a great difficulty in that it does not clarify the matter, for through those words, "that for the sake of which," the causality of the end is not so much declared as a certain denomination resulting in the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it; which denomination cannot be causality, both because it is not something of the thing in the effect, but something of reason in the cause or an extrinsic denomination, which is the same thing; for that God is that for the sake of which a thing occurs is not something intrinsic in things, nor in God himself, but is an extrinsic denomination of God taken from the things themselves. And also because in those words the end is not signified as principle, but rather as terminus, and therefore no emanation or influx of the final cause into the effect is signified, which seems to be of the nature of all causality. And it is confirmed first because otherwise in every motion with respect to its terminus there would be a most proper causality of the end, and in every act with respect to its object; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequence is clear, because the terminus is that for the sake of which the motion exists, and the object for the sake of which the act exists. But the minor is clear, because otherwise the causality of the end would no more belong to the object of the will than to other powers; nor would it be more in rational motion than in natural. Whence it is confirmed, secondly, because otherwise, as long as a thing exists for the sake of some end, it would be actually caused by such an end for so long, such that the visual power, which exists for

the sake of the act of seeing, or for the sake of a visible object, would always be actually caused by that end, because that denomination always endures, that this power exists for the sake of its act or object; which denomination can flow either from past action, or from natural propensity of the power toward its act or object. But the consequent is false, because actual causality of the end does not exist without actual causality of the agent, as I shall say immediately; therefore through that denomination the causality of the end is not sufficiently declared. Especially because all place this causality in metaphorical motion, which is not sufficiently declared by those words alone, unless the matter is further explained.

The Second Opinion is Examined

4. The second mode of explaining this causality can be that it is a certain metaphorical motion; which is thus commonly taken from Aristotle, I De Gener., c. 7, and St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, and other places which I shall immediately cite. Nevertheless, in the mode of explaining this motion, this opinion is singular; for it says that this motion is such that it precedes by its very nature the act elicited by the will, not only by nature, but also in time, because this motion results from the final cause sufficiently proposed by a certain natural necessity; but the act of the will remains in its freedom. Whence, although this motion with respect to the final cause itself is like a second act, nevertheless with respect to the will it behaves as a first act. This is explained and proven in this manner, for by the very fact that the goodness of the end is sufficiently known and proposed to the will, it excites it, and insofar as it is in itself, draws it to love of itself; but the will, because it is free, can suspend its proper act; therefore this motion of the end is distinct from the very act of the will and precedes it; therefore the proper causality of the end consists in this motion. The antecedent seems to be established by experience, and its foundation seems to be placed in a certain natural sympathy, which

exists between intellect and will, insofar as they are rooted in the same essence of the soul. The first consequence is evident per se; but the second is clear, because this causality seems to be able to be understood in no other way, both because what proximately follows after this motion in the will is some act of it, which, as I said above, is not causality, but an effect of the final cause; and also because, setting aside this motion, in other respects the end does not behave as a cause, but rather as a specifying terminus, which rather participates in the causality of form, which all objects have that specify the acts of whatever powers.

5. But this opinion is first of all foreign to the mind of St. Thomas, wherever he places the causality of the end in this metaphorical motion, for in q. 22 De Verit., a. 2, explaining this motion he says: Just as the influencing of the efficient cause is to act, so the influencing of the final cause is to be desired or longed for; where he clearly holds that there is no actual influence of the final cause, until the will is moved by desiring or longing. He holds the same in q. 5 De Potent., a. 1. And it is proven by reason, because there is open repugnance that there be an end causing in second act, and that there not be something actually caused; but before the will elicits an act, nothing is caused in it; therefore neither can the causality of the end be in second act. The major is clear, both because causing and being caused are correlatives, and also because real causality must terminate to something real and must be something real in itself, otherwise it would be nothing; if therefore no new thing, or operation or making[13] is in the will, neither can actual causality of the end be in it; nor is it in the intellect, as is evident per se; therefore such causality of the end before every act of the will cannot be understood. And it is confirmed first, because the end does not cause actually, unless the agent also actually effects, for, as Aristotle said, III Metaph., c. 2, text 3, the end and that for the sake of which, is the end of some action; and therefore the same Aristotle said, I De Gener., c. 7, that when action

[13] effectio, 1960; alit. affectio. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 738.

ceases, the final cause also stops; therefore in the same way, before in time the action of the agent is begun, the causality of the final cause in second act cannot exist; but before the will elicits an act, no efficient cause moved by the end actually acts anything, and conversely nothing is actually done for the sake of the end; therefore neither does the end itself actually cause anything in the will. Finally it is confirmed by clarifying the matter itself; for before the will is moved by eliciting its proper act, there is only the good object or end represented through cognition or judgment of the intellect; but in the will there is nothing which was not there before; therefore in that whole time there is no excitation distinct from judgment; but judgment itself is not causality, but sufficient approximation of the end so that it can cause; therefore the causality of the end placed in act before the act of the will cannot be understood. Especially since neither can that causality be concerned with the power itself, since it does not yet behave differently but remains unchanged, nor with the act of the will itself, since that does not yet exist.

6. Perhaps someone will say that these reasons conclude that this causality of the end is something new in the will itself, which is its proper elicited act or free consent; nevertheless it can still be some new mode of behaving, or, to speak more clearly, some simple affection through which it is actually and vitally inclined toward the end, so that it might love or intend it. But this is not consistently said in that opinion, for such an affection, however it may be feigned in the will, cannot be not elicited by it, otherwise it cannot be a vital motion or affection, but will be some quality by way of habit or first act, which can in no way be feigned or thought, as the reasons made thus far sufficiently prove. But if that motion is elicited by the will, it is a certain act of the will; therefore causality of the end is not given before the act of the will.

7. But if it is said that that act is imperfect and by way of velleity, as they call it, and that the second opinion which we are examining is to be understood concerning perfect act and consent,

against this it stands first, that that act, whatever it may be, is a certain effect of the end itself; therefore it is not causality of the end; or if in it causality can be distinguished from effect, the same will be able to be said of the first perfect and consummated act, nor will it be necessary to have recourse to such an imperfect act. It stands secondly because the causality which the end exercises around such an act, has its proper effect in it and therefore that is not the proper and necessary causality for another consummated and perfect act, which we are investigating, but will only be an occasion and certain disposition for that further effect. Finally it stands because either that simple act is necessary, or free; if it is free, therefore it neither always results from sufficient proposition of the end, as that opinion said; nor is it necessary that it always precede before the making of the consummated act of love, or intention of the end; it is therefore not per se necessary for the causality of the end, nor can such causality consist in it. But if that act occurs naturally and without freedom, much less can it be per se required for the causality of the end around the free and perfect act; for such imperfect acts or motions arise in us from conjunction of appetite, or from some superior cause preventing our deliberation, and therefore such acts are only useful or necessary, supposing some imperfection of ours, by way of disposition or excitation; not because they are per se required for the causality of the end. Whence in the angels, in the soul of Christ, in the Blessed Virgin, and others, there was a perfect mode of operating from the causality of the end without such acts.

The Third Opinion is Proposed & Advocated

8. There is therefore a third opinion, which also constitutes this causality of the end in metaphorical motion. But it adds that such motion is not placed in second act except when the will is moved in second act, and when it is thus placed in reality, it is not something distinct from the very act of the will itself. But just as we said above

that one and the same action, insofar as it flows from the agent, is its causality, but as it inheres in matter, is also its causality around form, so they say that one and the same action of the will is caused by the end and by the will itself, and insofar as it is from the will it is effective causality, but insofar as it is from the end it is final causality, and by the former aspect it is real and proper motion, because such action flows from the power as from its proper physical principle, but by the latter aspect it is metaphorical motion, because it flows from the object alluring and drawing the will to itself. This opinion is taken from St. Thomas, in the cited places, and I-II, q. 9, a. 1, where he says the end moves the will metaphorically, understanding that the causality of it consists in this, although he does not declare it so expressly. Nevertheless, from lib. I Cont. Gent., c. 75, rat. 5, this can be taken more clearly; for St. Thomas says that the causality of the end consists in this, that on account of it other things are desired. From these words I gather that the very desire by which something is desired on account of the end, insofar as it is from the end, is called by St. Thomas the causality of the end. Again, that the causality of the end consists in this metaphorical motion, is a common way of speaking among authors, as is clear from Avicenna, lib. VI of his Metaph., tract. V, c. 5; Albert, V Metaph., tract. I, c. 3; and Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1, and more clearly q. 8, p. Ad rationes; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 2. It is also taken from Alexander of Hales, I, q. 17, membr. 3. Nevertheless none declared the aforesaid opinion so clearly and expressly, as Ockham, In II, q. 3, a. 2, where he says that the causation of the end is to move the efficient to act; but that moving is nothing other than the end itself being loved by the agent, or something on account of it. Whence below, responding to a certain doubt, he says that the causation of the end is not prior in time to the motion of the agent, at least through love or volition by which it wills the effect to be carried out on account of the end, or the end itself for its own sake.

9. By reason this opinion seems to be sufficiently proven by refutations of the others and from sufficient enumeration of parts,

because nothing else can be thought which is the causality of the end; nor is anything else necessary for understanding that the will is moved by the end toward the end, and that its act has dependence on the end as end; therefore, the causality consists only in that which this opinion affirms. It is confirmed and clarified by a similar case, for the act of a cognitive power depends both on the object and on the power; whence the causality both of the object and of the power is nothing other than the very action itself, insofar as it flows from the object and from the power, for as it is from the object it is called its causality, but as it is from the power it is the causality of that; so therefore the action of the will, as soon as it occurs, necessarily depends on the will and on the end; therefore that same action insofar as it is from the will is active dependence on it, but insofar as it is from the end, it is final dependence. For there is this diversity between the end and the object of a knowing power, that the object of a cognitive power concurs efficiently to its act, by means of some real form by which it is joined, or through its very entity, if it can be united to it through that; but the good proposed to the will concurs only finally to its act, because it only moves metaphorically by attracting what is proposed through cognition, even if it does not otherwise exist in reality.

The Fourth Opinion is Rejected

10. But there are those who say that this causality of the end is not the action of the will as dependent on the end, but on the contrary is the very end itself objectively proposed through the intellect, as influencing in its genus or concurring to the act of the will[14]. But if you ask what that concurrence is, or what it adds above the end itself, they respond that it adds nothing intrinsic to it, but connotes actual dependence of the effect on such a cause. But, although this way of speaking agrees with the preceding in this, that it says no other thing intervenes in this causality besides the end itself

[14] Vide Fonsecam, lib. V Metaph., q. 13.

objected to the will by means of the intellect, and the act or effect resulting from it in the will, and the denominations arising from it by which both the end is said to cause the act and the act to depend on the end, nevertheless it displeases in this, that it says the end itself is its causality or its concurrence to the act, because concurrence never signifies the cause itself, but something which proximately flows from the cause in its genus, by which it causes the effect, whether that is distinguished in some way in the thing itself from the effect, or only by reason, insofar as it is conceived as "by which" and "what." About which we spoke above, treating of the causality of the efficient cause; but there is the same proportional reasoning. Indeed in this there is in some way greater reasoning, because the end sometimes causes not existing actually, but only objectively in the intellect.

11. But they also say it is not necessary that the concurrence of the final cause really exist when it actually causes, but it is sufficient if it exists objectively. This however is not rightly said, because to exist objectively is only to be known; but truly in order that the final cause actually cause, it is not necessary that its concurrence be actually thought or known, but it suffices to think about the goodness of such a cause, and conversely, although that concurrence is in objective being through formal and express thought about it and about its appropriateness, this is not sufficient for an effect to be placed in the will, as is evident per se, because with all that thought remaining the will can not be moved. Therefore, although the final cause according to its being or its goodness is only objectively in the intellect, nevertheless in order that it actually cause, it is necessary that its actual concurrence be placed in reality itself, because this concurrence in reality is nothing other than the dependence of the effect on its cause; but in order that the cause actually cause, it is necessary that the effect be actually caused in reality itself; therefore also that it really depend on the cause; therefore also that actual concurrence, or what is the same, actual dependence exist in reality itself, and not only in the intellect, indeed this latter is irrelevant. But because this dependence

of this effect of the final cause on it consists only in a certain intrinsic relation to such a cause, which relation can exist in reality itself and be terminated to the cause as existing only objectively in the intellect, hence it is that the final cause can actually cause existing only objectively, but it cannot cause actually unless its causality exists really, through relation to the very cause objectively existing.

The Third Opinion is Chosen & The Question is Resolved

12. Whence from the refutation of this last opinion the third remains more explained and confirmed, which is without doubt true and best satisfies both regarding this effect which the end has within the created will, and regarding its causality. Nor does the objection made above stand against it, that the act of the will is rather an effect than causality of the end. For first of all in the very act of the will we can distinguish action from act, and we shall call the act an effect, but the action, insofar as in its genus it is from the end, the causality of it, just as proportionally must be said about effective causality. Then, even if in that act those two aspects are not distinguished from the nature of the thing, but it is imagined to be pure action, nevertheless it does not contradict that the same thing which is an effect of a cause, in that genus in which it is an effect, is also causality, when that effect is the very action, and the distinction of reason suffices so that they are distinguished by way of causality or by way of effect, just as is manifestly established in active causality.

13. It can seem more difficult to someone that the very same thing, or real mode without any distinction in reality, is causality of both final and efficient cause, since nevertheless these causes are of diverse natures. But if the things said above about the causalities of other causes are considered, the wonder will cease. For also the same union by diverse respects is causality of matter and form, although those causes are of diverse natures; indeed the same change as it is

action, is causality of the agent, but as it is passion, is causality of matter, although action and passion are not distinguished in reality; and similarly the same action by diverse respects is causality of first cause and second. And the reason is because one and the same action through itself can be immediately caused by many causes, by each in its genus; and thus by means of it the effect is caused by the same causes, and therefore by comparison to each of them it is the causality of each, and conversely it is the proper dependence of such an effect on such a cause.

14. Another difficulty remains to be explained, because, although this way of explaining final causality satisfies regarding acts elicited by the created will, it nevertheless does not satisfy regarding commanded actions and exterior or transient effects (while we meanwhile omit the divine will and actions of natural agents, about which we shall speak below); therefore it seems that the superior opinion and doctrine cannot be applied to the aforesaid actions and effects, because the final cause does not move metaphorically the powers subject to the will, but only the will itself, which afterwards moves or applies the inferior powers to their actions not finally, but effectively; therefore the end as such has no proper causality in these actions, or it does not consist in such metaphorical motion.

15. In this matter it must first be established that exterior effects which are produced through these actions can be effects of the final cause insofar as the actions through which they occur are caused in some way in their genus by the final cause and depend on it; because, as we said above with Aristotle, the final cause does not cause actually except when the agent acts something[15] on account of the end. Whence, just as an effect made by an agent, if it does not depend on it in being conserved, but only in being made, when action ceases it is no longer caused, but has been caused, so the same effect insofar as it is caused by the end for which it was made, when the action of the

[15] agens agit, 1960; alit. agit actu. "La expresión agit actu por agens agit en otras ediciones no nos parece admisible." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 745.

agent on account of the end ceases entirely, is no longer caused by the end, but has been caused, and remains ordered to the end, either through intrinsic relation or propensity, or through extrinsic denomination or relation from past action.

16. Therefore the whole difficulty remains around commanded actions, for in the way that they have been caused by the end, they will be causalities of the same end with respect to effects or termini, for through them such effects will depend on the final cause and only by reason of them will they be said to occur for the sake of such an end. Therefore about commanded actions themselves it can be said that, although physically and according to entity the external action is distinct from the interior act of the will, nevertheless in the nature of action and in order to the causality of the end they have the nature of one, and arise from the same causality or metaphorical motion, because for the end, for example, to move metaphorically to willing to write and to the writing itself, are not two, but one and the same, because those two are so connected that they cannot be separated; for I speak of the volition which is by way of use and proximately commands the external action of writing. Whence further it can be said that the final causality, which we said is in the interior act and is identified with the very elicited action, is simultaneously the causality of the interior act itself and of the external, which is necessarily conjoined with it, although in diverse ways, for with respect to the interior it behaves proximately and intrinsically, but with respect to the external, more extrinsically and remotely. Nor on account of this reasoning will the end be called a per accidens cause of the external action, since it follows entirely necessarily and per se from its causality, and it so moves the will that simultaneously and by way of one it moves to execution of the action to be commanded by the will. Nor does it stand in the way that such causality adds nothing to the external action except extrinsic denomination, because such action is not called an effect of the end only because that extrinsic denomination is from the end, but because the very action, insofar as

it occurs here and now, truly proceeds from the motion of the end in its genus, even if that exterior action, taken physically and entitatively, could occur without that metaphorical motion and proper causality of the end, because it proceeds from such a cause only by means of internal action. Especially because this causality is in some way moral and quasi-artificial and intellectual, and therefore is not to be equated in all things with efficient causality, which is more physical and real. And thus the difficulty touched on at the end of the preceding section and referred to this place is simultaneously answered.

17. Finally it can be added that the very commanded action, in the way that it here and now proceeds from such an agent, is both an effect of the final cause by way of action and its causality with respect to the thing made on account of that end through the same action, for by means of it that effect depends on such an end, and to be causality is nothing other than to be as it were the way by which the effect depends on the cause in such a genus of cause. But in this dependence the effect is not to be considered as it were materially, as it is such a thing; for thus it will not always require that dependence through such causality as per se necessary to its being, but it is to be considered formally insofar as it is an effect here and now made in such a way, in which way it necessarily includes order to such action and to the mode of acting of such a cause. And thus this response nearly coincides with the preceding, and we shall better explain both below by declaring final causality in the effects of God.

SECTION V

WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF FINAL CAUSATION IN THE END

1. The meaning of the present question is clear from what has been said above; for we are not inquiring into the principle of causation insofar as it refers to causation in second act, but insofar as it

refers to first act as something quasi-formal, constituting the final cause as proximately apt and sufficient for causing. For just as in efficient cause we distinguish the thing which causes from the proximate principle of causing, so in final cause it seems necessary, because the very same thing can be both an efficient principle and a final cause and a formal cause; therefore it is necessary that it exercise these functions under diverse aspects; therefore that aspect under which it exercises the function of final cause will be that which proximately constitutes the final cause as in first act, so to speak.

Resolution of the Question

2. Concerning this matter, therefore, there seems to be a common consensus of all Doctors that goodness is the proximate principle under which the end moves; and thus that goodness is what constitutes the final cause, giving (as I may say) the power to cause. So thinks St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, and more extensively III Contra Gentiles, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that to operate for the sake of an end is the same as to operate for the sake of the good, and I, q. 5, a. 4, he proves that the good has the nature of an end; and in the same place, in the solution to the second objection, concerning this causality he explains that statement of Dionysius, c. 4 De Divinis Nominibus, "The good is diffusive of itself," namely, by finally attracting and alluring the will. Alexander of Hales has the same doctrine, I p., q. 17, memb. 3, and q. 34, memb. 1; and it is taken from Aristotle, II Physics, c. 3, text 31, where he says that end and good are the same, which he also repeats V Metaphysics, c. 2, and book I Ethics, c. 7, he says that is good for each thing for the sake of which it operates other things; the same in book I Ethics to Eudemus, near the end. The reason, moreover, is that the causality of the end consists in the metaphorical motion of the will, by which it allures the will to itself; but nothing allures the will to itself except insofar as it is good; therefore goodness is the principle of moving the will; therefore it is

also the principle or basis of causing finally. I assume the minor premise as certain, from the common consensus of theologians and philosophers, who say that the will cannot be carried toward anything except under the aspect of good, according to that principle: "the good is what all things desire."

Whether Evil as Evil Can Be a Final Cause

3. But there immediately occurs a controversy with Ockham and other nominalists who say that the will can be carried toward evil under the aspect of evil. So Ockham, In III, q. 13, dub. 3. Scotus also inclines toward this, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, near the end, and In II, dist. 43, q. 2. From their assertion it clearly follows that evil as evil can also metaphorically move the will and consequently have the causality of an end, for if evil can be loved for its own sake, other things can also be loved for the sake of it, if they are necessary and useful for obtaining it. And thus it will come about that goodness is not the adequate principle and power of the end for causing finally, but it will be entity or something of this kind, as Ockham indicates.

4. Nevertheless, this opinion is antiquated and rightly rejected by the schools, as being repugnant to the consensus of Aristotle, Dionysius, Augustine, St. Thomas, and all who think correctly, as is clear from Aristotle, book I Ethics, c. 1; Dionysius, c. 4 De Divinis Nominibus; Augustine, II Confessions, c. 6 and 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 1, and the remaining theologians, In II, dist. 43; Henry, Quodlibet I, q. 17. See also Gregory of Nyssa, book De Opificio hominis, c. 20; and Damascene, book II de Fide, c. 22. For the common axiom of all these is that no one operates with the intention of evil. And this is most evident from experience. And the reason is that the faculty of the will would be most disorderly instituted if it could be carried toward evil qua evil. For what could be more disordered than to will evil because it is evil? But the will can will nothing by elicited appetite except what is consonant with some

natural inclination of the will itself, because from such inclination arises all elicited appetite, at least natural appetite, because every appetite of this kind is referred to an object adequate and proportioned to the will or to some part of it; but the natural inclination of the will is toward that entire object; if therefore the will could be moved by its proper act toward evil as evil, its natural inclination would also be toward evil as evil; therefore the natural inclination itself would be disordered. But this is entirely repugnant, both because it is most wisely instituted by the best author, and also because it would be repugnant to itself. For the end or institution of the will is that through it man might seek things suitable to himself and flee from unsuitable things; if therefore it had received an inclination to tend toward the unsuitable insofar as it is unsuitable, it would formally and directly be repugnant to itself and to its own end, and therefore Damascene rightly said, book II, c. 22: "The will is carried toward acting in those things which are consonant with nature." As Seneca said, book IV De Beneficiis, c. 17: "Nor has anyone so departed from natural law and cast off humanity as to be evil for the sake of his soul."

5. And this is confirmed, for it is impossible that the intellect give assent to the false insofar as it is false; therefore also impossible that the will pursue evil insofar as it is evil. The consequence is clear because, as the intellect is related to the true, so the will is related to the good; and there is as much repugnance from the terms themselves between pursuit and evil, as there is between assent and the false. Also, because if the intellect cannot judge by assenting to the false, therefore it cannot judge that evil as evil has something whereby it should be loved, for this is evidently false from the terms themselves and repugnant to every intellect. A clear sign of this is (to solve in passing all arguments that are usually made against this), that we never judge that something should be loved or pursued which we otherwise know to be evil, except because we judge it useful either for pleasure, or for taking revenge, or for some other similar utility. Therefore neither can

the will be carried toward evil as such, or toward what is only known to be evil. The consequence is clear, because, as will be said below, the will cannot be moved except through the mediation of a judgment of reason by which something is sufficiently proposed as either to be desired or desirable.

6. And from this is finally taken the reason which pertains to the matter we are treating, because in evil as such, insofar as it is evil, there is nothing that can be apprehended or considered as a sufficient reason on account of which the will might be moved. For either malice is considered in evil, or the entity which underlies the malice. Malice taken per se and formally has nothing by which it might allure or attract the will, because it itself is nothing, as we said above. But the entity, which can underlie malice, has something of goodness; whence if it moves the appetite, this is by reason of goodness. And this is confirmed, for in the choice of means it is impossible for the will to choose something as a means to an end because it is unsuitable, or impedes the attainment of the end, which would be to choose evil opposed to useful good under the aspect of evil; therefore in intention or love of the end it is impossible that it be carried toward something as toward an end because it is per se unsuitable, which is to will under the aspect of evil opposed to good desirable for its own sake. The antecedent seems self-evident from the terms; for who can understand how someone might from intention of an end choose what is repugnant to the end, insofar as it is such? For this would be a contradiction in the will itself. Rather, all who think correctly teach that when a useful means to an end is presented, it cannot happen that the will does not choose it, if it truly and efficaciously intends the end; much more impossible therefore is it that it choose a useless means, qua such. The first consequence is proved, because evil as evil in itself is as repugnant to intention, as the useless qua useless is to choice; for just as the choice of the useless, as useless, is repugnant to the intention of the end, so the intention of evil as evil per se is repugnant to the natural and adequate propensity of the will.

Section V

Whether the Indifferent as Such Can Be a Final Cause

7. You will say these arguments sufficiently prove both that evil as evil cannot cause finally and that good as good can, but they do not prove that only good can have this kind of causality, or that goodness is the adequate principle of final causation. Because between good and evil there can be given something indifferent either in reality, or at least by precision of the mind, insofar as the notion of being or the true can be considered with precision from the notion of the good; therefore this can be a sufficient principle for moving the appetite, and consequently for causing finally. I respond that in reality there can indeed be given a being indifferent according to some aspect of good, but not according to every aspect, because a being cannot not be good, and thus when a being indifferent under some aspect moves the will, it does not move it insofar as it is indifferent, but insofar as it has some aspect of good. But if it should happen that some being is indifferent under every aspect of good with respect to the one desiring, that is, so that it is neither honest, nor base, nor pleasant, nor troublesome, neither suitable to nature, nor unsuitable (which perhaps cannot be found), nevertheless, this being supposed, such a being could not have final causality in the will; because it would have no suitability or conformity with it; but the will, since it is essentially appetite, is inclined only toward the suitable as such; whence since the notion of being is of itself indifferent to the notion of suitable and unsuitable to the one desiring, it is not of itself sufficient for moving the appetite. But if sometimes some being seems to move the will only because it is not considered unsuitable, this is because in every being there is apprehended to be present something of goodness and perfection, which if it has no unsuitability from elsewhere, is by this very fact considered suitable by reason of its perfection.

8. Indeed, because that which is good in itself can be either suitable or unsuitable to man, therefore not just any goodness, but goodness according to some suitability to the one desiring is a sufficient principle of final causation. On account of which Aristotle said, VIII Ethics, c. 5: "The lovable is indeed good, but for each person what is proper to him." How this should be understood requires a long and theological disputation, both because of the love of friendship, and especially because of the love of God above all things. Now let it briefly be noted only that "proper good" should not be understood as only that which results in one's own advantage, but simply what per se befits or is consonant with the nature of the one desiring. In which sense is comprehended every end, even if it pertains to the most perfect love of friendship.

9. Again someone will say: the will is not always moved by an end to obtain something, but often also to avoid something; but for this it is moved by an end by reason of malice; therefore not only good, but also evil as evil can have some final causality in the will. It is answered that when something movable recedes from one term in order to approach another, the term from which it recedes is not the end of that motion, nor does it excite the movable (we speak metaphorically) to recede from itself, but the end is the term itself toward which the movable is carried, and if it could be finally excited by that alone it would be drawn and consequently would recede from the other term by reason of that one. Thus therefore the will is properly moved only by good as by an end from which it is drawn to approach itself through love, intention, etc.; from this, however, follows recession from evil, which is not so much motion into an end as something consequent upon tendency toward an end and like a certain means to obtaining the end. Whence for that very act which is hatred of evil, evil does not move except in virtue of good, because evil is not held in hatred except by reason of good that is loved, and thus also in that act goodness can be said to be the moving principle for pursuing evil with hatred. For to hate evil under the aspect of evil is

nothing other than to hate it because it deprives of good, and thus goodness is the principally moving principle for them, as we shall say in a similar case a little below concerning the choice of means.

10. Finally someone will say: sometimes lesser goodness moves the will more to love than greater malice moves it to withdraw, and conversely lesser malice sometimes moves more to flight than great goodness moves to pursuing an end; therefore by the same reasoning it can happen that the will withdraws from good insofar as it is good, or even if it is not evil, and conversely, that it is carried toward evil even if it is not good, because, as dialecticians say, as the simple relates to the simple, so the more to the more, and conversely. It is answered: just as only good can move the will, so also only greater good, insofar as it depends on itself, moves more, provided it is sufficiently proposed. But that the will sometimes is not so moved comes from the freedom of the will itself. This freedom, however, is not sufficient for it to be carried toward evil under the aspect of evil, both because freedom cannot be exercised outside the object of the will, and also because, by this very fact that the will is carried toward evil to experience its freedom, it is now not carried under the aspect of evil, but under some aspect of utility. Although this experiment of freedom always supposes in the object a sufficient reason of good or evil, which on the part of that object can ground this kind of use of freedom. For this use, however, if it is only as to exercise, it suffices that either the goodness of the object, or the act itself or the love of it is not considered necessary, as was handed down above when we were treating of free causes.

11. Whence, although good insofar as it is from itself is more efficacious in its genus for causing finally, because nevertheless it cannot actually cause unless the will itself allows itself to be moved, or cooperates in its genus with its motion, which for its freedom it can choose not to do, therefore from this source it can happen that lesser good actually causes finally, while greater good is passed over. Which nevertheless it could not do if it had no goodness, because then the

reason for causing would be entirely lacking, without which the freedom of the will does not suffice for it to be moved, although, for it not to be moved, the lack or negation of necessary good suffices (as I said), even if it is not evil. But it will be otherwise if the use of freedom is not only as to exercise, but also as to specification through a contrary act of hatred, or similar, for then it is necessary that some aspect of evil appear in the object, for hatred properly taken can be concerned only with the aspect of evil.

12. I say second: not only true good which is or can be in reality, but also apparent good or only supposed good, can be sufficient to exercise its final causality. So teaches St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8, a. 1. And this is sufficiently established by experience, for man is often moved to seek things which appear good, or delightful, which in reality are not such. Which is also manifest in the choice of means; for we often choose what we consider useful for an end, which we later experience to be useless, or even impeditive. The reason, moreover, is that final cause does not cause unless it is known, as we shall say below; but insofar as knowledge is concerned, a thing which is considered good relates itself in the same way as if it were good in reality, because the same judgment is made about it and it is equally considered true, and finally it is represented or proposed to the will in the same way.

13. Nevertheless, this seems usually to be difficult in this conclusion, since final causality is true and real, how a merely fabricated or supposed reason can suffice for this causality. For real causality cannot arise except from a real principle; but that merely apparent goodness is nothing real, but rather fictitious; therefore it cannot really cause. Indeed such goodness, since it is not in things, but only in reason, does not seem to be able to be sufficient for moving the will metaphorically, for the will is carried only toward things themselves insofar as they are good.

14. It is answered first that this final causality is so real that it happens in a certain moral and intellectual way through the natural

sympathy which exists between will and intellect, and therefore for it there is not required other real being in the cause except that which suffices for motion between these powers through their natural agreement, and because for that there suffices real being, as represented in the intellect, even if it is not true in reality, therefore also for final causality apparent goodness can suffice, although it is not true. And this is approximately what St. Thomas says in the cited place, that elicited appetite follows apprehended form and therefore for its motion apprehended or supposed goodness suffices for its motion, even if it is not true.

15. But it can be added further that it is one thing to speak of goodness, another of a good thing, for the will sometimes moves a thing which is not truly good; in which sense proceeds the conclusion posited, namely, that sometimes only apparent good causes finally. Nevertheless it can be said that the will is never moved except by true goodness; for it is never moved except either by delight, or by honesty, or by advantage to nature, all of which are true goodnesses (I omit appetite for good in general, in which there is no deception). Whence in the proper formal aspect which moves there is never deception either, but this intervenes in the application of this formal aspect to this or that thing, and for this reason indeed a thing which appears good moves; but the moving principle is not apparent but true goodness, although it is falsely attributed to such a thing. For example, if someone loves theft so that from it he might give alms, he is indeed moved by supposed good, yet by true goodness and honesty, namely, by the honesty of mercy which he considers to exist in such an act. And the same is true when a man seeks some object which he thinks is delightful, but in reality is not delightful, for he seeks true delight and is moved only by it, but he errs in applying it to a thing in which it truly is not. In this sense, therefore, it can be said that the principle of causing finally is always some true goodness, although it is not always true that something is good, because such goodness is not always apprehended or judged concerning a thing in which it truly exists.

16. I say third: only that good which is good in itself or per se is sufficient for exercising final causality. This is explained, for good, as we treated above, is only either honest, or delightful, or useful; of which the first two are good in themselves and per se, but the third only through relation to those, all of which were explained in that place. Therefore the first two goods suffice for exercising final causality, which can easily be proved. For the causality of the end consists in two things, or in either of them, namely, that it move the will so that it love or pursue the end for its own sake and other things for the sake of it; but either of those goods can accomplish both of these things. For honest good for its own sake is maximally desirable as something per se fitting, or per se suitable to nature; indeed this is the very notion of honest good, as we noted in the cited place with St. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 6. Concerning delightful good the same St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, from Aristotle, X Ethics, c. 2, that it is foolish to seek why it is desired, for delight itself per se has that whereby it is desirable. Therefore these two goods are sufficient for causing the first motion into an end for its own sake.

17. From this motion, moreover, arises the other, which is toward means for the sake of the end; for that same good which is loved for its own sake moves to loving other things for its sake, if they are necessary or useful for obtaining the good loved for its own sake. Therefore either of these goods is per se sufficient by reason of its goodness for exercising final causality as to both its parts. In which function they relate to each other mutually as exceeding and exceeded, for delightful good both usually moves us more and draws appetite to itself, and delight in a certain way is the ultimate perfection of operation lovable for its own sake; but truly honest good, the greater and more noble it is per se, the more powerful it is by itself and by its nature for exercising this causality and it can also cause nobler effects in this genus. Rather, if we look to the institution of nature, only honest good should have the proper notion of end, for delight from the intention of nature is not for its own sake, but for the sake of the

operation to which it is joined, and therefore it should be loved for the sake of that operation, concerning which more extensively elsewhere.

18. Concerning useful good, however, since it is not good per se, it appears sufficiently manifest that it is not sufficient for exercising final causality, because useful good as such is not lovable per se; therefore it is not sufficient for exercising the first motion of the end. Again insofar as it is useful, it is not that for the sake of which something else is loved, for rather it itself is loved for the sake of something else; therefore it cannot exercise the second motion or causality of the end either. Rather under that aspect it is an effect of the end, because it is that which is done or loved for the sake of another; therefore useful good as such cannot exercise final causality. Therefore only honest goodness, whether moral or natural, and delightful goodness, can be the proper principle of causing finally. Here, however, there immediately occurred a difficulty concerning means, whether they can exercise final causality, which we shall treat better in the following section.

SECTION VI
WHICH THINGS CAN EXERCISE FINAL CAUSALITY

1. The difficulty of this question can arise from a twofold source. The first concerns means, whether they can exercise the causality of an end; for it seems manifest from the very terms that means cannot have the causality of an end; for only that thing which is an end can exercise the causality of an end; but a means is a thing distinct from the end; therefore it cannot exercise the causality of an end. On the contrary, however, it is because a means as means attracts the will so that it loves it; therefore in this it exercises the causality of an end. And especially because another means can be ordered to one means; then therefore that means which is prior in the order of

intention exercises the causality of an end with regard to another thing which is ordered to it.

2. The second difficulty concerns privations or negations, whether under this proper nature they can exercise the causality of an end, that is, without the error of being judged and estimated that privations or negations exist, and are not true beings. And the same concerning relations, especially those of reason. And the reason for the difficulty is that these, just as they do not have true entity, so neither do they have goodness, and especially goodness that is lovable per se; therefore they do not have the force and proximate reason for causing finally. On the contrary, however, it is because we often intend such privations per se, and for their sake we choose means, such as someone's death, or something similar. Similarly we sometimes intend a relation of reason, such as human dignities, or estimations among others, which consist in a mere relation of reason.

Whether Means can Exercise the Causality of an End

3. Concerning the prior difficulty there are various ways of speaking. The first is that means even as means can exercise the causality of an end; this opinion openly contradicts the final part of the third assertion proposed in the preceding section. Gabriel holds this view, In I, dist. 38, a. 1, where following the opinion of Gregory there, a. 1, he distinguishes that one end is most proper, another proper, another common or most common, and in this last way he says that means have the nature of an end and exercise its causality. Whence also he says that that means which is ultimate in intention and first in execution, for the sake of which nothing else is chosen, participates in the causality of an end. The foundation seems to be that every object of the will has the nature and causality of an end; but a means as means, or what is nothing but a means, is an object of the will; therefore it participates in the causality of an end. The minor is

evident, because the will truly and properly is engaged with an end by loving it; but that is the proper object of a power around which it is engaged. The major, however, is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, where he says that an end is the object of the will; he speaks, however, of an adequate object, both because he says that an end relates to the will as color to sight; but color is the adequate object of sight. Also because from this he infers that the will loves all things under the aspect of an end, because it loves all things under the aspect of its object; this consequence would not be good unless an end were an adequate object. Aristotle also favors this, II Phys., c. 3, saying that end and good are the same; but good is the adequate object of the will; therefore so is an end.

4. The second way of speaking is that a thing which is a means, even if it is not loved for itself nor is it lovable, can exercise the causality of an end, not however insofar as it is a means, but insofar as another means can be sought on account of it. Thus that means which is not first in execution, but stands between the end and the first means, is said to participate in the causality of an end, not insofar as it is loved for the sake of the end, but insofar as another means is loved for its sake, because under that aspect it is that for the sake of which, and consequently has the nature of a proximate end, and not of a means[16]. But that which is the first means, for the sake of which nothing else is loved, does not participate in the causality of an end. Aegidius holds this opinion, In II, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2; Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, a. 1, and Ockham, In II, q. 3, and St. Thomas seems to favor it, III cont. Gent., c. 2, where in the fourth argument he says: All intermediates between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to prior things, and active principles with respect to subsequent things, and in II Phys., lect. 5, he says that it is not of the

[16] sed quatenus aliud medium amatur propter ipsum, 1960 et aliae ed.; ed. Vivès om. "We depart from the Vivès edition and others, because we judge that these have omitted a line which is found in other editions". Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 759.

nature of an end to be ultimate simply, but only with respect to what precedes. The same view is held in I Ethic., c. 7, where Aristotle greatly favors this opinion, for he says that not all ends are perfect and desirable for their own sake, and in V Metaph., and II Phys., he numbers among ends the instruments of art and riches, because they are made or acquired through other means, although they themselves are also means to further ends. The reason, however, has already been touched upon, because in those there is sufficient reason for moving the will, so that it wills something for their sake, and this is enough for exercising some office of final cause, even if they do not exercise all.

A Principle Necessary for the Resolution of the Question is Established

5. Nevertheless I think it should be said that no thing can properly and (so to speak) by intrinsic denomination exercise the causality of an end unless it is good per se and desirable. Why I add those particles, properly and by intrinsic denomination, I will declare below. I take this assertion from Aristotle, II Metaph., c. 2, where he says that it is of the nature of an end that other things are sought for its sake, but it itself not for the sake of other things; where by this latter negation he circumlocutes that notion which we explain positively by saying that an end ought to be desirable per se through the proper goodness which it has in itself. For it is not of the nature of an end, speaking generally, that it not be sought for the sake of another, but this is proper to an end that is entirely ultimate. Whence in I Ethic., c. 7, he says that in each series that is an end which is sought as ultimate, that is, in which the intention of all the means which are sought for the sake of the end comes to rest. So also in II Phys., c. 3, he says that all means which are subordinated among themselves are for the sake of one end. Finally, lib. I Magn. Moral., c. 2, he distinguishes: Of goods, some are ends, others are not; just as health indeed is an end, but the cause of health is by no means an end, where he calls the cause of

health a means to health. And it is proved by reason, for in each genus of cause that thing can cause in such a genus which has the power or formal principle constituting a cause of such genus in first act; but goodness is the formal reason of final cause, constituting it in first act sufficient for causing; therefore only that thing which has goodness can be a final cause through intrinsic power or denomination; but every thing, and only that thing, which has in itself goodness and fittingness with respect to the one desiring is good per se and desirable; therefore only a thing which is good per se and desirable can exercise the causality of an end.

6. You will say: even a useful thing, as such, has goodness in itself, since it has utility in itself, for utility is a certain species of goodness. But against this is what we said above when treating of goodness, disp. X, that the useful good, as such, is not something entirely intrinsic to the thing which is considered useful; for although utility, insofar as it only denotes some force or efficacy, is something in the thing which is denominated useful, nevertheless all that utility is not good nor desirable as useful, except on account of the goodness of the intended end, and as it is subject to it. On account of which St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, rightly said that useful things are not lovable for their own sake, but only by reason of the end. And therefore also the useful good as such is not considered good simply, nor by intrinsic denomination, because it is not fitting per se, but only as it is subject to such an end and receives fittingness from it as if formally.

7. I argue secondly therefore in this way; for that thing which is not good per se cannot move the will to love itself for its own sake; therefore neither can it move the will to love other things for its sake; therefore it cannot exercise any causality of an end. This second consequence is evident from what has been said, because the whole causality of an end is contained in those two aspects. The first antecedent also seems evident per se from the terms, because since only the good draws appetite to love of itself, only that thing can draw appetite to love itself for its own sake which is good according to itself

and without order to another end. Whence it was not correctly assumed in the reason for doubting posited at the beginning that a means as means draws the will to love of itself; and further[17] it would be said that the end itself draws the will to love the means, for in reality nothing else is to will a means for the sake of an end except that the whole reason for willing it is the end itself; but the reason for willing is what moves and attracts the will, and therefore it is also usually called the motive of the will; the means, however, is like a material object, which is loved by reason of the end. And from this the prior consequence is easily proved, because what does not suffice to draw the will to love itself, much less can it draw the will to love another for its sake; but that thing which is not good per se cannot draw the will to love itself, as we have shown; therefore much less can it draw the will to love another for its sake. The major is evident, both from that principle that on account of which each thing is such, that thing is more such; and thus if a means is loved for the sake of an end, the end is loved more; therefore a thing which makes another be loved for its sake, must make itself be loved more; therefore, conversely, what cannot draw to love itself, much less will it be able to draw to love another for its sake. Also because the love of a means for the sake of an end proceeds from love of the end; therefore if love of some thing as an end cannot be caused by it, neither can love of another thing for the sake of such an end be caused finally by that end; which is to say that it cannot be an end, if by the name of end a true final cause is signified, as we now speak of it in order to created will.

General Response to the Proposed Question

8. From this principle is gathered first the general response to the question proposed in the title of the section, namely, that that

[17] ulteriusque, 1960; alit. utriusque. "In other editions, this word is seen to be substituted by utriusque; it is clear that it lacks sense in the present context." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 761.

thing can properly exercise final causality which has in itself goodness on account of which it is loved (either truly, or in estimation, which should be understood as added in all similar expressions, lest it be necessary to repeat the same thing). This conclusion is evident from the preceding principle and its proofs. Therefore we cannot descend in particular to designate things which can cause finally, namely, whether God, or an angel, or a man, or a substance, or an accident, or riches, or honor, or other such things, can cause finally; but in all and each it must be considered what goodness or fittingness they have per se and, if they have any, according to that they will be able to be a final cause, but if they have none, they will not be able. Only twofold good is good per se and according to itself, namely the delectable and the honest, under honest comprehending whatever is fitting to nature per se, and therefore whatever is such will be able under that aspect to exercise the causality of an end; but what is not such never exercises the causality of an end unless because it is estimated to be such, and in this way riches or honors are often sought as an end, although those things, if right judgment is made about them, are not lovable or fitting per se, but only on account of another.

9. You will say: by the same reasoning the delectable good will not be truly sufficient for causing finally, because if right judgment is made about it, it is not lovable for its own sake, but for the sake of another. Indeed neither science, health, and similar things will be able to exercise final causality, because they are not lovable for their own sake, but for the sake of man. To the prior part it is responded by denying the consequence; for the reason is far different, because the delectable good abstracted from every other extrinsic end truly has in itself that on account of which it is loved, and therefore it is powerful and sufficient of itself for exercising the causality of an end; although if it ought to be sought by man with right, that is, honest reason, it should not be rested in as in an end, but should be ordered to some higher end, which should be understood not only of the delectable good, but also of the good fitting to nature, or natural good, insofar as

it is distinguished from moral honest good. Whence for the sake of clarity it could be said that the delectable good according to true speculative or physical judgment is lovable per se, which is enough so that per se it suffices for exercising the causality of an end, and not only from false estimation of the one acting, but also from proper force which it has in itself; although according to true practical and moral judgment, which is attended through conformity to right and honest appetite, it should not be sought as an end by a man acting honestly. But it is otherwise with other things which lack all goodness of this kind; for these neither according to practical judgment, nor even according to true speculative judgment, can be final causes, but only from false estimation.

10. To the latter part it is responded by denying the consequence; for those things truly are lovable for their own sake, for per se they are fitting to nature. Nor does it matter that they are only lovable to man; for from this it only happens that they are not lovable with love of friendship, but of concupiscence, which does not impede true and proper final causality, whatever Gabriel signifies in the place cited above. And it is evident, because such things through the goodness which they truly have in themselves, attract and draw the will to themselves, according to their mode and capacity. For because they themselves are such that by their nature they are co-adapted to man and are his perfections, therefore although they are loved for their own sake, nevertheless they are loved for man; and these two relations do not conflict with each other, nor are they compared as means to end, but as the end of which and the end for which, which integrate one complete end, as we saw above.

Resolution Concerning the Causality of Means

11. Second, the resolution of the prior difficulty concerning the causality of means is principally gathered from the said principle. For a thing which is a means to another end can under some other

aspect be desirable per se, by reason of some goodness which it truly has in itself even with the relation to that end abstracted, and under that aspect there is no doubt that a thing which is a means can have final causality, because it does not have it as a means. Indeed with respect to that, it is something material and per accidens that such a thing is a means or is loved for the sake of another end; nor is there any controversy about this. Therefore in another way a thing which is a means can be related, so that it has no nature of good per se, or at least that it does not cause through that nor is loved on account of that, but only insofar as it is useful; and under this consideration it should be simply denied that such a thing as such is sufficient for exercising final causality. And indeed if that thing is such that it is only loved for the sake of an end, the matter seems most evident, because then it is loved as a pure means, which all philosophers distinguish from an end as end, and rather consider it to pertain to the effect of an end than to have the nature of a cause. And this also confirms all the things we adduced in the proof of the first assertion. But truly when this thing which is a means takes on the relation of a term with respect to another means which is loved for its sake, it seems already to participate in some way in the nature of an end.

12. And therefore for the sake of greater clarity, and to explain the expressions of some weighty authors, we can here accommodate the distinction which Gabriel adduces in the cited place; for it is one thing to speak of an end as it takes on the pure nature of a term, another however as it has the proper nature of final cause; for here we speak of it under this latter aspect. And in this way we deny that such a means, even if another is ordered to it, exercises true final causality properly speaking and according to intrinsic denomination, so to speak. And this is proved by all the things adduced in the prior assertion, because a means even considered under this aspect does not have in itself that from which it draws the will to love itself for its own sake, but the end itself to which all means are ordered moves the will to love all means and their subordination among themselves, or, which

is the same, the same end moves the will to love some means immediately for its own sake, some however immediately for the sake of another means, mediately however or ultimately for its own sake. Therefore the very goodness of the end is what moves proximately and finally, although it does not always terminate proximately and immediately the relation or relation of means to end, but final causality consists in metaphorical motion; this therefore is not in the means, even insofar as another is ordered to it, but is only in the end. And it is confirmed from the specification of acts of the will, or of all elections of means tending to the same end; for all those receive species and honesty or malice from the end itself, as theologians teach more widely, in I-II, q. 18; therefore it is a sign that, although one means is ordered to another, nevertheless if all are sought only as means, only the end for the sake of which all are sought is what through its goodness causes finally all those elections.

13. But truly if we speak of an end only insofar as it is the term of ordering or of the relation of another to it, thus one means is called the end of another which is ordered to it, because it is the term to which it is proximately referred. For a remote means, as such, does not have fittingness and proportion with the end unless a proximate means intervenes; and therefore it is proximately ordered to that; therefore under this aspect such a means participates in the nature of a proximate end. And this confirms the testimonies of Aristotle and St. Thomas adduced in favor of the second opinion; the common way of speaking also favors this; for it is said absolutely that one means is loved for the sake of another; from which kind of expression Aristotle everywhere gathers the nature of an end. You will say: if a means participates in the office and nature of an end under the aspect of a term to which another means is ordered, why will it not also participate in the causality of an end, which consists in metaphorical motion? For the reason seems to be equal. Especially because just as, for example, love of health moves to procuring evacuation or

digestion, or something similar, so desire for evacuation moves to taking a potion, or to walking, or some other similar means.

14. It is responded first that there is a difference because the proximate ordering of one means to another is attended according to what is material in them, namely, insofar as one means can be an effective cause of that effect, and thus one means can well be ordered to another, and conversely one can be the proximate term of ordering of another, according to what is truly and really in it; and thus it can participate in the nature of an end, as a term. But final causality formally proceeds from an end insofar as it is good, and because the goodness of an end is not participated intrinsically by the nearer means, even if another is ordered to it, therefore final causality is not so participated by it as the nature or relation of a term. But the motion or natural resultance which is between the acts of the will themselves (insofar as from one the will is excited to another) should not be confused with final causality; for that causality among acts is rather effective than final, whether it be through proper physical efficiency, or through natural sympathy and consent, concerning which elsewhere, for it does not matter at present. But the final reason is from the object itself; and therefore, although desire of one means may cause or excite desire of another, nevertheless in the genus of final cause all that motion comes from the same end.

15. Unless someone finally wants to say that just as a means from conjunction with an end becomes lovable and desirable, so it becomes powerful for causing finally, at least the election of another means for its sake, and thus participates in final causality. Which indeed in reality is not different from what we have said; for at most this can be attributed to a means through a certain extrinsic denomination. For, just as a means does not receive any intrinsic goodness from an end by which it becomes desirable, but only through extrinsic denomination and quasi-information receives from it objective fittingness and desirability, so at most through similar extrinsic denomination it can participate in final causality; but in

truth, all that causality comes from the end itself and its goodness; and therefore I have often said above, that properly and by intrinsic denomination only an end exercises final causality.

16. The objection is satisfied. You will say: therefore, in the way that the nature of an end is attributed to means to which others are ordered, so it can be attributed to a means which is first in execution and ultimate in the way of intention; for, although another extrinsic means is not ordered to it, nevertheless the very act of the will which terminates in it is ordered to it; whence also it can be said to be for its sake, according to the doctrine delivered above, sect. 3. Again, although that means does not draw the will through intrinsic goodness, nevertheless as conjoined with an end, just as it is rendered desirable and fitting through extrinsic denomination by that, so through the same it can be said to cause finally, not through itself, but through the end as through its extrinsic form. It is responded first that it is not a great inconvenience to concede all this, which pertains more to the mode of speaking than to the thing. And if anyone wants to sustain Gabriel's opinion in this way, he will be able to easily; for St. Thomas also, I, q. 5, a. 6, calls the useful good as such the proximate term of motion of the will. Nevertheless that mode of speaking, especially concerning participation of causality through extrinsic denomination, seems to me very improper; for in rigor the means does not move, but the end moves to the means, as I was saying above. However as regards the relation of a term it can be said to be participated by the first means, insofar as it is the material object in which the act of the will is engaged, which alone St. Thomas intends in the place cited. Indeed under that aspect by which the act is said to be for its sake, it no longer has the nature of first means; for the act itself takes on in some way the nature of a prior means, as I explained in sect. III.

The Foundations of Other Opinions are Satisfied

17. What is the adequate object of the will. The foundations of other opinions do not need much new solution, because in explaining the true opinion they are partly solved, partly accommodated to confirm the things we have said. Only to that which we objected in favor of the prior opinion concerning the adequate object of the will, it must be said that the object of a power is twofold, material and formal; therefore an end cannot be called the adequate material object of the will, because means also are matter about which the will is engaged, as has been said; but an end can be called the adequate formal object, because whatever the will loves is an end or for the sake of an end; and this St. Thomas intends in the cited place. When therefore it is said that every object of the will has final causality, it should be understood of the formal object, not of the material. And in the same way should be understood what Aristotle says that end and good are the same; he understands concerning good simply, which is good in itself and per se; in which sense he also said, I Ethic., c. 7, that the good of each thing is that for the sake of which it operates. And to the same thing returns what others say, that an end is the adequate motive object of the will, not however terminative, and final causality properly belongs to the motive object, not however to the purely terminative. Conrad, however, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, says that an end is the adequate object per se of the will, but a means is an object per accidens; which returns to the same, provided that that per accidens is not so understood that it is thought that the will does not attain the means itself in itself; for thus it would be false that means are objects per accidens, for they are properly and in themselves loved; but it should be understood per accidens, that is, through another, namely through an end, and in this way only the object per se of the will can have final causality.

18. Whether there is any act of the will not caused by an end. You will say: therefore no act of the will is not from a final cause, because none is not from the adequate formal object of it; but this seems false, both because there is some act in the will which is

engaged neither about an end nor about means, as Scotus and some other theologians contend, In I, dist. 1; also because simple complacency, or inefficacious desire of an impossible thing, is not caused by an end, since it in no way moves to the attainment of an end. This objection demanded a long disputation, whether there is a neutral act in the will which is not caused by an end; but because this is not of our purpose, it is briefly responded to the argument by conceding the consequence, namely, that there is no act in the will when it operates with reason and some deliberation which is not an effect of an end, as the reason made rightly proves and can be confirmed from all the things said in sect. 3. To the prior part of the objection, however, we deny that there is an act in the will which is not in some way either about an end or about a means for the sake of an end, which Gregory proves at length, In I, dist. 1, q. 1, especially from Augustine, I De Doctrina christiana, c. 8, where he reduces all lovable goods to goods which are to be enjoyed or used, that is, which are ends or means. Which Aristotle also holds, III Eth., c. 3 and 4, and is also taken from St. Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 86. And the reason is that between good lovable for its own sake or only for the sake of another no middle can be found. For what Scotus thought that good in common or abstractly taken could be a middle, is not true, because good in common is not abstracted except as lovable per se, because something else which is loved only for the sake of an extrinsic end is not good simply, but analogically and by extrinsic denomination, in which an abstract common concept is not given, as is evident from the above. To the other part of the objection it is responded that in that simple or inefficacious act concerning an impossible object, the impossible object itself is not loved through the mode of an end to be sought or attained, but either the very delight which is taken from that act is loved through the mode of an end, or some reason of good which is represented in that impossible object is loved either absolutely or under condition. For that is what moves the will to that simple affection, and that also is what participates in the causality of an

end, not indeed as regards intention or election, but only as regards simple affection; for this also is engaged about an end.

How Privations Participate in Final Causality

19. Finally the resolution of the second difficulty posited at the beginning concerning negative or privative objects is plainly easy from the above. To which some respond that good which can cause finally should not be taken so strictly that it is convertible with true real being, but more broadly insofar as it is convertible with being, as it analogically comprehends also privations or negations, according to what was said above, disp. XI, sect. 3, n. 3. For as Aristotle said, V Ethic., c. 1, the lesser evil is in some way good; therefore privations and negations, although they do not really bring goodness, nevertheless insofar as they remove some inconvenience, are considered to have some fittingness, by reason of which they can cause finally, which opinion is true in reality; but we can add that lack of evil has no force of causing finally except in virtue of some positive good; and it can rightly be said that privation is loved more as a means to obtaining good or to fully enjoying it than properly as an end, and therefore that final causality which is in effect of some privation is more to be attributed to the good by reason of which that privation is loved, than to the privation itself. For someone loves to lack pain on account of the delight opposed to it, or certainly on account of love of his nature and state fitting to it, such as is freedom from pain, even if other positive willing is absent. Only this seems to obstruct this doctrine, that sometimes someone can love not to be simply, which love cannot be caused from love of some positive good, because not to be simply and absolutely leaves no foundation of positive good. But it must be said that even not-being itself cannot be loved, nor have force of moving affection, except from love of the advantage of being itself; for someone does not love not to be except to avoid some grave inconvenience of being itself, which is apprehended as greater with

respect to his own nature, which he loves for its own sake, than entirely to lack being. And thus it happens (which is wonderful) that from excessive love of himself someone can desire not to be. Read St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 2; Hervaeus, Quodl. VIII, q. 8; Durand., In IV, dist. 50, q. 2; Ferrari, III cont. Gent., c. 19; Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 16.

How Relation Participates in the Causality of an End

20. To the other concerning relations, some contend that not only real relations, but also those of reason can exercise the causality of an end. Others also deny that force to real relations, like Hervaeus, Quodl., II, q. 1, and consistently enough, if he holds that real relation has no perfection. And indeed I think that no relation either of reason, or of those real ones which are called predicamental and is only considered to be through resultance from foundation and term, none (I say) of these relations is lovable for its own sake, but only by reason of its foundation or on account of the concomitance of its term; for one who loves form does not love the resultant relation, but the real estimation of himself, which he considers to be very fitting to himself, and so concerning others. Therefore, if false estimation does not intervene, these can never exercise final causality. But it is otherwise concerning transcendental relations, which per se have their entities or are included in the concepts of some absolute things; therefore they can be good per se and fitting, as is evident concerning the relation of science, sight, and similar things, and thus they can exercise this causality. I also omit divine relations, which by another higher reason can obtain this causality, especially since they essentially include the whole goodness and perfection of the essence.

SECTION VII
WHETHER BEING KNOWN IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE END SO THAT IT CAN CAUSE FINALLY

1. This question seems to coincide with that which is customarily treated concerning the object of the will, namely whether the will can be carried toward the unknown; however, in truth they are not entirely the same, although they are closely connected; for even if the will were carried toward the unknown, the final cause would not therefore cause while unknown, but rather it should then be said that the will elicits its act without the proper causality of the end around itself, because then indeed the will would be moved not drawn nor moved by the object, but from its own efficacy alone tending toward the object. And thus the present question does not entirely depend on that other one, although conversely if the will cannot be carried toward the unknown, it is rightly inferred that neither can the end cause unless it is foreknown.

The End Does Not Cause Unless Known

2. I say therefore first: in order that the end may cause, it is altogether necessary that it be foreknown. This is the received opinion of all philosophers, whom we shall review below, and especially in the following section. And it is proved first a priori from the mode of causing of this cause, which is by metaphorically moving and alluring the appetite. For this metaphorical motion, as has been explained above, is founded in the natural harmony and sympathy of intellect and will, which cannot be understood except through the mediation of acts of such powers; for while they do not operate, they neither move nor are moved, nor do they have any vital harmony. In this

harmony, however, it is necessary that the act of the intellect precede, because that through its act or object conducts itself as mover and the will as moved; therefore for this metaphorical motion which the final cause exercises around the will, a previous cognition of it is necessary.

3. Second, because in order that a real cause may cause, it needs some being; but the final cause does not necessarily postulate proper and intrinsic real existence; therefore it at least requires being in cognition, and thus it happens that the end often causes when it does not exist, as has been seen above; never however if it is not known. So much so that, although it may sometimes really exist, if it is not apprehended, it moves the affection in no way. As for this reason, among others, it has been deservedly said: "a hidden treasure and invisible wisdom, what utility is in either?" And from the same root it happens that the end, even if it is good in reality, if however it is not known as such, but is falsely apprehended as evil, does not allure, but rather retracts the will.

4. Aristotelian pronouncement. Third, this is confirmed a posteriori from the fact that the will cannot be carried except toward a known good. This truth is as it were a first principle and axiom of all philosophers and theologians. For Aristotle, in De Anima III, chapter 10, says that the appetible does not move unless perceived by mind or imagination; to which all interpreters there consent, and excellently St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 4, and I-II, q. 3, a. 4, ad. 4, and q. 9, a. 1. And it is the express opinion of St. Augustine, book X De Trinitate, chapters 1 and 2: "No one (he says) can love a completely unknown thing"; the same, book XV, chapter 26, where he says that love arises in us from knowledge of the mind; the same, book VIII, chapter 4, and book III De Libero Arbitrio, chapter 25, and elsewhere often; and St. Gregory, book V Moralia, chapter 23, and book XXIII, chapter 12, and book XXXI, chapter 12; and excellently Bernard, book De Interiori Domo, chapters 18 and 19, and book De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, not far from the beginning, and sermons 7, 8 and 52 In Cantica; and Anselm,

in Monologion, chapter 48: "Nothing is loved without memory or understanding of itself."

5. The a priori reason of this truth, however, must be taken from the principle we have posited in the assertion, namely, that the final cause cannot cause unless known; joined to another, namely, that the will cannot move itself unless moved in some way finally, and therefore cannot be carried except by previous cognition. The minor or second proposition is established by experience; for vital appetite cannot begin its vital appetition from itself alone, unless it is in some way allured and moved by the appetible. The reason can be given either from the general condition of vital power, especially of that which acts by immanent action, which cannot act unless moved in some way or determined by its object; but this motion with respect to appetite is metaphorical. Or the reason can be given from the condition of appetite; for every appetite follows some being and some form or nature; but elicited appetition does not follow immediately from natural being itself or natural form, as is evident, and therefore it is necessary that it follow apprehended form and known being which comes from that; whence just as without natural being natural appetite does not follow, so neither without cognition does elicited appetite follow. But there is a difference that natural appetite, because in reality it is not distinct from nature itself or natural faculty, accompanies it as it were formally or as it were by natural consequence, according to our mode of conceiving; but elicited appetite is of a far different nature, and is an act distinct from apprehended form or from concept, both formal and objective; and therefore it is not caused by that formally, but finally by the good object applied through cognition.

Whether God Can Bring It About That the Will Love the Unknown

6. And from these reasons theologians more frequently infer not only that according to the order of nature it is necessary that cognition precede elicited appetition, but also that by absolute power it is impossible that it happen otherwise, or that the will be carried toward the unknown. This opinion St. Thomas insinuates in the cited places, and Henry teaches this more openly, Quodlibet I, q. 15; and Gabriel, In II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, doubt 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, book De Laudibus Vitae Solitariae, articles 36 and 37. And this opinion seems true to me and is sufficiently proved by the reasons made above. It is very well explained from those two principles, namely, that the will in its act essentially depends on final causality, because it cannot desire except metaphorically moved or excited by the good which it is about to love; and that the final cause altogether necessarily and essentially requires being known in order to cause, because metaphorical motion can neither be understood except through the mediation of cognition, as has been sufficiently explained.

7. Nevertheless there have not been lacking theologians who would say that God can bring it about that the will love without previous cognition. Thus Paludanus thinks, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, n. 29; it is also customarily attributed to Gregory there, and to Ockham, q. 25, ad 7 and 15. Some mystical theologians also have asserted[18] that in the highest contemplation one sometimes arrives at that state in which the will loves without previous cognition. These authors do not explain, however, whether then also the final cause causes without cognition, or truly the will then loves without the proper concourse of the final cause; and indeed they would more consistently say this latter; for then the object would only be the terminus of the act of the will, but not the principle, and consequently neither the cause. But if it were true that the will could love by receiving an act which it itself would not effect, that opinion would be more intelligible; for then it would suffice that that action, insofar as it is from an extrinsic cause,

[18] Bonavent., In Itiner. Mentis in Dem, cap. ult., et in quadam quaest., quae habetur in fine de mystica Theologia. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 775.

would also have a final cause. Nevertheless, since the will cannot love except by vitally eliciting love and moving and inclining itself through that in a vital way, it cannot be understood that it would begin such motion in itself, unless excited and allured by the object through final causality, which cannot exist without cognition.

What Kind of Cognition Is Necessary for the Causality of the End

8. Immediately, however, various questions occur here, which because the same are treated concerning the object of the will, I shall only suggest and refer to their proper place. One is what kind of cognition this is which is required for causing finally, namely whether intellective cognition is necessary, or sensitive suffices. In which two can be included; one is whether sensitive cognition suffices to move the will, and this part does not pertain to the present; we suppose, however, that cognition of the intellect is necessary in order that the will be moved, because only intellective power is proportioned to the will for moving it; concerning which matter it is discussed in I, q. 9, a. 1 and 2, and is touched upon by Cajetan, q. 10, a. 3, because of certain words of St. Thomas there, ad 3, saying that the will is moved not only by universal good apprehended through intellect, but also by particular good apprehended through sense, which are not so to be understood as if apprehension of sense is thought sufficient for such motion, but so that these material goods which sense apprehends, can also move the will insofar as through the mediation of sense they reach even to reason. The other part included in the said question could be hypothetical, whether if the will were moved by an object apprehended through sense only, that motion would suffice for final causality, or (which is the same) whether that motion would be final causality, concerning which question there is the same reason as concerning the similar absolute question, whether the motion of

sensitive appetite by good known through sense is final causality, which we shall explain in the last section of this disputation.

9. Another question, consequent to the preceding, is what kind of intellective cognition is necessary, namely whether apprehensive suffices, as Scotus In II, dist. 6, q. 1, seems to think, or judicative is necessary. Concerning which matter it is treated in I-II, q. 9, a. 1. And it can scarcely fall into doubt that judicative cognition is necessary concerning the object under the aspect of fittingness and concerning its fittingness. This is the open opinion of the Philosopher, II De Anima, chapter 3, who in this sense says that bare phantasy does not move appetite, but opinion; and chapter 7 denies that appetite is moved until judgment of good or evil is present; and book IV Metaphysics, chapter 4, text 18, is the best testimony. For he thinks it so established that for determinate motion of the will determinate judgment is necessary concerning the fittingness of the thing toward which the will is moved, that by this experiment he refutes philosophers denying the first principle and shows that no thing simultaneously is and is not, but only one determinately. The same is the opinion of St. John Damascene, book II De Fide, chapter 22; and of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, and I, q. 53, a. 3, and often elsewhere. And the reason is clear, because as long as the intellect does not judge the object to be fitting, it does not yet know its fittingness, for pure apprehension precise from all judgment is indifferent as to whether what is apprehended is estimated to exist thus or not; and therefore one who only apprehends and does not judge the stars to be even, does not know them to be even, but remains doubtful and ignorant; such apprehension therefore concerning the fittingness of a thing cannot be sufficient to move the will, as experience itself sufficiently teaches; therefore neither for causing finally; therefore judgment is required.

10. You will say: sensitive appetite is moved without judgment from[19] apprehension of the object; therefore the will also can be so moved. It is answered that the antecedent is false; for, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 59, a. 3: "The sheep flees the wolf from a certain judgment, by which it estimates it to be harmful to itself." Such judgment however in a brute is not through ratiocination, nor through composition, nor through formal cognition of that reason on account of which the thing is fitting, but is through simple and natural estimation concerning the fittingness of such a thing. The human intellect however achieves perfect judgment concerning fittingness and concerning the formal reason of such fittingness, both by composing and also by reasoning; but superior intelligences judge in a superior way through simple acts. Whether however sometimes in man, in order that the will be moved, cognition of the object through a simple act suffices, which although it does not say thus to be or not to be through formal composition and division, is nevertheless not pure apprehension but includes virtual judgment and cognition that such an object is fitting, is disputed by theologians; and it is probable that such a mode of cognition can suffice for some simple affection of the will; and perhaps in this sense Scotus spoke above, and more broadly Marsilius, In II, q. 16, a. 1; Major also and Gabriel, In II, dist. 6. Nevertheless for proper and formal motion on account of the end, concerning which we now treat, more perfect judgment is necessary, which is not had without ratiocination or composition or division, because it is necessary to know either the proper and formal fittingness which is in the end, or the proportion of means to the end, which cognition is not had except through comparison of one to another, which is not done without composition and ratiocination and perfect judgment which is compared therefrom. And therefore undeliberated operations of the will are not considered to be properly on account of the end, as St. Thomas noted, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3,

[19] From some editions, other editions put "and." The meaning varies. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 777.

because, although they do not happen without some cognition of the intellect, nevertheless it is imperfect, and in mode is similar to imaginary estimation. Here however a doubt would immediately arise concerning the will of the insane, whether in it the proper causality of the end has place, concerning which matter I shall speak immediately.

11. Again, however, it is customarily doubted whether this judgment ought to be practical or speculative suffices, concerning which matter many things also are disputed by theologians in the cited places. From those things however which have been said above by us concerning the use of human freedom, and concerning the mode by which the will can be determined by judgment of the intellect, sufficient resolution of the said doubt can be taken insofar as is necessary for the present. And because much depends on the use of words, it is necessary to distinguish them. If therefore by practical judgment we understand some act of intellect, so judging concerning the end that it is able by itself and by its own force to determine the will efficaciously, thus it must be said that such practical judgment is not required for final causality, because motion of the end, or judgment through which the end is applied, does not impede the use of freedom; for such practical motion would be altogether contrary to the will, as we showed above. If however by practical judgment is understood judgment concerning the fittingness of the end, not only according to itself but also with respect to the man judging, not only in common and abstractly, but also in particular here and now, and consequently judging not only concerning the object itself or end, but also concerning the act itself or tendency toward the end, that is, so that not only is the object judged to be fitting, but also here and now it is fitting to will that, if such (I say) judgment is signified by the name of practical judgment, it is true that judgment practical in this mode is required for final causality; and in the same sense, speculative judgment contradistinct to this practical judgment does not suffice.

12. In which sense I understand the saying of Aristotle, III De Anima, chapter 9, text 42: "Contemplative intellect says nothing at all

whether it should be fled from or pursued; but motion is always of one fleeing from or pursuing something." For that he speaks there of practical judgment or command in this latter mode and not the former, is evident from text 47, in which he adds: "Intellect sometimes commands, and reason says to flee from something else, or to pursue, but man does not obey and is not moved, but acts by desire, as is customary to happen in the incontinent person." The reason however why such judgment is required, is clear, because, as also was said above, while the will is moved, it not only wills the object, but also in its own way wills here and now its own act and motion; therefore it is necessary that judgment be made concerning this whole and concerning such fittingness. That however such judgment suffices, is evident, because it sufficiently applies both the fittingness of the object and of practical motion into it; but whatever else is required, neither can be founded in the nature of final cause, nor in the mode of operating of the will; but rather from that part by which it is free, it is repugnant to it; therefore.

13. Whether the insane will anything on account of the end. But immediately a difficulty occurs, because neither does such practical judgment seem necessary, otherwise final causality will not have place in the insane or in children before perfect use of reason, which seems to be against experience, because by words they show that they know the reason of good by which they are moved and the utility of means to the end. It is answered by absolutely denying the consequence; for, although these men cannot exercise practical judgments in order to honest or depraved morals, because cognition of honesty requires perfect use of reason and integral judgment, they can nevertheless have practical judgment concerning a thing as here and now operable and fitting under some inferior aspect, as is the aspect of the delectable or the aspect of fitting or unfitting to animal nature, which is found in health, for example, and utility, which is in the means with respect to such an end. For, although these are insane, they are not deprived of all discourse and ratiocination, through which

the final cause is sufficiently applied so that it can have some causality of its own, although not most perfect.

14. Whether cognition is a per se cause of causing finally. Lastly it can be inquired concerning this cognition, which we say is necessary for causing finally, whether it is required only as a necessary condition for this causality, or also as a principle or per se cause. This doubt can have a double meaning. One is whether cognition of the end, besides that necessity which is taken from the part of the final cause, has another per se causality around the act of the will, on account of which also it is necessary. In which sense this question is not to be treated in the present; for it coincides with that whether cognition concurs effectively to the act of the will as a proper principle per se influencing into it, which refers nothing to the present question concerning final cause. For it is certain, as I said above, that the final cause, which is applied through cognition, does not influence effectively into the act of the will; but that the act itself of cognition by which such cause is applied, has from elsewhere force for sufficiently causing the act of the will, is irrelevant to final causality, although it is more probable that cognition does not have that force of effecting into the act of the will, as has been touched upon in the above and is to be disputed more broadly in the science concerning the soul. Another sense of that doubt is whether the being known which the final cause has through cognition is to it the reason of causing finally, and therefore cognition is not only a necessary condition, but also a per se principle of this causality; and this doubt is customarily considered serious, which demands the following section.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER THE END MOVES ACCORDING TO ITS REAL BEING OR ACCORDING TO ITS KNOWN BEING

1. The first opinion affirms that the end moves according to the being it has in cognition, not according to real being; and therefore that cognition is not only a condition sine qua non, but is the formal reason of causing finally. This is considered to be the view of Avicenna, Metaphysics VI, chapter 5, and it is held by Soncinas, Metaphysics V, question 3, and some other modern Thomists; and they attribute it to St. Thomas, I-II, question 31, article 3, ad 1, where he says that the object of animal appetite is the apprehended good, and therefore diversity of apprehension pertains in some way to diversity of object. And similarly in I, question 80, articles 1 and 2, he says that appetite varies according to the form or apprehension it follows, and thus distinguishes three appetites: natural, sensitive, and will; for the first follows a natural form without apprehension, the second follows a form apprehended through sense, the third follows a form apprehended through intellect.

2. From this doctrine can be conceived the first argument for this opinion: for that which on the part of the object essentially distinguishes appetites is not only a condition, but also the formal reason of moving, or of the moving object; but diverse apprehension is a sufficient reason for essentially distinguishing appetites; therefore. The minor premise is from St. Thomas above. The major premise is established from the common doctrine that powers are distinguished by formal objects, not by conditions of objects. Hence St. Thomas in the cited place, having said in the body of the article that appetite is a power that is moved, and is moved by the apprehended appetible and therefore is distinguished by it, adds in the solution to the first objection: "It is not accidental to the appetible to be apprehended through sense or intellect, but belongs to it per se. For the appetible does not move the appetite except insofar as it is apprehended, whence the differences of the apprehended are per se differences of the appetible. Hence appetitive powers are distinguished according to the difference of things apprehended as according to their proper objects." And St. Thomas has the same teaching in I-II, question 30,

article 3, ad 2, where he similarly distinguishes natural from non-natural concupiscences from diverse apprehension; and Cajetan there notes that from that response it is manifestly held that apprehension in respect to the object of appetite is not related as the approximation of the active to the passive, but as an objective reason.

3. And this argument is confirmed: for in the same intellective appetite, the effect of the final cause varies greatly from diversity of cognition; but a mere condition or application of the cause could not suffice for such great diversity. The antecedent is clear, for cognition of God through clear or obscure vision, intuitive or abstractive, causes, as many wish, specific diversity in love, and at minimum is the cause that one love is free and another necessary. Again, the same good apprehended absolutely causes love; as absent and to be acquired it causes desire or intention; as present it causes joy, which are specifically diverse acts; and the same proportion distinguishes acts concerning apprehended evil as absent or present: sadness and fear. Again, acts of virtue and vice in the will are not distinguished from the object according to its real being, but according to its apprehended being; hence it happens that if someone from erroneous conscience wishes to give alms thinking he is doing evil, that is not an act of virtue but of vice; and conversely, one who from invincible ignorance wishes to steal in order to give alms, thinking he is doing good, does not perform an act of vice, but of virtue, properly and according to the true real species of virtue. Finally, a similar argument is that good does not move as it is, but as it is apprehended; and therefore we said above with Aristotle that for the causality of the end it does not matter what kind it is, but what kind it is thought to be; but to be thought is the same as to be apprehended.

4. The second principal argument for this opinion is that the being which per se and alone the final cause requires in order to cause is not merely a condition, but the formal principle of causing; but the being of existence is not required in the end for causing; but known being is per se necessary and that alone suffices; therefore. The major

premise seems evident from the terms, because nothing else is to be the formal principle of causing than to be that which per se, primarily, and formally is required in the cause so that it can cause. Hence in the above we have often said, and below we shall also say, that the being of existence with respect to the efficient cause is not a required condition, but the very reason of causing, because it is the very entity of the thing and the first being required for causing. The minor premise regarding the first part has been sufficiently proven in the previous section, and that this necessity of apprehension is per se from the force of the final cause is established from the mode of its causality, which is through metaphorical motion; for this per se proceeds from objective being, not from the being of the thing in itself. Regarding the second part also it is established from what has been said, for it has often been shown that the end causes before it exists; indeed even one that will never be future, or sometimes even one that cannot exist, if nevertheless it is apprehended as possible.

5. The second contrary opinion states that the end moves according to real being and that this being is the formal reason of moving, and consequently that cognition of the end is only a condition or necessary approximation of this kind of cause. This opinion was taught extensively by Cajetan, I-II, question 1, article 1, circa ad 1, and he considers it to be the opinion of Averroes, Metaphysics XII, comment 36, insofar as he says that health which is in reality causes finally, although insofar as it is in the soul it efficiently causes desire for itself. And it can be taken from St. Thomas, I, question 82, article 3, insofar as he says the will is inclined to the thing itself as it is in itself; and from the Philosopher, whom he cites there, in Metaphysics VI, text 8, saying that good and evil, which are objects of the will, are in things. The same opinion is held by Ferrariensis, I Contra Gentiles, chapter 44, where he says that being in the mind is only a required condition for final causation. Javellus also holds it, Metaphysics V, question 6; Ockham, In II, question 3, article 2; and

Gabriel, In II, distinction 1, question 1, article 3; and it is also taken from Scotus, In I, distinction 1, question 4.

A Judgment is Rendered Between The Aforesaid Opinions

6. Between these opinions, the latter seems to me simply true; and the whole matter appears so clear that there can scarcely be a reason for dissent, unless some equivocation is mixed into the very words. This will be easily evident if we distinguish those things in which the authors of both opinions agree, or which are so manifest that they necessarily ought to agree on them.

7. First, therefore, all agree that the end does not need real or exercised existence (as they call it) in order to cause finally, in which sense it is clear that the being of existence is not the reason of causing finally, indeed not even a necessary condition. I add also that neither the being of essence truly nor the being of possible existence is actually necessary for causing finally; for the apprehended suffices, and this is what the arguments of the first opinion largely prove.

8. Second, it is certain that the will does not tend toward the end so as to attain it in known being as such, but so as to attain it in its proper real being, which it apprehends in it according to its condition, and in this sense it is most certain that being in cognition is not the reason of final causation, but only a necessary condition. The first part is made evident by examples and explanation of the matter itself. For one who intends health or riches does not intend to know them or to think about them, but to attain them in reality according to true real existence, and the same for other things. The reason must be taken from what was said in section 5, that the formal reason of causing of the final cause is its goodness and suitability; but the thing that moves as an end does not have its goodness and suitability in objective or known being, but in relation to its real being; for health is suitable so as to be present, not so as to be apprehended; therefore the formal

reason of moving is its real being, insofar as it is suitable or good, or its real suitability, insofar as it is founded in that very real being and renders it good and appetible. This is confirmed because the end moves according to that being according to which it satisfies the appetite of the agent after he has attained it and without which he does not rest; but thus the end is related to the will according to real being and not according to apprehended being; therefore. The major premise is established, both because that is first in intention which is last in execution, and also because the end is that toward which the impulse of the agent tends; but it tends toward that by attaining which it rests. The minor premise is also clear, because the mind does not rest in the apprehension of the end unless it attains it in the thing itself, and without this kind of attainment the intention of the agent is considered frustrated. And the authors of the first opinion do not deny this, as Medina finally admits, I-II, question 1, article 1, although perhaps not very consistently, as will be established from what is to be said.

9. But I said that the will tends toward the end according to real being according to its condition, because sometimes it happens that the very end of the operating will is nothing other than cognition of some object, as when we intend or desire to see God; for then that being seen pertains to the formal reason of such a final cause; and it is similar when a man appetites as an end the mere contemplation or speculation of some truth. And in this way theologians also say that sometimes man can delight in cognition alone and not in the thing known, except according to known being, from which the act then receives its goodness or malice. Although in these and similar examples cognition itself is appetited as an end, nevertheless it has its own proper real being, according to which it is appetited, and such cognition even then is not the reason of final causation insofar as it is something prerequisite on the part of the end so that it may move the will, but insofar as it is a certain action which is per se judged suitable and as such is proposed to the will as sufficient to move it, or as a

terminus toward which it tends. And thus according to proper distribution it is universally true that the end moves according to real being, which through mediated apprehension is presented to the will; for according to that it is judged suitable, and insofar as it is judged suitable, it moves.

10. Third, it must be said that apprehension or judgment of that real suitability, speaking properly and formally, is not the reason of moving or final causation, but is a necessary condition by way of necessary approximation to this kind of causality. Regarding this the second opinion speaks more truly and properly, and it is proven because being in cognition is not the goodness or suitability according to which the end moves, as has been proven; therefore neither is cognition itself the formal reason for the end to move; it will therefore be a necessary condition. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration of parts. Therefore, just as in efficient cause local approximation is a required condition, so in final cause quasi-animal or vital approximation is a required condition for this mode of causing, because since the motion of this cause is metaphorical, it must occur through natural agreement of cognitive and appetitive powers, as has often been said.

11. Hence it must be added, fourth, that this cognition is such that by reason of it, or rather through its mediation, the reason or formal principle of final causation can be varied, not because it itself is the formal motive reason, but because it applies a diverse formal reason of moving. And in this the authors of the first opinion seem to have labored under equivocation. This is explained from the aforesaid similarity of efficient cause; for although one who applies a per se agent cause is only a per accidens cause, nevertheless if he is able to apply diverse causes having diverse principles of acting, he will be able from that aspect to vary the formal reason of acting, and consequently to be the cause of diversity in the effect. Thus therefore, because apprehensive power is universal, it can apply diverse objects and diverse formal reasons of moving; and therefore, although it itself is

not the reason of final causation, it can be the cause or occasion that such a reason is varied. And by similar reasoning apprehensive power can apprehend the same material thing under diverse reasons, either truly or apparently; and thence also it comes about that from diversity of apprehension or judgment the motion or causality of the end is changed; not because formally and per se that variety proceeds from apprehension, but because it applies a formally diverse end, as has been explained.

The Foundations of the First Opinion are Resolved

12. And according to this last assertion all the testimonies and arguments which the first opinion brought forward are excellently explained and resolved. For whenever St. Thomas says that diversity of apprehension pertains to diversity of object, it must be understood to pertain not formally, but applicatively, so to speak. Or it can be said otherwise (and it comes to the same thing) that diversity of apprehension, not that which is held on the part of the subject, but that which is held on the part of the object, varies the appetite and its object and the causality of the end. But I call conditions of apprehension on the part of the subject that it be clear or obscure, certain or probable, and similar things, which do not result in application of the object under a diverse reason of goodness or suitability; but when diversity of apprehension extends to this, it is said to be diverse also on the part of the object.

13. Hence to the first argument the major premise must be distinguished: for that which on the part of the object essentially distinguishes appetites, if it does this per se primarily, will be the formal reason of the object; if however it only does this as applying a diverse formal object, it will be able to be only a required condition; and in this way apprehension contributes to this diversity. And according to the same doctrine it must be understood that intellective and sensitive appetite are distinguished because they follow

apprehension of sense or intellect; for if this distinction is to be reduced to the apprehended object, it consists in this, that through sense the object is applied under a diverse reason of suitability to sensitive or rational nature. And although sometimes intellect can apprehend and propose the reason of suitability to sensitive nature, nevertheless this is quasi-material with respect to it; for its adequate reason is more universal, and in that very thing it applies the formal reason of such good far otherwise than sense does, and thus all that diversity, insofar as it results from apprehension into the object, occurs only as through a condition that applies. And the same must be said to all the examples which are adduced in confirmation; for vision and abstractive cognition, if perhaps they are causes that loves are diverse in species, this is because the goodness of God through vision is applied far otherwise also on its part, so that according to all its perfections formally and distinctly known in one most simple perfection clearly seen it moves the will of the one seeing, whereas in abstractive cognition it only moves as known under a determinate reason of some attribute or under some reason of very confused good. And similarly if the necessity, which is greater in one love than in another, comes from the object, this is because through vision both the object and its love are apprehended as here and now more necessary. Thus also good as absent or present do not vary acts on account of apprehensions alone, but because the thing itself and the condition apprehended in it is naturally suited to cause diverse motion in the appetite; and the same reason applies to the other examples, as anyone can easily understand by applying individual cases to the doctrine handed down.

14. To the second argument it is responded that in both premises taken there can be equivocation. For when it is said in the major premise that the being of the cause which per se and alone is required for causing is the formal reason of causing, if this is understood of exercised being of existence, it is false in final cause, because, as has often been said, it does not always require this being

for causing. If however it is understood of being of existence absolutely, namely abstracting from whether it then exists when it causes, or whether it will be future, or is thought to be, thus it is true that the reason of causing is in the cause some such being. But in this sense the minor premise is false, because, although when the end first moves it often does not have this existence in reality itself except in apprehension, in the way it is said to be first in intention, nevertheless in that apprehension it is presented and represented according to another real being, on account of which the will is moved.

SECTION IX
WHETHER FINAL CAUSALITY HAS A PLACE IN DIVINE ACTIONS AND EFFECTS

1. The reason for doubt is taken from what has been said thus far concerning created intellectual agents; for in these, final causality has no place regarding external actions, except through mediated causality in the very will of the acting cause; but the end cannot have its causality in the will of God; therefore neither in the effects or external actions which proceed from that will. On the contrary, however, it is the case that God is most properly the end of all creatures, whence He is also properly said to work all things for Himself; therefore He is the final cause of all things and of the actions which proceed from Him.

Whether There Is Final Causality in the Free Decrees of the Divine Will

2. Concerning this doubt, two things must be briefly clarified. First, whether and in what manner the end exercises its nature or causality regarding the very free determinations of the divine will, which are like immanent acts in it. Second, what should be said

concerning transient actions which proceed from the divine power, and consequently also concerning the effects to which they are directed. Regarding the former part, Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 2, holds that proper final causality is found in the divine will. His foundation is that the motion of the end is only metaphorical; but this metaphorical motion falls upon God, because the divine goodness, on account of which God acts, moves the will of God; therefore final causality also falls upon the divine will. Second, because God loves on account of His goodness as on account of an end; but by this nothing else is signified except that the divine goodness moves the will of God to love His essence; therefore [the conclusion follows]. Third, because God loves creatures on account of His goodness; but to love one thing on account of another is nothing other than to be moved metaphorically from the love of one to the love of another; therefore God is thus moved metaphorically by Himself as by an end. Fourth, the reason hinted at above can be brought forward, because otherwise the effects of God as they are from Him would not have a final cause; for a final cause has no effect except through the mediation of an agent, which it moves to act; if therefore it has no causality regarding the agent, neither can it have causality regarding the effects of the agent.

3. The response is negative. This opinion, however, is entirely false. Whence it must be said that the end cannot exercise its causality in the divine will as regards the immanent acts or free determinations of the same will. This is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 5, where in this sense he generally denies that there is any cause of the divine will, and I cont. Gent., c. 86 and 87, he says that, although there is some reason for the divine will, there is nevertheless no cause. The same [is held by] Alensis, I p., q. 35, a. 5; Driedo, de Concor. lib. arb., I lib., tract. 1, c. 4, memb. 1, ad 4. The same is the opinion of Ferrara, in the aforesaid c. 87, who notes that, although the divine goodness according to our mode of understanding is the cause of the divine will, it is not so according to real causality. This must also be understood in a sound way regarding the former part; for it must not be thought that

objectively or on God's part there is causality in Him, even in our mode of understanding, otherwise we would understand falsely, but that on our part we understand and explain the reason of the divine will in the manner of causality, because we cannot conceive or explain divine things except in the manner of created things. Moreover, in the same sense, St. Augustine, lib. LXXXIII Quaestionum, q. 28, denies that the cause of the divine will should be sought, on account of which He willed to create the world, and he gives the reason that every cause is efficient, which I think should be understood thus, as I have also explained above, that is, because in every true causality some efficient cause intervenes.

4. And hence the first reason for this truth is taken, because in the divine will there is no true efficiency regarding an act immanent in it, even as freely terminated toward external objects; therefore neither can true final causality have a place regarding such an act. The consequence is evident from what has been said above; for final causality has no place except in order to efficient causality. It is further clarified, second, because the act of the divine will, as regards its essential and necessary entity, cannot have any true cause in any genus, because as such it is being through essence and entirely independent. Neither can that act, as freely terminated toward creatures, have a real cause, because as such it adds nothing real to the necessary entity of the same act; nor can a real cause be imagined which has as its effect only a relation of reason. Therefore, those who think that free determination adds something real to the divine will which could simply not be in it, can quite consistently posit, or even ought to posit, this genus of causality regarding that act; for, as I think, they are forced to posit also effective causality, which is as absurd as that foundation from which it follows is false, as I shall show below in its proper place. Nor does Soncinas proceed by this way, because he admits that final causality not only regarding free determinations, but also regarding the act itself, as it is the necessary love of God, which, taken in rigor, is improbable by every reason, because that act as such

is being itself through essence, and therefore independent, and not caused under any aspect. Whence furthermore, if free determination, as it is something real, is nothing beyond the act itself, and as it is something of reason, it truly is not but is conceived or imagined from our mode of conceiving, it follows that under no aspect can that act have a true cause.

Response to the Opposing Arguments

5. To the arguments it is responded that, just as God loves Himself through Himself in the most eminent way without any causality, either effective regarding love, insofar as it is conceived by us as a vital act, or formal regarding the one loving, insofar as the lover is constituted by such love, so it must be understood that God loves Himself on account of Himself and others also on account of His goodness in the most eminent way without any final causality regarding that same love either of Himself or of others. And thus, when it is said that He loves Himself, metaphorically moved or attracted by His goodness, the expression is metaphorical, taken from the way in which we conceive divine things in the manner of human things. As Boethius also said, lib. III de Consolat., pros. 3, that innate goodness lacking envy impelled God to work external things.

6. Whence to the first [argument] it is denied that metaphorical motion of the end has a place in the divine will just as in ours; for in ours that motion is called metaphorical in such a way that nevertheless it is true causality, because there is true dependence, in the act elicited on account of the end, upon the end itself; but in the divine will there is no such metaphorical motion, but there is a certain eminent reason for loving, which, just as it is without distinction of acts or powers, so also it is without any true motion even metaphorical. Therefore equivocation in the term "metaphorical motion" must be avoided; for with respect to us, that particle "metaphorical" is added to distinguish that motion from the motion of

an efficient cause, not indeed to exclude it from the entire latitude of motion and real causality properly so called; but when God is said to be moved or attracted by His goodness, the entire expression is metaphorical, to explain only the reason of the divine will.

7. How God is said to love Himself or others on account of His own goodness. And through these things response is made to the second and third reasons; for that particle "on account of" (propter), when God is said to love Himself or others on account of His goodness, does not signify a true cause of that love, but only a reason (as I said) of the divine will. But it is false that God loves Himself on account of Himself as on account of an end; for God is not the end of Himself; for who has ever spoken thus? or how can He who has no beginning have an end? Unless perhaps He is said negatively to be the end of Himself because He has no other end; for thus God is said to be from Himself. But in this sense He is not the end of Himself through final causality, just as neither is He from Himself through efficient [causality]. It is also false that to love one thing on account of another is the same as to be moved from the love of one to the love of another, if that "from" signifies proper causality or distinction in reality between one love and another; for in rigor, for the truth of that expression it suffices that one be the reason for loving the other. Whence, just as when God is said to be immortal because He is immaterial, that particle "because" designates not a true cause, but a reason, so He is said to love creatures on account of His goodness, not because it is a cause, but because it is the reason for loving them. And just as God, by that act by which He necessarily loves Himself, freely loves creatures without real addition or increase, so the same act as terminated toward God can be said to be the reason, in our mode of conceiving, why it extends (so to speak) to creatures, with no proper causality intervening. For, just as that termination occurs in the most eminent way without real increase, so also without real causality. As Dionysius said, c. 4 de Divin. nom., that divine love did not allow God to be without offspring.

Whether There Is Final Causality in God's External Actions & Effects

8. The fourth reason of that opinion requires that we explain the second point proposed at the beginning, namely, how true final causality is given in God's actions and effects ad extra, if such causality is not found in God's very will. And the reason for doubt is sufficiently proposed at the beginning and in that fourth reason. On account of which someone could concede that an end toward which they are ordered and on account of which they are made is properly found in God's effects, yet that proper final causality is not found. For as Gabriel notes, In 11, dist. 1, q. 5, in princ., end and final cause are not entirely the same; for end as such only designates the terminus toward which operation tends, or toward which motions are ordered; but final cause is that which moves the agent to operate. Therefore, if there is given an end which does not move the agent through proper causality, there can be given an end which is not a final cause taken in propriety and rigor. Thus therefore it can truly be said that God works all things on account of Himself as on account of an ultimate end into which all things are ordered, yet not through final causality, but through a more eminent mode free from all causality. But this manner of speaking does not entirely satisfy. First indeed, because according to the opinion of all theologians God is the final cause of all things, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 44, a. 4. Second, because Aristotle defines final cause as that on account of which something is made; but God truly and properly is that on account of which creatures are made, according to that passage in Proverbs 16: "The Lord has made all things for Himself." Third, because final cause as such includes no imperfection, indeed it is considered to be the first and most perfect of all causes, in the manner to be explained below; therefore it belongs to God properly and formally and with the highest perfection; but it belongs

[to Him] only with respect to effects ad extra; therefore [the conclusion follows].

9. Therefore it must be said that, although final cause does not properly cause its effects except in some way through the mediation of an agent which it moves and attracts to operate, nevertheless, for an end to be the proper cause of an agent's effect, it is not necessary that it first have some proper causality in the agent itself. For, although this happens in created intellectual agents, because they immediately move or apply themselves to operate or love through some real motion and proper causality, nevertheless, in an uncreated intellectual agent this is not necessary, because without any change or real addition, dependence or causality in itself, it applies itself (so to speak) or determines itself to freely love and operate in the most simple and eminent way. But God's final causality with respect to effects ad extra consists in this: that God, through the intuition and love of His goodness, produces effects outside Himself; whence, that very operation which He has ad extra essentially depends on God both in the nature of efficient [cause], and also in the nature of end, because it regards God both as omnipotent and as supremely good, who by reason of His goodness, both is worthy that all things be ordered to Him as to an end, and inclines Himself in the said eminent way to communicate His goodness to others on account of it. And thus the response to the reason for doubt is easy; for we deny that final causality within the agent itself is always necessary in order that it can have a place outside it in its other effects, as we shall also clarify below that exemplar causality has a place in God's effects without any proper causality within God Himself.

10. An occurring doubt is resolved. And hence is easily resolved the doubt which Cajetan touches upon regarding the aforesaid a. 4, q. 44, I, whether it can be conceded that God, as He is agent, has a final cause, which is the same as asking whether God's action ad extra has a proper final cause. For it must be said that it does indeed have a final cause. For God truly and properly exercises that

action on account of some end which He intends. Likewise, because, as St. Thomas says in that article, the end of the agent and of the patient is the same, although in different ways; but the discussion concerns the agent as agent, and the patient broadly, as it extends to the effect made by the agent; but God's effect as such has a proper final cause; therefore God's action as such has the same final cause, which, although it is not the end of God, is nevertheless the end of God's effect, and consequently also of His action; for the end toward which the effect is ordered is what moves the agent to operate; whence it orders its action toward the same [end].

11. Objection. But immediately a difficulty arises: for God's action is God's very essence; therefore it cannot have a final cause. In this objection the Thomists are stuck and labor; and Cajetan responds that that action, as regards the reality which is action, does not have a final cause; but formally insofar as it is action it has as final cause God's very goodness. But the response does not satisfy because either that action as action adds something real to God Himself, and thus it will not be in God; or it adds nothing real, and according to this it cannot have a final cause. Some moderns respond that action as such only adds an intrinsic relation of reason, and as regards that it has a final cause. And they add that, since the end moves the agent metaphorically, it is not necessary that there be real distinction between the end and the agent or its operation, but it suffices that there be distinction of reason and that the agent be determined by the end to action, whether that determination be through a real mode or through a mode of reason. But this doctrine is false and falls into the opinion of Soncinas, and from it clearly follows that God's love, as freely terminated toward creatures, has a proper final cause, which nevertheless has been shown to be entirely false. And the consequence is evident; for in that free determination there is also real identity and a mode of reason proceeding in its way from God as from an end. Likewise, it is false that a relation of reason belongs to the intrinsic nature of a real act, since that [relation] is nothing. And therefore it

can no more be understood to be caused through proper final causality than through proper efficiency. And therefore other Thomists deny what we have said, namely that God so operates on account of an end, that that end is the cause of God's action, but only of the passion, so to speak, or effect, or even of the very becoming. In this indeed they seem to speak consistently; for according to them, God's action is nothing other than God's volition; but God's volition cannot have a final cause. But from a false foundation they are forced to depart from the true opinion.

12. True response. And therefore it is more easily responded by denying the antecedent; for God's transient action is not God, nor in God, but in the creature; and therefore it can have a final cause and be ordered to an end. And thus, although God does not have an end of His being, He nevertheless has an end of His transient action, which, if it be a proximate end, can be something outside God; for God acts ad extra in order to communicate Himself, which communication is something outside God, and universally action can be said to be ordered to a terminus as to its end; but if there be discussion of the ultimate end, it is God Himself, not because He intends to acquire some advantage or good for Himself, but because He acts on account of His goodness to be communicated and manifested. And Durandus well clarifies this opinion, In II, dist. 1, q. 6, although he mixes in some things which are not true, which it is not necessary to examine now.

SECTION X
WHETHER TRUE FINAL CAUSALITY EXISTS IN THE ACTIONS OF NATURAL AND IRRATIONAL AGENTS

1. The reason for doubt. This question is general concerning all agents lacking intellect and will, to all of which it is common that they cannot refer or order their actions or means to an end. And from

this arises the reason for doubt; for the proper causality of the end does not exist without this ordering, as those particles "for the sake of which" and "on account of which something is done" sufficiently declare, by which the causality of the end is usually explained; and therefore it is difficult to find or explain final causality in the actions of these agents and in their effects, insofar as they proceed from them. On the contrary, however, it is because these agents also act for the sake of an end, as Aristotle proves at length in Physics II, chapter 7; but operation for the sake of an end cannot be understood without the causality of the end. And concerning brute animals there is a special difficulty; for they are truly moved to love from some cognition of the good; therefore there exists in that effect and work the metaphorical motion of a known good; therefore this pertains to true final causality. And experience confirms this; for we see the swallow gather straws or accomplish something similar in such a way as is expedient for its end, and so with others.

The Old Opinion Concerning Natural Agents

2. In this matter there was an ancient opinion of the old philosophers denying that the works of nature proceed from the intention of some end, but that they were so constituted by chance, or from the concourse of atoms coming together randomly, or from the necessity of matter, as Aristotle disputes against Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Epicurus in the cited place Physics II, chapters 7 and 8. This opinion is so absurd that it needs no refutation. Nevertheless, it must be noted that it is one thing to act concerning the constitution of the entire universe, and concerning the action of universal nature for composing it and governing it so that it can be conserved, but another thing concerning the proper actions of individual natural agents. The former action or bringing about is not really the action of some natural agent lacking intellect, but is the action of the supreme author of nature, who by his wisdom founded

and governs the entire nature of the universe; and therefore that action does not pertain to the present question, nor can it be doubted that it proceeds for the sake of an end intended by its author, and thus from the causality of the end, according to the doctrine of the preceding section. And the very beauty of the universe and the wonderful consensus and ordering of all its parts and causes teaches this most evidently. From which not only the holy Fathers, but also the wiser philosophers understood that there is one author and governor of this universe, who constituted and ordered all things for an end intended by himself, as we shall treat more broadly below in demonstrating that God exists, and the Conimbricenses have indicated many things about this matter learnedly and briefly, book II Physics, chapter 9, question 1.

3. Therefore, we inquire here only about the actions of natural causes, whether they are entirely particular, such as fire, plants, etc., or in some way universal, such as the heavens. Concerning these it is moreover certain and clear that they do not operate certain actions by chance or contingently, but that each natural agent has from the inclination of its proper nature a definite operation, and mode of operating, and a certain terminus toward which it tends through its operation. This is also evident from experience, for a stone by its natural motion is always carried downward, fire always heats, from diverse seeds diverse living things are procreated, and some powers and organs are destined for this function, others indeed for others; and individual things have that form, position, and all other things necessary for operating in that proportion which is necessary for such actions or effects. This can be seen in all natural things, and especially in living things and animals. And this was necessary for the fitting composition and governance of the universe itself, for since it consists of various and contrary things, which also exercise various and sometimes contrary actions, if all were not so constituted that individual things would perform their duties in order, there would be the greatest confusion in the universe itself and the things themselves

could scarcely be conserved[20]; but in order that such harmony and order could arise from so many things, it was necessary that individual things tend in their actions toward destined ends or termini, from which the good of the entire universe would arise. Likewise, for this reason we see natural motions regularly completed in the same way, and rarely fail, and this not without some extrinsic impediment occurring. Likewise, in their works natural things conduct themselves in such a way as is expedient for arriving at their connatural terminus, and having achieved this terminus they cease from operating. Therefore, all these things are manifest signs that these natural agents operate not by chance and randomly, but in a definite way tending toward some certain goal.

4. Having rejected the error, in what the difficulty lies. Now indeed there remains only the question (which in part seems to be able to pertain to a manner of speaking), whether by reason of this determination these agents should be said to act for the sake of an end, and (which concerns us more) whether their actions can be said to be properly caused by a final cause. For some simply deny both manners of speaking, because the agents themselves are not moved by the end, in which the causality of the end properly consists. Likewise, the end with respect to these actions does not relate as a principle, but only as a terminus; for the place below with respect to a stone is not the principle of the motion by which it descends, but only the terminus; but the end, as we have often said, as it has only the nature of a terminus, is not a cause, but as it is in some way a principle. Others indeed simply think those expressions should be admitted, because Aristotle absolutely says that natural agents operate for the sake of an end, and he says that form is the end of natural generation, and signifies that it is properly a final cause. Likewise, because nature seems to exercise these its operations with the highest artifice and skill through means very proportioned to the end.

[20] See Lactant., lib. de Opific. Dei, et D. Thomam, III cont. Gent., c. 2

Section X

Resolution Concerning the Causality of The End in Merely Natural Agents

5. Nevertheless, the proper manner of speaking in this matter is that the actions of these natural agents are for the sake of an end and are effects of a final cause. Not, however, as they proceed precisely from the natural agents themselves, but as they are simultaneously from the first agent, which operates in all things and through all things. Or conversely (and it comes to nearly the same thing), insofar as the proximate agents themselves are subject to the direction and intention of a superior agent. And therefore the natural agents themselves are said not so much to operate for the sake of an end, as to be directed to an end by a superior agent. Thus the wiser theologians and philosophers have explained this matter, St. Thomas, question 103, article 1, and III Contra Gentiles, chapter 25, where he uses the common example of an arrow, which tends toward a certain target, yet does not direct itself toward it, but is directed by the archer. The same Albert, in II Physics, chapter 2; and there other philosophers, and Simplicius, text 78; and it is taken from Aristotle there, and I On the Heavens, chapter 4, text 32, where, while he joins God and nature, saying that nothing acts in vain, he sufficiently indicates that nature in acting for the sake of an end is subordinated to God. And in the same way, book II On the Parts of Animals, chapter 13, he says that nature does nothing in vain; and in the same place he says that nature wills this or that for the sake of an end, which cannot be understood of nature, except on account of its author. And in the same sense he says, IV On the Generation of Animals, chapter 2: All things that are made by nature or art are made for some reason. And from this also flowed that well-worn axiom, that the work of nature is the work of intelligence, as it is in Averroes, XII Metaphysics, comment 18; and Themistius, I Physics, text 81, and I On the Soul, text 23. Finally, therefore Hippocrates, whom Galen imitates, book I On the Use of

Parts, calls natural agents learned and unlearned, unlearned in themselves, learned in the direction of the first cause.

6. And thus it happens that in these actions, as they are from natural agents, there is not proper final causality, but only a relation to a certain terminus; but as they are from God, so there is final causality in them just as in other external and transitive actions of God. For the adequate principle of these actions is not only the proximate natural agent, unless perhaps in a qualified sense, namely in such an order; nevertheless, absolutely the principal one is the first cause; and therefore in the adequate principle of such actions is included an intellectual cause intending their end.

7. Why natural things are affected with diverse dispositions. Whence Aristotle further correctly concludes that the first root on account of which natural things have these dispositions, or these organs, or these parts and similar things, is not to be taken from matter alone, but from the end. For if matter is taken according to itself, it is indifferent and has no necessity of these dispositions or properties; but if it is supposed as already affected with these or those dispositions, those have already been introduced for the sake of some end or form, and the form itself needs them for its conservation or for some operation; but the operation itself in turn is either for the conservation of the species or of the individual itself, or at least for the communication of its perfection; for in these natural agents there are no operations which are themselves ends; for this is proper to intellectual things. And thus every connection and connatural necessity which is per se in these natural things, is taken from the order to the end. Nor does it stand in the way that natural properties necessarily belong on account of intrinsic emanation from the form, because one relation does not conflict with another, but they have subordination among themselves, for that necessary emanation is reduced to efficient cause, which is subordinated to the final; for therefore nature gave to such a form the power that such properties would emanate from it, because those are accommodated to the end

for the sake of which the thing exists which is constituted through such a form. Thus therefore, both in the constitution and formation of these things and in their action, the concurrence of final cause is found; but the proper intention of such an end is not in the natural agents themselves, but in the first cause.

8. What necessity there is for asserting the connection of natural things and direction to an end. But it can seem to someone that this manner of acting for the sake of an end is contrived without cause, and is beyond Aristotle's intention. For first, Aristotle, in XII Metaphysics, seems to think that God does not know these lower things, much less care for them; and in the book On the World to Alexander, he signifies that they do not think correctly about God who think that God is occupied in caring for these lower actions. Then if, per impossibile, God did not concur to the actions of natural agents, but allowed them to perform their motions independently, nevertheless the stone would descend downward, fire would generate something similar to itself, and so with the rest; therefore this is not final causality, but mere natural necessity. And it is confirmed, for if natural agents acted from divine intention, they would never err in their actions, nor would they fail to achieve their termini; the consequent is against experience; since monsters are often generated, which are called sins of nature. The consequence is evident, because divine intention can neither be frustrated nor err.

9. It is responded: concerning Aristotle's mind it is already sufficiently established from what has been said, and we shall show more broadly below, that according to his opinion, God has knowledge and providence of these singular and lower things; which he indicates not obscurely below, book XII, at the end, while he subjects the entire universe to God as supreme principle and leader. To the first argument, however, it is responded first that from that impossible hypothesis it follows that nature operates most orderly tending toward an end without any direction or intention of the end, which is sufficiently absurd per se. For in the same way someone could

argue that, although this world were not founded by another, if it were from itself as it now is, it would have a most fitting order without the causality of the end. This nevertheless does not prevent that in fact, just as it cannot exist unless it is caused, so it cannot exist unless it is caused by an end. Thus therefore we say that the motions and actions of natural things, just as they cannot exist without the concurrence of some intellectual agent, so they cannot exist without the causality of the end. I add then that, if per impossibile God did not concur per se and immediately to all actions of natural agents, nevertheless they should be said to be mediately ordered to an end by the author of nature, who both gave such powers to natural agents for the sake of such actions and willed the actions themselves to exist for the sake of certain ends and generally for the sake of the good and conservation of the universe.

10. Many effects in nature of which no sufficient cause can be given except an end intended by the first cause. Whence finally I add that there are many motions or actions in these natural things of which sufficient reason cannot be given from the private properties or inclinations of individual things; for water ascends upward to fill a vacuum, the reason for which cannot be given from the peculiar nature of water and its proper impulse, but from the end which is placed in the perfection of the entire universe, which must be intended by another superior agent. Similar is the case of sea water, which so contains its impulse and swelling waves at the shore, that it never covers the earth; surely for the sake of the safety of mixed things and living things, which end the supreme Governor of nature intends. From these things therefore we understand that when these natural things are moved or operate according to their proper and peculiar inclinations, since through those they also serve the conveniences and conservation of the entire universe and of their species, or even of individuals and especially of man, in them also there operates from direction to an end, through subordination to a superior agent.

11. To the confirmation it is responded by simply denying the consequence; but rather Aristotle, II Physics, text 82, from this confirms that these natural agents act for the sake of an end, because, just as art intending an end sometimes does not achieve it, so in the actions of nature, because they intend a certain end, thence follow monsters or sins of nature, because they cannot always achieve their end on account of an impediment occurring[21]. Otherwise, if nature did not tend toward a certain end, there would be no monsters in nature, because it would not err more from the goal by producing a monster than by producing anything else; for a monster properly is a vice of nature failing from its end. But what was objected about the intention of the author of nature does not stand in the way, because that intention is not always absolute and efficacious, or (to speak in the manner of theologians) through the will of good pleasure or consequent, but through general or antecedent will, which is a quasi-conditional intention, which consists in this that God wills a perfect effect to follow insofar as it can follow according to the order of natural causes, with which, as far as it is in him, he wills to concur. At the same time, however, he either permits, or even sometimes wills and intends monsters or sins of nature, either for the sake of the beauty and variety of the universe, or so that he allows natural causes to perform their motions and courses. And therefore, neither does he will to concur with a cause impeded by another in an extraordinary way, nor also to remove the impeding cause by peculiar care or providence, speaking regularly, although for the sake of the common good he sometimes accomplishes this, concerning which more broadly the theologians, partly In I, distinction 45, partly In II, distinction 37; and St. Thomas, I, question 22, and question 105; and Augustine can be read, XVI On the City of God, chapter 8, and book LXXXIII Questions, question 24.

[21] Read Arist., II Phys., c. 8; et II de Anim., c. 4; et I Pol., c. 5.

How Brute Animals Operate for the Sake of an End

12. It remains that we say a few things about brute animals, for in them appears some greater participation in final causality[22]. First indeed, because they are metaphorically allured by a good suitable and known to them, and thus they tend toward it through an act elicited by themselves and caused by that metaphorical motion; therefore that motion is some real causality and not except final. Then, so that they may achieve that suitable object which they desired, they also desire certain means known by themselves with such skill and prudence that they seem clearly both to recognize their utility for the end, and to desire them on account of it. Concerning this sagacity and skill of animals, both many philosophers write, and daily experience sufficiently establishes it for us. These things so moved some philosophers, that they thought brutes use reason, although weaker and more imperfect than men. This opinion is usually referred from Porphyry, book III On Abstinence. It is nevertheless not only foreign to the doctrine of our faith, but also to all reason and common sense of men; for rational power, as Aristotle said, IX Metaphysics, is capable of opposites, for by middle discourse in things to be done it now uses this means, afterwards another; but beasts do not so operate, but always in the same way, which is a sufficient sign that they are led not by reason, but by natural impulse. Add that, if the souls of brutes were rational, they would also be immortal.

13. It is absurd that brutes truly know nothing, or vitally desire nothing. Others indeed, so that they might avoid this inconvenience, fell into another extreme error, denying that brutes truly know or desire anything with elicited appetite, but are only carried by natural weight, like a stone, or moved and attracted extrinsically, as iron is drawn by a magnet. But this is equally absurd,

[22] Read Plin., lib. 4 suae Hist.; Plutarc., in proprio lib. de Industr. animal.

and against evident experience, indeed and against divine Scripture. Nevertheless, against these two errors we must act more broadly in the science of the soul.

14. Brutes do not formally know the nature of the end. What therefore pertains to the present matter, it must be said that brutes do not formally cognize the nature of the end or means, because they cannot compare one with another; whence neither do they cognize in the end itself the proper nature of suitability on account of which it is lovable per se, indeed nor do they discern between an object insofar as it is suitable per se or on account of another, because this whole thing requires great discretion of reason. In some way, however, they cognize and apprehend some thing or motion as suitable to themselves, and by natural instinct they judge that such an object is to be desired, pursued, or fled by themselves[23]. This natural instinct is nothing other than a certain act of phantasy or the estimative power flowing from it by natural necessity when the phantasm of such a thing is posited; by which act the brute judges practically (to speak in a human manner) that this is to be avoided, or pursued, or desired by itself, although it cannot discern the reason of suitability or unsuitability. But this natural judgment being posited, the appetite also naturally follows it.

15. What causality of the end brutes participate in. From which it happens first that the causality of the end is in some way participated by brutes, as the argument made convinces, because that elicited appetition is undoubtedly caused from the metaphorical objective motion of a suitable good, which cannot be reduced to another genus of causality. Nevertheless, however, it must be added that such causality is so imperfect in that genus that it is quasi the material motion of the end rather than formal, as St. Thomas signified, I-II, question 1, article 2, and question 6, article 2. And the reason is because they do not cognize the formal nature of suitability or utility; therefore they are not so moved that they can order one thing to

[23] Read D. Thom., I, q. 78, a. 4, et q. 87, a. 1, ad 3, et II-II, q. 72, a. 7, ad 3.

another, nor even formally desire something as lovable for its own sake; therefore they do not formally tend to an end as an end, nor to a means as a means, neither to an end for its own sake and to a means for the sake of the end, but as far as concerns their mode of operating, they tend equally to both, and therefore they are deservedly said to operate materially rather than formally for the sake of an end. Wherefore, as to the formal relation to the end, it must be thought about the actions of brutes just as about other natural agents. And the same judgment is about the sensitive appetite of man, if it is considered per se alone and not as it is subject to the motion of the will or reason, concerning which elsewhere.

DISPUTATION XXIV
ON THE ULTIMATE FINAL CAUSE, OR ULTIMATE END

What is the rationale for treating the matter of this disputation here. Although disputation concerning the ultimate end is proper to moral philosophers, nevertheless metaphysics, which is the supreme natural wisdom, cannot entirely pass over this matter; because, just as in other genera of causes it contemplates the first causes, which we have accomplished thus far, so also in this one. Hence Aristotle also touched upon this matter in Metaphysics II, chapter 2, while he proved that there is no infinite regress in ends, and in Metaphysics XII he seems to attribute the character of ultimate end to the prime mover. Therefore the moral philosopher disputes about the ultimate end in relation to human customs and to the means by which it is to be obtained; but it belongs to the metaphysician to treat of the ultimate end, insofar as it holds the primary reason of causing in this genus, and insofar as all causality of other ends depends upon it, and consequently insofar as all beings that participate in existence through causality depend upon it; and finally insofar as being the ultimate end is an attribute of the first being. We shall therefore briefly explain two things about this ultimate end. First, whether it exists and at the same time whether it is one and what it is. Then, what influence it has in this manner of causing.

SECTION I
WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN BY NATURAL REASON THAT SOME ULTIMATE END IS GIVEN, AND THAT THERE IS NO INFINITE REGRESS IN FINAL CAUSES

1. Two modes of ultimate end. In two ways, as we said in the preceding matters, something can be understood to be an ultimate end, namely, either only in a certain respect, or in some series of means or with respect to some intention and the choices that proceed from it, or simply and with respect to all things that can be ordered to an end; here we treat principally of the ultimate end in this latter mode, because the principal difficulty of this matter lies in it; nevertheless, so that we may proceed from clearer matters, we shall premise certain things about the former mode of ultimate end.

Resolution Concerning the Ultimate End Only in a Certain Respect

2. I say therefore first: in every series or intention and action for the sake of an end, some ultimate end must necessarily be given, either negatively, that is, which is not ordered to another end in that series or by virtue of that intention, or even positively in a certain respect, or in that series, because, namely, all things that pertain to it are referred to such an end and rest there. And in this sense it is impossible for there to be an infinite regress in these ends. This conclusion is principally intended by Aristotle in Metaphysics II, and the remaining parts are necessarily inferred from the last part. For if, proceeding from the choice of the first means toward the end, one does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary to stop at something beyond which the intention does not tend; that therefore will be the

ultimate end in that series, and negatively, because such an end is not ordered to another, otherwise it would not rest in it; and positively, because all things that pertain to that series are referred to it, since all things are desired for its sake; for if something were not desired for its sake, it would not pertain to that series, but would be joined as if accidentally. As, for example, with respect to a physician and in the series of healing, the health of a man is the ultimate end negatively, because that is intended per se and the intention of the physician does not progress beyond it, and therefore, when it is achieved, the action ceases; it is also the ultimate end positively, because all things that belong to that art are referred to it, such as instruments for preparing medicines, medicines for tempering or evacuating humor, and this finally to health itself. But if someone perhaps also takes medicine, either for pleasure or for nourishment, then that end does not pertain to the series of healing, but to another intention accidentally conjoined with the other.

3. It remains that we prove the last part of the conclusion, which Aristotle demonstrates extensively in the cited place; but the demonstration can easily be formed in this manner. For first, descending from the intention of the end to the choice or execution of means, it is necessary that the choice finally stop at some means which is first in execution and last in the order of intention, because otherwise action could never be begun and thus all choice would be frustrating, because one would always proceed from one choice to another, and would never arrive at use, and thus all action would be removed. Hence as much as it is evident from experience that inquiries about ends through means are begun by us, so much is it evident that in the progress from end to means one stops at the last, or first means. Again, that infinite progress cannot be made from this first means tending toward the end is proven first, because it is impossible that all things that are desired in that series are desired for the sake of another; therefore one must stop at something that is desired for its own sake; that therefore will be the ultimate end in that series, for in

that phrase, "for its own sake," the negation "for the sake of another" is included, which negation is also supposed in the antecedent while we assume that all objects, or all ends contained in one series, cannot be desired for the sake of another or ordered to another.

4. But this antecedent is proven, for I take the whole collection of ends and means (for whether this is finite or infinite, it can be conceived all at once); concerning it therefore I ask whether it is desired for its own sake, or for the sake of another; the latter cannot be said, otherwise there would be something outside the whole collection, which involves a contradiction; therefore the first must be granted; therefore necessarily within that collection one must stop at something that is desired for its own sake. For when beginning from the first means, that is chosen for the sake of the second, and the second for the sake of the third, and so on, unless one stops at some end intended for its own sake, the whole collection cannot be desired for its own sake, because neither by reason of all or individual things that are in it, since many and almost all are desired for the sake of another; nor by reason of something, unless something intended for its own sake is admitted; therefore this must necessarily be admitted.

5. An objection is satisfied. Perhaps it will be said that that collection is desired neither for its own sake nor for the sake of another, because not the whole is intended in the manner of one thing, but by parts (so to speak), that is, by loving individual things contained in that collection; and thus it is said to be desired only by loving one thing for the sake of another. Hence it will also be conceded that, although the collection of those things that are loved one for the sake of another is always finite, because proceeding from one to another cannot be traversed to infinity, nevertheless the desirable ends in that series are not finite, but proceed to infinity, and thus do not stop at some ultimate and desirable for its own sake.

6. But against this the arguments of Aristotle evidently proceed. First, because in this way intention could never be begun, for this must be begun from something that is first in intention; but this

can be nothing, if in that way one proceeds to infinity. For either that which is first in intention is loved for its own sake, and thus the process ceases; or it is loved for the sake of another and thus it cannot be that first in intention, but that other for the sake of which it is loved; therefore if one always proceeds from one thing loved for the sake of another, to that other for the sake of which it is loved, there can never be given a first in intention; therefore neither will there be a first intention; therefore intention will never be able to be begun, because it is not begun except from some first.

7. The second argument (and it returns to almost the same thing), because thus final causality is removed. The consequence is evident, for an intermediate end does not cause except in virtue of a prior one and dependently upon it, as was also declared and proven in the preceding disputation; therefore if one proceeds to infinity from one to another prior one, and never arrives at an end that is first in intention, all the intermediates will not be able to cause anything, since all depend upon that first one and it never causes, or does not exist; therefore it is necessary to come to some one that is first in causing in this order which we now call ultimate in execution, because in the process of means the inquiry stops there. And this argument is clarified, lest anyone think that the principle is begged in it by supposing that a first end is given; for it is not supposed, but it is proven to be necessary, if there is to be final causality. But it is clarified by an argument made almost at the beginning; for I take the whole series of ends collectively: either it is dependent in causing finally upon another end, and this is impossible, otherwise the whole collection would not now be taken; and moreover because then that whole could not cause, unless supported by another, upon which it is said to depend; concerning which the same question returns, for if that end is said to be independent, it is the ultimate one we seek; but it cannot be posited as dependent, otherwise it would have been comprehended in the prior collection. But if the whole collection is independent in causing finally, it is necessary that within it there be

some end independent from another prior one in causing finally; for it is impossible that all things contained in a collection be dependent and the whole collection be independent, and for the same reason it is impossible for causality to be begun, unless in a collection of subordinated causes some one is independent. We shall pursue this reasoning more extensively below concerning efficient causes, demonstrating that God exists.

8. The third argument of Aristotle, and the best, is that while it is said that every means is desired for the sake of another and never arrives at something lovable for its own sake, the notion of good is destroyed, which is manifestly most absurd. The consequence is evident, because a good that is useful for another is only good in a certain respect and only becomes desirable by reason of another to which it is useful; but when that which is such simply is removed, it is necessary to remove that which is only such in a certain respect, especially since it is only such through relation to others. Therefore, when an end desirable for its own sake is removed, good simply is taken away, which is good per se, and consequently good in a certain respect is also taken away, because now it has no source from which to be good, nor from which to be rendered desirable. Hence the repugnance is manifest in saying that one thing is desirable for the sake of another, and this in turn for the sake of another, with nothing existing that is desirable for its own sake. Aristotle has other arguments, both in the cited place and in Ethics I, chapter 2; but these suffice, for the matter is also sufficiently clear.

Resolution Concerning the Ultimate End Simply

9. I say second: there is also given some ultimate end simply with respect to all things and particular ends and their coordinations, which is God himself. This assertion is certain in the doctrine of faith, which St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 44, a. 4, and q. 103, a. 2; and with him

the other theologians from that passage in Proverbs 16: "The Lord has made all things for himself"; and Revelation 21 and 22: "I am the Alpha and the Omega." The same was taught by the holy Fathers, especially Dionysius, chapter 10 On the Divine Names; and St. Augustine, book I On Christian Doctrine, chapter 23, and book XIX On the City of God, from the beginning, and among philosophers Aristotle touched upon it in Metaphysics XII, chapter 10, and in the book On the World to Alexander, and Plato in the Timaeus, and book IV On the Laws, and Trismegistus in the Pimander.

10. But the difficulty is whether it can be demonstrated by evident reason that this ultimate end is one with respect to all things. For from those demonstrations by which it is proven that there is no infinite regress in ends, it cannot be sufficiently concluded that some universal or common ultimate end is given in this way, into which all things are referred, and it itself into no other; for each thing can ultimately tend to its own proper end, and thus in no series will there be an infinite regress in ends, even if no ultimate end common to all is given.

11. It is answered that it is one thing to ask whether some common ultimate end is given into which all things are ordered, another thing truly whether all and individual things intend and seek that end. Concerning this latter point we shall speak in the following section; now we treat only of the former sense. And in that we say it is evident by natural reason that one ultimate end of all things is given, and this is gathered from that principle, that there is no infinite regress in ends, joined with two others also demonstrated above, namely, that one first effective principle of all things is given and that it operates for the sake of an end. From which the reasoning is thus concluded. The first effective principle of all things produced, conserves and governs them for the sake of some end, and in its intention there is no infinite regress; therefore it operates all these things for the sake of some ultimate end; that ultimate end therefore, which the first agent intends, is one, and consequently is the ultimate end simply of all

things. This last consequence is proven, for the other things are clear. Because God cannot intend several ultimate ends adequate to his intention in his works; for even man cannot intend several ultimate ends in this way, as is demonstrated in I-II, q. 1, a. 5; much less therefore God, because to intend several ends pertains not to perfection, but rather to imperfection.

12. You will say that there is a far different reasoning concerning man and concerning God; for man intends an ultimate end as his end, in which he places his beatitude and sufficiency of all goods, and therefore it cannot happen that man simultaneously intend two complete ultimate ends; for if he judges that neither is sufficient for him without the other, neither is a complete ultimate end; but if he loves one of them as sufficient, the other cannot have the character of an ultimate end. But truly God, while he operates for the sake of an ultimate end, does not operate for the sake of his ultimate end, but of those things which he creates; for it was shown in the preceding matters that there is a difference between created and divine will, that in created will the act itself of willing is ordered, as to an end, to the object which it loves; but in divine will not at all, but one thing willed is ordered to another as to an end. Thus therefore it will not be repugnant for God to intend several ultimate ends of those things which he wills and operates outside himself, because with respect to diverse things nothing is repugnant in diverse goods being given in which their ultimate perfection and quasi-happiness consists. Just as several men can intend several ultimate ends, although one cannot. For thus God is situated in intending ends for several things. Hence it is confirmed; for the things whose ends God intends are of diverse natures and characters; therefore they can also have various ultimate ends proportioned to themselves; therefore God also can intend those ends, as they are several, for various things.

13. Someone will say that God does not intend the variety and distinction of things except in order to something one, for example, the completion of the universe or something similar, and

therefore it is necessary that in the procreation of things, however distinct, he intend one ultimate end. But this does not satisfy. First, because it is not so evident that God intends all created things for the composition or completion of one thing; for, although this appears so in corporeal things, concerning spiritual things it cannot be so proven by reason, especially if spiritual things are compared with corporeal ones, and especially if God had produced several worlds, as he could have. Second, that is not sufficient for all things to be said to have one ultimate end simply, both because the very unity and constitution of the universe is something very imperfect for all things to be said to be ordered to it as to an ultimate end, and also because the very order of things of the universe is ordered to the conservation of individual things or species and all corporeal things are ordered in some way to man, as Aristotle also acknowledged in Politics I, chapter 5.

14. Therefore this whole demonstration cannot be concluded otherwise, unless by demonstrating the last part of the conclusion, namely, that this ultimate end which the first efficient intends in its actions, cannot be anything other than itself; for from this it evidently follows that all things procreated, however diverse among themselves, just as they are united in one first principle, so also are united in one ultimate end, even if we suppose that some of them are so constituted that among themselves one is ordered to another, or several to some one outside God. But the first proposition assumed is proven, because that which is to any agent the most powerful end of its actions, is to it the best and greatest good, especially if the intention is ordered and right, as Aristotle taught in Ethics I, chapter 7; but to the first agent nothing is the best and greatest good, except its intrinsic goodness; therefore with respect to it nothing can be the ultimate end of its actions and effects, except itself by reason of its goodness; for the ultimate end is most powerful in every intention and action. Moreover, because the perfect notion of final cause belongs of itself to perfection simply; therefore it belongs to God in the highest degree of perfection, both because every perfection simply is in God in the

highest degree, and also because, since goodness is the principle of causing finally and God is the highest good, it is necessary that he have the principle and perfection of final cause in the highest degree. But just as the highest perfection in the order of efficient causes is that it be first and most universal, so in the order of ends, that it be ultimate and most universal; therefore such perfection must necessarily be attributed to God. Moreover every agent, insofar as it is an agent, operates in some way for its own sake, and thus is the end of its actions; therefore the first agent also operates all things for its own sake; therefore it is the end of all things, since all things exist from its action and efficiency; but it is not a non-ultimate end, for that is always imperfect in its order; therefore it is the ultimate end. Finally, that axiom tends here, that the order of ends is according to the order of agents; for an agent, the more perfect or universal it is, the more it intends a more perfect or universal end; but God is the most perfect and most universal agent; therefore he intends the most perfect and most universal end. Read St. Thomas, III contra Gentes, chapters 17 and 18.

15. To the objection therefore made above it is answered, although God does not act for his own sake as for his end, but of his effects or actions, nevertheless he cannot have except one ultimate end of all of them, not because he seeks that end so that he might be satisfied and in it have sufficiency of all goods, but rather because he is supposed to have in himself sufficiency of all goods and highest goodness and perfection, by which alone he could first be moved or invited to benefit others for his own sake. Hence, although it is true that from the very things which he creates, he orders some to others as to ends, or rather connects all among themselves so that some serve others in turn, and in this way under God himself other common or universal ends can be assigned to which individual creatures, besides private ends, are ordered by the creator himself, and especially to the order or beauty of the universe, nevertheless simply no one outside God can be said to be the ultimate end toward which the divine

intention or action tends. So much so that St. Thomas said, in q. 3 On Power, a. 15, ad 14, that even the communication of divine goodness is not the ultimate end, but the divine goodness itself, because the communication of divine goodness is something created, whence it also is referred to uncreated goodness, from love of which God willed to communicate himself, not because it is convenient or useful to him, but because it befits it, and is consonant with his goodness. But St. Thomas adds there that God does not act from appetite for an ultimate end, but from love of himself, because he does not act to attain an ultimate end, but to communicate his goodness. This indeed is true with respect to God himself, because, as we have often said, he does not act for his own sake as for his end; nevertheless with respect to creatures it can also be said that God operates from appetite for an end, that is, desiring that creatures attain himself as an end.

16. God is the ultimate objective, not formal end of creatures. From this it is also understood, since in the preceding disputation we distinguished a twofold end, objective and formal, that God is not said to be the ultimate formal end, but the objective end of creatures, either properly or broadly speaking of the object, according to what we shall say in the following section. And the reason is because the formal end is not ultimate simply, since it is ordered to the objective, as was shown above. Likewise, because, although God is the highest good, nevertheless creatures do not attain it except insofar as they participate in it in some way; whence the attainment of that highest good, which is called the formal end, is always something created. Hence incidentally is solved a certain objection made above, namely, how such variety of things and natures can be ordered to the same ultimate end; for the reason is because that is not an end as attainment, but as good attained; but diverse things have diversity in the mode of attaining that end although they agree in the same ultimate end, just as they agree in the same first principle, yet they differ in the mode or degree of emanation from it.

17. The end for which of God's actions is God himself. Finally it is understood from what has been said, that, although with respect to creatures God is the ultimate objective end, for whose sake they either are created or themselves operate, nevertheless with respect to the action of God himself he is the ultimate end for which; for all things are created or acted for him, or rather he creates and effects all things for himself. For every agent has the character of an end for which with respect to its action, whether through it it seeks its own convenience, as created agents commonly act, or only the communication and manifestation of its goodness, as God does.

SECTION II

WHETHER THE ULTIMATE END PER SE AND PROPERLY CONCURS WITH ALL PROXIMATE ENDS IN CAUSING FINALLY, AND CONSEQUENTLY WHETHER ALL AGENTS IN ALL THEIR ACTIONS INTEND THE ULTIMATE END

1. The title of the question is explained. This question must be understood concerning the ultimate end absolutely or universally; for concerning that which is only ultimate in some series, we have already shown above that it is what immediately influences finally all effects or actions that per se pertain to that series. Indeed, we have said that such an end is the entire reason for causing, so that the means or intermediate ends have no proper final causality except insofar as they are subject to, or are quasi-informed by, this end. But concerning the ultimate end absolutely, there is a special question whether it influences with all particular ends to their causalities per se and immediately, by the mode of a universal cause in that genus, in the manner by which the first efficient cause in the genus of efficient cause concurs per se and immediately with all particular efficient causes.

Arguments for the Affirmative Position

2. And it seems indeed that it must be said to be altogether so: first, because the nature of final cause belongs to God in His genus as perfectly and universally as the nature of efficient cause in its genus; therefore, just as the nature of the first efficient belongs to God such that all things depend upon Him per se and immediately in causing efficiently, so the nature of the first or ultimate end belongs to God with this perfection and universality, that all particular ends depend upon Him per se and immediately in causing. Nor is it sufficient if someone should say that the causalities of particular ends depend indeed immediately upon God, but not in the genus of end, but in the genus of efficient cause, just as we said above concerning material and formal cause; this (I say) is not sufficient, because material and formal causality include imperfection, on account of which they cannot be exercised by God in their own genus, and therefore God's concurrence to those causalities is through efficiency; but truly final causality as such formally involves no imperfection, and therefore it can belong to God as immediately and per se concerning every action and causality, just as effective causality; therefore it belongs to Him equally, for whatever perfection absolutely can be understood in God, is present in Him. Whence it is confirmed, for just as there is an order per se between the proximate efficient cause and the first, so between the proximate end and the ultimate; for, just as the proximate efficient cause has being and power of effecting participated from the first, and therefore dependent upon it, so the proximate end has goodness, through which it causes finally, participated from the supreme goodness of the ultimate end; therefore it depends equally upon that regarding causality in its genus.

Arguments for the Negative Position

3. On the contrary, however, it is the case that neither in proper agents acting for an end, such as intellectual beings, nor even in inferior beings does such an influence of the ultimate end seem to intervene per se and immediately in every final causality. The first part is proved, because in agents acting through intellect, an end has no causality unless it is known by the one who operates for the end; but these agents operate for a particular end when they think nothing at all about the universal ultimate end; therefore then the particular end causes finally without actual influence per se and immediate of the ultimate end itself in that genus of cause. And it is confirmed and further declared: for causality in the genus of end is through metaphorical motion; therefore, in order that God might concur immediately by the mode of ultimate end and in the genus of final cause, it is necessary that He metaphorically move simultaneously, or that the metaphorical motion which is from the particular end be also immediately from Him, as such; but this cannot be, unless He Himself is known, as is evident from what was said above concerning metaphorical motion; therefore. And indeed experience itself seems to persuade this sufficiently; for when a man is moved by health, so that he might seek it, he is in no way moved immediately by divine goodness, of which he thinks nothing, but by the suitability of health.

4. Nor does it matter if someone should say that health does not move except insofar as it has goodness participated from divine goodness; for this is the same as if it were said that motion proceeds remotely from essential goodness, insofar as some goodness is derived from it into health, but not that essential goodness itself also concurs immediately and per se. Just as also heat does not heat except through the power of acting participated from the effective power per essentiam, which is in God; yet from the force of this participation or emanation of that effect from such participated power, it is not immediately from God, but remotely, and therefore it is necessary that God immediately influence through that uncreated power itself, as He has the proper influence of the first efficient cause; but He does not

have this mode of influence in the genus of end, as the argument made seems to prove.

5. And hence the other part concerning inferior agents is proved a fortiori; for brutes, in the way that they are metaphorically moved through cognition, can in no way be said to be moved immediately by the very goodness of the ultimate end, which they can know much less. But inferior natural agents are only said to operate for an end insofar as they tend toward or are directed to their ends; but they do not tend immediately toward the goodness of the ultimate end, but only toward such a form or terminus of their action. But what is customarily said, that these agents intend to be assimilated to the ultimate end in communicating their perfection, seems to be said metaphorically rather than properly; and thus it serves nothing for explaining the immediate causality of the ultimate end concerning these actions. The assumption is evident, both because these agents per se do not intend similarity as related to God's goodness, but only intend the foundation of that similarity, which is nothing besides that created good which is in their actions; and also because in their communication, speaking regularly, they do not intend to communicate themselves for the sake of communication alone (so to speak), but for some advantage or their own perfection, namely, so that they might preserve their species, or so that they might perfect themselves; therefore it is a sign that in their communication they do not intend properly and formally assimilation to God's communication.

Various Opinions

6. In this matter I frequently find it said by theologians that God is the ultimate end of all creatures, such that all in their actions intend to attain Him, each according to its capacity. Thus St. Thomas teaches extensively, III Contra Gentiles, chapters 18 and 19, 20 and 21, and I-II q. 1, articles 6, 7 and 8; and in that doctrine all the rest

agree. Yet none, as far as I have seen, sufficiently declares the proper dependence of proximate ends upon the ultimate in causing within the proper genus, nor the mode of influence which the ultimate end has together with the proximate or particular ends. Rather, they finally declare that nature of the ultimate end in such a way that they seem to attribute only remote concurrence to the motions of proximate ends to it. For concerning an agent acting from purpose, a human being for example, they say only that he operates for the ultimate end in all his actions, because he operates for some good, which has no power of moving finally except insofar as it is a certain participation of the supreme good; concerning inferior agents, however, they say that they only intend the ultimate end insofar as they intend some representation or participation of His goodness; through all of which nothing is declared except the remote causality of the ultimate end, as seemed to be proved in the objection. But Fonseca, book V Metaphysics, chapter 2, question 12, since he holds that God per se and immediately concurs with all causes to their causalities, and with each through proper concurrence pertaining to its genus, attempts to prove this opinion of his specially only there concerning material and formal causes; for concerning final cause he supposes it to be as certain and received a doctrine as concerning efficient cause, about which he had already disputed. But omitting material and formal cause, about which it was said above and does not pertain to the present matter, concerning final cause he expressly teaches there, section 5, that it concurs immediately with proximate ends to their causalities, from that general reason, that they are causes essentially subordinated in the same genus; but he does not declare the mode of that immediate concurrence but only affirms it.

Resolution of the Question

7. But this matter seems to me to be explained in such a way that we declare the causalities of ends through proportion to agents;

for, as has often been said, the causality of an end is best understood through respect to an agent as agent is, or to the action of the agent. Therefore it must be considered, what we have handed down above, that all actions of secondary agents are also actions of God; for it is chiefly for this reason that God is said to concur to all those per se and immediately as first efficient cause. From which it is inferred that those actions are for an end, and thus are caused by some end, not only as they are from proximate agents, but also, and much more, as they are from the first agent. Because the first agent, just as He operates through intellect and will in every action of His, so in every action of His He operates for an end in a far more excellent way than any other agent; and thus every action, insofar as it is transient outside God and immediately flows from God, is caused by some end, also intended by God Himself.

8. God as ultimate end concurs finally to all actions of creatures for an end. I say now first: God as ultimate end immediately and per se influences every action of a creature insofar as it is from God Himself, and in this way at least immediately and per se concurs in causing finally with every proximate end. The first part is proved, for every action of a created agent is immediately from God operating for an end; therefore it is from God as from the ultimate end; therefore God as ultimate end causes in His genus immediately that action. The antecedent has been proved. But the first consequence is proved, because God does not act for an end except by acting for Himself as for the ultimate end, because, as was proved above, He cannot per se primarily be moved or inclined to acting by any extrinsic goodness, but by His own.

9. You will say, can God not be moved by some created goodness, so that He might confer or effect another? For thus He is moved by the goodness of merit to give reward and because He promised, He is moved to fulfill the promise, and in this way God exercises an act of fidelity, or justice, or mercy, etc., for the sake of the honesty of each; therefore God also operates for some proximate

created end; therefore the aforesaid inference is not certain and formal.

10. Some do not dare to concede that antecedent, because it seems to be beyond divine perfection to will something for the sake of a created end. Nevertheless, since for God to act for an end is not to act for His own end, but for the end to which He orders that thing which He effects, it is not unsuitable that He should proximately effect something for the sake of some created end, because this is nothing other than to order one creature to another as to a proximate end, which is most orderly and without any imperfection. And in this way God ordered individual things to the beauty of the universe, and created herbs and animals for the sake of man, etc. And for the same reason, because creatures are not good formally by divine goodness, but by their own, as was said above, so God wills creatures for the sake of His own goodness, yet so that He wills for each the goodness or perfection proper to it, and in this way God wills grace for man, as it is the perfection of man himself; whence He proximately wills it for the sake of the advantage or utility of man himself. And in this way, although by comparison to His goodness He wills all creatures as means to His manifestation and communication, nevertheless comparing one creature to another, He wills one as the proximate end of another.

11. Nevertheless it is necessary that in every action and operation for an end God operate for Himself, as for the ultimate end. Both because He always operates for an end in the most perfect way, and therefore by the simplest and most eminent act He leads all things up to the supreme cause and refers them back to Himself as to the ultimate end; and also because divine goodness is to God the universal reason for willing every other goodness or created end, such that without relation or reference to it nothing is lovable to God outside God Himself. For if divine goodness were not communicated, presented or shown through created goodnesses, there would be no reason why they should be loved by God Himself. Nevertheless,

because that by which a creature represents and participates divine goodness is something lovable according to itself and for its own sake with respect to created appetite, therefore it is not repugnant that God simultaneously will one creature as the end of another and as something ordered to Himself as to the ultimate end. Therefore this relation is not separable from God's volition, as it is terminated to a creature, and therefore it is rightly inferred that if God operates something for an end, He also operates it for Himself, as for the ultimate end actually and most perfectly intended.

12. Now indeed it is easy to prove the other consequence, namely, that the ultimate end immediately and per se influences with whatever proximate end to every action of a creature, because an end immediately influences in its way that action which is done from the formal and direct intention of the agent for its sake; for final causality, especially concerning transient actions, consists only in this dependence which the action has from the agent thus ordering it to the end; but it has been shown that every action of a creature, at least insofar as it is from the first agent, is done necessarily with this actual relation or ordering to the ultimate end; therefore every such action is caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end in its genus.

13. Whether God concurs with dishonest ends to finally cause depraved actions. You will say that this cannot be true universally; for, although in merely natural actions and in free honest ones it seems possible and without inconvenience, nevertheless in free and sinful actions this seems both indecent and impossible; the first is evident because it is indecent for God to will these actions; therefore much more to will them for His own sake. The second is evident, because those actions are intrinsically repugnant to God's supreme goodness; how therefore can they be referred to the supreme good as to the ultimate end? It is answered first, that the entire argument can and should be conceded concerning sinful actions, as they are sinful; for strictly concerning them as such the objection proceeds; for as such they are repugnant to divine goodness, and concerning them as

such we confess that they are not from God as from the ultimate end, nor is this inconvenient, because also as such they are not from God as from the first agent, because as such they are not actions, but defects of action. Whence it is further added that these actions, however sinful with respect to the secondary cause, as they are actions, are also actions of God Himself, and as such are per se and immediately from the ultimate end, and for the sake of the ultimate end; for as such they include no defect or malice by reason of which they would be repugnant to the supreme goodness of the ultimate end. And although God does not efficaciously and absolutely will them for the respect which they absolutely taken have to the secondary cause with which and from which they have concomitant malice, nevertheless He wills to concur to them and thus wills them insofar as they are His actions, and in this way He orders them to Himself as to the ultimate end, because in them viewed under this aspect the goodness of God shines forth most greatly, which diffuses itself to all things insofar as they have something of good and is powerful to so influence goodness that, although malice be joined to it, it does not touch that goodness, nor is it in any way to be imputed to Him. In which He also manifests His omnipotence and wisdom, indeed and in some way His justice, either because He uses His right in offering His concurrence even to those who are going to abuse it, or because He gives to each principle the concurrence naturally due to it, and allows each to act according to its mode. Thus therefore no creature is caused by a proximate end which is not simultaneously caused per se and immediately by the ultimate end, at least with respect to the first agent. Let St. Thomas be read, III Contra Gentiles, especially argument 6, for there he virtually contains the entire doctrine of this assertion.

14. Creatures in their ends do not always intend the ultimate end formally. I say secondly: the action of a creature, as it is from the creature itself for an end, is not always caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end formally and according to its proper goodness, but at most virtually or implicitly; and in this sense it can be said with due

proportion that the ultimate end does not always concur to these actions as such immediately by immediacy of subject, but only of power. This conclusion is sufficiently proved, as I think, by the reasons placed above in the latter place, with those also which we added in relating the common doctrine of St. Thomas and others. And indeed concerning natural or irrational agents there can be no reason for doubt, because these do not operate for an end toward which they themselves direct their actions; therefore much less can they operate for the ultimate end. Then, by what reason they are said metaphorically to intend an end, insofar as by natural inclination or appetite they tend toward something certain and determined, they do not truly tend properly and formally toward God, but toward something created suitable or proportioned to themselves, and thus only virtually and quasi-interpretatively do they tend toward God. Finally, if they are considered insofar as by extrinsic denomination they are said to be directed to an end by their author and cooperator God, thus indeed they can be said to tend toward the ultimate end itself formally intended; nevertheless that direction and ordering to the end is already from the first agent Himself, from whom alone that end is intended.

15. Concerning agents acting from purpose, however, it is not necessary that their actions never be per se and immediately from the ultimate end, even insofar as they are for an end from the direction and intention of such agents. For often they can be so, namely, when these agents consider the ultimate end itself in itself and refer all actions and private intentions of theirs to it, which they can do because through intellect and will they can objectively attain the ultimate end in itself, which inferior agents cannot do. But we said that not always do the actions of these agents, insofar as they are from them for an end, get caused finally per se and immediately by the ultimate end by immediacy of subject, that is, through itself and through its goodness finally influencing such action, and in this sense that assertion is sufficiently proved by the reason placed above,

because the ultimate end thought of in itself does not always move these agents, when they operate for some particular end. But virtually the ultimate end can be said always to move such agents, because they are always moved by some good or under the aspect of some good, which, insofar as it is a certain participation of the supreme good, is judged to move by virtue of that; and conversely, one who tends toward that good is judged by virtue to tend toward the ultimate end, because by appetizing (so to speak) a part of good, he is judged by virtue to love more the complement of the whole good, which sense St. Thomas declared, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 4, and he speaks in the same way I, q. 60, a. 2, and I-II, q. 1, a. 6, where, in the solution to 3, he says that the power of the first intention with respect to the ultimate end moves in any appetite of any thing, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of. Read Aristotle, I Ethics, chapters 4 and 7, and I Rhetoric, chapter 5; Augustine, X Confessions, chapters 20 and 21, and book XI On the Trinity, chapter 6.

Brief Resolution of an Incidental Question

16. Here, however, a question immediately suggested itself whether in these agents it is always necessary that an intention of the ultimate end proper and elicited and terminated to the ultimate end itself in itself proposed under the aspect of supreme or complete or common good, should necessarily precede intentions of particular ends. For some theologians seem to think it necessary that such a quasi-universal intention should precede at least sometimes, or once in life, so that other intentions of particular ends might be had by virtue of it. But this question is proper to theologians, and is customarily treated in the cited places of St. Thomas. And it seems to me that the opinion which denies such intention to be necessary is certain, because neither on the part of the intellect is there anything which would necessitate thinking first about that object, nor on the part of the will is that intention necessary so that it might be able to

will particular goods proposed to it as lovable per se, since in those objects there is sufficient reason for tending toward them on account of their goodness. Indeed even if that universal intention should precede, nevertheless if afterwards it remains neither in memory, nor in any affection or habit, it can serve nothing for subsequent acts. See Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, and In IV, dist. 49, q. 3; and there Paludanus, Major, Capreolus, and others.

Satisfaction of the Reasons for Doubt Posed at the Beginning

17. The arguments placed in the first place at the beginning confirm our first conclusion; nevertheless they do not obstruct the latter, because it is not of the nature of the first cause that it influence the action of the secondary cause except with due proportion; nor is it necessary that the causality of the first and secondary cause, formally and precisely taken, express the same relation, although in reality, as they are in the effect, they are not distinguished. Thus therefore for the subordination of proximate and ultimate end it is sufficient that the former depend upon the latter in causing in its genus, and that the latter cannot cause except when the former causes; nevertheless it is not necessary that with respect to the same agent both ends cause, but only with respect to the same effect or action. Rather the proximate end causes with respect to the proximate agent and the action which is in it or from it; but the ultimate end does not cause with respect to the first agent itself, but with respect to the effect or action as it flows from Him. But the arguments placed in the latter place on the contrary obstruct nothing to the first conclusion, as is sufficiently evident per se; but they confirm the latter, as has been declared.

DISPUTATION XXV

ON EXEMPLAR CAUSALITY

Although Aristotle, in the opinion of many, said absolutely nothing about exemplar causality, while to others he appears at most to have merely mentioned it together with formal causality, nevertheless a particular disputation concerning it has seemed necessary to us for the completion of this subject matter, both because it contains pleasant and useful material, and also because either it is probable that it has its own proper and peculiar mode of causing, or it is necessary to declare its reduction to some genus of causality. We shall therefore first say what an exemplar is, then we shall explain its influence or causality. As regards the name, however, I suppose that "exemplar" signifies the same thing in this place as "idea" does among the theologians, which name, although it is Greek, is also employed by the Latins, and Cicero in book 1 of the Tusculan Questions, Seneca in epistle 66, and Augustine in book 83 of the Questions, in question 46, testify that Plato was the first author of it, where he says that ideas can be called in Latin "forms" or "species"; indeed, he also calls them "principal" or "original" forms; for he deals principally with divine ideas, to which by antonomasia the name "ideas" has been applied, as can be gathered from the same author in book 12 of the City of God, chapter 23. We, however, take this word more generally, and shall use the words "exemplar" and "idea" indifferently.

SECTION I
WHETHER THERE IS, WHAT IS, AND WHERE IS AN EXEMPLAR

1. That there is something exemplar in things is the common consensus of both philosophers and theologians, as is evident from Plato in the Timaeus and from Socrates, who (as Eusebius testifies in book 11 of the Preparation, chapter 11) disputed about ideas before Plato; and from Cicero and Seneca in the places cited; Dionysius, Justin, and Nazianzen in places to be cited below. And Augustine in the cited place, especially in the aforementioned question 46, says that the ancients placed such power in ideas that no one could be wise unless they understood them. What Clement of Alexandria says in book 4 of the Stromata, near the end, is consonant with this: "Plato also rightly said that he who contemplates ideas will live as God among men." Augustine also adds in book 1 of the Retractions, chapter 3, that the intelligible world, which Plato posited, is the eternal and unchangeable reason by which God made the sensible world. He who denies that this exists, it follows that he says God made what he made irrationally. Therefore Augustine considers it as certain that there are ideas, which are the same as intelligible reasons of things to be made, as it is certain that God did not create the world without knowledge and reason. And this is what Boethius said in book of Consolation, meter 9:

> *"You draw all things from a supreme exemplar,*
> *most beautiful yourself*
> *bearing a beautiful world in mind."*

Finally, this same thing can easily be demonstrated from human artificers; for they conceive in mind the form of the thing to be

produced by art, which is called an exemplar. And thus Aristotle said in Metaphysics 7, chapter 7, that bodily health is made by health, which is in the mind.

2. There are two meanings of exemplar. But it is necessary to observe that exemplar is usually distinguished in two ways: one external, as is an image or writing presented to the eyes, which is proposed for imitation, about which that passage from Exodus 25 can be understood: "Look and make according to the exemplar which was shown to you on the mountain"; the other is an internal exemplar, which is formed in the soul or mind. Seneca indicated this division above, saying, "But it makes no difference whether he has the exemplar outside to which he refers his eyes, or inside, which he himself has conceived and placed there." I indeed think that, although perhaps as regards the use of the word "exemplar," the external exemplar is properly and by first imposition so called, nevertheless as regards the function of the cause, which we now explain, the nature or causality of the exemplar is found per se and properly in the internal; but that external one is employed only per accidens and remotely, as I shall declare more extensively in the following section, and therefore we must speak principally about the internal exemplar.

Where the Exemplar Is

3. From these things it is easy to understand, following common opinion, where the exemplar is and what it is. For it is in the mind or intellect, and for this reason it is sometimes called an exemplar. Plato also for this same reason called the exemplar of the world an intelligible world, as Augustine noted above. Finally, for this reason Clement of Alexandria above said that the Mind is the place of ideas, and in book 5 of the Stromata, not far from the beginning, he said that Plato in the Phaedo for this reason declared that truth is an idea. But an idea (he says) is God's intelligence, or what is understood by the divine mind. Therefore an idea or exemplar is in the mind. It is

usually described in common thus: An exemplar is a form which an effect imitates by the intention of an agent who determines an end for himself. Thus Saint Thomas, question 2 of Truth, article 1; and nearly the same Seneca above. But since this description is common to an external exemplar, we can add that it is a form conceived in mind, or something similar. By "form," however, is to be understood not an intrinsic form informing and constituting a thing, but a form conceived and extrinsic to the effect, for the imitation of which the effect is made by the proper intention of the agent. This last clause is added, because if it happens by chance that one thing is made similar to another, it is not an exemplar, nor even if from natural action alone the agent makes an effect similar to itself, as I shall now explain.

4. The exemplars of all things are in the divine mind. From this it can be further gathered that the exemplars of natural things and forms are only in the divine intellect, which Augustine intends in the places cited above. For among causes acting through intellect, God alone can be properly and per se the cause of natural effects, especially of substances and natural forms, and therefore he alone can have exemplars of such things. For intellectual or rational creatures, although they can conceive intellectual forms truly and properly representing natural effects, because nevertheless they do not have the power to effect these effects, therefore they cannot either apply those forms to work, or (which amounts to the same thing) be directed by them in the production of the things which they represent, and therefore those intellectual forms in a created intellect do not have the nature of exemplars. And this is what is commonly said, that an exemplar is a practical form, which directs work, or is applied to work. This is what theologians generally think about the name "idea"; although it seems to others that it suffices that it can be applied, about which elsewhere, for it pertains only to the question of the name. But inferior agents lacking intellect, although they have the power of effecting effects and forms similar to their natural forms, nevertheless cannot by their intention direct their actions, so that they produce

their effects in imitation of such forms, and in these agents also exemplar properly speaking has no place, but only by metaphor, which Saint Thomas noted in the aforementioned question 3 of Truth, article 1. It remains therefore that with respect to natural effects or forms, an exemplar is found in the divine intellect alone. But in a created intellect it is found according to a certain participation with respect to artificial things, under which we can comprehend local motion, insofar as it can be made by a voluntary agent according to the measure of reason.

Whether Exemplar is Only Objectively in Mind

5. From this, however, a serious question arises, how an exemplar is understood to be in the intellect, whether subjectively or formally, or only objectively. Subjectively is said to be what inheres in the intellect and informs it, either really through true inherence, as in creatures, or according to our mode of understanding, when nevertheless in reality it is through identity[24], as in God. Objectively, however, is said to be what is known, or is actually presented to the mind. This distinction is sufficiently established from what was said above in disputation 2, section 1, about formal and objective concept. Whence what is inquired in sum here is whether an exemplar is only an objective concept, or rather is a formal concept. This question theologians treat concerning ideas; it is however common about any exemplar as such.

Common Opinion

6. There is a rather common opinion that an exemplar is an objective concept. This can be understood in two ways: first, that it is

[24] identitatem, 1597, 1605, 1960; alit. entitatem. "Creemos más conforme identitatem." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 39.

an objective concept of the same thing to be produced by art, or (and it amounts to the same thing) that it is the same thing which is to be made by art, as objectively existing in the mind of the artificer. Second, that it is an objective concept not of the same thing, but of another, in imitation of which another thing is to be made. In the first way Saint Thomas seems to have followed this opinion, question 3 of Truth, article 2. This opinion is held by Scotus, in 1, distinction 35, question 1; there Ockham, question 5; Gabriel, question 5, article 2; D'Ailly, in 1, question 6, article 3; Durand, distinction 36, question 3; Bassolis, question 2, article 2. And Richard treats this opinion there as a problem, article 2, question 2, and Major considers it probable, in 1, distinction 35, question 1, at the end. According to which it is consequently said that the ideas of creatures in God are not something uncreated in him, but are the creatures themselves in known being, or presented to the divine intellect according to their essential or possible being; for intuiting them thus, he produces such in reality as he has objectively present. And he says the same proportionally about the exemplar of a human artificer.

7. The latter mode, namely, that an idea is a conceived thing, not however the same one which is to be produced by art, but another in imitation of which another is produced, many theologians hold, who explain this differently in divine ideas and differently in human ones. For concerning divine ones they say it is the divine essence, as known by God, as imitable by creatures. For since God does not receive knowledge from things outside himself, but intuits all things in his essence, in it also he knows how it can be imitated or participated by each creature, and they say that the divine essence itself under this aspect is the exemplar of creatures. Thus think Cajetan and many Thomists, 1st part, question 16, article 2; and Ferrara, 1 Against the Gentiles, chapter 54; and Giles, in 1, distinction 36, question 5, to 2; and there Richard, article 2, question 2. Concerning the human exemplar, however, the cited authors do not speak so expressly; but some more recent ones say that it is always a known thing distinct

from the exemplified, which either is some particular thing, presented to the senses or conceived in mind, or is something confusedly conceived, from which also the particular artifice is distinguished, which is made in the individual in imitation of what was confusedly conceived.

Foundations of the Stated Opinion

8. I omit the foundations of this latter opinion, because insofar as they prove that an exemplar cannot be the same thing which is made through the exemplar, nor creatures known, with respect to the divine intellect, we shall use them; but insofar as they prove in general that an idea is an objective concept, they are the same as the foundations of the first opinion. Therefore that opinion can be persuaded, first from a certain proportion between exemplar and end; for both require being known, so that they can exercise their function; for just as an end does not move unless known, so an exemplar does not direct unless perceived by mind. Then just as in an end it is not the formal being of knowledge that moves, but the good itself objectively known, so in an exemplar it is not the formal being of knowledge that directs the action of the agent, but the form itself presented to knowledge; for that is what through knowledge is proposed to be imitated in the action itself; therefore, just as an end is not subjectively in the intellect, but objectively, so also an exemplar is objectively in the intellect and not formally. Second, from the common mode of speaking about exemplar; for exemplar is said to be what the artificer imitates, or in imitation of which he produces an effect; it is also called a form, not from which, or through which, or out of which[25], but toward which the artificer operates while looking; but these things belong to a thing as presented to mind; for the artificer looks toward it, not toward his formal concept, nor is this reflection necessary. Third, because all theologians say there are several ideas in God

[25] vel per quam, seu ex qua, 1597, 1605, 1960; Vivés om.

according to the opinion of Augustine, book 83 Questions, question 46; but they cannot be said to be several, unless because in known being several creatures are present to God, for in the formal concept of God there is no distinction or plurality; therefore ideas are the creatures[26] themselves in objective being; therefore universally an exemplar is an objective and not a formal concept. Fourth, if the blessed seeing creatures in God received the power of effecting such creatures in reality, they would properly have exemplars or ideas of creatures, and not through a formal concept or word which they themselves form, because they do not really form such a word, as is the opinion of many; therefore the creatures themselves, which they behold in the uncreated Word, would then have the nature of an idea; therefore it pertains per se and formally to the nature of an exemplar that it be objectively in mind. Durand and Gabriel propose other arguments, which I omit, because they all suppose that an exemplar has the nature of a known object, and from this supposition they infer that it cannot be another thing, unless the very one which is made through action, insofar as it is supposed in the mind of the artificer in known being; which consequence I shall easily concede, as I shall say in what follows; but now we inquire about what they suppose, whether it is true, namely, that an exemplar has the nature of a known object.

Second Opinion, that Exemplar is Subjectively in Mind

9. The second opinion is that an idea is in the intellect subjectively and formally, and thus is a formal concept, which the artificer forms of the thing which he undertakes to make. Alexander of Hales holds this opinion, 1st part, question 23, member 4, article 1,

[26] praesentes Deo … sunt creaturae, 1597, 1605, 1960; alit. om. "Toda esta frase está omitida en varias ediciones, con detrimento del texto." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 39

where he openly says that an idea is the wisdom and exemplar of God, and that according to the exemplar God is said to be wise. Although there he establishes I know not what difference between exemplar and idea, which does not seem right to me. Bonaventure holds the same opinion, in 1, distinction 35, article 1, question 1, where for this reason he says that God knows through ideas, and has in himself the reasons and likenesses of the things which he knows. Capreolus thinks the same, in 1, distinction 36, question 1, article 1, to 1 of Durand against 3rd conclusion, insofar as he says that for an idea it suffices that it be such according to representation as is the thing of which it is the idea; and below, that if a creature were not contained in the divine essence, except objectively, and in no way formally or virtually, this would not suffice for it to have the nature of an idea. And this seems to be the opinion of Saint Thomas, 1st part, question 15, for in article 1, he says that an idea is a form, that is, a likeness of the thing to be made, which the artificer has in himself according to intelligible being. And in solution to 2, he says that God has ideas through his essence, because through his essence he knows things operable by himself; but God does not know creatures through them in known being, but through his formal concept of them. And in solution to 3, he says that the divine essence is an idea insofar as it is a likeness of all things; which cannot be understood of natural likeness, but of likeness or intentional representation, which is had through formal concept. And he is to be understood in the same way in article 2, while he says that in the divine essence there is an idea, insofar as it is participable according to some mode of likeness by creatures; and in solution to 1, he says that an idea is essence, insofar as it is likeness or reason; where that latter word, namely reason, declares the former, namely likeness; for reason is not properly said except of a formal concept expressly representing to the intellect the thing ideated in it. And in solution to 2, he says that God understands several reasons of things, insofar as he understands himself to understand several things outside himself, and in this way there are several ideas in God; and he says the same

proportionally there about the exemplar of any artificer. And this opinion is more approved by me. But so that it may be proposed and proved more distinctly, some assertions must be proposed.

First Assertion Against the Prior Opinion

10. I say first: An exemplar is not a thing objectively known, or existing only objectively in the mind of the artificer. It is proved, because either it is the same thing which the artificer makes, or is about to make, or can make, or it is another objectively known, and distinct from the formal concept, in imitation of which he makes another; neither of these can be said; therefore. The antecedent as regards both parts is shown first in divine exemplars, then in created ones.

The Assertion is Proved in Divine Exemplars

11. The first part is proved, because the divine idea, according to the opinion more consonant with the holy Fathers, and more approved by theologians, is not something created or creatable, but the divine essence itself uncreated. This is taken from Dionysius, chapter 5 of the Divine Names, saying that exemplars are substantial reasons of existing things, and singularly preexisting, which Theology calls predestinations and good wills. By these words he signifies that ideas are not any things outside God, nor creatures objectively existing in the mind of God, but their substantial reasons, that is, substantial, or formative of substances singularly, that is, uniquely and most simply existing in God, as he manifestly expounds in what follows.

12. Similarly Augustine, book of the City of God, chapter 29, says that in the Word of God are the causes and reasons of things according to which they were made, remaining incommunicably, which could not be said unless because of uncreated ideas; and in tract 1 on John, he thus expounds those words: "What was made, in him

was life," because what was made, in God has a reason, which is life. And he declares this by the example of an artificer, who in his art has an ark: "Which in art (he says) is life, because the soul of the artificer lives"; he calls it life in the artificer, because it is the work of life; but in God, because it is the very concept of God, who is life by essence. He expounds this in the same way in book 65 Questions, question 26; and in book 5 Genesis according to the letter, chapter 13, he similarly calls ideas divine, unchangeable and eternal reasons, and immediately in chapter 14, by reason of those he understands it to be written that all things which were made live in God, namely in God's knowledge. The same he signifies in book 12 of the City of God, chapters 25 and 26; and in book 83 Questions, question 46, as I related above, he says that ideas are principal forms, or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which are not themselves formed, and through this are eternal, and always have themselves in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence. And below he says that these ideas cannot be seen, except by beatific vision; and further below he says that they truly are, and by their participation it happens that whatever is, is. Therefore it is the open opinion of Augustine that ideas are not creatures, but uncreated reasons truly and really existing in the mind of God itself.

13. Which Ambrose also sensed not obscurely, in Hexameron 2, chapters 1 and 2, where he disapproves the opinion of Plato and the philosophers, positing exemplars distinct from God, toward which God intending created things; therefore he thinks that a creature, as it is something distinct from God, cannot be an exemplar by which God operates; therefore whether a creature is taken as existing in act, or in potency or according to essential being, it cannot be a divine exemplar; for in both ways it is outside God. But in the same way other Fathers, Justin Martyr, in the Parenetic Oration to the Gentiles, near the end, and Eusebius of Caesarea, book 11 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 11, and Gregory Nazianzen, oration 33, which is the first on Theology, at the end, and in the same place Elias of Crete

condemn the opinion of Plato as to that part, by which he is reported to have asserted that God looking toward exemplars, established things outside himself; for they must say the same who teach that creatures, as presented to the divine intellect, are per se ideas of it, for indeed creatures, even taken thus, are something outside God, and it matters little whether they are posited to have the nature of idea according to actual existence, or according to essence. This part is also proved by reason, because an exemplar is a true cause of the production of a thing; but a possible creature as presented to the mind of God is not a true cause of itself as made; therefore. The major will be proved below; the minor is established, because otherwise God could not cause a creature, unless with that creature itself truly and properly concausing, which is most absurd. We shall bring forward other general proofs immediately.

14. The other part is further proved, namely, that neither can another objectively known thing, and distinct from the formal concept, be found in the intellect of God, which has the nature of an exemplar. And first indeed the testimonies of the Fathers confirm this, especially Augustine; for he places ideas in art itself, insofar as through it the reason, or concept of the thing to be produced is formed; in which concept the effect is said to be contained, because it represents it, and thus according to his opinion an idea in God is nothing unless essence intellectually representing the thing to be made. Second I argue by reason, because in God there is no known object rationally distinct from knowledge, unless either primary, which is the divine essence, or secondary, which are creatures; concerning this latter, it has already been shown not to have the nature of idea; concerning the former therefore it is proved, because in the divine essence, as thus co-distinguished from knowledge, a creature is not contained as in an exemplar cause, but as in an efficient cause, which only by eminent power contains creatures, not formally in any way; therefore according to that nature it cannot have the nature of an exemplar. The minor is proved together with the consequence, because it is of the nature of an

exemplar that it be an extrinsic form, and thus that it formally contain the exemplified thing, either through formal agreement and likeness, or through intentional or intellectual representation.

15. And it is confirmed and declared in this way, for the divine essence, if it is considered prior by reason to being knowing, or known by itself, cannot be understood as exemplar of creatures according to their proper natures, because although it contains them by eminent power, nevertheless it does not contain or refer them formally in any way; just as the light of the sun, although it eminently contains heat, cannot be said to be the idea of heat, because according to itself it neither formally, nor representatively expresses heat. Again therefore the divine essence, as known, cannot have the nature of an exemplar. The consequence is proved, both because being known (so to speak) does not constitute an exemplar in the being of an exemplar, but presupposes it, and at most can be a necessary condition for it to cause; if therefore the divine essence according to itself does not have the nature of an exemplar, from the fact precisely that it is known, it will not have it. And especially, because either essence is considered precisely and according to itself as known; and as such it cannot be an exemplar, because as such, it is entirely dissimilar to creatures; or it is considered as creatures are known in it as in a cause, and in this way the object of such knowledge is now not only primary, but also secondary; if therefore the object thus known is an idea, the creatures themselves are ideas, or at least complete the nature of idea; which is equally disproved by the reasons made in the prior member.

16. An objection is sufficiently met. Perhaps it will be said that neither essence absolutely known, nor creatures known, but essence known as participable by creatures, is an idea. But on the contrary, because to know essence as participable by a creature is nothing other than to know that from the power of such essence a creature can participate such a degree of being. But this is nothing other than to know the creature itself, insofar as from the power of God's eminent virtue it can proceed from it; therefore such knowledge

is really knowledge of a creature in God; therefore if the object of that knowledge is an idea, the creature will be an idea. And I confirm, because in God only those things are known which are eminently in him, or which are formally; therefore if essence as objectively known is an idea, either it is according to those things which are formally contained in it, and this is not so, otherwise absolutely and precisely known without creatures it would be an idea, which is established to be impossible, because as such it is entirely dissimilar to creatures, and does not represent them according to their proper natures; or it is an idea according to those things which it has eminently, and according to which such things are known in it, and thus rather the creatures themselves known as eminently contained would be the idea. Or the idea will be called the essence itself according to some middle nature, namely, according to that which it formally is, not absolutely, but as it expresses a certain relation to things which it contains eminently, by reason of which it can be a primary object, in which creatures are secondarily known; and this also is not rightly said, both because that relation is rather on the part of creatures, insofar as they can depend on God, and are certain participations of him; and especially because the essence of God is not a primary object, in which creatures are known, as in some representing image, but as in an efficient cause eminently containing them, and therefore as such it cannot have the nature of an exemplar; therefore an exemplar in the divine mind is not a thing objectively known as such, and as distinguished according to reason from knowledge itself. But if anyone finally says with Durand that the divine essence has the nature of an exemplar at least imperfect, insofar as at least analogically it is imitable by creatures, that indeed is most improperly said, both because exemplar expresses some proper nature of an effect; but that is a most common nature; and also, because essence under that aspect does not have the proper concurrence of an exemplar cause. For this does not belong to a thing insofar as it is, but insofar as it is knowing, as I shall show in the

following section. Finally because that would be a most imperfect nature of an exemplar.

The Assertion is Proved in Created Exemplars

17. From these considerations, both parts of the argument can easily be proved in the examples of artifacts that exist in created intellects. First, indeed, because although these created exemplars are better known to us, nevertheless in themselves they are certain imitations of divine exemplars; hence they preserve the same proportion. For this reason, the opinion of those has always displeased me who think that in this matter one should judge differently about divine exemplars than about created ones, such that they say the former are placed in the formal concept, the latter in the objective, or conversely; for this is supported by no reason, since although these exemplars are far distant from each other in perfection, nevertheless in their mode of existence, representation, and causality they preserve a proportion, as the reasoning already made proves, because one is a participation and imitation of the other, just as also in the genus of efficient or final cause, a secondary cause imitates the primary as much as it can. And therefore St. Thomas much more correctly judged that there is an equal reason regarding this matter for divine and created exemplars, as is evident from the cited passages, especially Ia, q. 15, art. 2, ad 2, and the same is supposed by Scotus and others, and rightly so.

18. Second, the same is proved by nearly the same reasoning, for if an artistic exemplar is something known by the artist, either this is that very artifact which is to be made, as objectively pre-existing in knowledge, or it is something else to be imitated in the production of another thing. The latter cannot be said, because very often no other object intervenes which the artist might contemplate. For in a human artist that reason ceases which exists in God, who can know nothing outside himself except as a secondary object known in his essence as

in the primary; and therefore in divine knowledge there always intervene as it were two objects, about which it was necessary to speak individually. But truly a created artist directly and immediately conceives the artifact, and through that knowledge produces it; therefore there is no other third thing there which could have the nature of an exemplar. It can be responded that a created artist does not conceive that very artifact in particular and in individual form which he is going to make, but only confusedly an artifact of such a nature or figure; and therefore he always has an idol objectively conceived distinct from the artifact, which he afterward makes in imitation of that idol. But first, as I shall immediately say, that mode of pre-conceiving is not per se in the artist as such, but in an imperfect artist, or one imperfectly knowing. Then that confused concept is not in reality distinct from the effect, but only in reason, as the common from the particular, and if the effect is considered as it per se falls under the intention of such an artist, it includes only that confused nature; but the exemplar only regards that which per se falls under the intention of the agent; therefore insofar as exemplar causality can intervene there, the pre-conceived object is not distinguished from the effect made per se from the agent's intention.

19. Someone might say that sometimes at least an external exemplar intervenes, which the artist contemplates and operates in accordance with its likeness; and then at least it could be said that the exemplar is a thing objectively known, and existing only objectively in the intellect. I respond that we speak only of the internal exemplar, as we said at the beginning; because we judge that alone to be the proper and per se exemplar cause with respect to the action of the one operating. For that other external exemplar is either only remote, insofar as it is a cause of the knowledge of the one operating, or sometimes it is not even a cause, but only an extrinsic terminus of the action of the one operating; in what way it can sometimes also be found with respect to God, as we shall see and declare in the following section.

20. Nor can it be said that the very artifact itself, as pre-known by the created artist, is the exemplar of itself as to be made. Because if creatures pre-known by God are not ideas, why will the thing made by art, as pre-known by the artist, be one? Some respond that there is a difference, because God does not receive knowledge from things, as the human artist does. But I do not see what this refers to in the present matter, for if in knowledge which is taken from things themselves, the thing known could be an exemplar of itself, much more in knowledge which is not taken from things, but which God has from himself, could the things known be exemplars, because before such knowledge they are in no way supposed to exist according to their formal being; but through knowledge they are expressed and as it were formed (which perhaps Scotus called coming to be in known being). Therefore, conversely, if in God, who pre-conceives things not taking knowledge from things, nevertheless the things known do not have exemplar nature, neither will they be able to have it in a human artist. Especially since we can constitute an artist not taking knowledge from things, but having it infused per se. Others try to give a reason from the fact that God's knowledge is most distinct, but the conception of a human artist is confused. But this is neither per se, nor does it satisfy, as has been said, and will be declared more fully in the following reasoning.

21. I argue second, therefore, because a human artist never pre-conceives the thing to be made by himself, wholly and individually the same as he afterward makes, because he can never know certainly what and of what kind the individual future thing will be that is to be elaborated by his art, for the determination of the effect in the individual depends on various circumstances, or on a superior agent, as was touched upon in the preceding. This reason proves well that, regularly and speaking in a human manner, the same artifact in individual form does not fall under the human exemplar which is afterward made; nor is this surprising, because even the determination of the action to such an effect in the individual does not fall per se

under human intention; but the exemplar only exists with respect to that thing to which human intention can be directed. Nevertheless that reason does not prove that at least according to the common nature of such an artifact, according to which it falls under the intention of the agent, the same as pre-known is not the exemplar of itself as made through art. Likewise that reason does not prove that absolutely even the same in number cannot be the exemplar of itself, either in the mind of an Angel, or even of a man, if he is divinely strengthened to pre-conceive the effect as it is to be perfected in the individual.

22. It is proved therefore differently, because the exemplar is a true and real cause of the thing which is made through it; therefore it cannot be the very thing itself which is afterward made, as it was previously pre-conceived. The antecedent will be proved below; the consequent is evident, because the same thing cannot be the true and proper cause of itself. Nor indeed is it sufficient that the pre-conceived thing and the produced thing are distinguished as a thing existing in potency or in act; for such a thing in act and potency is the same, and includes the same existence as actually exercised or as possible; and therefore a thing as in potency cannot be the cause of itself as in act. And this reason generally proceeds also concerning divine ideas.

23. But it can still be responded that in those causes which only influence according to being as an object for the mind, it is not incongruous for the same thing to be the cause of itself, as is evident in the final cause, about which Aristotle said that it coincides in the same thing numerically with the form made. Moreover, in this there is found a certain agreement between exemplar and end, for each causes as existing in knowledge. Therefore just as the same thing in the nature of an end moves to the production of itself, so in the nature of an exemplar it will direct or concur in its own way to the production of itself. For the reason common to both is this, that in other genera the same thing cannot be the cause of itself because it is supposed to exist in order to cause; therefore what is not supposed to exist, except as

known, in order to cause, will not be repugnant to cause itself in real existence. Especially since both causalities, of end and exemplar, do not tend toward the effect except in some way through a mediating agent, by moving or directing its action.

24. But this can be disproved first from the very reason for explaining exemplar causality, and the difference which exists in this between it and final causality. For an exemplar is said to be a form, according to whose pattern or imitation something is made; in which mode of causing there seems necessarily included a distinction between the form which is the exemplar and the exemplified form or thing effected, because the same thing is not said to be made in imitation of itself, nor to be assimilated to itself; therefore the same thing cannot be called the exemplar or idea of itself. But this reason seems to have its force and efficacy only in the manner of speaking. For someone could respond that it is not of the nature of an exemplar that the effect be made according to the pattern or imitation of it; but, as Seneca says, an exemplar is that to which the artist looking, effects what he intended; for by these words there is not involved a relation which would require a distinction between exemplar and exemplified, and nevertheless they sufficiently declare the nature of an exemplar. The assumption is evident, for an artist can, mentally looking toward some possible artifact, intend to effect that very thing; therefore the whole and sufficient definition of exemplar is preserved without the distinction which the likeness or imitation of the effect would require with respect to the exemplar. And this is confirmed and declared further, for if when an artist conceives one thing, and proposes to make another distinct thing according to the pattern or imitation of that, this is sufficient for the prior thing to have the nature of an exemplar, why will not the same thing objectively conceived, if it is proposed in the very thing to be effected, just as it is conceived, have the nature of an exemplar with respect to itself? For it truly seems to direct the action of the agent in the same way; indeed, all the more

perfectly, the greater the adequation of the thing made to the thing conceived, which will be the greater the greater the identity is.

25. The proper reason for this part therefore seems to be sought from this last point which we were just saying, namely, that the function of the proper and internal exemplar, about which we are treating, is to direct the action of the agent as to specification (as they say); but this function belongs not to the known object, but to the knowledge of it, insofar as it is contained in that knowledge in representative being. This reason will be explained more from the following assertion.

Second Assertion & Approval of the Second Opinion

26. I say second: the exemplar exists formally in the intellect as its formal concept. With the word of inherence we use here, since now we speak abstractly and in common about the exemplar, whether created or uncreated, it should be understood broadly either through union and proper inherence, or through identity and simplicity. The conclusion thus posited is very consonant with the expressions of St. Thomas and the Saints adduced above. For when they say that the mind is the seat of ideas, and that divine ideas are unchangeable and eternal reasons of things, and intelligible forms, they sufficiently signify both that they are true things existing from eternity, and that they are in God intrinsically, and that they are in him formally, insofar as he is understanding and intellectually representing all things, which belongs to him by reason of his concept or act of understanding. Many taught that Plato felt the same way about ideas, and Augustine especially indicates this in the cited passages. And Coelius Rhodiginus explained this very well, lib. 16 Lect. antiq., c. 17, with these words: "God, who is and is called omnipotent, in the mind inherent to himself fashions and paints in a certain way the natures of things to be created, which we perceive all things in these bodies; there the spheres of the

heavens and the masses of the elements, finally all things, even the forms of animals are generated, which compressed in the divine mind, the Platonists do not doubt are and are called the nourishment and ideas of God." Similarly Eugubinus, lib. 1 de Peren. philosoph., cap. 12, reports from Plutarch that Socrates and Plato placed ideas in the thoughts and senses of God, that is, subsisting in the mind; and below, from the same Plutarch, he observes that the divine mind and those ideas are the same; and from Philo and Plotinus, that the whole series of ideas is the same as God's immense wisdom itself; and from Trismegistus and the Chaldeans, that ideas are the thoughts of the Father, and universal reasons of nature. And that this is Aristotle's opinion about the created exemplar, I will show a little below.

27. This opinion can be proved by reason from a sufficient enumeration of parts; for the exemplar is in the intellect, and not only objectively; therefore it is in it formally or inherently; but it is not the intellect itself, insofar as it is or is understood by us as a bare potency, because as such it is not a representing form, which belongs to the nature of an exemplar; and for the same reason, it is not any of those habits which are called judicative, and belong on the part of the one having power, as can be, for example, art in the human intellect, because such a habit also is not a form formally representing, but only inclining to judgment. Nor also in the human intellect is it the intelligible species, both because, according to the truer opinion, this species does not represent formally, but is only a seed of the object efficiently cooperating toward formal representation, which occurs through the act or word; and also because the species by itself is not an operative cause toward external things, or directive of operation, which belongs to the exemplar. It remains therefore that the formal practical concept itself of the thing to be effected is properly the exemplar.

28. Various functions of the exemplar. First. Second. Second, it is proved from the function or office of the exemplar itself; for its function is to determine the external action of an intellectual agent;

and therefore in this regard it performs the function of a form, for natural things are determined through natural forms or qualities to their actions; but an intellectual agent through an intellectual form proportioned to itself, as St. Thomas correctly noted, in the said quaest. 15, 1 part., and 3 de Veritate. The exemplar is therefore a form actuating and informing the intellectual agent itself; but it is no other form than its conception, as has been declared. Again, it pertains to the function of the exemplar to direct the action of the intellectual agent, so that it may tend toward a certain terminus and goal, so that it may not happen by chance, nor in an irrational manner; and therefore Augustine said that it is as certain that God has exemplars as it is certain that he operates from reason; but this direction does not occur except through actual mental representation, which is like a certain light which goes before showing the way and manner and terminus of operation; but all this is done formally through the very formal concept of the mind. And for this reason the thing itself directly conceived cannot properly be called an exemplar; for if that thing is the very one which is to be made, and wholly the same in the individual, it is not that which directs, but that toward which the action is directed through the mediating exemplar; nor is that properly proposed to be imitated, but to be made; and in order that this may be done correctly, the action is directed through the exemplar conceived in the mind. But if that conceived thing is another, as in the created artist is an external image, or something similar, such a thing is not per se necessary for the operation of art, which is done through an exemplar, for it would be done better through proper and immediate knowledge of the very thing itself to be effected through art; that external aid therefore (so to speak) objected to the mind is not the proper and per se exemplar, but is like remote matter, or an object helping toward forming some or imperfect exemplar. Finally, if that other conceived thing is only a cause virtually containing the thing to be made through the exemplar, as in the uncreated artist the divine essence is, that as such cannot be the exemplar, because it is in no way

a form formally containing or representing the thing to be made, as we were arguing above. Nor does that as such direct the action of the artist, but it is only as it were the reason (remote according to reason) for conceiving the exemplar or idea, which directs the operation of the artist.

29. Third. Third, it is customary to attribute to the exemplar being the measure and rule of the truth and propriety of the thing made. In which sense (as we treated above, disput. 8), many authors say, and sometimes St. Thomas, that the truth of created beings is taken from conformity to the exemplars which are in the divine intellect, as from their measure; but the truth of artificial things is taken from conformity to the human intellect; for the exemplar of the artist is the measure of the artifact. But this properly belongs to the formal concept; for the objective concept, if it is wholly proper and adequate to the thing to be made, is not distinguished from the very thing itself; but the same thing is not the measure of itself; but if it is a concept of another thing, either it relates itself accidentally and only remotely, as has been said, or it does not have in itself the form of the effect, neither formally nor representatively, and therefore, as such, it cannot have the nature of a measure.

30. Fourth. Fourth, it is attributed to the idea to be a principle of knowledge, as St. Thomas notes, in the said quaest. 15, art. 1; but this is not to be understood about an effective principle, because, as we said, the intelligible species is not properly an exemplar; therefore it must be understood about a formal principle; for the object precisely as known, or as terminative, is not properly called a principle of knowledge, since it is rather the end and terminus; but the formal principle of knowledge is the very formal concept itself; therefore that is the most proper exemplar, if it is a concept of the thing to be effected.

Third Assertion

31. I say therefore third: it is not of the nature of the exemplar as such, or[27] as to its being, that it be actually and directly known as the object which; nevertheless in order that it may cause, it is necessary that it be known in some way, and the more perfectly it has been known, the more perfectly, other things being equal, it will cause. This conclusion is proposed to dissolve the foundation of the contrary opinion, and in it we suppose that the exemplar causes, although this has not yet been proved, because thus taken in common, it is per se manifest; and then it is necessary for us to distinguish in what the proper being of the exemplar consists, and what indeed is the condition required for it to cause. For it is commonly said that it is of the nature of an exemplar to be actually known, because it does not seem sufficiently noticed that, just as in the end those two things are distinguished, namely, the very being of the end through which it causes, and being known, which is a necessary condition for causing, so in the exemplar these two things are to be distinguished; for being known, as such, insofar as it is said of an object directly known, since it is only an extrinsic denomination, cannot be the proper reason constituting the exemplar itself, nor can it be in that thing the formal principle of causing.

32. Furthermore, just as we were saying about the end, that it does not move to appetition according to being known as to denomination (so to speak), but as to the thing denominated, or as to the very being which is known, so the exemplar does not direct toward effecting in the effect the very being known as to denomination, nor such being as is being in knowledge; therefore the exemplar in the being of exemplar is not constituted through being known as such. Whence also in an external and remote exemplar, when an image proposed to sight is called an exemplar, in imitation of which another thing is made, although it is necessary for that image to be seen or known, nevertheless it is not constituted in that mode of exemplar

[27] seu, 1597, 1605, 1960; alit. non esse. "In some editions seu is inexplicably substituted by non esse." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 54.

through being seen, but this is a necessary condition; but being thus depicted or figured is the proper being of such an exemplar. And according to the opinion asserting that the artifact itself, or the creature objected to the mind is the exemplar, it cannot be said that being known, as to the denomination of the known, constitutes that thing in the being of exemplar, since in the effect likeness or conformity is not intended as to that denomination, but as to the natural or artificial being which is known in such a thing; therefore the same must be said in every opinion, that namely the exemplar is not constituted in the being of exemplar formally and precisely from the fact that it is known, but from its proper and as it were intrinsic being, whatever that may be, which either is known or can be known.

33. From this therefore the prior part of the conclusion seems sufficiently proved; for if the exemplar is not formally constituted through being known, therefore to be known as such, especially directly and as the object which, is not of the nature of the exemplar, insofar as it is an exemplar. And this can also be confirmed from the first conclusion; for it was said that the exemplar is not, formally speaking, an objective concept, which is formally constituted in the being of such a concept through being known; therefore this being is not formally of the nature of the exemplar as such.

34. But the other part of the conclusion is confirmed in part by the arguments of the prior opinion, and I take it from St. Thomas, 1 part., quaest. 15, art. 2, ad 2. And it is declared first in divine exemplars; for God, knowing creatures in his essence, forms (as we speak in our manner) reasons or concepts of them, through which he directly knows them, although as secondary objects of his knowledge. But because his knowledge is most perfect, in knowing and forming exemplars of creatures, he knows in himself that concept which intellectually represents creatures; which is to know in himself the exemplars of creatures. Where by distinguishing those two things according to reason, we understand that the formal exemplars themselves are prior, and then are known, which although it may seem

to be a certain reflection, nevertheless in God on account of the supreme simplicity and infinity of that act, both are known by the same most simple act. In this way therefore there is in God an idea (so to speak), not only formed, but also known, and as such it has everything which is necessary on the part of the intellect, so that it may cause in its genus, because it is both a form existing in the mind of the artist, and it is so proposed and applied that he can, looking toward it, effect the thing represented through it in imitation of that. And thus distinguishing in God according to reason the idea from the knowledge of the idea, just as we can also distinguish according to reason direct knowledge from reflexive, and we understand the idea as to its being to consist in the formal concept which God directly has of an operable or makeable thing, insofar as it is makeable; but we understand the knowledge of the idea to be like a certain perfect application and conjunction to the artist himself, so that in imitation of that he may produce the effect.

35. St. Thomas reasons in nearly this manner above, about the exemplar existing in the mind of the artist: For when the artist (he says) understands the form of the house in matter, he is said to understand the house; but when he understands the form of the house as speculated by himself, from the fact that he understands himself to understand it, he understands the idea or reason of the house. Where he plainly distinguishes that it is one thing to form an idea, another to understand an idea. For if the artist when he understands the form and reason of the house as speculated by himself, understands the idea, therefore when he speculates the very reason and form of the house, he forms the idea; but in order that he may operate through that and effect the house in imitation of it, he reflects upon the reason of the house as speculated by himself, and thus acknowledges the idea, and through that knowledge as it were applies the exemplar, so that he may cause through it. Thus therefore it is established how the knowledge of the idea serves for causality.

36. But immediately a doubt arises, whether such reflection is simply necessary in the artist, so that he may be able to operate externally through an exemplar conceived by himself; for in God that quasi-reflection is always necessary, not so much on account of causality as on account of the infinite perfection of that knowledge, which cannot be so terminated toward some object that it does not intrinsically intuit itself under every reason and representation. But truly in a created artist, since that reflection must be made through a distinct act, it is difficult to believe either that it is necessary or that it always intervenes whenever the artist operates through his art, or through an exemplar formed by that art. Indeed, experience seems to show the contrary; for one who writes or builds is not always in that actual reflection while operating.

37. What kind of knowledge of the exemplar is required so that the artist may be able to use it. Whence some say that that reflection is not necessary, and that the created artist uses his exemplar by knowing it, not as it is a certain quality inherent to the mind, but as it is a form and image objectively representing the artifact. Just as many judge that the mental word is a quality distinct from the act of knowing, serving knowledge as a proximate object, in which the represented thing is known; for what the word is in speculable matters, the exemplar is believed to be in operable matters. And I indeed think this last point is true in created things, nevertheless, just as that opinion about the mental word is false, so also in the present case that reason for explaining the knowledge of the exemplar or idea through direct knowledge of the exemplified thing is not true, that namely it is a proximate object in which another thing is known, because neither can that mode of objective representation through formal likeness be understood in that quality, which has neither formal nor real agreement with the external object, nor can it be understood how in that thing the external object is directly known, when that thing is in no way known. But these are common points about the mental word explained in that manner; and therefore I omit those, and suppose that

the formal concept is immediately terminated toward the very thing which it represents, and that it does not represent otherwise than by referring the object itself to the intellect, as an intellectual form constituting the intellect itself in ultimate act; and that the same formal concept is called the mental word, insofar as it is the internal terminus of the intellectual action or conception of it; but it is called exemplar when it is about an artificial or operable thing.

38. To the difficulty therefore posed, others concede that reflexive knowledge is necessary, through which the artist looking toward the exemplar, that is, toward the direct concept which he has formed of the thing, may be able to make such a thing as he has conceived in thought. And to the experience they respond that such internal acts do not always fall under experience; for often the intellect compares one thing to another, and does not notice that it is comparing; and so also it can compare its very knowledge and exemplar, so that through that it may measure the thing which is being made, although it may not notice that it is using that comparison; but if it does notice, it will understand that it does not do this without reflection upon its own knowledge. And this indeed does not displease me, if we only understand that this reflection intervenes when the artist perfectly uses his exemplar to measure and define the form which he ought to provide to his effect; and St. Thomas plainly seems to have wanted this above.

39. Nevertheless I think it should be added that during the whole time in which the external operation proceeding from art lasts, that formal reflection is not necessary; which indeed experience and reason seem sufficiently to prove to me, because the direct representation itself, and as it were the mental intuition about the thing or operation to be made, suffices to direct the operation. Then therefore it is not necessary that the exemplar be known as the object which, but it suffices that it be known in some way implicitly and through the mode of tendency toward the object, with only that implicit and virtual reflection which any act of the mind includes in

itself, by reason of which it is said to be known by itself as that by which, although it is not known as that which. And therefore I said in the conclusion that the exemplar is known in some way, nevertheless it is applied to its work all the more perfectly the more perfectly it is known.

Satisfaction of the Arguments of the Prior Opinion

40. End and exemplar as to the necessity of knowledge, in what they agree and differ. To the first argument therefore of the prior opinion it has already been responded that there is a far different reason about the end and about the exemplar; for although they agree in this, that each causes as existing in knowledge, nevertheless in the mode of causing they have diversity, by reason of which the end can be the very thing itself which terminates the action of the agent, because it draws its affection to itself; but the exemplar cannot be that same thing, but another, which may be the measure and rule of it. Whence it happens that the end is so in knowledge that it is not necessarily knowledge; but the exemplar required per se and proximately is so in knowledge that it is also intrinsically a certain knowledge, or intellectual concept; for it is an intellectual rule and measure.

41. To the second it is responded that that expression, that the exemplar is that according to whose likeness the effect is made, and which the artist imitates in operating, is easily verified of the formal concept itself, because those expressions are not to be understood about formal likeness, which is natural or entitative, but about likeness according to intellectual representation, which the formal concept has concerning the thing which it expresses, and the artist intends this imitation or conformity in his operation; but that expression, that the artist looking toward the exemplar operates in imitation of it, need not be taken with complete propriety. For that manner of speaking seems to have arisen from sensible exemplars,

which men are accustomed to use on account of their imperfection, and to look toward them as proximate objects which they imitate. Nevertheless I have already said that such exemplars are as it were accidental; for the internal exemplar per se suffices and is required for action, and its imitation is immediately intended; and therefore the nature of an exemplar could be sufficiently explained by saying that it is that by which the artist represents to himself the thing which he is going to effect, so that he may imitate that, or rather so that he may fulfill that representation. But because, as we said, the exemplar itself can also be reflexively known, and that reflection contributes so that it may perfectly and completely exercise the function of exemplar, therefore it can also properly be verified that the artist, looking toward his exemplar, operates.

42. The third argument has no difficulty; for the multitude of ideas in God is not according to reality, but only according to reason, through relations of reason to diverse creatable things, and therefore it is not repugnant that that plurality or distinction of reason be understood in the very formal concept or knowledge of God. But what and how great that plurality of ideas may be, and through what intellect that distinction may be made, and with respect to what things ideas are to be distinguished, has more of a question about the name than about the thing; but that disputation of whatever kind belongs to the Theologians, not to us.

43. To the fourth it is responded first that it supposes what is false, that the Blessed do not form a word; for they truly conceive God as he is in himself, and thus form in themselves a formal concept by which they represent God to themselves as he is in himself; and that concept is a word, and nothing else. Whence, if they know creatures in God, they also form in themselves a reason or word of them, and that could have the force of an exemplar, if with that there were given the power of operating, which could be directed through such an exemplar. I add furthermore that the Blessed one seeing God and creature in God, also sees the idea which God has of creatures, and

therefore the very formal concept of God can in some way undergo the nature of an idea, even with respect to another intellect, to which it is per se and immediately objected; but that also would be remotely and mediately; for the proximate exemplar is always that which the operator himself forms in his own intellect.

SECTION II

WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR CONSTITUTES ITS OWN PROPER NATURE OF CAUSE, OR IS REDUCED TO SOME OTHER

1. This question presupposes that the exemplar is truly and properly a cause; for we take this as certain from the common opinion of philosophers and theologians. Indeed, in those things which operate through intellect, an exemplar is intrinsically necessary so that they can direct their action toward a definite effect in a rational manner. For since they are not limited by their nature to determining forms to be given to effects, as natural agents are, it is necessary that they be determined in their own proper and intellectual mode. Although they are determined regarding the exercise of their action by the will, nevertheless regarding specification and direction they are led by the intellect. For this purpose they require proper exemplars of such effects, so that they can produce them in an artificial and intellectual manner. And although Seneca (Epistle 66) thinks that by this reasoning it is only proven that the exemplar is something requisite, but not therefore to be numbered among causes per se (otherwise many other things could similarly be counted per se among causes), nonetheless it is more true that it pertains per se to some genus of causality, or to some mode of causing, even though perhaps it does not increase the number of causes, nor constitutes per se a new genus of causing. Both points, however, will be declared more

conveniently by explaining to which genus of cause the exemplar belongs.

The Exemplar is Neither Material Nor Final Cause

2. And to begin from clearer matters, it is certain that the exemplar neither pertains per se to, nor is reduced to, the genus of material cause, because it has no proportion or similarity with that cause. For the exemplar indicates nothing potential, but rather something actual and formal; nor does it concur in any way by receiving, but rather by acting and determining in its own mode. Concerning the final cause, however, someone might doubt. For the function of the exemplar is said to be that the effect is made according to its likeness or imitation; but this is the relationship of an end; therefore the concurrence of the exemplar is nothing but a certain final concurrence. I prove the minor and the entire argument from St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles 3, ch. 19), where he proves by this principal reasoning that all things tend toward God as their ultimate end, because all things intend to be assimilated to Him. Therefore, by converting the reasoning, we correctly conclude that when God produces things so that they may be assimilated to Him, He concurs as their end; and then He concurs as exemplar; therefore [exemplar and final cause coincide]. Indeed, in argument 2 St. Thomas thus concludes: An agent is called the end of its effect, insofar as the effect tends toward likeness with the agent; but God is the end of things in such a way that He is also their first agent; therefore all things intend, as their ultimate end, to be assimilated to God. Therefore God, as He is that to which the creature is assimilated, has the nature of an end; therefore also as He is imitable by creatures. For these words, "to be imitable by creatures" and "to be that to which creatures are assimilated," seem to signify the same relationship; but to be imitable speaks of the relationship of exemplar cause; therefore it coincides

with the relationship of final cause. Hence more clearly in argument 4, St. Thomas says that all created things are like certain images of the first agent; but the perfection of an image consists in this, that it represents its exemplar, and therefore all creatures intend this representation as their end. In this argument he plainly seems to confuse the exemplar with the end.

3. But nonetheless all authors consider exemplar causality to be far different from final causality, because the causality of an end consists in the metaphorical motion of the will. But the nature of the exemplar consists precisely in this: that it is a form determining the action of the agent, as is taken from St. Thomas (I, q. 44, a. 3). The difficulty proposed proceeds as if the exemplar were some known thing which is proposed for imitation, and not rather the intellectual concept itself of the thing. But to respond in every way, admitting that mode of speaking, it must be said that although it happens that the same thing is both end and exemplar of the same effect, as the arguments made prove, nevertheless [it is so] under a diverse nature of causality. For as end, it moves toward effecting its own representation; as exemplar, however, it determines the action of the agent, and in some way gives species to the effect. Hence it exercises the nature of an end as it is a certain good; but the nature of exemplar, as it is a certain form. We can add, to declare this more fully, that the exemplar can be considered either as a certain term toward whose imitation the action tends, or as a principle directing and regulating the action of the agent. Under this latter nature it exercises exemplar causality; for the former pertains more to the nature of an end, because under that aspect it is that for the sake of which the action is done. For when an image of Christ is painted so that it may represent Him to us, truly Christ under that aspect has the nature of an end, and this also proves the difficulty touched upon. And therefore it does not please me that some say exemplar causality consists in the passive imitation of the thing made after the pattern of that [exemplar]; for this passive imitation properly belongs to the end, when nothing else is intended

in it except its representation. Therefore in the passive action itself it must be distinguished whether it is taken as alluring the affection, or as determining and quasi-specifying the action, or the form induced through it; for under the former aspect it will pertain to the causality of the end, under the latter to the nature of the exemplar.

4. And for this reason I consider it most probable that proper exemplar causality, distinct from final causality, is found per se in the internal concept formally expressing and representing the thing to be made by art. For although conformity with that concept so representing is intended through the action, nevertheless it is not intended as the end of the action, speaking formally about the conformity, but the very form in which the conformity exists is intended; but the conformity itself is attended to only as a certain commensuration, and as it were a rule of the form to be induced. But truly in the external exemplar a distinction is needed, for that takes on more the nature of an end, especially when its representation is intended per se, for its honor, or something similar. Sometimes, however, it also has only the nature of a measure and not of an end, as when an artisan externally fashions a small model of an entire building; for then he intends conformity to that, not as an end, but as a regulation, so to speak.

5. And in a similar way it seems to be able to be said with sufficient probability (distinguishing in God according to reason the intellectual ideas, as they have been explained by us in the preceding section, and the divine essence as participable in being and in the perfections of being by creatures), that under the former aspect [God] has proper exemplar causality, and thus the conformity of creatures to ideas is intended, not according to their relationship to an end, but to a measure and rule. Under the latter aspect, however, the divine essence has the nature of an end, and thus also the likeness of creatures to God is intended, as to their end. For under the former aspect it is intended that the creature be such as it is represented in the idea; under this latter aspect, however, it is intended that it itself represent the divine

being and divine perfection as much as it can. And therefore the latter relationship is not to God as to an exemplar, but as to an end.

6. Finally, from this I judge it most fittingly said that in the actions and effects of God, as they are from Him, nothing outside Him can exercise exemplar causality properly understood, but that He Himself is the singular exemplar of all His actions and effects, because nothing outside Him can be the rule and measure of His actions, as they are from Him. Hence if sometimes something created is said to be an exemplar of another, as Christ, insofar as He is man, is said to be the exemplar of just men, either it must be understood broadly of the exemplar quasi-materially, as it takes on the nature of a proximate end (for thus Christ can be called an exemplar, because other just men are made similar to Him for His honor), or it must be explained with respect to secondary causes. In this way also Christ can be called the exemplar of men, because He is proposed to them so that they may look to Him as to an exemplar, which they may imitate.

The Opinion is Proposed Which Reduces the Exemplar to Formal Cause

7. Omitting therefore the material and final cause, there is controversy among authors concerning the other two. For many reduce the exemplar to the genus of formal cause, and this is believed to be the opinion of Aristotle, who in numbering the causes, named the exemplar together with the formal. And this opinion is held by Albert (In I, dist. 20, art. 1); Cajetan (I, q. 6, a. 3, at the end, and q. 44, a. 3); Thomas of Argentina (In I, dist. 45, art. 2). It is taken from Durandus there (q. 2), insofar as he denies that the exemplar pertains to the genus of efficient cause. The same is held by Giles (Proposition 37 on the Eucharist). These authors suppose that the exemplar concurs only as a known object, according to whose imitation an agent operates something; and therefore they do not think it can have efficiency, and hence they conclude that it has extrinsic formal

causality, which consists only in this: that through passive imitation it concurs in giving similar form and species to the effect. Indeed, there are those who consider that the exemplar is not reduced to the genus of intrinsic formal cause, but constitutes per se and directly a new genus of extrinsic formal cause; this is the opinion of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 9, q. 2), whom some moderns follow. And indeed, supposing the prior part, they speak quite consistently; for although the exemplar agrees with form in name, as the very name "idea" suggests, and we noted above from Augustine, nevertheless in causing it has a far different nature. For the informing form is intrinsic, and an essential part of the composite; but the exemplar is an extrinsic form. Hence in this respect they differ more among themselves than matter and form, and no less than efficient form and form made, for the efficient form is also a form, and is an extrinsic cause, whose participation is the informing form proceeding from it. Therefore if the exemplar is an extrinsic formal cause, it constitutes a new genus of cause just as much as efficient form does.

The Opinion is Preferred Which Reduces the Exemplar to Efficient Cause

8. To me, however, the opinion of those who deny that exemplar cause constitutes its own proper genus of cause is more approved, but who say that it pertains to efficient cause. This opinion is held by Alexander of Hales (I, q. 23, memb. 4, a. 1); Bonaventure (In III, dist. 11, art. 1, q. 3); Scotus (In I, dist. 2, q. 2, and dist. 36, art. 1); and there Hervaeus (q. 1). And first this opinion is proved from the mind of Aristotle, to whom the opposite opinion seems to contradict modestly, because it constitutes a fifth genus of cause distinct from those which Aristotle numbered. For although they call the exemplar by the name of form, nevertheless in reality it is a cause no less different from the informing form than efficient form is, as we declared in explaining that very opinion, and that agreement with

form is scarcely more than in name. For the nature is far different, since one is a form essentially and intrinsically constituting the thing; but in another way it is only called form, because extrinsically it represents or moves toward making something similar to itself. Hence Aristotle did not number the exemplar with form in this sense, but either because the name "idea," which he uses, signifies generally the same as form, or because (as he himself relates) Plato so posited ideas as exemplar forms, that he constituted in them the essences and species of things. Add that Aristotle always numbers art itself among efficient causes, under which he comprehends the exemplar; hence in Metaphysics 7, he said that health outside is efficiently made by health which is in the mind, that is, by the exemplar of health.

9. Second, that opinion seems founded on a false principle, namely, that the exemplar is some thing objectively and directly known, so that the nature of exemplar cause consists per se primarily in that [thing]; for this can be shown to be false from what was said in the preceding section. And it is declared furthermore in this way, for in a created artisan such an exemplar is not per se necessary; for that which human artisans are accustomed to fashion externally for themselves is only a certain aid, which helps toward conceiving the thing interiorly, and preserving memory. Hence if without such a sensible object they could exactly conceive a house to be made, and have it present interiorly, they would not need that extrinsic exemplar. Again, neither is some object distinct from the artificial effect to be made per se necessary interiorly, for although in men it regularly happens thus, nevertheless (as we argued above) that distinction is quasi-accidental, because the artisan does not intend the effect, except insofar as it is entirely the same, and in that in which it is different he does not proceed from exemplar causality. And besides, this is not universal in a created artisan as such; for angels also can make artificial things, and it is not necessary that they conceive them confusedly, but distinctly, and the very same in number which they fashion. And Christ the Lord, insofar as He is man, if He had wished to work

something artificial, would look to no other object except to that very thing distinctly known in its individual nature, which He was about to make. Therefore this causality is not per se from a distinct object, nor can it be from the same in number, as was shown in the superior section, and the same can be proved a fortiori concerning divine ideas from what was said above. Therefore this causality does not consist in that quasi-extrinsic information, which is as it were through comparison and imitation of one form to another.

10. I add furthermore that even when a distinct extrinsic exemplar intervenes, it effects nothing per se concerning the effect of art, which could have the proper nature of real causality, and truly and per se be called formal causality. For if we speak of a sensible exemplar, that first and per se moves toward knowledge of itself, and in that genus it concurs efficiently as a motive object. Then it can mediately move toward conceiving or effecting another similar or proportional thing, and in this respect also it is compared by way of end, or of efficient remotely, and almost accidentally. For if the matter is attentively considered, it per se only moves toward its own conception, from which the intellect fabricates or conceives another similar thing, and through the will intends to effect that. But if such an object moves the will itself, as when an image, which pleases, moves toward making another similar one, this motion pertains to the end, not to the exemplar. Therefore no causality intervenes there which merits the name of formal causality. Furthermore, either that causality is concerning the conception of the intellect, and this is not so, because with respect to that it is rather objective efficiency, as was said; or it is concerning the artificial thing, and this also is not so, both because with respect to that such an exemplar is very remotely related, for the artificial product is proximately regulated only according to the conception of the mind; and also because (setting aside the causality of the end) that the artisan intends to assimilate the effect to an extrinsic object, is only a relationship or extrinsic denomination arising from an act of his will, and does not add to the effect an

essential dependence on another object, which would pertain to the genus of formal cause. Indeed, neither to any genus of cause per se, unless perhaps, as I said, such representation or likeness is intended under the aspect of an end. For the artisan per se intends only to induce such a form in his effect, for which he per se needs only his own conception of that form; but that this form be assimilated to another extrinsic one, is accidental to the causality of art as such; therefore also to exemplar causality. And this reasoning proves concerning the knowledge of any other created object, whether particular, or universal or confused.

11. In God, however, a special reason can seem to intervene, because God does not know creatures to be made by Him except in His essence, and through His essence; and this is per se to Him. But nonetheless, although according to our mode of understanding the essence is like a medium for knowing creatures, nevertheless in the order of operation ad extra God does not per se operate as knowing precisely His essence, but as knowing the very creatures, which He is about to produce. And therefore that order according to reason, which is per se between the essence as known, and creatures as known, namely, that the essence is the reason for knowing creatures, with respect to the exemplar causality of creatures is remote and accidental. Therefore by reason of that [order], the essence as known cannot be called the extrinsic formal cause of creatures. Hence if it were true, as many think, that the divine essence is not the reason for knowing creatures as a medium or as a known object, but only as a mirror, or as a most eminent intelligible species, as far as exemplar causality is concerned, it would make no difference, for God could equally well produce creatures by His increate art, such as He conceived. Therefore that the knowledge of creatures is understood by us according to reason as arising from knowledge of the essence, as of a cause eminently containing creatures, is something remote, and quasi-accidental to exemplar causality. Especially since it was shown above that the essence as known precisely without creatures formally known,

cannot have the true nature of an exemplar, nor can there be understood another quasi-intermediate knowledge between the knowledge of the essence precisely and the knowledge of creatures in the essence, which is called knowledge of the essence as participable by creatures, because, as I was also saying above, this is nothing other than knowing creatures as participative of the essence (so to speak). It remains therefore that proper exemplar causality is not in some known object distinct from the effect, which is made according to its imitation; therefore its causality will not be formal, since it was said to pertain to that genus only on account of that objective or passive imitation.

12. Finally it is proved directly that exemplar causality pertains to efficiency. First indeed, because art is a principle of effecting; hence Aristotle, treating of causes, says that Polyclitus is the accidental cause of a statue, but the sculptor is the per se cause, because namely he formally signifies art, which is the per se principle of that effect. But art does not cause except through the mediation of an idea; for art teaches how to fabricate in the mind both the thing to be effected, and also the way and mode of executing it. And in this manner it is the principle of an artificial effect. Hence St. Thomas (III, q. 78, a. 2) says thus: "The artificial form is the likeness of the ultimate effect, toward which the intention of the artisan is carried, just as the form of art in the mind of the builder is the form of the house built principally, but of the building consequently." Therefore also the exemplar itself is compared to the artisan, as the proximate form through which he operates in his own way. Therefore just as the form of the agent pertains to efficient cause, insofar as it is to that [agent] a principle of acting, so also the exemplar, insofar as it is the form of the artisan, by which he operates, pertains to efficient cause. This is also confirmed by the common mode of speaking of philosophers and theologians; for thus they say that the external house proceeds from the house which is in the mind of the artisan, just as concerning health, we related above from Aristotle. And St. Thomas (Quodlibet 7,

art. 3) thus inquires: "The likeness of the known thing is in the knower in two ways: in one way, as caused by the thing, in another way as the cause of the thing, as is evident in the artisan, who knows the artificial product through that form, through which he makes it." From which he infers below that the ideal reasons existing in the mind of God are efficacious for knowing singulars of which they are the cause. He repeats the same in Quodlibet 8, art. 2; and Dionysius speaks in a similar way about divine ideas (ch. 5, On the Divine Names); and Augustine (City of God, bk. 12, ch. 25). For they call them effective of things. And for the same reason theologians say that God is the efficient cause of things through intellect and will; but intellect and knowledge do not cause ad extra except through an idea; therefore if knowledge is a principle of effecting ad extra, so also is the exemplar.

13. Hence it is confirmed; for three things concur in the action of an artisan: art, will, and executing power. But the will, as moving the executing power, pertains to the genus of efficient cause; therefore also art as directing and determining that [power]. But it directs and determines through the mediation of the exemplar; therefore the exemplar pertains to the same genus of cause. It is confirmed furthermore, because, just as a natural agent is completed in the nature of an acting principle through form, so an intellectual agent is completed in its order through an exemplar. For just as a natural agent through form contains the likeness of the effect, and is determined to that, so an intellectual agent through an exemplar has in itself the likeness of the effect, and receives a certain determination to that, at least regarding specification, for regarding exercise it is not determined through the exemplar alone, and therefore needs the will. Therefore the exemplar pertains to the genus of efficient cause as a form in its own way completing a certain genus of efficient cause, namely the intellectual or artificial.

14. You will say: by the same reasoning it could be said that the end does not constitute its own proper genus of cause, but completes a certain genus of efficient, so that it may be sufficiently

constituted for acting, namely an intellectual agent, which, unless it be moved or determined by an end, cannot act. It is answered by denying the consequence, because the end is not compared to the agent, as constituting it proximately apt for acting, but rather presupposes it so constituted, and moves it to act. But truly the exemplar does not presuppose [the agent] completely constituted regarding its peculiar mode of acting, namely artificial or intellectual. Then the end as such is compared to effects according to a certain peculiar mode of dependence which they have from that, insofar as they are for the sake of that; but the exemplar does not have a peculiar relationship per se to the effect, except only insofar as it directs or determines the action of the agent. Therefore, just as the will of the agent does not constitute per se a new genus of cause, but determines such a mode of acting, namely voluntarily, so knowledge, or art, or (which is the same thing) the exemplar does not constitute a new genus of cause, but completes a peculiar mode of effecting, namely artificially.

Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine

15. And from this another reason can be collected in passing, why Aristotle named the exemplar together with form; for the exemplar is a certain form not so much with respect to the thing to be effected through it, as with respect to the artisan himself, whom it informs in its own way and constitutes in his genus in act, so that he may be sufficient for acting. But if with respect to the exemplified thing the exemplar is called form, it is not on account of formal causality, which it has concerning that, but because it contains that in itself in some way by the mode of an image, or in representative being. But all images are accustomed to be called forms; hence also the fourth species of quality is called form and figure.

16. Second, it is also understood in passing that common distinction of threefold form: from which, by which, and toward which. For through these expressions neither three distinct forms are

signified, nor indeed three distinct formal causalities; but only three relationships, which can belong to the same form with respect to different things. For the same form of fire, insofar as it is the principle from which another fire proceeds, is called the form from which; insofar as it constitutes the generating fire itself in its being, it is called the form by which; insofar as the form in the generated is made toward its likeness, it can be called the form toward which. Hence that particle "from which" denotes the relationship of efficient cause; "by which" the relationship of intrinsic formal cause; "toward which," although it is considered to denote exemplar cause, nevertheless in reality it is equivocal. For fire properly generates fire toward its own likeness, and yet its form is not an exemplar. Hence through that particle in that form can be denoted the relationship of final cause, just as we related above from St. Thomas, that every natural agent acts for itself as an end, insofar as it acts to produce an effect similar to itself, in which it is preserved at least according to species, or in which its perfection is represented in some way, if we speak more generally about the agent. And according to this universal consideration, every form from which is also toward which, under a diverse aspect of extrinsic cause, and without formal causality. Therefore, so that the form toward which may be said peculiarly about exemplar causality, it must be understood as the form proximately regulating the effect toward which the proper intention of the agent is directed, and therefore it can be said according to whose norm the effect is made. Hence, just as the form from which is not so called because it exercises formal causality concerning the effect which is from it, but because it is the form of the cause itself, so, although the exemplar is called the form toward which, it need not be understood to be so called because it exercises formal causality with respect to that which is made according to its imitation, but with respect to the artisan whom it informs, unless form is said more broadly, not on account of causality, but on account of representation. But when we say the exemplar is the form of the artisan, it must be taken just as concerning the form of the

agent, for in a created artisan or agent it is truly a form; in the increate, however, it is only a form according to our mode of understanding, or it has whatever is of perfection in form, setting aside imperfection, that is, intrinsic causality or information.

17. Third, it can be understood from what has been said why exemplar cause is usually distinguished from efficient, if it too is efficient; for this also can be objected against our opinion; just as St. Thomas (I, q. 44), when in articles one and two he had shown that God is the efficient cause of all things, in article 3 he inquires whether God is exemplar cause. I say nevertheless that exemplar cause is not so much to be distinguished from efficient cause, as [to be placed] under efficient cause, or under those forms or conditions, which constitute a peculiar genus of efficient. As in the said example, after it is established that God is an agent cause, it is the same to ask whether He is exemplar, as to ask whether He is an agent through intellect, and whether He has from Himself whatever is necessary for that mode of causing. It is true however, if we attend to the force of names, that exemplar cause is not said of every agent which operates through an exemplar, but of the form alone, which has the power and nature of exemplar. For the artisan is not called the exemplar cause of the artificial product, but to have an exemplar, or to operate through an exemplar, because exemplar signifies quasi in the abstract the very form. But truly God, because through Himself He knows and represents all things, therefore He is simply called the exemplar cause of all things.

18. Finally, it is established from all that has been said that this genus of causality is found properly and intrinsically in intellectual agents alone, insofar as they operate something ad extra through their art or knowledge. Hence it is found most perfectly in God, indeed in Him alone is this causality with respect to all substances and all natural accidents, as was also touched upon above, because no intellectual creature can per se make anything of this kind through art, but at most accidentally, by applying active to passive. Hence only

concerning artificial things can proper exemplar causality be found in created agents. And with respect to those also God has the power and property of first exemplar cause, not only because the first exemplars even of those artifacts are in the divine mind, but also because through them He actually influences, and immediately in His genus with all inferior artisans. Indeed, under this aspect also all actions and effects of natural causes are immediately from the divine exemplar cause, and under that aspect or in that genus they have no other more proximate cause. For just as God immediately through His power concurs with all those actions, so through His ideas He directs them, and in this mode, just as God is the first and immediate cause of all actions in the genus of efficient and final cause, so also in the aspect of exemplar.

DISPUTATION XXVI

ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES TO THEIR EFFECTS

After having disputed concerning individual causes, it is necessary for the completion of this treatise to discuss certain matters that can be common to all, which will be conveniently done by comparing causes to effects (which we now undertake) and also among themselves (which we shall accomplish in the following disputation). Causes can be compared to effects either in perfection, or in sufficiency, or in duration, or in the relation of prior and posterior.

SECTION I.

WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS MORE NOBLE THAN ITS EFFECT

1. An effect can be compared in perfection either to its individual causes or to all taken together, and this either to[28] all absolutely, or to all of the same genus or nature.

[28] ad, 1960; 1619 om.

2. First, therefore, it is certain that an effect cannot exceed in perfection all its causes taken together. This is proven because there is nothing of perfection in the effect that it does not have from its causes; therefore, an effect can have nothing of perfection that does not pre-exist in some of its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in no way contain within themselves.

Comparison of Effect to Intrinsic Causes

3. Second, it must be said that if an effect is compared only to those causes of which it intrinsically consists, it cannot exceed in perfection all of those taken together as actually causing. This is to say that a composite substance, for example, which is the intrinsic effect of matter and form, cannot exceed in perfection that same matter and form taken together and united; for I added "actually causing" in order to include their union. And thus the assertion is easily proven, first, because that effect is not distinguished in reality from such causes taken together and actually causing, as I shall show below when treating material substance; therefore, there cannot be inequality of perfection between them.[29] Second, because the effect does not have perfection formally or entitatively from elsewhere except from those causes of which it intrinsically consists; therefore, it cannot exceed in perfection all of those with their causalities, because there is no source from which it would have that excess of perfection. You might object that many things belong to the composite that pertain to perfection and cannot be attributed to its intrinsic causes, such as existing per se, operating per se, as in living things it belongs to the composite to live, which belongs neither to matter nor to form. It is answered that these perfections do not belong to individual intrinsic causes taken per se, but they do belong to them as simultaneously and actually causing; whence it is only concluded that from the union or causality of these causes something more perfect arises than would be the aggregate (so

[29] eas, 1960; ea, 1619.

to speak) of these causes without union and causality among themselves.

4. From this, however, it is inferred and said third, that comparing the effect totally and absolutely to individual intrinsic causes, the effect is more perfect than any of them. This is clearly proven because it includes the total perfection of any of them, and moreover includes the perfection of the other, and moreover the perfection of their union among themselves. Likewise, if such an effect is a composite substance, it is evident that it is more perfect than matter; it has also been shown above that it is more perfect than form. Nor can this seem surprising, because such an effect does not have its entire perfection intrinsically from either of such causes taken per se, and therefore it can exceed any of them taken per se by reason of the other. But I said, if the total effect is compared absolutely according to the total perfection it has; for if comparison is made only secundum quid, precisely in that which the effect has from such a cause, it cannot exceed the perfection of the cause in that respect, since it can have nothing more from it than it contains in itself. Indeed, under that consideration the cause in some way exceeds, insofar as it is what communicates its perfection to another, and insofar as the effect depends on it under that respect. You might object: when this effect is some accidental composite, it is not always more perfect than the other cause taken per se, namely the material cause, which is the substance itself. It is answered that this composite also surpasses the substance itself at least in the perfection of the accidental form and its information[30]; for this is some perfection. But if it happens that this entire perfection is contained eminently in the substance alone, that will not be by reason of material causality, but by another superior reason. Whence that is per accidens to the comparison of the material cause as such to its effect, which we now make. Moreover, a further

[30] informatione, 1960; ratione, 1605 (J. Bta. Colosino). "En la edición de Juan Bta. Colosino y en otras aparece cambiada la palabra informatione por ratione, que juzgamos menos apropiada." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 81.

comparison could be made here between the material and formal causes themselves, insofar as one can be the effect of the other; but we shall better touch upon this comparison in the following section.

Comparison of Effect to Efficient Causes

5. Fourth, it must be said that an effect can never exceed in perfection all the efficient causes that concur to it, taken together; indeed, not even any of them that concurs to it as a principal and total cause in some genus; conversely, however, a principal efficient cause often exceeds its effect in perfection. This assertion in all its parts is easy, from what we have most extensively disputed concerning efficient cause. And the first part indeed is proven, because the total perfection of the effect flows from efficient causes; therefore, it cannot happen that there is some perfection in the effect that is not in some of the efficient causes in an equal or more noble way; therefore, the effect cannot exceed in perfection all its efficient causes taken together. You might object: besides efficient causes, the effect has others intrinsic to it; therefore, by reason of those it can exceed efficient causes in perfection. It is answered that the intrinsic causes composing the effect necessarily flow from some extrinsic efficient cause; and therefore it cannot happen that an effect, compared to its adequate efficient cause, has some perfection from its intrinsic causes that is not in the extrinsic or efficient cause in an equal or more noble way.

6. The other part, however, by which an effect is compared to individual efficient causes, is easily explained from the distinction of principal and instrumental cause. For an instrumental cause can be less noble than the effect, as was said above and noted by St. Thomas, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiunc. 1, ad 3, because the effect does not proceed principally from its power. But truly a principal cause can never be less noble, especially if it is complete and total in its genus; for concerning a partial cause the matter is more doubtful. Although speaking properly of intensive perfection, it is more probable that even

a partial principal cause is never intensively less perfect than its effect, because in this it differs maximally from an instrumental cause, and because such a cause, although it is partial on the part of action, nevertheless acts on the whole of that effect on the part of the effect; and therefore it cannot exceed the degree of its perfection, as was touched upon above. And hence a fortiori it is evident that when a cause is total and principal, it cannot be inferior in perfection to its effect, because it could not give it perfection that it did not have in itself. Among principal causes, however, some are univocal, others equivocal, as we said above; of these the latter are necessarily more noble than their effects, because since they are of different species from their effects, it is necessary that they do not contain their perfection formally and according to the same nature; therefore, it is necessary that they have it in a more eminent way, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and this is frequent among all philosophers. But truly a univocal cause, although it cannot be inferior to its effect, nevertheless it is not necessary that it exceed it; for it communicates its total perfection to what it produces in the same species; and therefore equality is found between them. But if you object with Augustine, lib. LXXXIII Quaestionum, q. 2, saying: "Everything that is made cannot be equal to that by which it is made," I respond first that this can be understood that an effect is never equal to its cause in all respects; for at least in the relation of dependence it is inferior; not however in absolute and intrinsic perfection. Or second, and perhaps more according to Augustine's mind, I respond that this is to be understood concerning that which is made by another as by a necessary principle on which it essentially depends; but an effect never has such dependence on a univocal cause, but on some superior one; and therefore concerning such an effect it is true that it can never arrive at equality with its cause.

7. From another source someone can object that when several principal causes per se subordinated concur to the same effect, even if each is total in its genus and degree, nothing prevents the effect

from exceeding the inferior or proximate cause, provided it does not exceed all the superior ones, because it suffices that the total perfection of the effect be in the total series of causes, although it may not be in individuals. And thus it happens that a less perfect brute generates another of a more perfect species; and more frequently it occurs that one man generates another of better talent, and thus more perfect in the individual. It is answered to the argument from what was said above, that no causes are per se and essentially subordinated in acting except the second and the first; for secondary causes among themselves do not have that so intrinsic subordination, although among secondary causes there are some universal and superior ones that in their own way assist inferior ones to their effects. Therefore, the first cause, when it acts with a secondary cause operating principally in its order, accommodates its action to the perfection and nature of such a cause, and therefore an effect can never exceed the perfection of a secondary cause, nor can any perfection flow from the first cause into the effect except through the second; otherwise in communicating that perfection the first cause would no longer be acting as concurring with the second, but by itself, as supposing some defect of the secondary cause. And in a similar way if sometimes an effect has some greater perfection than a particular univocal cause from the influence of the heavens, with regard to that perfection it does not proceed from the particular cause, at least not as from a principal one, but from heaven or another universal cause that in that effect plays the role of proximate principal cause.

8. Whence to the examples concerning animals, which seem to be generated in a more perfect species by others less perfect, either the assumption must be denied, because always at least one of the generators is equally perfect or more perfect in species; or certainly it must be said that such generators do not concur to that effect as principal causes, but as instrumental ones disposing the matter; but the generation is completed by virtue of some superior cause, as also happens in the production of a mixture that is generated from mutual

action and mixing of elements. Concerning individual inequality, however, if we hold that individuals of the same species are unequal only in accidental dispositions, as is the opinion of many, the response is easy; for the perfection of such disposition or complexion does not always come from proximate and univocal causes, but from other circumstances and especially from celestial influence, as is the concordant opinion of all philosophers. But if perhaps in the individuals themselves there is inequality of perfection, and a more perfect individual is generated by a less perfect one, it must necessarily be said that that excess of perfection also comes from the concomitance and concurrence of other causes, which, just as they help in more perfectly disposing the matter, so also in introducing a more perfect form individually. This matter is properly disputed in books on the soul, and well by Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 28, q. 16.

Comparison of Effect to Final Cause

9. Finally, it must be said that a final cause is not always more perfect than its effect; although, if the end is ultimate and the order to the end is right and according to the institution of nature, it is always more perfect than its effect or the thing ordered to the end. The first part is evident first by induction; for often someone exercises most noble actions for money, or human esteem, which ends are more imperfect. And the reason is because an end only moves an agent metaphorically to operating, and therefore it is not necessary that it contain the effect either formally or eminently, but it suffices that it have some nature of good under which it can move the will. The latter part is also evident by induction, for insofar as God operates for an end, it is clear that the ultimate end that he intends is more noble than other things procreated for such an end. Again, natural agents, since they do not operate for the ultimate end intended by God, also act for a more noble end. But if they are considered precisely insofar as they act from the natural impulse of nature, they operate in one of three

ways. The first is for the perfection of the individual or a suitable state, as when a stone is moved so that it rests in the center, or a brute so that it preserves life; and in this mode of operating the agent itself is the end of that action, and in some way ultimate, namely in that series; and thus it is evident that such an end is more perfect than such action, or the formal term of it. The second mode is when these agents act for the conservation of their species, as when fire generates fire, etc.; and then the end in some way is equally perfect, insofar as the form itself of the generated is called by Aristotle the end of generation; or insofar as the generator[31] itself is the end of its action, it is in some way a more perfect end, insofar as the common good of the whole species and its perpetuity is a more excellent good than one or another individual. The third mode is when these causes operate for communicating in some way the being they have, as when the sun illuminates, and the same is true of all influences of the heavens; for they do not act to conserve themselves, since they are incorruptible; therefore they act only to communicate themselves, or (which is the same) so that they conserve or perfect others. In this action if the proximate end of the action itself is considered, that indeed is less perfect than the agent itself, nevertheless that is not the end of the agent itself, but of the action alone; but if the ultimate end is considered, for which such agents can be said to act, that according to a certain nature or series is the good of the whole universe; but absolutely it is God himself, whom these agents imitate while they communicate themselves; and in both ways the end is something more excellent than that which is ordered to the end.

10. Finally, created intellectual agents, if they operate rightly and ordinately for an end, through their operations tend toward the true ultimate end, which is God, either expressly, or at least implicitly, insofar as they operate for virtue and honesty. In which they also in

[31] generans, 1960; genitum, 1605. "No nos parece aceptable la sustitución que se hace en la edición de Juan Bta. Colosino de generans por genitum. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 85.

some way operate for themselves, insofar as they operate for their proper perfection, not indeed stopping in themselves as in an ultimate end for whose sake they operate, but as in an end for which they procure that perfection. And thus the end that they ultimately intend is absolutely more perfect than everything they order to the end; for concerning God this is evident; concerning the agents themselves, however, insofar as they order something to themselves and are compared to it as an ultimate end in some series, it is also necessary that under that respect they be more perfect, for these agents are more perfect than their operations. But if they themselves are said to be for their operations, they do not so rest in them that they do not order them to themselves, so that they completely intend themselves in a perfect state; which can be called the intrinsic ultimate end of such action, not however absolutely ultimate, since that whole action either is referred or of itself tends to a further extrinsic ultimate end, which is God.

11. Sometimes, however, these agents can order other things more perfect than themselves, even God himself, to themselves as to an absolutely ultimate end; nevertheless that is a perverse order and alien to right reason, and to what the natures of things demand; and therefore I said in the conclusion if the order to the end is right from the very institution of nature. And in this way is to be understood what Aristotle said, that the end is the best of each thing; for he speaks of the ultimate end respectively, so to speak, that is, either absolutely, or secundum quid, in order to that of which it is the ultimate end. And the reason is because an ultimate end is desired for itself, and others for it; and therefore it is also loved more than the rest, according to that principle: "That on account of which each thing is such, that thing is more so"; and therefore if it is rightly and consonantly loved according to the natures of things, it is necessary that it be more lovable, and consequently a greater and more excellent good.

12. But it is otherwise concerning a non-ultimate end; for rightly and in most fitting order a more perfect thing can be ordered to

a less perfect one as to a proximate end, provided the whole series is referred to another ultimate and more perfect end, because then attention is paid not so much to the proximate end as it is lovable from its proper goodness and perfection, as to how it is lovable from relation to a more perfect end.

SECTION II
WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECT

1. The reason for doubting. The reason for doubting is that Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 2, without any distinction asserted that a cause in act is simultaneous with an effect in act; therefore it is not prior to it. But if you say that a cause in potency is prior to an effect in act, this certainly is nothing, both because this does not come from the nature of cause, but from the nature of potency and corresponding act; for thus a being in potency can also be called prior to a being in act. And also because the comparison is not rightly made; otherwise it could also be said that an effect in potency is prior to a cause in act; therefore it should be made proportionately; and in this way, just as a cause in act is not prior to its effect in act, but simultaneous, so neither is a cause in potency prior to an effect in potency. But if you further say that Aristotle was only speaking of simultaneity of time or duration, against this is first, because he distinguished nothing. Second, because in c. 11 of the same lib. V Metaph., enumerating various modes of prior and posterior according to nature, he does not mention that which is between cause and effect. Third, because cause and effect are said relatively; but relatives are not only simultaneous in time, but also simultaneous in nature. On the contrary, because every cause is a principle; but every principle, especially in created things, is in some way prior to that of which it is a principle, as was seen above. Whence

also Aristotle, in Postpraed., c. de Modis prioris, said that every cause is prior by nature to its effect.

2. This question, as was touched upon, can be understood concerning a twofold priority, namely, of time and of nature; and because the reasoning concerning them is different, it must be said of them individually, running briefly through individual causes, since one general response concerning all cannot be given. It must be considered, however, that it is one thing to inquire what belongs to a cause per se, namely, whether it is per se and necessarily simultaneous with or prior to its effect, but another what can belong to it, even if it is not necessary. Finally, we can speak of the thing that is a cause, either as it can be, or insofar as it is actually a cause.

The Question Is Resolved Concerning Final Cause

3. A final cause does not necessarily exist prior to its effect. Beginning therefore from final cause, it is evident from what was said above that it does not always require real existence for causing, but sometimes it can have it, when, namely, the end does not move so that it be made, but so that it be acquired, or accidentally perfected. Hence therefore it happens that some end, as to the thing itself that is the end, can be prior in real existence to its effect, yet this is not necessary, indeed not even that the end as actually causing exist simultaneously in time with its first effect, but only with the last; because that which is first in intention is last in execution. But if you object that Aristotle generally proclaimed that a cause in act is simultaneous with an effect in act, it must be answered that this is to be understood with proportion concerning a cause in act according to that being which is necessary for causing, and because in final cause it suffices that the end as actually causing be necessarily simultaneous with its effect, because it cannot actually move an agent unless it is apprehended.

4. Nevertheless it has priority of nature to its effect, as depending on it. Concerning priority of nature, however, final cause has nothing special beyond what is common to every cause, namely, that, insofar as an effect depends on it and it does not depend on the effect, it is prior by nature to it; concerning which priority of nature, what it is and how it is to be understood, we shall say more extensively below. And this priority of nature alone belongs per se to final cause. But other modes of priority of nature, which are either priority of perfection, or in consequence of subsisting, are not required per se in final cause; but how they can belong is sufficiently clear from what was said, both in the preceding section concerning the perfection of the end, and also in this assertion concerning its real existence.

The Question Is Resolved Concerning Material Cause

5. In the second place this matter can also easily be resolved in material cause; for concerning priority of existence, it belongs per se to this cause that it not be posterior in time to that effect which it causes. And concerning this, that pronouncement has truth in it: A cause in act is simultaneous with an effect in act. And the reason is because it cannot actually cause unless it actually really exists, as was proven above, and therefore it cannot happen that it be posterior in time to its effect. But it is not of the nature of this cause that the thing itself which causes be so simultaneous in time with its effect that it did not also exist before; for it can have existed before in time than such an effect, not indeed actually causing it, but as to the absolute entity itself of such a cause. And in this sense another pronouncement of Aristotle can have truth in this cause: A cause in potency is not necessarily simultaneous with its effect, but can be prior; for the comparison is made between the things themselves of cause and effect in order to actual existence; for it is not called a cause which can be, but which can cause. And in this way it is said of it that it is not always

simultaneous in real existence with its effect, but can be prior, which is manifest in this cause; for the matter of wood, from which fire can be generated, is a cause in potency of fire not yet generated, and is prior in time to it.

6. Matter cannot precede all its effects in duration. But it must be added that it is peculiar to this cause that, although it can be prior in time to any signified effect of its own, nevertheless it cannot be prior in time to every effect of its own collectively, understanding this which is maximally true in the material cause of substance; nevertheless, with proportion preserved, it will also be found true in the material cause of accidents. And the reason is because this cause is of such a nature that in no moment can it actually exist without also actually causing, because neither can matter naturally be without form, nor can substance capable of accidents be without every accident; and thus there is always given some effect of this cause equal to it in duration; therefore with respect to such an effect it is not prior in time. Yet that it be with respect to this determinate effect is accidental; for such matter could have been made under another prior form, and thus precede in time. I omit the matter of heaven, for which it is connatural always to be under such a determinate form; for this comes from a peculiar nature and connection; but now we speak from a general nature.

7. In how many ways matter is prior by nature to its effect. And hence it is easily understood in what way prime matter is prior by nature to its effect. For it can be said to be prior by nature in two ways, either from the intrinsic nature of causing, by reason of which an effect depends on it, but it does not depend on the effect. This will be easier to understand if matter does not depend on form as on a prior and as on its proper cause, as was touched upon above and will again have to be touched upon in the following disputation. Second, it can be said to be prior by nature on account of consequence of subsisting, which is to be explained according to what was just said concerning priority in existing. But truly, if prior by nature is taken by reason of perfection,

thus this cause is not absolutely prior by nature, but rather posterior, because it is less perfect than its effect. And this is the common opinion, which is most clear if comparison is made with respect to the whole composite, which is also the effect of the material cause. But if comparison is made with respect to form, I interpret it thus that in substances matter is understood to be absolutely posterior in perfection; but secundum quid excelling, namely, in the nature of subsisting or the mode of existing per se; for in this matter exceeds material form, which is its effect, because it sustains it. Whence such form in some way inheres in matter itself; but matter, since it is the first subject, cannot inhere in anything, but must exist per se, and in this we say this cause exceeds this its effect, which will be more evident from what will be said below concerning created subsistence. But truly in accidents the converse happens; for the material cause is absolutely more perfect than the effect, which is an accidental form, since the cause itself is substance; nevertheless secundum quid it is less perfect, insofar as it is compared as passive potency to its act.

What Is to Be Said Concerning Form in the Present Question

8. Form is always simultaneous in time with its effect. Third, it must be said concerning form that per se and from its nature it is never prior in time to its effect, nor even posterior, but simultaneous. Whence in this cause there is no place for it to be prior as a cause in potency than as an effect, because this cause is not prior in time as actually being and potentially a cause, than it is also actually a cause, because it does not exist prior in time or have real power of causing, than it actually causes, as Aristotle rightly taught, XII Metaph., c. 3. And the reason is manifest, maximally in those formal causes that in their being depend on matter, as are all except the rational soul; for such forms cannot naturally exist outside their subjects; therefore neither outside their composites; therefore neither can they exist

without their effect. In the rational soul, however, although there is not this necessity of dependence, there is nevertheless the connatural property of such a thing; for since its being is for composing a composite, its nature demands that it not be made except when there is actually a composite to be composed from it, and thus it is never naturally prior in duration to its effect, although it can afterwards endure when the effect ceases; in which it has a certain genus of priority as to consequence of subsisting, as I shall now say.

9. What reasons of priority of nature form receives with respect to its effect. Concerning priority of nature, however, if it is taken as to perfection, comparison has already been made above between form and composite, and we said that form is less perfect absolutely, in which sense it can be said to be posterior by nature to its effect; but with respect to matter it will be prior by nature, if however matter is to be called an effect of form. But if priority of nature is taken in consequence of subsisting, thus it is not necessary for form to be prior or posterior by nature to its effect, but they are simultaneous, because neither can the composite be without form, nor form at least naturally without the composite. I except only the rational soul, which although in some way it is simultaneous, insofar as it cannot be without sometimes also being man, nevertheless it is not absolutely convertible, because sometimes the soul can exist even if man is not; and according to that relation it can be called prior as to consequence of subsisting.

10. Whether form is prior to its effect in causality. Concerning priority of nature, however, which per se follows the nature of cause, it is difficult to explain how this belongs to this cause from its proper nature, omitting the peculiar condition of the rational soul. And the reason for the difficulty is because it seems impossible that form be prior by nature than it informs; therefore it cannot be prior by nature than its effect. The antecedent is clear, because it is not prior by nature in itself than in subject; for this is proper to subsisting form; therefore it is not prior by nature than it informs, and

consequently it is not prior by nature than the composite, because as soon as form informs matter the composite arises. Some respond that form informs prior by nature, yet it is not prior by nature than the composite, for being belongs prior to the composite, and through that to form, who a fortiori will say the same of matter. Nevertheless this response neither removes the difficulty nor contains true doctrine. For first Aristotle said not only that a cause causes prior by nature, but also that it is prior by nature than its effect. Then, if form informs prior by nature, in this very thing it is included that it be prior by nature, both because being is a transcendental predicate included in any real predicate; but informing is a real predicate; and also because informing is nothing other than by actuating to give proper being; therefore informing intrinsically includes being. Finally, if form informs prior by nature than the composite is, this is because the being of the composite arises from the information of form; but also the entity of the composite arises from the entity of form; therefore the entity of form is prior by nature than the entity of the composite; therefore form, just as it informs prior by nature, so it is prior by nature.

11. It can be responded otherwise that three things intervene here, namely, form to be, form to inform, and the composite to be or (which is the same) to be formed or constituted, which three are distinguished not only by reason, but also in some way from the nature of the thing, as can be evident from what was treated above. Therefore, form to be and to inform is prior by nature than the composite, because they are compared in some way as way and terminus, and as becoming and having become. And thus also in this genus of cause the general pronouncement of Aristotle has truth: A cause is prior by nature to its effect. This is true not only of the thing that is a cause in potency or in first act, but also of a cause in second act causing; because as such it exercises the action of cause and the effect depends on it, as we shall also explain in the agent cause. But form is actually causing insofar as it actually informs; therefore as such

it is prior by nature to the composite, which is its effect. Nor does the difficulty touched upon proceed against this, because rather from the fact that the composite results from the information of form it follows that the information itself and form as informing is prior by nature to the composite. But truly comparing the other two among themselves, namely, being and informing, it can be conceded that neither is prior by nature to the other in those forms that are made dependently on subject; for this seems to be intended and sufficiently proven by the difficulty touched upon, which being conceded satisfies. Nor does that principle oppose, that a cause is prior by nature; for Aristotle did not say that every cause is prior by nature than it causes, but he said that a cause is prior by nature to its effect; but this latter can be true, even if the former is not, for the very causing is prior by nature to the effect, as I said. But it does not seem necessary that causing be posterior by nature than the being of the cause, where the causing itself is not properly the effect of the being itself of the cause, but is the being itself communicated or united to subject, which union is the effect of an agent, just as the being itself of form, and is made simultaneously with the existence of form.

12. This response as to the former part concerning priority of nature with respect to the composite is true and satisfies optimally. As to the latter part, however, although it is probable, it is nevertheless not entirely proven to me, because it does not seem that it can be denied that the very causality of form is from it in some way, just as the causality of an agent is from the agent; whence just as an agent is not only prior by nature to its effect, but also to its action, in a different way however, for insofar as it is actually agent, it is prior by nature to the effect, but not to the action, because it is formally constituted actually agent through it, nevertheless insofar as it is actually being, it is at minimum prior by nature to its action, so it seems form is prior by nature than its actual causality, since this also is caused by it; therefore it is prior by nature than it informs. Whence this causal statement is true: Because form is, therefore it informs or causes the composite,

and this very thing was said by us above. Let us concede, therefore, that form is prior by nature than it informs.

13. To the difficulty placed above, however, it must be said that even if form, which by its nature depends on matter, is prior by nature than it informs, nevertheless it is not prior by nature in being in itself or per se than in matter, but only precisely (so to speak) prior by nature in being than in being in such a way, namely, informing matter. But if it is asked in that prior of nature how it is in itself or in another, it is responded first that it is not rightly asked concerning that prior of nature as if it were some instant in which form is and does not inform; for this priority of causality is not to be explained through a prior in which, but from which. For form is not called prior by nature than informing for any other reason except because informing in some way flows from being, although in reality, in no sign even of reason is form understood to be absolutely prior than it informs matter. But priority being thus understood, to the question asked it must be said that in that prior form is not in itself nor in another, but only is through such being that intrinsically demands to be in another, which matter we shall explain more extensively in the following disputation, treating how causes are mutually causes to each other.

A Question is Treated Concerning Efficient Cause

14. In the fourth place, it must be said that an efficient cause can, by its very nature, be prior in time to its effect as regards its absolute entity or power of acting, which Aristotle called a cause in potency or in first act; however, this is not always necessary. For the effect of such a cause can sometimes be equal in duration; but if such a cause is taken in second act, it is necessarily simultaneous in time with its effect, although it is simply and most properly prior by nature. The first part is proved, first by induction, for God, who is the first efficient cause of things, existed through eternity before he produced anything,

and the matter is manifest in the heavens and other secondary causes. The reason, moreover, is that this cause, properly speaking, does not need its effect in order to exist, nor does it have from elsewhere a necessary connection with its action. Hence, if sometimes there is some efficient cause that does not precede its effect in time, this is not from the precise nature of such a cause, but from some particular condition.

15. But this can happen in three ways (by which we prove the second part of the conclusion): first, if the efficiency is less proper through mere natural resultance, in the way that essence does not precede in time the properties flowing from it. Second, if the cause is naturally acting and from the first instant of its being has all the requirements for acting without any impediment, in the way that light produced by the sun can be coeval; third, if the cause is free, and as soon as it exists wishes to act, in the way that angels in the first instant in which they were created were able to do something; and God from eternity could have created something, if he had wished. In all these modes, however, it must be supposed that the effect ought to be such that it can be made through an indivisible action; for if it is to be produced successively, it will not be able to be entirely simultaneous with its cause, unless it is otherwise supposed that the cause itself also begins and exists successively or in the manner of successive things. Otherwise, a successive effect necessarily begins after some instant in which the cause is already supposed to exist, either from itself, like God, or through creation or generation, at least from the nature of the thing and setting aside miracles. For this reason, the motion of heaven could not be simultaneous in time with its mover, but the latter had to precede at least by an instant. I say setting aside miracles, because, if it is true that God could have created an angel through the ultimate non-being, it will also be true that such an angel could have simultaneously existed and moved heaven; but concerning this, elsewhere.

16. The third part of the conclusion, besides the authority of Aristotle, is self-evident, because a cause is in act through action; but

action is not without a terminus; moreover, the terminus of action is the effect of the acting cause; therefore, from first to last, an acting cause in act is not without its effect in act. Two things are included in this: one is that an effect cannot actually emanate from a cause without the cause itself simultaneously existing, which was proved above against some who said that an effect can actually emanate from a thing no longer existing, neither in itself nor in any of its power, which is plainly impossible and contrary to this doctrine of Aristotle, that a cause in act and an effect in act must be simultaneous. An effect in act is said to be not that which is actually a being through its actual existence, but that which is actually an effect, that is, which actually emanates from a cause; for that thing can actually exist and not actually emanate, but have emanated, and then it is clear that it can exist without a cause that then exists, although it presupposes that it was and caused. Second, it is included in that pronouncement that a cause cannot be temporally prior to being actually a cause than the effect is actually, because it is actually a cause insofar as it actually influences; but it cannot actually influence unless there is already something into which it influences. But it must be observed that an effect is simultaneous with a cause in act just as it emanates from it; for if it emanates entirely at once through a momentary action, it will be simply and according to its whole being simultaneous in time with its cause in act, because in such an effect (as they say) the becoming and the having become are simultaneous, and consequently the cause's acting and the effect's existing are also simultaneous. But truly, if the effect is made successively, the cause will also be in act successively, and then the effect will be simultaneous with the cause in act only in its becoming or according to something of itself.

17. One can only object that God from eternity was a cause in act, not only in the first way, but also in the second way, and yet there was no effect from eternity. But this objection has place only in the opinion of those who hold that the entire action by which God acts ad extra is immanent in God and eternal. According to which it must be

responded that this is peculiar to the action of the divine will, which is powerful not only to influence being into an effect, but also to influence for that time which it itself prescribes and not before, although it itself exists before. Those who think thus will speak better if they say that that immanent act or volition of God does not constitute him as actually acting ad extra, except insofar as it actually influences, and as such connotes the coexistence of the effect. But for us the response is easier; for we deny that God is a cause actually acting ad extra through an act remaining only in himself, but through an action passing outside, which is not temporally prior to the effect.

18. Finally, the last part concerning priority of nature is established first from the general opinion of Aristotle, that a cause is prior by nature to its effect, which priority is nothing other than the dependence of the effect on the cause and the independence of the cause from the effect; but this dependence on the part of the effect and independence on the part of the cause is most clearly seen in the efficient cause, as we will declare more broadly in the following disputation. And therefore I said that the efficient cause is not only prior by nature, but this also belongs to it most properly; because the efficient cause most requires existence for causing and according to it is entirely independent from its effect. It must be considered concerning this priority of nature that there can be discourse about the efficient cause, either as it is actually efficient, or according to itself, that is, as it is in first act proximately disposed to acting. Again, it can be compared either to its proper effect, or to its action or causality. Therefore, by comparison with the effect, a cause in act is simply prior by nature, even as actually acting, because action itself is prior by nature to its terminus. But truly, by comparison with action itself, a cause in second act cannot be prior by nature, as Soncinas well noted, V Metaph., q. 7, because it is formally constituted as an agent in second act by the action itself; therefore it cannot be prior by nature to the same action. With respect to action, therefore, a cause can only be said to be prior by nature insofar as it is considered in first act.

19. You will say that in this way it is prior not only by nature, but also in time. It is responded that, if we speak of a cause in first act sufficient and unimpeded and with all requirements for acting, this is not so except perhaps in free potency, in which this is special. Then it is said that, even if temporal priority precedes, priority of nature can also intervene for that very instant in which action and the acting cause are already simultaneous in duration; and thus also a free cause is not only prior to its action at that time when it does not operate, but also for that instant in which it operates it is also prior, at least by nature; and therefore it can be free for that very instant, as we said above. And the reason is that action itself emanates from first act, yet it does not emanate through a mediate action, but through itself; and therefore it is posterior by nature to the cause in first act, but not to the cause in second act.

Arguments Posed at the Beginning are Satisfied

20. The Aristotelian axiom is explained. From what has been said, the reason for doubting posed at the beginning is solved, and the proposition of Aristotle is explained: a cause in act and an effect in act are simultaneous. For he speaks openly of a cause actually causing, and of an effect in act in the character of an effect, as we have explained, and of simultaneity of time, not of nature, as is openly clear from the context. Hence it matters not that he does not there distinguish with express words, both because the matter itself is sufficiently clear, and also because in the very context, as I said, it is sufficiently declared; especially since the Philosopher himself, in the Postpredicaments, says that those things are said to be simultaneous simply which are simultaneous in time. And in the same way must be taken what Aristotle says in the same place, that a cause in potency is not simultaneous, namely in time, with its effect; for he calls, as I said, a cause in potency, not the thing itself which is a cause, as existing in potency, but a thing actually existing and in potency to causing; and of

this he denies that it is simultaneous in time with the effect, not because it cannot be, but because this is not necessary.

21. To other arguments against priority of nature, response is made. To the first it is said, first, that it is sufficient that Aristotle in the Categories posited this mode of priority of nature; for in Metaphysics V he does not seem to have repeated all the modes of priority posited elsewhere. Or it can be said that this priority of nature was comprehended under that which is in the consequence of subsisting; for a cause is said to be prior by nature to its effect by reason of causality, insofar as that which depends, as such, cannot exist without that on which it depends, in which it has the character of the posterior; conversely, that on which another depends, as such, is independent from it, and by virtue of this independence can exist without it; but if perhaps it depends from elsewhere, this is accidental on account of another causality. And thus causality is said to be priority of nature insofar as it virtually includes priority in the consequence of subsisting, either absolutely, or at least as far as concerns that respect.

22. To the last point about relation, I have often said already in this treatise on causes that we do not care about predicamental relations consequent upon causality; for, whether those are real or of reason, they are posterior to causality and have their proper consideration and placement in the category of relation. Therefore, cause and effect are not here taken as they can formally speak of predicamental relations, in which sense it is true that they are simultaneous not only in time, but also by nature, if they are taken as relation and actually a terminus; but there is discourse about cause and effect as regards the act of causing and being caused; and thus they are not simultaneous by nature, even if they include a transcendental relation, because this does not require simultaneity of nature between the extremes, as is known per se in many other things.

SECTION III
WHETHER THERE CAN OR OUGHT TO BE SEVERAL CAUSES OF THE SAME EFFECT

1. The title of the question is explained. Under this title many things are comprehended which must be distinguished and briefly dispatched. For there can be discourse either about causes of different genera, or about causes of different order or species in the same genus, or about causes of the same nature and species in the same genus. Again, the question can be about total causes in their order, or about partial ones; a total cause is one that provides the entire concurrence necessary for the effect in that order; partial, on the contrary, is said to be one that by itself alone does not confer sufficient and entirely necessary concurrence. Furthermore, it is one thing to ask whether several causes are necessary for an effect, in which is simultaneously inquired both the connection of the effect with the causes and the connection of the causes themselves among themselves in order to causing the effect; but another thing is to ask whether several causes can converge for causing the same effect, even if it is not necessary. Finally, this must be considered: when inquiry is made about the influence of several causes into one and the same effect, inquiry is not made about the unity of the effect as regards the relation of effect, that is, whether such an effect is referred to several causes by one and the same respect; for this question is of little moment and has its proper place in the category of relation. Nor is inquiry made about the unity or identity of the causality of several causes into the same effect, but inquiry is made about the very being or absolute entity of the effect, whether several causes can or ought to influence into it, whether each influences by a distinct influx, or not; for this must be judged from the mode of the causes and from the principles posited above concerning

the causalities of individual causes, as will also easily be established from what is to be said.

The Question is Dispatched in Causes Different in Genus

2. First, therefore, concerning causes of different genera, it is certain that there are some effects to which causes of all genera must necessarily concur, if they are properly and per se effects. Such are especially all natural substances, of whose nature it is that they are composed from form and matter, and thus already two causes concur there; but matter cannot exist per se, unless it is made by something; nor does it have form, unless some agent induces it; but the agent does not induce it, unless it intends some end, and thus it is necessary that the other two causes also concur. Whence it happens that the same concurrence of causes is necessary, both for matter and for material form or matter informing, yet not in the same way, both because neither matter causes itself, nor form; and also because matter concurs differently to form than to the composite, and conversely, and so concerning others, as is sufficiently clear from what precedes. The same concurrence of causes is proportionally necessary so that any accident is caused per se in a connatural way, because it is not made except from a subject, by some efficient thing, for an end. I said, however, if it is properly and per se an effect, because in a contingent and per accidens effect, as such, there is neither a final cause nor properly and per se an efficient one; yet that, as such, is neither an effect per se, nor properly one effect, but an aggregation of several in whose individuals the aforesaid causes are found. But truly, in simple or immaterial substances alone, only two causes concur, namely, efficient and final, because they do not have a material one, nor can they have a formal one, unless perhaps someone might call a metaphysical form a cause; but we showed above that this is not properly and physically a cause.

3. No effect depends on a single cause. From these things it is understood, first, that there is no effect in the nature of things that has only one cause, speaking formally. For first, it is necessary that whatever is caused has an efficient cause, as is clear both from the induction made, and also because what is caused does not have being from itself; therefore it must have it given by another extrinsic cause; but a cause that really influences being, as an extrinsic cause, is efficient. Then, because everything caused has a final cause; for this is the first of causes; but whatever has a final cause also has an efficient one, as Averroes taught, lib. de Substantia Orbis, c. 2, because the final cause is that for the sake of which the agent operates. Hence we showed above that the causality of the end is exercised first and per se concerning some action of the agent. And conversely, an efficient cause also per se operates nothing, unless a final cause also concurs for the sake of which it operates; these two causes therefore are at minimum necessary and have between themselves a necessary connection, in the way we declared above how every agent operates for the sake of an end. I said, however, speaking formally, because where it happens that the efficient and the end coincide in entirely the same thing, the effect will indeed be able to be really from one cause alone, as exercising nevertheless a double reason of causing, according to which two causes are formally denominated. And in the same proportion, those who count the exemplar as a distinct cause will say it has connection with the efficient and the end, at least by reason of the first agent, according to what was declared above.

4. You will say that some thing can be understood to exist from itself for the sake of another end, even if it is not from another efficient cause, so that the adequate notion of an end is not to be that for the sake of which something is made, but that for the sake of which something either is made or exists. And thus they think that Aristotle felt about some things, that they have a final cause and not an efficient one, concerning which matter we partly spoke above, and partly we will speak below. Now, as regards what pertains to the present matter,

it is first impossible that a thing which exists from itself exists for the sake of another thing from itself; for what exists from itself also exists for the sake of itself, because such a being is entirely perfect, nor is there reason why it should have being ordered to another, if it has that from itself. Then, even if such an order were feigned, it would not be through proper causality of an end with respect to the very being of such an entity, because such being would be simply necessary from itself, since it is supposed not to need an efficient cause; therefore it does not depend on another also as on a final cause, because otherwise, that being removed, it would lose its being, which is repugnant to a simply necessary being. Hence neither in operating could it depend on another as on an end, because as the being is, so also is the operating. Therefore these two causes at minimum are required for any effect.

5. Second, it follows from what was said that no effect has an intrinsic material cause that does not have all the others, nor does it have an intrinsic formal cause that does not have the rest, and finally, intrinsic material and formal causes have a necessary connection, not only among themselves, but also with the efficient and the end. All these things are clear and certain from what was said, because matter and form under the aforesaid notion have among themselves a mutual relation or transcendental relation, because neither matter causes intrinsically except through the complex of form, nor form except through the information of matter, and thus one cannot cause intrinsically without the other. I say, however, intrinsically, because insofar as matter causes form itself, it does not cause so much intrinsically, and therefore as such it does not require form as co-causing itself, but only as caused, and consequently as co-causing the composite. But truly, each of these causes, and both also simultaneously, have connection with the efficient, and consequently also with the final, because both matter, and form, and also the composite from them is a being so imperfect that it cannot have being from itself, and therefore, just as neither of these causes is without the

efficient, so neither does it cause without the efficient; but the efficient, as has often been said, per se does not effect without the concurrence of the end.

6. Why material and individual other causes are called total. Finally, it is understood from what was said how these causes are said to be total, although none of them by itself alone suffices for the effect. For they are total in their genera, because each in its genus suffices and applies all the causality necessary in that order, and because each has its causality of a different nature from another and they do not compose one integral cause, therefore each absolutely exists as a total cause. You will say: at least it follows that each of these causes is imperfect in the absolute and common notion of cause, even if each is said to be perfect in its genus. The consequence is clear, because each of them is absolutely insufficient for the effect to be constituted in the nature of things without the partnership of others. But the consequent is false, otherwise God also would be something imperfect in the notion of cause. It is responded, first, by absolutely denying the consequence because of the instance concerning divine causality. Second, it is added: the consequent is true in every other cause besides God; I declare the reason of both statements thus. For first, material and formal causes are simply imperfect, both because they do not cause except by composing, which mode is imperfect from its genus; and also because since both cause as it were by giving their very entity for constituting the entity of the effect, neither by itself alone is sufficient for this, because each has imperfect and incomplete entity, so that from the conjunction of both the complete entity of the whole effect may arise. Finally, each gives something proper, which the other can in no way confer. For these reasons, therefore, both are simply imperfect.

7. Final cause and efficient are purely perfect from their genus. But the final and efficient cause, as such, indicate no imperfection neither in the mode of causing, nor from the fact that other causes sometimes concur with them. In creatures, however, they

always have some imperfections mixed in, as regards the mode indeed, because they either operate with change or mutability, or for their own advantage, or something of this sort. As regards the need of other causes (which pertains to the present matter), because every created efficient cause needs a material cause in order to be able to effect, which is of imperfection, both because of the limited mode of acting, and also because the very matter which they suppose is in no way from them. Again, they need some final cause outside themselves; for, although they operate for the sake of themselves, nevertheless it is necessary that they also operate for the sake of another, at least as an ultimate end. And besides, they need the concurrence of a superior cause in the notion of an efficient of superior nature. And in similar proportion, every created end has imperfection in causing, on account of which and on account of its limitation, it needs both some distinct efficient and some concurrence of matter or subject, in order to be able to have some effect.

8. But truly in God alone is causality without imperfection; for first he absolutely does not need the concurrence of matter or form for effecting. Then, when these causes are necessary in some effect, even if it is made by God, none of them concurs as simply supposed to the causality of God, but as made and conserved by him himself. And besides, the necessity of such causes is not from defect of the power of God, otherwise God would not give being also to the causes themselves, but is from the intrinsic need of the effect, whose nature is that it consists of such causes. Whence it also happens that such causes, insofar as they concur to the effect of God, concur more as his effects than as co-causes with him, so much so that the very causalities of such causes cannot be exercised unless God effects them. Again, God needs the accompaniment of final cause for causing effectively in such a way that he does not need an end distinct from himself, because he himself is the ultimate end of all his actions. But if sometimes he wishes to order his action to another proximate end, this also is not from need, but from his perfection and will, and besides, such a

proximate end could not be an end unless it received from God the perfection and goodness by which it could undertake that office. And similarly, conversely, in order that God may cause through the mode of an end, he does not need the partnership of another agent but of his own power, to omit that in those very genera of end and efficient God has supreme independence. Thus, therefore, it happens that the concurrence of several causes to one effect does not diminish the perfection of God in the absolute notion of causing, even if in inferior causes that is an indication of imperfect power.

The Question is Treated in Causes of the Same Genus Different in Species

9. Several matters of the same effect cannot exist. In the second place, it must be said concerning several causes of the same genus, yet of different nature or order in such a genus. And this can be briefly dispatched, because the matter is very easy. For it must be said that in material and formal cause several causes cannot concur in this way to the same effect; but in efficient and final, they can. The first part concerning matter is proved, because matter does not concur except by receiving form; but two matters of different nature, either in being or in causing, cannot concur for receiving the same form, because neither can the same form be received in several matters; but if several matters receive several forms, they no longer concur to one effect, but to several.

10. You will say that, although the reason made concludes with respect to substantial forms which depend on matter, it does not however with respect to the rational soul, because several matters concur with the same soul for composing the same man, either simultaneously by reason of different parts, or successively on account of the continuous change of matter. It is responded that because of the diversity of parts there are not properly several matters, but one adequate one, consisting of several parts, especially since neither can

those parts be informed by the same soul, unless they are united and conjoined among themselves in some way for composing one adequate receptive subject. I add, furthermore, that insofar as those several partial matters concur to one effect, to that extent the very effect is manifold and varied according to parts. Hence, to the other part concerning the successive change of matter, it is responded that that effect is indeed one by reason of the soul, yet from that part by which the matter is varied, the effect is also in some way varied, as was treated above, disp. V.

11. You will say again that, although this is true in substantial effect, it is not however in accidental. And the reason for the difference is that the proximate material cause of substantial form does not have another in which it is founded, because it is itself the first subject, and therefore only one material cause of one form and one composite can exist; but truly an accidental form can immediately have some material cause which needs another matter in which it is sustained, because, as we said above, an accident can immediately inhere in an accident. Thus, therefore, the same accident will be able to have two material causes, one proximate and another remote, as the same intellection, for example, is caused materially by the subject in which it is received and by the substance of the soul. It is responded, first, that that remote subject does not properly concur per se to the ultimate act, but only by sustaining that accident to which another inheres, and thus the assertion posited above is to be declared or limited concerning the immediate and per se material cause. But if someone wishes to defend that the same accident, for example, the same vital act, immediately affects both subjects, both the proximate and the radical, it is necessary that he say that those two then concur through the mode of one adequate receptive subject, and each concurs only partially, but the conclusion is to be understood concerning total causes.

12. Several forms of the same effect cannot exist, not even supernaturally. Now concerning formal cause the assertion posited is

more evident, because several forms cannot converge for constituting the same effect. For as regards substantial forms, it was shown above that several cannot exist simultaneously in the same matter; although they may exist successively, they do not compose the same effect with it, but diverse ones, because they attribute formally different being. Hence, although by absolute power several forms were simultaneously in the same matter, they would not concur to one effect, but each would constitute its own species and its own effect. But as regards accidental forms, although several can simultaneously exist in the same subject, they do not however concur to the same effect, but each has its own proper and distinct effect. Nor does it matter that sometimes a composite from such forms is denominated in some way one, as one artificer, even if he has several arts specifically distinct, for that singular denomination is taken from the unity of the subject subsisting in those forms; hence it does not formally fall into the effect of such forms, for that indeed is not truly one, but falls into the very supposit, insofar as one and the same underlies all those forms or accidents. Finally, if sometimes perhaps several forms, either accidental or even substantial, are said to concur for constituting one thing, they do not effect this as total forms, but as partial ones, as the form of blood, flesh and bone for constituting an animal, and color, figure, etc., for constituting a beautiful thing, or if there is anything else similar. Always, therefore, such forms concur as composing one, nor is there greater unity in the effect than there is proportionally in the form; therefore several formal causes never concur to the same effect.

13. But truly in efficient and final causes, if they are of different natures and subordinated among themselves, the matter is manifest from those things which we have discussed concerning these causes. For several such causes can concur to the same effect; and when an effect is from a created cause, this is always necessary because of the dependence of the particular cause.

SECTION IV
WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN BE SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES OF THE SAME GENUS AND SPECIES

1. It remains therefore to speak about the third point, which is principally intended in this section, namely, concerning several causes of the same genus and species or order within that genus. And, in order that we may immediately approach the point of difficulty, intrinsic causes, both material and formal, must be excluded, for in these this question has no place, as is evident a fortiori from what was said in the second point of the preceding section. The question therefore has place in efficient causes, and there is nearly the same reasoning concerning final causes, as we shall add at the end; and we shall show the same thing must be said about any cause, insofar as it is extrinsic. Again, the difficulty concerns total causes in their order; for concerning partial causes there is no difficulty, because it is established that many natural effects come from several proximate partial efficient causes, as the same son from father and mother, supposing the mother concurs efficiently, and the same light or heat from many lamps or fires, and so forth concerning others. And the reason is that when causes are only partial, from all of them arises only one total and sufficient cause; therefore nothing prevents several causes from concurring in that manner, because those are not so much several causes as several parts of one cause. For it is not necessary that a total cause be so one that it is either simple, or composed per se and properly through real union of partial causes, but it suffices that it coalesces from several mutually assisting each other in acting, and sufficiently conjoined or approximated, so that they can influence in their partial manner. Therefore in this part there is no difficulty.

2. Concerning total causes, however, a twofold question still turns. One is whether the same effect can simultaneously and conjointly proceed from several causes. The other is whether at least successively or separately the same effect can be made by various causes, that is, whether what is made by one would be the same numerically by another, if it were applied to the same matter at the same time. We shall speak first about the former question, and then about the latter.

The First Opinion Denying this is Altogether Possible

3. There is therefore a first opinion teaching that it is so impossible for several causes to concur simultaneously in that manner to the same effect, that it implies contradiction, and therefore cannot be done even by absolute power. Thus Scotus opines, In III, dist. 1, q. 2, and In II, dist. 20, q. 2. And many Thomists feel the same, who while they say this is impossible, add proof by inferring implication of contradiction; thus Caiet., III, q. 67, a. 6, near the end; Soncin., V Metaph., q. 6; and Capreol., In II, dist. 20, q. unica, a. 3, ad argumenta Scoti contra 3 conclus., and In III, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad argumenta Scoti cont. 2 conclus.; and Ferrar., III cont. Gent., c. 68; and Iavel., V Metaph., q. 7. And this opinion is customarily attributed to St. Thomas in this sense, because sometimes he says absolutely that this is impossible, as in I, q. 52, a. 3, and III, q. 82, a. 2, ad 2, and In I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 3, and V Metaph., c. 2; and Marsil. feels the same, I de Generat., q. 8. And I do not doubt that this was the opinion of those philosophers who thought that to be simply impossible which cannot be done through natural causes, concerning which we shall speak immediately.

4. Foundation of the Proposed Opinion. This opinion is founded first, because it is against the nature of a total cause to have partnership with another in the same order, for a total cause is that

which acts with the whole power necessary in that order for such an effect; therefore it is repugnant to a total cause as such to have partnership with another similar cause in the effecting of the same effect. The consequence is evident, because by the very fact that it has another cause concurring, it no longer applies the whole necessary power. Or certainly if it applies the whole power, and nevertheless another also exhibits its own, more power is actually applied to that effect; therefore a greater effect will also proceed, and consequently it will be made by those as by partial causes and by neither as total. For it seems to involve manifest repugnance that a more powerful cause should operate according to its whole power in act, and yet not operate more than if a less powerful cause alone were to effect it. And this is confirmed secondly in this manner, for if one cause effects an effect as a total cause, therefore either the other does nothing, and so it is falsely said to be a cause; or it acts upon what is already in act, and this is impossible, because to act is to lead from non-being to being, for, as Aristotle testifies, all action occurs between these terms; but what is already in act from one cause is already outside non-being; therefore it cannot be made by another. Third, this same thing is confirmed because otherwise one total cause could produce a thing not only simultaneously and at the same instant, but also at a later time, after it had already been produced by another, which is against the nature of production, as we have said. Whence it would further follow that the same thing could produce itself, because if it could not, it would be maximally because being is presupposed for acting; but even if a thing already exists, it can be produced again by another cause; therefore also by itself.

5. Fourth, it is impossible for the same action to be from two total causes; therefore also the same effect. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reasoning, and also because one effect cannot be made except by one action. The antecedent is proved, because action depends altogether essentially on the agent; therefore one and the same action cannot simultaneously depend on several

agents and on each as total. Whence there is a fifth and common reason, because otherwise it follows that such an effect depends and does not depend essentially on those causes, which is a contradiction. The inference is evident, for that it depends is asserted in the very fact that each of those is said to be a per se and total cause, for a per se cause is that on which the effect depends per se, and a total cause is that on which it depends totally. That it does not depend, however, is proved, for if this one is taken away, the effect will nevertheless remain from the influence of the other, since it is said to be a total cause; therefore it does not depend on this one. Again, if this one remains, although the other is destroyed, the effect will remain; therefore it also does not depend on the other; therefore it depends on neither. But if it is said to depend on either confusedly or disjunctively, therefore in fact neither of them taken determinately and per se is a total cause, because the effect does not depend on either of them taken determinately. Sixth finally I argue, because if the concourse of such causes does not absolutely repugnant, neither will it repugnant naturally, which this opinion supposes to be altogether false.

The Second Opinion Affirming This Even Naturally

6. The second opinion can be extremely contrary, that it neither implies contradiction, nor speaking per se from the nature of the thing, is it repugnant for two total causes of the same order to simultaneously effect the same effect. I say speaking per se, because perhaps on the part of antecedent conditions necessary for acting, two causes cannot according to the order of nature be so applied that they simultaneously and totally effect the same effect; nevertheless, per se and from the force of causality even natural, it is not repugnant. For if two agents are so applied to some patient as is necessary so that each can totally effect some effect, both will also simultaneously and in the same manner effect it. And Cajetan seems to hold this opinion, I, q.

52, a. 3, where, although he interprets St. Thomas as saying that one effect cannot be from two total causes, understanding this not of logical but natural power, nevertheless in his discourse he so explains that he places that natural repugnance only in the application of causes; but truly from the hypothesis that causes are applied, he openly teaches that the effect will naturally emanate simultaneously from those as from total causes.

7. Foundation of the Proposed Opinion. This opinion can be founded on the last argument made for the prior opinion, taking the contrary principle in this manner. It does not imply contradiction to grant two total causes of one effect; therefore if two fires, for example, were equally applied to the same matter disposed in the same manner, they would naturally act as much as they could; therefore they would act one and the same effect, because we suppose the same matter is not simultaneously capable of several; then however each would act as a total cause, because we suppose each to have sufficient principle for effecting that whole effect, and each would naturally act as much as it could; therefore each would produce the whole effect as its total cause, since from elsewhere no repugnance is adjoined. And this is confirmed, for then either each fire would act or neither, because there is no greater reason for one than for the other; but it cannot be said that neither would act, because nothing prevents them; for since they are similar in power, one does not impede the other; but we suppose no other impediment intervenes; therefore each acts and with its whole power, and thus as a total cause.

8. And hence it can be concluded not only in the aforesaid sense, but absolutely that it can naturally happen that the same effect proceeds from two total causes, because that supposition, namely, that two sufficient agents are simultaneously and equally applied to the same effect, there is no reason why it should naturally be repugnant. For Cajetan adduces no other reason except that nature abhors superfluity. But this is not sufficient, first, because, although nature abhors superfluity, it does not however abhor abundance, nor must

what is simply not necessary always be called superfluous. It would indeed be superfluous to require two causes where one suffices; nevertheless, that nature should have been so provident as to confer sufficient power for the same effect on several causes, should be called not superfluous but rather liberal. That those two causes should concur simultaneously, although it may not have been intended by nature per se primarily, can nevertheless be permitted and contingent, since it has nothing repugnant to the natures of things. Second, nature abhors a monstrous effect more than superfluity, and yet sometimes it does not refuse it, if the order and concurrence of natural causes brings it forth; why therefore cannot the same be said about the multitude of total causes? Third, although nature so abhors superfluity, nevertheless a free cause does not always abhor it; therefore two angels can according to their will apply their whole power to moving a stone, and then each will move as a total cause. The same can be said of two men, if each has the whole power sufficient for carrying a stone, and both simultaneously according to their judgment apply that whole power. And this opinion is customarily attributed to Ockham and Adam, whom Capreolus, In III, dist. 1, reports from In I, dist. 1, dub. 4; but I find nothing there and the allegation is ambiguous, because there is no dub. 4 there, but various questions, and neither in the 4th nor in others do they say anything.

Approval of the Third Opinion & Resolution of the Question

9. Among these opinions I think a middle way should be held: it should be said first that it does not imply contradiction that the same effect should come from two total causes. As to this part, Cajetan's opinion pleases, which he also suggests III, c. 3, a. 6. Nor can it be better proved than by responding to the prior arguments; for if there is nothing that proves contradiction, there will be no reason why it should be believed or asserted. On the contrary indeed, since God

can do everything in which repugnance is not shown, He will also be able to make two total causes effect the same effect. And this is briefly declared in this manner, for God can, with this sun existing in this hemisphere, create another equally perfect and equally applied to illuminating. Again He could through another sun effect in the air the same light numerically, which this present sun now makes separately, that is, with this sun not concurring nor assisting; for what repugnance is there, that God should make through one cause what He can make through another? Indeed rather I shall show in the following point that this can be done even naturally. Therefore with these two luminous bodies existing simultaneously and applied, God can provide to each the whole concourse necessary for producing the same light and make each of them produce it by its own proper action, total and independent from the other, which is to be properly a total cause; for no repugnance intervenes in this, as will easily be evident from the solutions of the arguments.

10. What Belongs to the Nature of a Total Cause. To the first, the assumption is denied, namely, that it is against the nature of a total cause to have another similar and equally influencing the same effect. For although it is necessary for a cause to be total that it actually operate with the whole power necessary in that order for the effect, nevertheless this is not taken away or impeded from the fact that another cause acts with similar power and action, but each will exercise its whole force and action concerning that effect. When it is inferred that then greater force is actually applied and consequently the effect increases, a distinction must be used concerning greater power, either intensive or extensive. And concerning intensive, the assumption must be denied, because several equal agents in intensive power per se speaking do not compose one of more intense power or efficacy, but that multitude can only contribute to a more intense effect when neither agent could act according to the whole intensity on account of some impediment, as has been treated at length above. In the present case however we suppose individual agents act

according to the whole intensity possible to them, or certainly that God does not provide concourse for a more intense effect, but up to a certain degree which can be made by individuals, and to give to each the whole necessary concourse. Therefore the acting power does not increase intensively as such, and therefore it is not necessary that the effect increase intensively. Nevertheless that power can be called greater extensively, which is not so much to be greater as to be more powers; nevertheless it does not necessarily follow from this that the effects also are several, because at least from the direction of the first agent the influence of each second cause can be determined to the same effect, since there is no repugnance in this from the force of multitude or plurality of acting powers; for just as several ways tend to the same terminus, so also several acting powers can tend.

11. The Manner Which Several Causes of the Same Order Concurring to the Same Effect Would Observe. To the second and third it is responded that when two total causes would so act the same effect, one would indeed act the whole with total action, and the other would not act nothing, but would act that same whole effect by another total action. But those causes can be understood to effect in two modes: first, that they begin to effect altogether simultaneously and in the same instant, and thus neither properly speaking acts upon what is in act, because neither acts before the other, neither in time nor in nature. For we suppose them to be equal and not subordinated among themselves, but having themselves merely concomitantly; therefore neither supposes the effect of the other as already made, either prior in time or nature; therefore neither acts upon what is in act, but each acts the same thing that the other acts, leading it from non-being to being, and this was sufficient for our conclusion. In another mode it can be understood, that one of these causes first in time produced that effect, and afterwards the other begins to effect the same by total action. And indeed, if the prior has already ceased from its action, there is no difficulty nor is it the case about which we dispute, because those two causes do not concur simultaneously to

the same effect, but successively, the prior as effecting and the posterior as conserving; which I shall also say below can happen naturally. It is necessary therefore to posit that with the prior agent continuing in its total action through the mode of conservation, another begins to effect the same effect, and we also say this is not repugnant. For to effect extends more broadly than to produce anew, because also to conserve is to effect. That agent therefore could effect the same effect anew by conserving it; which action although it could have been production, nevertheless then in that case it cannot receive that denomination, because production as such connotes on the part of the effect a certain negation of prior existence. Although therefore it is repugnant to act upon what is in act, that is, to produce anew what preexists, nevertheless it is not repugnant to conserve what has been made. Nor does it also hinder that it is conserved by another cause, because just as in the beginning it could be made by two, so afterwards it can be conserved by two, although it was previously produced by one alone.

12. The Same Thing Can Supernaturally Participate in Efficiency toward Itself. What is further inferred in the third argument, that the same thing can have efficiency toward itself, in my opinion is no inconvenience, speaking of absolute power and of conservative efficiency, provided it is supposed that the thing is already produced and conserved through another action; concerning which matter I have written more extensively in III tom. III partis, disp. XLIX, sect. 1, and disp. L, sect. 4, at the end, because that miracle is proper to that mystery, and therefore pertains to theological disputation. Lest however the present resolution seem necessarily connected with that opinion, it can be responded otherwise by denying the inference, because in the efficiency of itself there is a peculiar difficulty which is not in the efficiency of another, even if a thing is simultaneously made and conserved by another cause. Because an efficient cause seems necessarily to postulate distinction in reality from the effect, and therefore no thing insofar as it is active

includes itself under the object of its activity; and therefore perhaps it cannot happen that it should have action toward itself according to its proper being; but two active powers can include under the object of their activity one and the same thing distinct from themselves, as we shall declare a little below. And from this part there can be greater repugnance in the conservative efficiency of itself than of another thing, although it is not convincing; for, although that assumption is true concerning an object contained under natural power, nevertheless not concerning every thing to the effecting of which a thing can be elevated through obediential power; but concerning this elsewhere.

13. In the fourth reason it is asked whether an effect made by two total causes can or should be made by one or two actions. And it must be said that it is necessary that it be made by two actions, as the argument made there correctly proves. Indeed I add that the difference between two causes of the same order principally consists in this, when they act as total causes, or as partial; for if they act by one action, they cannot be total causes but only partial. Which I prove because a cause is not called total on account of power in first act, although that may be integral and total power, because from the force of that it is not constituted as a cause in act, but in potency; but here we do not treat of a total cause in potency, but in act. A cause is constituted in act however through actual influx, which is nothing other than action itself; therefore in order that a cause be total, it is necessary that it influence the effect by total action proper to itself in its genus; therefore whenever action is as if divided between two causes of the same order, it is not totally from either of them or as from a total cause, and thus each will only be a partial cause, with partiality on the part of the cause, as they say.

14. That One Action Emanate from Several Total Non-Subordinated Agents Implies Contradiction. You will say: by this reasoning it would also be proved that first and second cause are partial while they influence the same effect. It is responded that many

speak thus, as we said above, considering not the genus of causality but causality simply; nevertheless the inference is better denied; for there is a far different reason, for between first and second cause there is subordination and essential dependence, and consequently diverse order of causes; and therefore each can be total in its order, even if it influences through the same action with the other. But truly when two causes are of the same order, if they concur only concomitantly and influence through the same action, they cannot be called total either simply or in that genus; therefore they will be partial. Therefore, if such causes ought to be total, it is necessary that they influence the same effect by diverse actions; and it is repugnant that one and the same action be from two causes of the same order as from total causes, which the fifth argument made above also convinces, as will be established from its solution. I deny however that there is equal reasoning concerning the effect or terminus of action, for the effect flows from the cause through mediating action, and the same effect numerically can be made through various actions, as we declared above treating the causality of efficient cause; since therefore various actions can proceed from diverse agents, also the same effect numerically can proceed from diverse causes of the same order through several distinct and total actions, and this itself is to proceed from those as from total causes. Action however does not proceed from a cause through another action, but through itself, and therefore one action cannot be except from one agent or from several through the mode of one; and therefore it cannot simultaneously be from many causes as total in the same order, which will be more declared in the following solution.

15. To the fifth argument therefore it is responded by denying the inference and that contradiction, whose affirming part we admit, namely, that that effect depends on those causes and on each of them. When however it is proved that it does not depend, because with any of those causes removed the same whole effect remains, it is responded by denying the consequence. For there is equivocation in

that word "depend," for, in order that one thing depend on another, it is not necessary that, with that removed, this also be taken away from the middle, but it suffices that it receive being from that, even if, with that not giving being, it could retain being, as given by another. For thus the light of this air truly depends now on this lamp, and nevertheless with this extinguished the same light could be conserved, if in the same moment another luminous body sufficient for conserving such light were applied. Therefore when a thing is said to depend on a cause because with that removed it is taken away, this is understood concerning a cause which is unique, and because regularly and naturally a total cause is customarily so, therefore dependence on it is customarily declared in that manner. Or certainly a condition must be understood there, namely, with the cause on which the effect depends removed, the effect is also taken away, unless from elsewhere another cause succeeds which can conserve the effect in being, as happens in the present case.

16. With the Agent Removed, the Dependence of the Effect on It Must Necessarily Be Taken Away. It correctly and necessarily follows however that with the cause removed some dependence of the effect on it is taken away, by reason of which the effect would also be taken away unless it were conserved by another cause. This is proved, for every effect insofar as it is from a cause depends on it; but it can only depend as long as the cause exists, because nothing depends on what is not, especially efficiently, as has been shown above; therefore, with the cause from which the effect efficiently proceeded removed, it is necessary that some such dependence of such effect on such cause be taken away. This dependence however is nothing other than action, as has also been proved above; therefore it is also necessary that with the cause removed, some action of it concerning such effect be taken away; nevertheless it is not necessary that the effect itself be taken away, because another sufficient cause through another proper and total action contains it in being. And hence it is confirmed what we were saying before, that although the effect is one, if the causes are

several and total of the same order, it is necessary that the actions be several, because with the influx of one cause ceasing, its action is necessarily taken away, because dependence on it is taken away, and nevertheless the action of the other cause can remain, because since it is total and is not subordinated to the other, it can conserve its action, even if the other ceases from acting; therefore the actions must necessarily be distinct.

Second Assertion

17. Naturally the Same Effect Cannot Totally Flow from Several Non-Subordinated Agents. The sixth argument demands that we pass judgment concerning the second opinion. I say therefore secondly that it cannot happen naturally that the same effect be simultaneously effected by several total causes. In this conclusion philosophers nearly agree, and Aristotle signified it, V Metaph., c. 2; for saying that several causes of the same effect can be given, he adds "but not in the same manner," as St. Thomas and other interpreters noted. All of whom understand not only that this cannot be done naturally, because the application of several agents per se sufficient cannot naturally be made; for this is both uncertain, as the arguments touch, and very remote and accidental; but they understand, even with the application of several agents sufficient in themselves made (whether that application happens naturally, or is posited to be done supernaturally), provided those agents are left to their nature, they will not effect the effect as total causes, but only as partial.

18. Various Reasons for the Second Assertion. The reason however for this conclusion so understood is not very easy. Some recall the reason to another principle, namely, that no natural cause can naturally effect some effect the same numerically, which another can effect. From which principle one must philosophize thus. First it must be said that those two causes equally applied cannot simultaneously produce one and the same effect, so that each makes it

as a total cause, because, by the very fact that it is contained in the power of one, it is not contained in the power of the other. And thus it happens that, if any of them alone by its power effects the effect which it contains, the other effects nothing; nevertheless that will only happen when one is applied prior in time than the other; for then the posterior will effect nothing, because it already finds the capacity of the patient filled. But truly, when both are applied simultaneously, it cannot rationally be said that one effects its proper effect adequate to itself, and the other causes nothing, since there is no greater reason for one than for the other. Unless perhaps someone has recourse to the concourse and will of the first cause and says it is necessary for only one to operate, and therefore God by His will gives concourse to whom He wills, and therefore that one operates and not the other. But although this can be done by the first cause, nevertheless it does not seem philosophical nor consonant with the natures of things; for since each agent is equally powerful and equally prepared or approximated for acting, as we suppose, concourse is not more owed to one than to the other.

19. It must therefore be said that both simultaneously, as partial causes, produce one effect. For, although they cannot simultaneously operate either several effects distinct by number alone, because we suppose the subject is not capable of them, or one and the same through the mode of total causes, because there is no effect which is the same numerically contained in the power of individual agents, nevertheless it is not therefore necessary that only one of those agents effect its proper effect; for both can concur through the mode of one to some effect contained in those taken simultaneously, which necessarily will be distinct from those effects which those agents separately and per se could totally produce. Therefore it is more consonant with the natures of things that God provide concourse to those agents for acting in this mode, than that He provide the whole to one, deny it altogether to the other. Therefore those agents will simultaneously effect in the aforesaid manner; and thus they will

always act as partial causes, and not as total, because that effect so proceeds from each of those causes that it cannot proceed from neither, and thus it will also proceed by one single action, because it so depends on each of those causes conjointly that it cannot be without either.

20. This discourse however, although it proceeds correctly from the posited principle, nevertheless the principle itself is very uncertain to me, nor do I think it can be proved by any sufficient reason, as we shall declare in the following point. And therefore a more certain conclusion does not seem to be founded on a less certain thing; but it is more constant in philosophy that several total causes cannot conjointly effect the same effect, than that they cannot separately. The conclusion is therefore better founded on this, that one effect numerically cannot naturally be made simultaneously, except by one single action; but one single action cannot be from two total causes of the same order, as has been proved above; therefore neither can one effect naturally be made by several total causes. The major is proved first; because the unity of action is taken in some manner from the terminus; I say in some manner, because relation to the agent is also necessary; nevertheless, since unity of terminus is also necessary, at least from that title, one single action is naturally postulated for one terminus. Second, although the agents are several and otherwise could separately effect, nevertheless they also can be conjoined for acting through the mode of one, and this mode of acting is more consonant with the unity of terminus; therefore speaking naturally they always so act. Third finally, since each mode of acting is possible absolutely, although the natural agents themselves cannot determine themselves to one of those, but would have to be determined through the concourse of the first cause, double concourse for acting by two total actions would not be owed to them, because it is not necessary for them and nature abhors superfluity; therefore also from the definition of the concourse of the first cause, those second agents cannot naturally simultaneously act as total causes. Which reason will be

more declared in the next point, and after its resolution better response will be given to the arguments adduced above in the second opinion.

SECTION V
WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN NATURALLY BE PRODUCED BY SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES TAKEN SEPARATELY

1. It remains to be said whether at least separately the same effect can be produced by several total causes, which is to inquire whether the light that is here and now produced in this air by this lamp applied in this place would be produced as the same in number by another lamp distinct in number, yet entirely similar in its power of acting, if it had been applied to the same air at the same time and place; and so concerning other effects. In this matter there is no controversy concerning God's absolute power; for thus no one whom I have seen denies that God can make the same effect in number through one natural cause that He makes through another; although this also needs clarification in the opinion of those who deny that this can happen naturally, if they are to speak consistently, as I shall declare below.

The Prior Opinion Denying This

2. Therefore, the dispute concerns the natural power of causes, and in this way many deny that one natural cause can produce the same effect in number that another makes, even if it were applied to the same patient under the same conditions. This opinion is signified by St. Thomas, Quodl. V, a. 8; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 20, q. 1; and is held by Marsilius, I de Generat., q. 8; and Soto, In IV, dist. 34,

q. 1, a. 3. And it is the opinion of the Commentator, in VII Metaph., com. 31.

3. Various reasons are adduced. The first is because when this effect is produced as such in an individual, some proximate natural cause must be given for why such an individual is produced rather than another; but this can be none other than because from this singular cause such an effect is produced, not that this alone is the adequate reason for the production of such an effect in an individual, but that without it an adequate reason cannot consist; for this is sufficient that this effect in number cannot be produced except by this cause in number. The inference is clear; but the antecedent can be proved by examining all things that can contribute to the production of this individual effect. For neither does this subject suffice, because it is indifferent to several forms, nor time, place, etc., both for the same reason, and because they are very extrinsic, as has been treated extensively above, disp. V.

4. Nevertheless, this reason has no force in our opinion, for if the discussion concerns the intrinsic reason for the individuation of the effect, we have already said above that it is placed in the intrinsic principles of the thing itself or in its proper entity. But if the discussion concerns the reason why the agent is determined to this effect in number, the reason is not correctly given because it is this agent, for this agent too is powerful and of itself indifferent to producing several effects distinct in number. But if it is said that this particular agent is not indifferent to producing several effects distinct in number here and now concerning this subject, but is determined to one, there still remains to be investigated the cause of this determination, which is not sufficiently given from the individuation of the cause, because that is of itself powerful for several things; nor even from other added circumstances, as I have proved in the said place, because they are either also indifferent, and from many indifferent things one determined principle is not made; or they are very extrinsic, like extrinsic time, or place. For which reason we have judged it more

probable that the secondary cause is determined in this regard from the concourse of the primary cause; but this determination on the part of the primary cause can be made as much with this individual cause as with another similar one distinct in number in order to the same effect in number, as I shall show a little below; therefore from this source it is not proved that this singular secondary cause is necessary for this singular effect. But Soto objects (who especially magnifies this first reason) because it is not philosophical to refer this determination to the primary cause, since the primary cause of itself does not concur except with general and indifferent influence. But this is proved by him with no reason, nor is it true, as is clear from what has been said above concerning God's concourse; and it is more consonant with the perfection of divine providence that God by His will should decree what individuals are to be future from all causes.

5. A second reason is usually given, because if this effect in number could have been produced by another cause distinct in number, it would not depend per se and essentially on this singular cause by which it is now produced, and consequently such a cause would not be a per se cause of this effect, but only per accidens, because an effect depends per se and essentially on a per se cause. But it was supposed that the discussion concerns a per se cause; therefore in order that the per se order between cause and effect be preserved, it is necessary to say that a singular effect which is made by this cause in number cannot naturally be made by another distinct in number. The first consequence is proved, because if in place of this cause another distinct in number had been applied, the same effect in number would have been produced by that one; therefore it is per accidens that this effect is produced by this cause. And it is confirmed first, for every determined and singular effect by its nature demands a determined per se cause by which it is made, because it depends per se on some cause; therefore it cannot naturally be made except by that one. And it is confirmed second, because this action in number which is made by this total cause cannot be made by another distinct in number; but

this action in number tends toward this effect in number, and actions distinct in number toward effects distinct in number; therefore also this effect which is made by this cause cannot be made by another similar one of the same order and distinct in number.

6. But neither are all these things efficacious for persuading the opinion. And indeed in the principal reason two terms must be distinguished, to depend per se or essentially; for they are not equivalent, but to depend essentially is more than per se; for in order that an effect depend per se on a cause, it is sufficient that it truly and properly receive its being from that cause, because to receive being and to depend are nearly the same thing. But to depend essentially adds that the effect from its intrinsic nature and essence demands the influence of such a cause, so that without it it cannot be; which is sufficiently proved from the meaning of that expression, essential dependence. Therefore when it is inferred that if this effect in number could be produced by another total cause of the same order, it follows that it does not depend per se and essentially on this cause by which it is now produced, since the consequent is twofold, a twofold response must also be applied and the prior part of the consequence denied, and the posterior part conceded.

7. Therefore I deny that it follows that the effect does not depend per se, because it depends on a cause properly and per se influencing being into it. Nor does it matter that it could be made by another, because in fact it is not made by another, but by this one alone in the order of causes; therefore that is sufficient that it depend on that one as on a total cause. But when it is urged, because another could be applied, and thus it is per accidens that it is made by this one, it is answered that there is an equivocation in that term per accidens, because now it is not taken as opposed to a per se cause, but as opposed to a simply necessary cause, or unique one. I concede therefore with respect to the effect, per accidens, that is, contingent and outside the essence and beyond its nature that it be made by this cause in number rather than by another. Likewise on the part of the

cause, it can be said per accidens that this cause rather than another is applied, because either it is not applied by itself but by another, or because this is accidental and contingent with respect to that cause. But all these things are remote and extrinsic to per se causality, because now in that instant in which this cause is applied, it truly and properly influences being into this effect, and this is sufficient that both it be a per se cause and the effect depend per se on it. Just as also this cause here and now applied to this patient could induce not this form, but another in number, and for this reason it can be said per accidens with respect to that cause that it makes this one in number rather than another, because it is extrinsic and accidental that God has defined concourse toward this effect rather than toward another. Nevertheless, once thus applied, it per se makes this effect; thus therefore this effect also here and now per se depends on this cause by which it is properly made, even if it could be made by another. But the other part of the consequence correctly follows and must be conceded, namely, that such an effect does not depend essentially on such a cause; and that consequent is most true. Indeed, as is clear from what has been said above concerning the concourse of the primary cause, no effect depends essentially on a univocal cause; indeed no created effect, insofar as it is from an efficient cause, depends essentially on a created cause, but on God alone, because it can be made by Him alone without any other thing, but by others it cannot be made without Him.

8. But if it is said that this is true taking that word essentially in its rigorous signification, but here it is not taken thus, but as it is the same as connaturally, and in this way a created effect can depend on a created cause and a univocal effect on a univocal cause, and thus one effect has only one cause on which it depends connaturally, I respond that it is indeed true that actually only one effect depends on one total cause of one order, with connatural dependence; I deny however that one effect in number can only depend on one cause in number,

because if it were made by another similar one, it would depend as connaturally on that one as on the other.

9. Whence to the first confirmation I absolutely deny the antecedent, because this effect in number, if its individual nature and entity is considered absolutely, does not determine nor necessarily demand (with necessity, namely, connatural and intrinsic) that it be made by this cause in number and not by another; or at least this is proved there by no reason, because this thing by its nature only demands that it be made by something having sufficient power to make it. But if several agents have had that power, nothing pertains to the nature of such an effect, nor does anything prevent it from being made per se by whatever happens to be applied, as has been declared.

10. To the second confirmation, I concede that this action in number can only be from this agent and toward this term. I deny however that actions distinct in number are necessarily terminated toward effects distinct in number; for that this is not necessary has often been proved in the above; otherwise not even by absolute power could an effect, which is made by one agent, be made by another distinct in number, even separately, because the action of one cannot be made by another. But if it is said that actions distinct in number tend toward effects distinct in number by natural necessity indeed, but not by absolute necessity and in order to divine power, against this is that that natural necessity has been proved by no reason. For when several agents concur simultaneously, there is some necessity or at least natural congruity, that they act toward the same effect by one action rather than by two. But that diverse total agents as to the power of acting cannot have their own proper distinct actions concerning some effect, so that each can per se produce that effect, at least when it is applied alone and without the other, has been shown by no reason thus far. There is therefore no reason why it should be necessary by natural necessity that one effect can naturally be made by only one individual and particular action, even separately.

The Second Opinion Contrary to the Preceding

11. Since therefore more efficacious reasons have not been found thus far to confirm that opinion, it has not been proved by other authors, but they say that the same effect in number can be made separately by diverse total causes and indeed this light is now made in this air by this lamp, because this one has been applied; the same nevertheless would have been future if another lamp had been applied. This opinion is held by Scotus, In II, dist. 20, q. 2, which is proved by the same author with a philosophical and theological argument. The theological argument is, because God before foreseen original sin elected to glory these singular men whom He predestined, of whom many are now generated from reprobate men; but if Adam had not sinned, they would be generated from other men distinct in number, because then there would be none reprobate from whom they would be generated. But this argument inculcates many things which must be omitted by us, lest we transgress metaphysical terms. But in truth the reason is not efficacious and, besides many things which it supposes uncertainly, this is certain with me, that God elected the predestined with at least conditional foreknowledge of the fall of the human race, which is sufficient that He could simultaneously will these predestined to be generated by these parents in number. But if God had foreseen, even in conditional knowledge, that Adam was not going to sin, either He would not have had a decree of electing these men whom He now elects, or simultaneously with those He would have elected their parents whom He now elects, or certainly He would have permitted even then some to be reprobate. For it is not true, or at least certain, that if Adam had not sinned no other men would have sinned or been damned. And so (that we may omit these things) it is certain that on account of the certitude of predestination it is not necessary to say that one man can naturally be generated by other parents than by those from whom he is in fact generated.

12. The physical reason is because two agents of the same species are of equal power; therefore whatever one can produce from such matter here and now applied to itself, another can produce; otherwise they would not be of equal power; therefore the effect which is made by one could be made the same in number by another. But neither is this reason convincing; for from equality of power only equality of effect can be gathered, not however identity; for, just as in power itself it is one thing to be equal, another to be the same, so also in the effect. Therefore it is easily answered that equal power can produce an equal effect from the same matter, but not however the same effect. Other reasons also are usually made in favor of this opinion, which seem lighter to me and therefore I omit them.

The Point of Difficulty Is Opened

13. Therefore in order that the point of controversy be touched, we must insist on this that we see whether an effect contained under the object of one active power can be contained under the object of another, and whether this can be defined by certain reason in either part. In which the difference between a particular and univocal cause, and an equivocal and universal one must be noted, because the universal cause, since it does not formally but eminently contain the effect, can per se regard the whole species and all individuals contained under it. And hence I think it certain that the same effect in number which is made by a particular and univocal cause, can be made in a connatural way by an equivocal cause as by a total and proximate cause, if without the intervention of a univocal cause the equivocal cause alone and of itself universal is applied to generating such an effect immediately and by itself alone. This is most certain in the most universal and most eminent cause, which is God, for by this reason He can make any effect by His power which secondary causes can make. I think the same concerning celestial powers regarding those effects which they truly contain eminently and

as per se sufficient causes. For example, if the sun is a sufficient cause for generating gold or fire, as far as it is concerned, it is sufficient for any individual of gold or fire, because its power, being more eminent, adequately regards that whole species, and therefore, as far as it is concerned, it can produce that form in any individual.

14. Therefore concerning these causes no reason appears why it should be denied that an effect produced by fire, for example, in this wood, could be produced the same in number by the sun, if it were sufficiently applied to the same patient and with other circumstances. In which we do not properly compare a particular cause to a universal one, insofar as a universal cause is said to be one which operates with another particular cause, but we compare two particular and proximate causes operating through diverse powers, namely, formal or eminent. From which it is also understood incidentally that there is a far different reason concerning total causes operating conjointly or separately, for such two total causes which operate as particular and proximate causes, cannot conjointly and simultaneously produce the same effect in number with their own proper and distinct total actions, even if one is equivocal, the other univocal; for the reason and resolution made in the superior point proceed equally in these; but separately the same effect can very well proceed from either of these causes, as has been said and declared.

15. At truly a univocal cause cannot have for the adequate object of its active power the whole species of such an effect, as St. Thomas noted I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1, because otherwise such a cause would include itself under the object of its natural power, which is impossible; otherwise it could produce itself. Nor is it sufficient if someone responds that, as far as it is on the part of the power, it can produce itself, yet on the other part it is repugnant that that power be reduced to act with respect to itself, because for acting the cause itself is necessarily presupposed as already produced. This (I say) does not satisfy, because efficiency from its intrinsic nature regards a distinct thing; therefore also the power of producing by its nature has for its

object only a thing distinct from itself; therefore in no way does it contain itself under its adequate object, and therefore a univocal cause cannot regard its species as the adequate object of its power. This reason does not proceed in an equivocal cause, for, although this adequately regards some whole species, it does not reflect on itself, because it is not an individual of that species, but of a higher order. Hence therefore arises the doubt, how extensively the object of a univocal active power extends; for since it is not the whole species, nor is it only one individual of that species, as is clear per se, it must be that there are several individuals of that species; how many therefore will those be, or what rule is to be observed in assigning the adequate object of such a power? In which all agree that a finite number of individuals cannot be designated, because an active power, as far as it is concerned, if it is not corrupted or weakened, can always produce another and another individual. Whence it can be said to be of itself indifferent to infinite individuals syncategorematically successively or disjunctively. Nevertheless this same infinite multitude can be understood in various ways; but there are two principally which pertain to the present matter.

Various Ways of Assigning the Adequate Object to the Active Virtue of a Univocal Agent

16. The First Way. One way is to say that such a cause can effect any individual of its species outside of itself. A not improbable reason can be given for this, namely that it cannot have efficiency regarding itself because of identity; but if this impediment were removed, there would be no inconvenience in such a power having as its adequate object that entire species. Therefore, since this reason ceases regarding all other individuals of the same species, because all others are distinct from this particular agent, it is likely that any individual of such a species includes under the adequate object of its active power all individuals of the same species other than itself. If this

way is true, it evidently follows that two total causes of the same species can separately effect the same numerical effect. Indeed, it rather follows that no effect can be made by one which cannot be made by another, with the exception of themselves reciprocally, for any one can effect another, but not itself. Hence it further follows that any univocal cause, as far as its power is concerned, has the force to effect that individual from which it was itself generated, so that Peter, for example, would have the power to generate his parent or even his grandfather and any of his progenitors, as far as the force of active power is concerned; which can seem the greatest inconvenience of all that can be conceived in this way of speaking. Nor can it be denied that this follows, for all those individuals are comprehended under the adequate object of such power, as is supposed; therefore, as far as the force of active power is concerned, and speaking per se, it could produce any of those. Nevertheless, it can easily be denied that this is an inconvenience. For in fact this particular thing cannot effect those individuals from which it proceeded and was made, because those individuals preceded in being and were produced by other causes; yet if they were considered according to themselves and no repugnant condition were presupposed, nothing would prevent those individuals which are now causes of others from being effects of those others, and conversely.

17. The Second Way. Another way of explaining the adequate object of this power is to say that individual active virtues of individual agents determine for themselves certain particular individuals of their species which only they can effect, and conversely, that entire series of individuals determines for itself by its nature such a univocal cause from which they can be made, and not from another within that species. This series of individuals proceeds indeed to infinity, nevertheless it contains only a particular order or group (so to speak) of individuals having from themselves a relation to such a cause; which orders of individuals can be multiplied to infinity within the same species, for within one species there can be not only infinite

individuals, but also infinitely infinite and infinite series of individuals, which all contain distinct individuals and in each series proceed to infinity. And according to this way it clearly follows that a singular effect which is made by one univocal cause cannot be made by another, because individuals contained under the object of one power are not contained under the object of another.

18. What Difficulties Weaken This Way of Resolving the Question. However, I do not see a sufficient reason that can be given on the part of such causes, why they so determine their objects and each tends toward its proper collection of distinct individuals, but it can only be affirmed that by reason of their individuation each one is so determined in acting. Just as the intellect of Peter, for example, is by its nature determined to effect such particular acts of understanding which no other numerically distinct intellect can effect; and the same is true of individual intellects; for that opinion exposed in the aforesaid way philosophizes in this manner. Nevertheless, there is truly not the same reason concerning powers which elicit immanent acts and those which effect in external matter, for in the former powers each one is determined to effect only in itself and from itself, for this is of the intrinsic nature of immanent act; and because in diverse subjects diverse numerically distinct acts are found, therefore each of these powers is determined by its nature to acts distinct from the acts of another. But truly a power which acts in external matter does not determine for itself a certain subject in which to act; and therefore numerically distinct agents can act on the same numerical patient, either at different times, or at the same time, either joined as partial causes, or separately as total causes; and therefore there is not in them the same reason by which they would be determined to effect numerically distinct forms, even with respect to the same patient.

19. Therefore, on the part of the cause no probable cause of this determination occurs; for certainly individuation alone of the cause itself is not a sufficient reason that it should be determined to effect these individuals rather than others; nor even that numerically

distinct causes should be determined to numerically distinct individuals. Otherwise someone could with equal facility say that an individual cause is determined by the force of its individuation to effect only one individual, especially from the same subject, just as a univocal cause of one species is determined to make an effect of only one species. On the part of the effect, however, the reason touched upon above can be given, because one effect by its nature postulates one determinate cause from which it is made, because since the effect has natural dependence on the cause, a singular effect also has natural dependence on a singular cause; and therefore the power itself does not include under its object except those effects which can naturally depend on it.

20. The First Reason for the Difficulty. Nevertheless, I do not see by what sufficient reason this principle which is taken from the effect can be proven; and from elsewhere vehement conjectures occur by which it does not seem to be admitted. First, because the dependence of the effect on a univocal cause is accidental, since it is only in becoming and is separable from the thing itself; there is no reason, however, by which this individual thing determines by its nature such an accident; just as therefore the same subject is indifferent to several numerically distinct heats and naturally receives that which the first occurring agent can effect, so the same effect is indifferent to accidental dependencies, although while it is made, it is made naturally and per se through dependence which can be from that agent which is then applied.

21. Second. This is further explained because if the entity itself of the effect is considered, it is absolute, that is, not including in itself a respect, even transcendental, to some univocal agent, because since it does not depend on that essentially and in its being, there is no reason why it should include in itself such a respect; therefore such an effect by virtue of its entity does not postulate dependence on this numerical cause, as more connatural to itself, than on another.

22. Third. The same numerical effect which is made by a univocal cause can per se and connaturally be made by an equivocal cause, not only first, but also second and created, if it eminently contains such an inferior species, as we said and proved a little before; therefore, having made a comparison between those two causes, univocal and equivocal, that singular effect does not more determine for itself by its nature emanation from one than from the other; for it can equally indifferently be made by either of them, whichever is first sufficiently applied; therefore, having made a comparison between univocal causes, there is no reason why that effect should determine for itself by its nature emanation from only one of them, but it will be able to be produced indifferently by many, or by any similar one. The consequence is clear, both because, if it were connatural to every effect to determine for itself only one cause, it should determine simply one, either univocal or equivocal, at least among created causes. And also because the reason which seems to have moved other authors to say that one singular effect has natural dependence on one singular cause, namely, so that it might seem to be produced by it per se and not per accidens, this reason (I say) can equally be applied to univocal and equivocal cause, because it can also be said to be produced per accidens by the other of them, since it could equally well be made by the other, if it had been applied; but if this does not impede the per se causality of that cause which is de facto applied, whether that was univocal or equivocal, it also does not impede in univocal causes, whether this numerical one is applied, or another. But if someone should say there is a different reason in an equivocal cause, since that eminently contains the whole species and consequently all individuals of it, it is replied that this does not pertain to the present reason, in which we consider determination or indifference on the part of the effect, not on the part of the cause. But if the effect were by its nature determined to depend on only one singular cause, it could not be virtually contained in several causes; but if there is not this determination on the part of the effect, therefore neither on its part

does it repugn to be contained in many causes and to be able to depend on individuals; therefore there is no reason why this should be more true with respect to univocal and equivocal cause than with respect to univocal causes. Especially if both the first comparison and the second are made to created causes; for, although a univocal cause does not contain the whole species like an equivocal one, it can nevertheless virtually contain any individuals similar to itself and distinct from itself.

23. Fourth, we can at the same time take a similar reason from the fact that one numerical effect can separately depend on two total equivocal causes even created, whether distinct in species or in number, for either of them contains eminently the whole species of the inferior effect; whence as far as it is from itself, it is powerful to effect any individual of that species; and consequently every individual, which can be made by one of those causes, can be made by another; therefore the same can be the case in univocal causes. The consequence is clear from what was said above, because that is sufficient indication on the part of the effect that it does not repugn that it can naturally depend on this or that cause; nor can a reason be assigned why on its part it more repugns in order to univocal causes than to equivocal ones. But if there is no repugnance on the part of the effect; truly, none can be assigned on the part of causes.

24. And in this way another reason which can be made here has force, that the same numerical effect is made by one cause and conserved by another; for this does not have place in a univocal cause, for its effect does not depend on it in being conserved, speaking per se; for when it is said to conserve in wood the heat which it produced, it is not understood of conservation directly and per se, but per accidens, defending from contraries; and therefore it is not wonderful that such conservation or rather defense can be made by any agent of similar virtue. In equivocal causes, however, it seems certain that an effect produced by one can be conserved by another, as the light of this air made by this lamp is conserved by another sufficiently applied,

even if this one is immediately extinguished. For it is not likely that a sudden and insensible mutation of light occurs; therefore by the same reason one lamp could have effected from the beginning the same light which another made, if it had been applied, both because conservation of this kind is true efficiency and from itself and by its nature could be production; and also because, unless this light were contained under the object of the other lamp, it could not be naturally conserved by it; but if it is contained, it can also be made.

25. From univocal causes, however, some argument can be taken from the fact that one can intensify the same numerical quality which another began; therefore it can also begin or effect it; for it is strange to say that one and the same quality according to diverse degrees determines for itself diverse natural agents otherwise entirely similar among themselves. Finally, it does not seem likely that one angel cannot effect in the same body the same numerical local motion, or the same intrinsic where (ubi) which another would effect, if it had moved it at the same time. And therefore in this example also authors of the contrary opinion admit that the same numerical effect can be made by diverse total causes disjunctively; but they deny that a sufficient argument is taken thence for other effects, because through local motion no new absolute entity is made in the mobile thing. But this response does not satisfy, both because, although through local motion no new absolute thing distinct from the mobile thing is made, nevertheless a real absolute mode is made and distinct ex natura rei from the mobile thing, from which no light argument is taken for an effect which is a distinct form. And especially because, even with respect to local motion and where (ubi), true efficient causality and per se dependence of this effect on this cause intervenes; therefore if this does not prevent such an effect from being able to be made by another numerically distinct cause, it will not prevent in effects which are distinct things or forms. It is true that this example also proceeds concerning equivocal causes, because in local motion the mover is

always an equivocal cause; nevertheless we have already shown that from equivocal causes a sufficient argument is taken for univocal ones.

Affirmative Resolution of the Entire Question

26. Having weighed therefore the reasons of both parts, although neither completely compel or demonstrate, nevertheless these latter bear greater verisimilitude before them. Therefore speaking in general, I think it should be said that it does not repugn that the same numerical effect depend on several proximate and total causes disjunctively, or, conversely (and it comes to the same thing), that several causes can have virtue so that individuals can per se effect the same numerical effect, which is more certain if both or either is an equivocal cause; nevertheless it is also more probable in univocal causes. However, some things must be observed. First, it must be supposed that the effect is either equal to, or inferior to the cause; which I note because if that opinion were true which affirms that individuals of the same species can be unequal in perfection, it would not be necessary that any individual cause in some species could effect all other individuals of the same species by its proper virtue, but only those which would be proportionate or equal to itself. Then it is necessary to speak of effects entirely similar in individual, as are two heats of the same subject; for if effects, although they are of the same species, are not entirely similar, but (so to speak) in some way individually heterogeneous, it can happen that because of the peculiar condition which individual things have, they determine for themselves only one natural cause of one order, which can happen not only in univocal causes, but also in equivocal ones. As, for example, the visible species of Peter and Paul are of the same species (for I suppose that both are white), and nevertheless neither Peter can effect the species of Paul, nor Paul that of Peter, because those species, although they are similar in specific nature, nevertheless from their individuation have proper relations to distinct objects, and therefore I call those species

dissimilar and as it were individually heterogeneous, and those objects, although they are in their way equivocal causes of such species, nevertheless do not have eminent virtue for the whole species, but each one only for those species which represent it. A similar thing can be seen in immanent acts, as we said above; and the same is true of habits. Therefore where a peculiar reason or determination intervenes, it can happen that a cause is determined to some individuals of one species, and cannot apply to all; and thence it can also come about that an effect which is made by one cause cannot be made by another numerically distinct one; nevertheless absolutely this does not repugn the natures of things.

27. Lastly it must be observed that thus far we have only explained what can be made by virtue of particular causes, but not what is made; for that is much more uncertain to us, so that it cannot be defined by any reason. For, although two particular causes have virtue for effecting the same numerical effect, nevertheless the actual determination of such a cause so that it makes this individual rather than another depends on the first cause as on the primary origin of such determination; and therefore, although this cause now applied effects this singular effect, to which it is determined by the first cause, whether truly, if another similar one had been applied in its place at the same time and place and concerning the same subject, it would have made the same numerical effect, is not known to us. Not because the power is not in it, which we have done thus far, but because that power is also indifferent to several individuals and we do not know whether in that case it would be determined by the first cause to make the same numerical individual; therefore we only affirm that it can be so determined, but the actual determination depends on the concourse and will of the first cause.

Response to Arguments of the Second Opinion
Left from the Previous Section

28. From these things also response must be made to that interrogation which was made in the foundations of the second principal opinion adduced at the beginning of the previous section, namely, what would two total causes do in virtue or in first act, if they were applied to the same patient simultaneously and equally and were left to act according to their nature. For it must be distinguished, for either those two causes would be applied simultaneously and in the same instant, or one before the other in time. Again, either the patient is capable of several numerically distinct effects, or of only one. Then, if the effect is one, it can be indivisible, as is substantial form, or having latitude of dimensions; likewise it can depend on a cause only in becoming, or also in being conserved. First therefore, if causes are applied simultaneously and the patient is capable of several effects, they will effect those and each its own, and thus all controversy ceases; for in this way two white objects equally applied will effect two intentional species. For in this example those two causes neither are nor can be total causes of the same numerical effect, because neither object can make the species of the other. Hence I do not think an example can be found in which both causes can be total with respect to both effects, and yet that the patient can simultaneously receive both, because two forms or accidents distinct only in number and entirely similar cannot simultaneously be in the same subject. If nevertheless this is admitted according to the opinion positing several lights in the same air, it could also be said then that those causes would operate as total causes, yet not both the same effect, but each its own. Although this also would be uncertain; for it depends on the determination of the first cause, which could give concourse either to diverse numerical effects or only to one and the same; nevertheless, since those causes from that hypothesis are then apt to operate as total causes, it is likely that they would receive natural concourse to so operate, and consequently would effect diverse numerical effects.

29. Supposing however that the subject is not capable except of one form, then those causes applied simultaneously would

simultaneously effect the same effect, yet not as total causes, but as partial ones; not because that same numerical effect could not be made by individuals of those causes, nor by either of them alone, but by both simultaneously partially; for it is incredible that some natural effect determines for itself by its nature this mode of dependence on many causes simultaneously, to which it is so joined per accidens to operate. The reason therefore is only because that mode of acting is then more consonant with the natures of things, as was explained above. But if the effect is indivisible, it will not be able to be more perfect because of the conjunction of two causes; if however it is capable of greater or lesser intension, sometimes it will be more intense, namely when neither of those causes by itself alone could have operated according to the whole latitude of its intension or activity, either because of distance, or because of resistance of the patient[32], or because of the peculiar property of its nature; in which way we experience two lamps equal among themselves simultaneously effecting more intense light in air than individuals could effect per se.

30. But truly, if one of such causes is applied before the other in time, it will immediately effect the whole effect which it can effect at that time or instant; and then it is more uncertain what the other supervening cause will effect. And indeed, if the effect does not depend in being conserved, but only in becoming, and is indivisible or already totally produced, it is clear that the posterior cause can effect nothing, because it already finds it done, and because the other cause already does nothing, but has done. But if the effect depends in being conserved, some say that the effect which had been made by the prior cause will perish, and a new one will be produced by those two simultaneously and conserved in the future. But this is incredible, because there is no cause there why the prior effect should be corrupted, nor is it consonant with nature that God should suspend

[32] vel ob resistentiam passi, Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605, Madrid 1960; Paris 1861 om. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 142, footnote.

the concourse by which he conserves it, with no supervening corrupting cause.

31. Others more probably say that from that instant in which the posterior cause is applied, that effect begins to be conserved by two causes simultaneously, which previously was conserved by only one, because it should not be idle, since it can operate for this. But this also has difficulty, because either that effect begins to be conserved by the posterior cause through a new action which remains from it alone with the prior cause also persevering in its action; and thus it follows that that effect is conserved by those two causes simultaneously as total causes; which we do not admit; or the prior cause desists from its proper action, and both causes begin to have a new common action by which they conserve the same effect; and this is also difficult, because there is nothing which forces the prior cause to remit its influence, or to desist from the prior action. Nor can this be reduced to the determination of the first cause varying its concourse and determination of the action of the second cause, because it is not owed to the supervening cause that the action or concourse be changed, so that it can act something. Therefore it is probable that in that case the posterior cause will effect nothing, because it finds done whatever it could do.

32. But truly, if that effect were intensifiable and were not produced according to the whole latitude of such causes, then the posterior cause would effect intension of it. But this could be understood in two ways, first, that the first cause would precisely persevere in the prior action, but the posterior would add so many degrees of quality; and then both would be total causes of some part (so to speak) or of some degrees of that effect; but both would be partial causes with respect to the whole effect, with partiality, as they say, not only on the part of the cause, but also on the part of the effect. In which way of speaking it is only difficult, since those agents are similar and equal, as we suppose, why that greater intension should be made by the posterior agent alone, since that action of greater

intension seems to be more perfect in some way. For it cannot be said that the prior cause both conserves the whole action which it previously effected and helps the supervening cause for intension of such effect, because through the prior action it was acting as much as it could, therefore it cannot act anything beyond unless it remits something of the prior action. And therefore it is probable that in that case the prior cause ceases from the action which it was totally exercising, and joins with the posterior, so that both simultaneously both conserve the effect and render it more intense. And thus far concerning efficient causes.

Brief Resolution Concerning the Concourse of Several Final Causes

33. Finally, from what has been said it is easily established what should be said about final causes; for in them the resolution is much easier. For if there is discussion about intrinsic end, that cannot be except one with respect to one action, because both one action cannot have except one total term, and nature intrinsically and from itself always tends to one. But truly, if there is discussion about extrinsic end, which a free operator intends by his choice, either that is only proximate or particular, or it is the simply ultimate and universal end. When it is of the former mode, nothing repugns that there be given several final causes and total ones of the same action, as experience establishes; for someone can give alms, both so that he might satisfy for sins, and also so that he might honor God and so that he might help his neighbor, thus intending all these things so that on account of individuals he has absolute will to do that work. And the reason is, because when the end is thus extrinsic with respect to action or effect, it does not add intrinsic entity or real mode, but only subordination to extrinsic intention or will of the agent, and therefore there is no inconvenience that in this way the same action proceeds from many total ends. It is true that, if they are compared not to

external action, but to the internal act of created will, thus two ends of the same nature, that is, equally proximate, cannot be total causes of entirely the same act, because with respect to interior act they have the nature of object, if they are proximate ends; but one and the same internal act cannot tend to several total objects. And the reason is, because with respect to interior acts such ends are not extrinsic, but intrinsic, since they are their proper and formal objects, but we have spoken of extrinsic ends; concerning which matter can be seen what we have written in volume I, part III, disputation V, section 3. But truly, if the ends are simply ultimate with respect to the operator, there cannot be several total ones with respect to the same, even from the intention of the operator himself, because it is of the nature of an end so ultimate that all things are referred to it, and therefore it repugns to be multiplied, concerning which matter many things are disputed by theologians, in I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

SECTION VI

WHETHER THE SAME CAUSE CAN PRODUCE MULTIPLE EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY CONTRARY ONES

1. The order of connection between this and the preceding disputation. We have compared multiple causes to one effect; now conversely we compare one cause to multiple effects. And because there is a particular difficulty in contrary effects, we shall speak especially of these, and most especially because Aristotle, in treating of causes, made particular mention of this matter, saying that the same thing can be the cause of contraries. The question can be treated concerning multiple effects either simultaneously or successively. And because the matter is easy in material, formal, and final causes, we shall speak of these first, then of the efficient cause. Although, as pertains to contrary effects, we can assume without dispute concerning all of

them that one cause cannot simultaneously cause contrary effects, because they involve repugnance if they are taken with respect to the same thing, as they ought to be taken; for if they are taken with respect to different things, they are no longer taken as contraries. For although the sun at the same time dries mud and liquefies wax, it does not properly produce contrary effects.

The Question is Resolved Regarding Formal Cause

2. With these things presupposed, concerning formal cause it must be said that one cause cannot cause more than one effect; whence a fortiori it follows that it can never confer contrary effects. This is proved because, first, this cause does not cause except by providing itself to the effect; but it itself is only one entity; therefore from this aspect, what it causes and what it provides to the effect is always one and the same. Again, formal cause causes an effect by giving completion in its being; therefore also from this aspect, one formal cause always causes only one effect. And this can be confirmed by induction, both in any individual cause that is numerically one, and in that which is one in genus or species; for the former always constitutes the same effect numerically, the latter the same specifically or generically.

3. But objection can be made concerning the rational soul; for in other things, which depend on a subject and therefore are not transferred from subject to subject, there is no difficulty; but the rational soul, being numerically the same, is gradually united to different matter; therefore it now has various effects, either insofar as it conserves various matters or insofar as it composes different composites with them. Another objection can be that one form according to species gives specific and generic unity to an effect, although it does not participate in that genus, as is evident in the same rational soul, which gives to man the being of animal, although it itself is not sensitive. Third, objection can be made, for Aristotle said of

efficient cause that the same thing can be the cause of contraries, because just as presence is the cause of conservation, so absence of the same cause is the cause of corruption; therefore by equal reasoning it must be said that light is the formal cause of contraries or opposites, because just as the presence of light formally causes the luminous, so absence causes the dark.

4. To the first it must be responded from what has been said about the principle of individuation that man, speaking physically, is always the same, nor can it happen consistently with the natures of things that the same soul inform even successively totally different matters. But if it should inform them supernaturally, still the effect would be the same, although not entirely, yet it would be more the same than numerically different. But we speak physically; nor do we deal with matter itself, which is improperly called the effect of form, but with the composite itself, insofar as it is constituted by form; concerning which matter many things are usually said by theologians treating of resurrection. Concerning the second argument, philosophers also say much in the books On the Soul. Nevertheless I say briefly that the physical effect of one real form is one really and essentially. But if in the effect specific or generic grades are metaphysically distinguished, the same can be proportionally distinguished in the form, so that the form never constitutes an effect that is generically one with the effects of other forms, unless it also has proportional generic unity with those forms. This is also true in the rational soul; for it does not constitute animal except insofar as it is a principle of sensing, in which genus it agrees with the souls of brutes, and under that aspect it is truly a sensing soul. For it is not of the nature of sensitive soul that it be material; or if that term is taken in this sense, it is not that form adequately constituting animal as such. To the third it is responded that privation of form is not the form itself, but rather the opposite, and therefore it is no objection. Concerning that example of efficient cause, it will be said below.

Section VI

Resolution of the Question Regarding Material Cause

5. Concerning material cause it must be said that one and the same can in some way be the cause of multiple and contrary effects, not simultaneously, but successively. This is proved, for the same prime matter is the cause of multiple forms which succeed in it with the passage of time and of the composites which result from them. In this matter partly agrees with form, partly differs; it agrees indeed because it also causes by giving itself to the composite. Whence from this aspect it always confers the same being to the effect, namely its own potential being, which is always the same under whatever forms it exists; and therefore the effect is not diverse in matter itself, but in form. But matter differs from form because it only begins and as it were provides the foundation for the effect to be completed by form, on account of which, even if prime matter in various effects is of the same species, nevertheless the effects are simply different by reason of forms; and the forms themselves also, either according to their being, if they are material, or at least according to information, are properly effects of matter. And then matter, because it is a common subject, can successively underlie various forms, although form cannot change matter or successively inform multiple ones as such. And therefore the same matter numerically can simply be the cause of multiple effects, successively indeed, but not simultaneously, because it cannot simultaneously receive multiple forms, at least total and adequate ones. But we speak of substantial matter and form, for if the discourse is extended to the material cause of accidents, the same thing can indeed simultaneously be the material cause of multiple effects, because, as was said above, the same matter sustains quantity and substantial form, and the same subject can simultaneously sustain multiple accidents, as is known per se. Concerning which accidents this is to be understood, namely whether they are distinct in species, or genus, or number, was said above in disputation V.

6. And hence it is easily established how the same matter can successively be the cause of contrary effects; for we do not take contraries in every property, but as opposite terms in motion or generation are called contrary. Thus therefore matter is successively the cause both of form and also of the opposite privation, in that way in which privation can have a cause; for the same matter is the cause of generation and corruption of a thing. Whence it is also the cause of forms succeeding each other in the same matter, which, insofar as they formally conflict with each other, can in some way be called contrary. But the same subject of accidents will be called the material cause of contrary effects with greater propriety, because proper contraries are concerned with the same thing. Indeed, a material cause of this kind can in some way simultaneously be the cause of contrary effects, at least in remiss degrees, although those as such are not truly contrary.

Response to the Question Regarding Final Cause

7. Concerning the end it must be said that the same end can truly and properly be a cause in its genus both of multiple and of contrary effects; of multiple indeed both simultaneously and successively; of contrary ones only successively. All these things are easily established from what was said above concerning final cause, where we showed that there are multiple acts or actions of an agent which can be caused from the same end, namely choice of means, execution, and also intention itself and love of the end. Which actions, either all or some of them, it is not repugnant to occur simultaneously on account of the same end, since they are in some way subordinated among themselves. It is true that compared to the end they have in some way the nature of one adequate effect. Whence not only in voluntary things, but also in natural ones it happens that multiple actions occur on account of the same end; for since the end of generation is substantial form, on account of it occurs not only generation itself, but also the preceding alteration. This however is

always true of an end that is in some way extrinsic or which is not achieved by the very action itself, for an end that is so intrinsic is naturally achieved only by one action.

8. And in a proportional way it is easily evident how the same end, namely an extrinsic one, can be the cause of contrary actions, not indeed simultaneously, for that is repugnant, unless they occur in different subjects, for which reason they are not contrary. But in this it must be considered that it is one thing to speak of internal acts which are caused in the will itself by the end, another of external actions, which are means to achieving the end; for in the former, the same end, if it is properly and formally the same, cannot be the cause of contrary effects which are truly contrary; for effects contrary of this kind are love or hatred, joy and sadness, and similar ones; but the same end cannot move to love and hatred of itself, neither simultaneously nor at the same time, and consequently neither to other contrary acts which follow upon these. But I said if it is properly and formally the same end, because if it is taken only materially, the same thing which under one aspect of good moves to love of itself, under some aspect of evil will be able to move to hatred. I also said which are truly contrary, for the same end which moves to joy about achieving itself moves to sadness about losing itself, and so concerning others; nevertheless that joy and sadness are not properly contrary, just as sadness about sin and joy about good work are not formally contrary; but rather, one effect follows from another, if the object is supposed. But truly concerning external actions themselves, the same end formally and according to the same aspect of good can move to contrary actions at different times, as from affection for health we are now excited to motion, now to rest; nevertheless those contraries always fall under the causality of the end insofar as they are in some way one, that is, insofar as they agree in the nature of good useful for achieving the end.

The Question is Treated Regarding Efficient Cause

9. Concerning efficient cause the same general response cannot be given, but distinction is needed. First between free and natural cause, then between cause per se and per accidens, universal and particular; and judgment must be made differently concerning plurality of effects, differently concerning contrariety.

10. First therefore it must be said that every efficient cause, if it acts through its proper causality, can successively effect multiple effects, but not in the same way, for a particular and univocal cause can only effect multiple effects distinct in number, but an equivocal cause can also effect ones diverse in species. The whole assertion can easily be shown by induction. But I said if it acts through its proper causality, because when there is efficiency through natural resultance alone, sometimes it is a cause determined to only one numerically effect, as this rational soul to this numerically intellect or will; for other potencies numerically distinct cannot naturally emanate from this soul. But it can be said that this comes from the fact that these potencies can never be naturally separated from the soul; if however they were in fact separated by divine power and no other impediment were placed, immediately other potencies would flow from the same soul; and thus that active power is not from itself entirely defined to one numerically effect. This is probable, although it could be called into controversy, which does not matter for the present; for it is enough that a properly efficient principle is not limited from itself to one numerically effect. And the reason is because first it is not an intrinsic principle, nor does it confer its own real being, but another similar to itself, which it effects by its power; but after it has conferred such being to one effect, its power remains as complete as before, per se, as we speak; therefore if matter capable of another numerically distinct form is applied, it will equally be able to effect another effect. But if it is a cause which does not need matter for acting, much more will it be able to do this by its power and will alone.

11. And this reason is common to all causes, both univocal and equivocal. Nevertheless univocal causes, insofar as they are such,

are determined to one effect in species, because the nature of univocal cause consists in this, that it effects an effect similar to itself in the same species; for if it could also effect in another species, it would already be an equivocal cause. But truly an equivocal cause, since it is of superior nature than the effect, can from itself be universal in causing multiple species of effects, and the more eminent and superior it will be in power, the more it will be able to extend to more things. But I say that an equivocal cause can have this universality, and does not necessarily have it, because I do not see why it would be repugnant for there to be also an equivocal cause determined to one effect in species, so that on account of some eminence of its own, for example because its nature is ingenerable and incorruptible, or on account of another similar cause, it cannot produce a univocal effect entirely similar to itself in ultimate species, yet it can effect some effect of inferior order, of only one species however, because in that order its power is too limited and of the lowest. For I find no repugnance that some equivocal cause should be of this kind; but whether it is actually given or all extend to effects distinct in species is uncertain to me.

12. Nor does any difficulty of importance occur in this assertion, except that which was touched upon above concerning the determination of natural cause to one effect, if it itself is indifferent to multiple ones. For since in natural causes that philosophical principle is especially true: The same remaining the same always does the same, which was taken from Aristotle's Generation II, chapter 10, it does not appear how the same natural agent, remaining the same, can be determined to various effects, even at different times, or certainly to one out of many at the same time. But to this it has already been responded above, that such an agent is determined from the concurrence of other causes or circumstances, nor can it otherwise be determined by itself. But when it is said that the same remaining the same does the same, it must be understood that it remains the same not only in itself, but also in concurrence and in co-causes and

circumstances required for acting; which happens otherwise in a free agent, as was extensively explained above.

13. I say second: no efficient cause can simultaneously effect multiple effects adequate to its power; it can however effect multiple inadequate ones. The first part is proved because it is repugnant for an adequate effect to be multiplied, for if it is adequate, it is equal (so to speak) to the power of the agent; therefore it is clear repugnance that effects be adequate and be multiple; otherwise a thing would act beyond its power, and power beyond its adequate object. Whence not even God himself can simultaneously effect multiple effects adequate to his power; he can however effect multiple ones in whatever number, even if it proceeds to infinity, because no effect or multitude of effects is adequate to his power. And by the same proportional reasoning, finite power can be so superior with respect to only one effect, that it is not adequated as to the efficacy which it can exercise simultaneously and at the same time; then therefore it will be able to simultaneously effect multiple effects inadequate to its power up to that multitude which is adequate to the efficacy of the power; for finite power will always have some limit in this, because it is finite. And from this principle philosophers and theologians teach that man or even angel cannot simultaneously understand multiple things as multiple, yet can do so by way of one; which briefly has this sense, namely by way of one adequate effect, concerning which elsewhere. But a difference can be noted regarding this plurality of effects between free and natural agents; for a free agent per se and from its intention and freedom can be determined to multiple effects, if they can fall under its power; but truly a natural agent acts naturally and in the same way within the sphere of its activity; but because it happens that within that sphere there are distinct subjects, therefore from them it also effects multiple effects; in the way that one fire can effect multiple heats in different subjects, if they are contained within the sphere of its activity.

14. Third it must be said that only a free agent per se and properly can effect contrary effects, either successively in the same

thing or simultaneously and disjunctively even in the same thing, or simultaneously and conjunctively in different things. This is taken from the Philosopher, Metaphysics IX, text 3, where in this sense he says it is proper to rational powers to be able toward opposites. And it is also established from those things which we said above concerning causes acting freely or naturally. And it is briefly explained, for these opposites can be taken either privatively or contrarily; which correspond to two modes or parts of freedom, namely as to exercise or as to specification. In the first way therefore it is clear that only a free agent as such can toward opposites, speaking per se, that is, with all things required for acting being posited; for it can both love and not love and universally operate and not operate. But a natural agent can only operate if requisites are present; if truly they are not present, it can only not operate; and therefore it is said to be able toward such opposites only per accidens, namely from the defect of something necessary for operating. Aristotle taught this difference in Metaphysics IX, chapter 9, in these very brief words: "All powers of contradiction are those which are according to reason, certainly per se and from their own power"; whence he adds: "But irrational ones, by the very fact that they are present and absent, will be of the same contradiction," that is, because either they themselves can be applied and not applied, or the necessary matter or other things required for acting. This passage of Aristotle is worthy of notation, for from it the definition of free faculty exposed by us above is plainly collected. Whence a free agent is said to be the cause not only of its operation, but also of the lack of operation, when it freely has it, because namely not from defect, but from its power, which it has for suspending its action, it is the cause of such lack of action. Nor is it necessary that this causality be through positive and real influx, but through suspension of influx from the power of the cause itself, for causality ought to be proportioned to the effect; since therefore the effect is privative, it ought not to be caused through positive influx, but through suspension of influx, which is in the power of the cause itself; but a

natural cause cannot so properly be said to cause privation of its operation, because truly that privation does not come from its power, but rather from impotence or from another defect.

15. And in this way I think must be understood what Aristotle says about the helmsman of a ship, that he is the cause of contraries; because just as his presence is the cause of conservation, so his absence is the cause of submersion of the ship itself. For this is not to be understood only of the absence and presence of the helmsman of the ship, for in this way the same would not be assigned as cause of contraries, but contrary causes of contrary effects would be assigned; because absence and presence are contrary between themselves, just as conservation and submersion of the ship; it is therefore to be understood of the helmsman himself, who both through presence is the cause of conservation and through absence is said to be the cause of submersion of the ship. This can be true insofar as the helmsman himself is the cause of his absence, just as of his presence, for if he were not the cause of his absence, he would not be considered the cause of the detriment or submersion following therefrom. But it must be noted that that causality which is said to be through absence, if it is considered with respect to privation or lack of action, such as not defending or not steering the ship, so can be causality per se, even physical, in that way in which among privations there can be order per se of one to another. But truly with respect to positive effect following therefrom, such as sinking of the ship, that is only cause per accidens, speaking physically, for the per se cause are winds, etc. But morally the helmsman will be called cause per se, if he could and was bound to be present and steer the ship, as is treated more broadly in moral science. Wherefore that mode of attributing contrary effects to the same cause present or absent, properly and per se speaking, has place only in moral causes; for the sun will not so properly be said to cause darkness by its absence, because it itself is not the cause of its absence; whence although darkness follows from absence, nevertheless not from causality of the sun, but of him who was the cause of that absence.

16. In the latter way contrariety is properly between positive effects or repugnant forms; and in this way also a free agent per se and by proper power and with all things required for acting being posited can effect contrary effects, either by eliciting them through free power, in which way it can either love or hate, or by commanding them, in which way man can either assent or dissent to the same thing proposed, and a doctor (which is Aristotle's example) can by the same art of medicine heal a sick person or kill him. And thus it can effect contraries in those three ways posited above, namely either successively concerning the same thing, for it can now love, later hate the same thing; or for the same instant and concerning the same thing, not however conjunctively but divisively, because it can in the same instant exercise either love or hatred; but both simultaneously is repugnant; whence conjunctively and for the same instant it can do this only concerning different things, as a doctor can simultaneously apply to one a healthful medicine, to another a harmful one. Thus therefore a free cause per se and by proper power can work contrary acts or effects. But it is otherwise in a naturally acting cause, because it is by its nature determined to one, and therefore per se cannot effect contraries. And although sometimes contrary effects seem to come from the same natural cause on account of its eminent power, nevertheless either they do not occur concerning the same thing and disposed in the same way, but concerning different things affected in different ways, and thus they do not occur properly as they are contrary, in the way the sun dries mud and liquefies wax; or one occurs per se and another per accidens, as we said above concerning effect through antiperistasis; or certainly such a cause does not effect both of the contraries by itself alone, but with other causes and dispositions concurring; for thus the sun concurs to various and repugnant forms in these lower things; concerning which we said nearly all things above, and concerning the special difficulty which seems to be in the motion of the heart, it was said in disputation XVIII.

17. Only against the first part can it be objected that Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 3, signifies that even rational powers cannot per se toward both of contraries, but toward one per se and toward the other per accidens. Nevertheless, as we noted there, that per se and per accidens are not taken there in that signification by which they distinguish cause beyond intention and beyond proper influx and operating power from cause per se, but as they distinguish primary and secondary inclination of operating power; and will will be said in this way to love per se, but to hate per accidens, not because it does not per se and by proper influx elicit the act of hatred, but because pursuit per se first befits appetitive power, but flight consequently and quasi per accidens, that is, by reason of another.

DISPUTATION XXVII
ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES AMONG THEMSELVES

Only two comparisons remain to be made among the causes themselves: one in perfection, the other in causality; from which it will also simultaneously be established how they are compared in priority, or which of them should be considered prior. In these comparisons, however, it must be observed that they are to be understood generally, namely by comparing one kind of cause with another; for to descend specifically to individual causes of individual kinds would be an infinite matter and beyond scientific inquiry.

SECTION I
WHICH OF THE FOUR CAUSES IS MORE PERFECT

1. These causes can be compared either in the nature and perfection of being, or in the nature of causing and the perfection they have in that regard; and this latter comparison is formal (so to speak), and pertains properly to the present matter; nevertheless, because causality follows upon the nature of being and is a property or attribute of it, therefore greater perfection in causing usually follows

from greater perfection in being; and therefore we cannot make the latter comparison in such a way as to omit the former entirely.

Intrinsic Causes are Compared to Extrinsic Ones

2. First, therefore, it is certain that, comparing matter and form to efficient and final causes, the former are less perfect causes of their kind, both in being and in causality. This is proved because when a comparison is made between genera, that one is to be preferred to another in which the form and most perfect species exceeds the most perfect of the other genus, as is gathered from the doctrine of Aristotle, book I of De Caelo, chapter 11, texts 115 and 116, where he teaches that the perfections of powers are to be measured by what is maximum in each; but the supreme efficient cause and the supreme final cause surpass any matter or form, as is self-evident; therefore [the conclusion follows]. Likewise, in the genus of being, matter and form are incomplete beings and in some way imperfect, and they include this intrinsically by virtue of their very natures and in their entire extension; but efficient and final causes do not, rather the more an entity is complete, actual and perfect, the more apt it will be, properly speaking, for exercising the perfect nature of efficient or final cause. Likewise, matter and form include imperfection in their very mode of causing, because they do not cause except by composing; but efficient and final causes, which are extrinsic causes, properly speaking involve no imperfection in their causality.

Form & Matter are Compared Among Themselves

3. Second, comparing matter to form, it must be said that form surpasses matter both in the nature of being and in the nature of cause. This assertion has its place especially in substantial matter and form; concerning which sufficient treatment has been given above, when we dealt with these causes, where we showed both parts from

the fact that form has more actuality than matter; whence it is form that completes the essence of a thing and which is the principle of all operations and perfections of the composite. From this it is understood that this comparison in the nature of cause should be understood with respect to the composite, namely, insofar as these two are causes of it; for if the comparison is made between matter and form, especially material form, with respect to each other, thus the causality of matter toward form seems more proper than that of form toward matter, because the dependence of such form on matter is more a priori, as from a proper sustaining principle; but the dependence of matter on form is more a posteriori as from a condition or actuality required for the connatural and due state of matter, as has been said above. Nor does this prevent matter from being simply less perfect in the genus of being, although in some qualified sense it may exceed in some condition.

4. Whether accidental form is more perfect than its subject, or less perfect. Therefore, if this comparison is extended to accidental form and its subject, it must be understood proportionally with respect to the concrete thing, as formally constituted in such a nature; for thus it is more perfectly caused by accidental form than by the subject, and under the same consideration accidental form exceeds the subject, insofar as it is compared to it as act to potency; nevertheless that excess is only in a qualified sense, for absolutely in the perfection of being, the primary subject of accident is substance, which is simply more perfect. And also in the nature of causing, the subject is more a cause of the accident than conversely, because the subject simply sustains the accident in its being, but the accident as such only accidentally perfects the subject, and at most sometimes is a necessary condition or disposition for the conservation of its subject. And from these two comparisons it is permitted to gather that, speaking absolutely of the genera of causes, matter is in the first and lowest grade, form is in the second; therefore it only remains for us to compare final and efficient causes among themselves.

Final & Efficient Causes are Compared Among Themselves

5. Final and efficient causes do not necessarily exceed each other in entitative perfection. I say third: if final and efficient causes are compared in entitative perfection, neither is more perfect than the other, but they are of the same perfection, although in the nature of final cause that perfection is expressed more formally than in the nature of efficient cause. The first part is proved because final and efficient causes, taken in their entire extension, are not necessarily distinguished in the nature of being; for often they coincide in the same thing, which happens especially in the most perfect efficient cause and in the most perfect final cause; for these two natures are joined in one and the same thing, namely in God; therefore comparing these two causes in their genus and in the summit of each, neither exceeds the other. And the proper reason seems to be that each of these causes from its genus expresses perfection without imperfection, and each, in order to have the highest perfection possible in its genus, requires infinite perfection simply in the genus of being, and therefore neither from its genus necessarily exceeds the other.

6. But the latter part is explained, for in the final cause the proper and formal nature of causing is its goodness and perfection, as has been said above, but the efficient cause causes through its form or nature as such; and therefore the final cause is said to express perfection and goodness more formally than the efficient cause, which pertains more to the distinction from our concepts than from the thing itself. From this, however, it is understood proportionally that in other agents and ends often these two causes are also of the same perfection, insofar as any agent in some way operates for itself, or insofar as it operates for a univocal end or one similar or equal to itself; but sometimes the efficient cause surpasses the final in

perfection, when the end is proximate and not ultimate; but more often and more connaturally the end exceeds the agent cause in perfection, for when the agent cause is not supremely perfect, in order that it may operate in the best way, it operates for some more excellent good.

7. I say fourth: if final and efficient causes are compared in the nature of causing, in many things they also have equality, but in others they mutually exceed each other according to their proper and precise formal natures, but simply the final cause is considered first and principal in causing. To proceed more briefly, let us explain this entire conclusion in God, who is the supreme final and efficient cause. For although all things that are in God, as they are in him, are equally perfect or rather one perfection, nevertheless as various attributes are conceived by us according to their proper and precise natures, we understand one to be more eminent than another from its genus, or the office or work of one to be more eminent than that of another, in the way that theologians say mercy is the greatest virtue in God. Thus therefore comparing the nature of efficient and final cause, they will be found equal first in effects, because the most perfect efficient cause cannot have more or nobler effects than the supremely perfect final cause can also have, and conversely; for no effect is from God as efficient that is not for him as ultimate end, and conversely. Indeed, it can be added further that there is equality also in this, that, just as all effects of all efficient causes are from the first efficient, so all effects of all final causes are from the supreme end; and with changed proportion, just as all effects of all final causes are in their genus from the first efficient, so all effects of all efficient causes are in their genus from the supreme end. Third, there is also a certain equality in this, that each of these causes from its genus expresses perfection simply, whence neither includes imperfection, such as limitation or dependence, or anything similar, and just as one is connected (so to speak) with the other in causing, so also conversely the other with it; nevertheless neither can be called properly dependent on the other,

but the effects themselves are necessarily dependent on both, or on God under both aspects. And thus the first part of the assertion is clear.

8. In what the efficient exceeds the final cause. The second is explained, because the nature of efficient cause seems to exceed greatly in this, that its influence is most proper and real through essential dependence and emanation of the effect from it, whence the efficient is most properly said to give being to the effect, and Aristotle defined it as the principle from which motion or production or making of a thing begins. And from this also arose the fact that the effect, since it is the adequate correlative of cause, is named by antonomasia from effecting, on account of which the Stoics judged only the efficient cause worthy of the name of cause, as is clear from Seneca, letter 66, and Laertius, in the life of Zeno. But the final cause exceeds first in this, that it is like the ultimate terminus toward which all action of the efficient is directed, so that, if it is right to speak thus, we can say the efficient serves the end, and God himself in some way ministers to himself, while whatever he does he operates for himself. And for this reason, since an effect is in some way for its cause (for the particle "for" can generally indicate causality), nevertheless by antonomasia it is said only of the final cause that it is that for which a thing is made, and hence also Socrates called only the final cause "cause," in Plato's Phaedo. Then and especially the final cause seems to surpass in this, that it is the first beginning and principle of all action; because it excites and allures the very efficient to effecting; which, although in the first efficient it is found without causality of the end into the efficient itself, but only into its external action, nevertheless according to that aspect we understand the first mover or (so to speak) the first procurer of all causality to be the end. Which therefore is customarily called the first and cause of causes, as Albert noted, book II Physics, tract 2, chapter 5, where he considers certain other orders among these causes; but those which we have explained seem to be the principal ones.

9. Cause is said analogically of the four genera. But it can finally be asked here, which we referred to this point above, whether this inequality of causes is so great as to constitute analogy among them in the nature of cause. To which it must be briefly said with the common opinion that the nature of cause is not univocal, but analogical, first indeed for the reason treated above, that cause of accidents and of substances is not univocally cause. Second, because the nature of cause said of God and of matter and form cannot be univocal for the same reason by which neither the nature of being or of any other real predicate common to God and creatures can be univocal. These two reasons prove not only that the nature of cause in common, but also that the nature of efficient cause (and the same is true of the final cause) is not univocal, whether as it is common to efficient cause of accidents and of substance, or as it is common to the first cause and to secondary ones, because of the essential dependence of the secondary on the first. This is especially true if they are compared in the power of causing, for if they are compared in the action itself, the analogy is not so proper, because the action itself is something created, and often one and the same action is from both causes, which has been touched upon above.

10. Moreover, comparing matter and form among themselves, no analogy appears between them in the nature of cause; nevertheless, if they are compared with efficient and final causes, another aspect of analogy seems surely to intervene here. For the efficient most properly influences being; but matter and form do not so properly influence being as they compose it through themselves, and therefore according to this aspect the name of cause seems to be said first of the efficient; but to have been transferred to matter or form through a certain proportionality. Whence, although those two causes are properly essential parts and intrinsic principles of a natural thing, they seem to be called causes through the said analogy, although now according to common usage the name of cause should simply be attributed to them.

11. But truly comparing efficient and final cause among themselves, it seems to me indeed, if we attend to the imposition and force of the name, that it was said first and chiefly of the efficient cause, whose influence is both more known and most real and most properly reaching the very being which it communicates to the effect. As regards the thing signified, however, it has already been said that it belongs properly and in some way primarily to the final cause. But I do not see what necessity there is for constituting proper analogy between these two causes proposed by us, namely final and efficient, if they are compared by themselves and other things being equal on the part of the effect and according to the total perfection which each can have in its order, which is to compare the nature of final and efficient cause as they are in God. For the nature of cause belongs properly and intrinsically to each, and in that they can be conceived as having some true and proper agreement, and they do not have essential dependence among themselves in that aspect, although they have connection, as we have explained; therefore there is no reason for analogy between them; therefore under that aspect the name will be univocal. For it does not contradict that a name otherwise analogical to many things should belong univocally to some, as we will say below when treating of the analogy of being and accident. And let these things about this comparison be sufficient.

SECTION II

WHETHER CAUSES CAN BE MUTUALLY CAUSES OF EACH OTHER

1. The reason for doubting in favor of the negative position. The reason for doubting is that a cause, as was said above, is prior to its effect and consequently the effect is posterior to the cause; therefore, that which is an effect cannot be the cause of its own cause; otherwise it would be simultaneously prior and posterior, or not every cause

would be prior to its effect. Nor will it suffice if someone responds that it is not repugnant for the same thing to be prior and posterior by nature only and according to diverse considerations, for the priority of nature which is required in a cause with respect to its effect is not merely a priority according to one or another consideration, but is an absolute priority, which can be called a priority of presupposition, insofar as, speaking absolutely, being must be presupposed in the cause so that it can cause. Hence it can be concluded thus: in a cause, being is absolutely presupposed for the being of the effect, for an effect does not have being except through causality, and for causality simply being is presupposed in the cause; therefore, for the being of an effect, being is simply presupposed in the cause; therefore, a cause must simply and in every respect be prior by nature to the effect, for priority of nature does not seem to be anything other than a certain priority of presupposition; therefore, it cannot happen that a cause is the effect of its own cause.

2. Arguments for the affirmative position. On the contrary, however, is the fact that Aristotle, when treating of causes, taught that axiom which has been received by the other philosophers. Wherefore we do not so much investigate whether this is true, as in what sense it should be understood; which we will accomplish better by comparing individual causes among themselves, for, speaking in general, it is neither necessary nor possible for all causes to be mutually causes of each other, whether they be compared according to diverse genera or within the same genus, because first of all not all causes have a cause, as is evident concerning the first efficient cause and the ultimate end. Then, although some cause, an efficient one for example, has a cause, nevertheless it does not have a cause caused by itself, nor does it always have a material or formal cause. Therefore, that axiom should not be understood universally, but indefinitely or without repugnance, because, namely, it is not repugnant for some causes to be mutually causes of each other, or certainly that in some cases it is even

necessary, and therefore it remains to be seen in which cases it is not repugnant or is necessary.

The Meaning of the Question is Explained

3. It must be noted, however, that causes can be understood to be mutually causes of each other in two ways: first, formally only (so to speak) or according to the general notions of causes; second, in particular and according to the same things causing and caused. The prior sense is easy and without difficulty, but it is not principally intended in the present case, because in it is only asserted that an efficient cause, for example, can have a material cause, and conversely a material cause can have an efficient cause, and so forth with others, which is manifest in all genera, for matter is also produced and many efficient causes are things caused by matter, and insofar as they are actually causes, their causality is also caused by matter. Nor does the difficulty touched upon above proceed in this sense, because the same thing is not compared in the notion of cause and caused, but one thing is compared to another as to its effect in a certain genus of cause, to another however as to its cause in another genus, which genus of cause is participated by the effect of the other; thus there is no inconvenience that some material cause should be posterior to some efficient cause by which it is made and prior to another which it materially causes. Therefore, causes ought to be compared individually and in the same things. Again, however, among these very things a comparison can be understood either according to the same thing or according to diverse things; according to the same thing, as if one is the cause of the being of another and vice versa is caused by that one as to its being, for, since each cause causes through its own being, if according to that same being it is also caused by its effect, such things, both the same and according to the same thing, will be mutually causes of each other; according to diverse things, however, they will be if one is the cause of another according to its being, while the other is

the cause of the former only according to causality toward some other superadded perfection, all of which will be more clearly evident from examples in what follows.

How Matter & Form are Mutually Causes of Each Other

4. I say therefore first: matter and form are mutually causes of each other and in some way according to the same thing, but not entirely. This assertion is first declared in prime matter and material substantial forms, concerning which it is certain that they are caused by matter both as to their being, because they are made from it and are sustained in it, and as to their causality, because their information depends on matter in the same way. Conversely, however, form is also a cause of matter in its genus, because it informs and actuates it and because without that information matter cannot naturally exist. In which it must be considered that two things are contained in this causality of form regarding matter: one is that form perfects matter itself by informing it; the other is that, through this mediated information, matter retains its being. Insofar as they are mutually causes of each other, nevertheless not according to the same thing, because that perfection which form formally provides to matter is something distinct from the very being of matter, because it is nothing other than the form itself or its information, whence under this consideration form is not so much a cause of matter absolutely and simply, as of informed matter. And thus matter is a cause of form simply and according to its being, while form is a cause of matter only insofar as it is formed, and according to this consideration we say they are not mutually causes according to the same thing.

5. But truly according to another thing which matter has through form, they can be said to mutually cause and be caused according to the same thing, for matter through its being causes form, and in the same respect it can be said to be caused by that form insofar

as it cannot have that being without it, for this is a sign of dependence and of some causality. Nevertheless, if what we said above about these causes is true, in this quasi-circle there is not entirely the same property and similarity, for matter through its being directly and per se causes the very being of form, so that in no respect should or can the being of form be understood as something presupposed to the influence of matter, but as caused through that influence. But truly conversely, the being of matter must simply be conceived as presupposed to the being of such a form, because it is the principle of that very material influence, without which such a form does not come to be; so much so that its natural production, if conceived according to its proper nature, cannot be so abstracted that it does not presuppose matter, because it is essentially an eduction from the potency of matter. Therefore, the being of matter depends on form only as on a condition and superadded actuality, without which it cannot naturally exist, which is called by many (as I noted above) dependence a posteriori and not a priori. On account of this reason, therefore, I said that, although this mutual causality is in some way according to the same thing, nevertheless not entirely, because namely it is directly and immediately according to diverse things, but consequently it terminates in some way to the same thing insofar as the very being of matter depends in some way on form.

6. The assertion is explained in prime matter and the rational soul. And according to these things the conclusion is easily explained in matter and subsistent substantial form; for that form is not caused by matter according to its being, but only according to information; it is however a cause of matter in the same way as other substantial forms, and thus the difficulty in that mutual causality is somewhat less. Between subject and accident also that mutual causality intervenes in a proportional way, for the subject is the material cause of the accident and most properly causes the coming-to-be and being of that accident, because it sustains it; the accident, however, is not properly a cause of the subject according to its being, it is nevertheless a cause in some

way actuating and perfecting it, which is rather to be a formal cause of that being which it confers on the subject, than of the subject itself. Sometimes, however, this causality redounds in some way to the very subject, when, namely, such is the connection between subject and accident that the subject cannot naturally remain without such an accident or disposition, and then in some way such mutual causality can be said to be according to the same being of the subject; nevertheless that causality is not so much causality properly and dependence a priori, as a certain necessary condition according to the natural order, as has often been said.

How End & Efficient Cause are Mutually Causes of Each Other

7. I say second: end and efficient cause are mutually causes of each other not only according to diverse things, but also according to the same thing. This assertion as to its first part is Aristotle's, Metaphysics V, chapter 2, and Physics II, chapter 3, where he does not adduce examples of this mutual causality except between end and efficient cause. It is commonly explained according to diverse things, namely, that the end is a cause of the efficient cause as to its causality, while the efficient cause is a cause of the end as to its being. Thus approximately St. Thomas on Aristotle; and Alensis, in Metaphysics; and Albertus, Physics II, tract. II, chapter 6; but I do not think it should be entirely excluded that in some way these two causes are mutually causes of each other even according to the same thing, as will be evident from what we shall say. Now the common opinion is easily declared as to what it affirms. For the end which an agent has in acting is not a cause of its being, for it presupposes being in that agent so that it can both act and be metaphorically moved by the end to act, if it is capable of such motion. That the end is a cause of the efficient cause as to causality is evident, because it excites and moves the efficient cause to act. That conversely the end is an effect of the agent according to its

being is evident, because the same form which moves the agent to act is the terminus of its action. The reason a priori, finally, is that the end, in order to cause, does not require actual existence, but only being in apprehension, and therefore, before it exists in reality, it can move in its genus the agent to act and again can receive existence from it through true efficiency.

8. Several objections against the resolution concerning efficient and final cause. But it is objected first against both parts. First, because the end does not confer on the efficient cause in any way that it should be that from which motion first proceeds, but it has this from itself or from other prior causes; therefore the end is not a cause of the efficient cause as to causality. Second, for otherwise it follows that God, insofar as he is efficient, is caused by an end, which can in no way be said. Third, conversely, it seems that the end is not only a cause of the efficient cause as to causality, but also as to being, as is evident in Aristotle's example; for laboring or walking is an effective cause of health; it is caused, however, by health in the genus of end; it is caused, however, not only as to causality, but also as to being; for the very being of walking or its becoming (which in it is the same thing) is for the sake of health. Fourth, it also seems false that the end is from the efficient cause as to its being, for the end of the one operating is the very agent itself, which cannot be from itself effectively.

9. On account of the first objection, some universally deny that the end is a cause of the efficient cause as to causality; indeed in all causes they deny that they are mutually causes of each other as to causality, because neither does matter have from form that it should sustain form nor form from matter that it should inform. But I fear there is equivocation in these terms; for we can speak either of causality in first act or in second act. When therefore it is said that one cause is a cause of another as to its causality, properly and per se the discourse is about causality in second act; but the arguments proceed about first act. For thus it is true that matter does not have from form the sustaining, that is, that force which it has for sustaining form, and,

conversely, form does not have from matter the force which it has for informing. Although this latter is not universally true, but only in the rational soul, for other forms, just as they have their being dependently on matter, so also all their force and substantial aptitude, as is sufficiently evident per se. Whence, if it is also said conversely that matter has its being from form, it must be admitted that it also has from that form the force of sustaining form; but we do not speak thus, because we do not think, speaking properly, that matter has properly its peculiar being from form, but has that being dependently on form as on a posterior condition, as has often been declared. But truly, as to actual causality, it is false that matter and form are not mutually causes of each other, for matter is in its genus an actual cause of the information of form, because form cannot inform unless matter causes materially the very information of form; and conversely, matter similarly cannot actually sustain form, unless the same form causes in its genus the very sustentation of matter, whatever that may be. Whence, considering the reality, this mutual causality in causing is nothing other than the mutual concourse of each cause to their proper causalities.

10. Thus therefore it is easily evident how the end is a cause of the efficient cause as to its causality, whatever may be the case concerning the power of causing, about which I shall speak below. The end is therefore a cause alluring the power of the agent so that it may cause, and consequently in its genus influencing its actual causality. From which I further conclude that the efficient cause can also be said in its genus to be a cause of the end as to actual causality. For although the power of causing of the end, as it precedes in intention, is not from the efficient cause itself, nevertheless the actual causality of the end cannot be without the efficiency of the agent, as was demonstrated above; and therefore, just as the efficient cause is constituted in second act, with the concurrence of the end, on account of which it causes and for this reason is said to be caused by the end as to its causality, so conversely the final cause is not constituted in second act unless with

the concurrence of the efficient cause in its genus to its causality; therefore they have in this mutual causality between themselves in their genera, just as matter and form do between themselves. And as to this part what I said in the conclusion is especially true, that end and efficient cause are mutually causes of each other, not only according to diverse things, but also according to the same thing.

11. Second. To the second objection it can be responded, first, that the conclusion posited need not be understood universally of every end and of every efficient cause. For what we noted in the beginning, that Aristotle's proposition is not universal about all causes, can also be applied to the present conclusion, because, as we shall immediately say, not every efficient cause gives being to the end for which it operates, and in a similar way not every agent is moved by an end to operate through the proper causality of the end. Second, however, it is said, speaking of God as efficient, not as to the power of effecting nor as to the internal will of causing, but as to his actual and transient causality, that it is true that this causality by which God is denominated as actually efficient is caused by God himself as end, for this causality of God is nothing other than his action passing from himself and received in the creature, which is also truly caused by God himself, as by an end, as was seen in the preceding sections. And thus also in God it is true that he is not constituted as actually acting unless with the concurrence of himself as end to his active causality, and conversely he is not constituted as actually an end unless with the concurrence of himself actively to his final causality.

12. To the third objection it must be conceded entirely what it intends; for there is some efficient cause which has its whole being from an end in the genus of final cause, which it both causes and for which it causes. Which can be shown not only by Aristotle's example, but also by others; for the end of the intellect, for example, is to understand; indeed in general a created potency or agent is said to be for the sake of operation; therefore in the genus of end the intellect is caused by understanding, not only as to causality but also as to being,

for it is made and exists for the sake of intellection. And hence it is also understood that sometimes the end is a cause of the agent, not only as to actual causality in second act, but also as to the power of causing in first act, as, for example, health is the final cause of rhubarb, not only as actually expelling or applied to expel choler, but also as to the very innate power which it has for that effect, for it received that power from the author of nature for this end, that it might cause health. And this second point is concluded a fortiori from the first, as I was saying above in a similar case; for, if the very being of the thing, which is an efficient cause, is caused finally by its own effect, much more can the effective power for causing, which follows upon the very being, be caused by the same end. And in this also is verified what we said in the conclusion, that end and efficient cause can be mutually causes of each other according to the same thing, for the end in its genus causes the efficient cause as to its being, and the efficient cause in its genus causes the end as to its real being. And the reason is the same as was touched upon above, because the end, in order to cause, is not presupposed to exist according to real being, and therefore if it is presupposed as apprehended in the efficient cause of another efficient cause of that very end, it can finally move that cause or finally concur with it to give being to the thing from which afterwards the same end proceeds according to real existence, and thus the house in the mind of the craftsman is the final cause of making a saw, for example, by which saw the house itself is afterwards efficiently made.

13. Wherefore, when grave authors say that end and efficient cause are mutually causes of each other according to diverse things, they are to be explained as having explained what more per se belongs to these causes and more formally as actually causing, but not as having excluded every other mode of mutual causality which can be had between these causes. Thus it is specially attributed to the end that it is a cause of the agent as to actual causality or action, because this is always and per se necessary, since every action is in some way for the sake of an end; that it should be a cause of the very being of the agent,

however, is not thus per se or necessary, although it often happens thus. And although the agent also concurs to the causality of the end, as we have declared, nevertheless this is more attributed to the end, because it is first in moving and influencing the causality of the agent, as was also declared above. Conversely, however, the efficient cause is said to cause the end according to its being, because this per se and always belongs to it, because it cannot operate for the sake of an end, unless in some way it effects the very end.

14. This, however (so that we may now respond to the fourth objection), is to be understood of the end of which (finis cuius), or also of the end by which or formal end, which is the attainment of the objective end. For the end for which (finis cui) is not made by the efficient cause, as that fourth objection correctly proves; nor is the objective end made, but obtained; the end of which, however, is the intrinsic terminus to which the action of the agent tends and is terminated, and therefore per se and according to its being it is an effect of the agent. And similarly, when a good is loved or desired not that it may be made, but that it may be possessed, the very attainment or possession of the end is made by the very agent, because the whole intention and application of means tends to that; and then in that series there is a certain end for the sake of which and on account of which the operation is made.

How Matter & End are Mutually Causes of Each Other

15. Third, it must be said that end and matter can mutually be causes of each other. This is proved, because Aristotle says that form and end coincide numerically in the same thing; but form is not only the end of generation but also of matter itself, because matter by its nature is for the sake of form as for an end, and simultaneously it is also for the sake of the composite, because these two do not conflict, but are subordinated. Therefore matter is an effect of form and of the

composite in the genus of final cause; but the same matter is the material cause of form and of the composite; therefore there is reciprocation between these two causes in the notion of cause and caused. This indeed is general on the part of matter, but not on the part of the end, but only then when such is the end that matter consists of it or depends on it; for every matter is ordered to some form or composite, as to an end, and therefore in any matter with respect to such there always intervenes the said mutual causality; but not every end consists of matter or depends on it, as is per se evident; and therefore on its part that reciprocation cannot be universal. And thus with this assertion explained, no difficulty remains in it and its foundation is the same as was touched upon above, because the end, in order to cause, does not presuppose existing really, and therefore it can be a cause of its matter, although it is really caused by it in its genus.

Mutual Causality Between Form & End is Excluded

16. I say fourth: form and end, properly and per se speaking, can never be mutually causes of each other. I speak of form as it exercises the genus of formal cause, and therefore I said properly and per se speaking; for sometimes it happens that one form which is an effect of another in the genus of final cause, is a cause of the same form which is the end; nevertheless it is never a formal cause of it, but either efficient, or material. As the light of glory is an effect of the beatific vision in the genus of final cause, and is also a cause of it, not formal, but efficient; and the intellect also is an effect of the same vision in the genus of end, because it is made for its sake, and is a cause of it both material and efficient, but it cannot be formal. And the reason for the conclusion is, for either form is considered as it is the end of generation, or as it is ordered to another form or operation as to an end. In the prior way form and end fall into numerically the same

thing, and therefore that form cannot be a formal cause of that end, because it cannot be a formal cause of itself; which is otherwise in final causality; for the same form as antecedent in intention is a cause of itself in execution according to final causality, which does not require preexistence in reality. But truly in the genus of formal cause, form cannot cause itself, but the composite, because its causality consists in composition and union to matter.

17. But so that the conclusion as to this part may lack all difficulty, it is to be understood of form compared to its proper effect, as is the composite, which I say because if it is compared to the very union or actual information, it is indeed in the genus of end an effect of it, for form exists in order to inform, and it is made for this end, and yet the very information is from form in the genus of formal cause; nevertheless it is not so properly an effect of it as its causality; if nevertheless the very union or information is also called an effect of form in the genus of formal cause, as to such an effect, the posited conclusion must be limited on account of the special connection which it has with the very form, as it exercises the notion of form. For, just as the efficient cause exists for the sake of operation, and therefore between them there is mutual causality, for just as[33] operation is the final cause of the active potency and the potency is the efficient cause of operation, so form, for the sake of information and in its genus, is a cause of it. But truly, comparing form as it is the end of generation to the same proper form as informing, the said mutual causality cannot intervene, because it is one and the same form entirely.

18. If, however, we compare two forms, one of which is ordered to the other as to an end, that mutual causality also cannot intervene, because one form cannot be a formal cause of another insofar as it is also a form; for if it happens that one form is informed by another accidental one, it is necessary that that which is informed exercises under that consideration material causality, not formal. I know that some speak in such a way that they say immanent acts

[33] icut add. Castellote.

depend on the soul or on a vital potency in the genus of formal cause, when nevertheless those very immanent acts are accidental formal causes; and similarly it is customary to say that the passions or potencies of the soul depend on it in the genus of formal cause, when nevertheless they inform it. But these locutions are improper, for neither acts nor potencies depend on form except either materially or effectively, because truly that efficiency is very intrinsic or through natural resultance, it is customarily called a secondary effect of form, nevertheless properly and in rigor it does not pertain to the formal effect.

Mutual Causality between Efficient Cause & Material & Formal Causes is Excluded

19. I say fifth: an efficient cause cannot have mutual causality with matter or form, but only with final cause, as we have already explained. The sense of the conclusion is that if some cause truly and properly effects some form, it cannot be caused by that form in the genus of formal cause; and, conversely, if some form formally constitutes some thing, it cannot be effectively made by that thing. And regarding these two parts there is no difficulty in the conclusion established. And the reason is, first, because an efficient cause is supposed to exist absolutely in order to effect something; therefore it cannot be formally constituted through the form which it effects. The consequence is clear, because if that thing is to be constituted in its being through form, then the form is already supposed to be constituted, because it is already supposed to have being; therefore it cannot be formally constituted through a form made by itself. Second, because form is a principle of acting; therefore a form, which is the terminus of action, cannot be the formal cause of the very agent; for this reason Aristotle said, in Physics II, chapter 7, text 70, that the form which is made does not coincide numerically with the efficient cause, but specifically. From these reasons, however, it is easily

gathered that the conclusion should be understood concerning formal causality with regard to the proper being of the efficient cause itself, for if we speak of formal causality with regard to some other being superadded to the efficient cause itself, it can often happen that a form made by an efficient cause informs its own cause, as love informs the will by which it is made, but it does not inform it with regard to giving it that being through which it is caused by it; hence it does not inform it insofar as it is efficient, but it can be a subject and material cause.

20. In a similar way the conclusion should be understood when comparing efficient cause to material cause. For if some thing effects some matter, it cannot be materially caused by that matter; and conversely, if one thing materially causes another, it cannot be effectively made by that other. And indeed, if we speak only of prime matter, the matter is most evident, because prime matter can only be made through creation, and therefore its cause is most remote from all dependence on matter; therefore it is impossible that whatever is caused from such matter should be an efficient cause of matter, not only of the same numerically, but of any whatsoever; however, extending the conclusion (as it should indeed be understood) to every material or subjective cause, the general reason is because an efficient cause is supposed to exist simply and absolutely for acting, and therefore if it needs some cause or material causality in order to exist, such a cause is presupposed before all its efficiency, and consequently such a thing cannot be the efficient cause of its own matter. And this is confirmed, for material cause is intrinsic, if compared to the composite, or is intimately conjoined, if compared to form; therefore whether the thing which is called efficient cause is composite or form, it cannot effect the matter or subject on which it depends. The consequence is clear, because the intrinsic constitution or union of a thing is simply prior to its efficiency; likewise also because intrinsic constitution cannot be effectively from the very thing which is constituted; nor can intrinsic material union be effectively from the

very form which is united, otherwise even the very eduction of form could be effectively from the same form which is educed.

21. Ultimate disposition is not effectively from form. But against this part certain instances are usually brought forward: One is concerning form and ultimate disposition; but about this much has been said in disputation XIII, on material cause, where we showed it to be more probable that ultimate disposition, which truly prepares matter, is not effectively from form; but that which is effectively from form is not preparatory of matter, nor does it participate in material causality, but is a disposition that adorns and as it were fosters and contributes to the union of form with matter.

22. Whether the expulsion of one form is the material cause of the introduction of another. Another instance concerns the introduction of one form and the expulsion of another, for this expulsion is as it were the material cause of that introduction. But this pertains more to mutual causality between matter and form than to the present matter; for the form introduced does not expel the other effectively, but formally, as has been seen above; but if we speak of a form actively introducing another, with respect to that form the expulsion of the form has no causality, but is only a secondary effect of that action. I add also that the expulsion of form is improperly said to be the material cause of the introduction of another form; for it is rather the removal of a certain impediment, not so much antecedent as subsequent or concomitant, or, if there is some order or priority, it is more according to our consideration than according to true causality.

23. Whether the opening of a window has causality with respect to the entrance of light. Another instance is usually given concerning the opening of a window and the introduction of light, which seems more common than philosophical, for the opening of a window is the removal of a certain impediment simply antecedent in the order of nature, because it is in no way an effect of the introduction of light. But if we imagine a window being opened by external wind

pushing and entering, thus the opening is indeed effectively from the air pushing, yet that air, as pushing and efficient, is in no way an effect of that opening in the genus of material cause, because the air pushing does not effect that motion of the window as already introduced into its place, but as touching and impressing impulse upon it, which it does at a prior time or instant than it is introduced into the place of the window and than the window itself is moved from its place; and thus with respect to that efficiency there is no material causality in its effect. But if air is considered as already occupying the place of the window which is opened, thus it is not the effective cause of the opening, but the formal cause, through formal incompossibility of those two bodies in the same space. And according to this reasoning, if there is mutual causality between the opening of the window and the introduction of air, it pertains to material and formal, not to efficient causality; and the same judgment should be made about it as about the introduction of one form and expulsion of another. And thus universally it is true that efficient cause does not have mutual causality with its effect except in the genus of end; nor did Aristotle ever teach otherwise. But here a difficulty will immediately occur to theologians concerning ultimate disposition to grace, which we remit to them; we think, however, that according to these principles a true judgment should be made about it.

How there Can be Reciprocal Causality among Causes of the Same Genus

24. Within the same genus of cause there are simply no causes mutually of each other. Finally, it must be said that within the same genus of cause two things cannot be causes of each other simply and according to the same respect; but according to a qualified sense and according to diverse reasons as it were specific within the same genus of cause, it is not repugnant. The first part is the opinion of Aristotle, in the cited places, which all his interpreters also teach

absolutely and can be proved by induction, for a thing which effects another cannot conversely be made by it, and so concerning the rest. But the reason can be given proper to each case, for matter either has no material cause, like prime matter, or if it has one, like secondary matter, the same thing which it composes or receives cannot be its matter. Because matter is compared as part or receptive potency to its effect and is presupposed to that effect; but if it itself has a material cause, it is compared to that cause as whole to part, and in the order of generation or existing it presupposes that cause, and therefore there cannot be such a circle among material causes. Nor indeed among formal causes, because form does not have a formal cause, as we were saying above. In final cause also the matter is manifest, because final cause as such does not have a final cause; but if it has one insofar as it takes on some notion of means, it cannot be ordered to the same thing which is means to it as to an end; otherwise in the same order of intention it would be prior and posterior, which is repugnant. In efficient causes the reason is also manifest, because a thing which effects another is supposed to exist, and consequently to be made, if it needs to be effected, and therefore it is impossible that it should be effectively made by its own effect. This should always be understood (which should also be observed in ends) speaking of actual mutual causality which exists simultaneously; for speaking only of the potency of causing and separately, it is not repugnant that a thing which now is the end of another should cease from that causality, and afterwards be ordered to another as to an end by the freedom of the agent. And similarly it would not be repugnant that a thing which now effects another should be made by that other, if the order of causing had been changed from the beginning, and the thing which is now made by one cause were not made by that cause, but by another; for then without inconvenience it could effect the same thing by which it is now made, as I have treated above. But now we speak not separately, but conjointly, and thus it is impossible that a thing should be made by the effect which it makes.

25. Another general reason is usually given here, because otherwise the same thing would be the cause of itself, for what is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused, which axiom holds in causes of the same genus, as all say, and Scotus especially noted, In IV, distinction 49, question 2, and in the Theorems, universal conclusion 22. But someone can not unreasonably ask why that consequence holds in causes of the same genus, but not of different genera. Then someone can doubt, because it does not follow that something is the cause of itself per se, but only per accidens, just as a grandfather is the cause of a grandson, which does not seem a great inconvenience. To the first part I respond that the reason is because in different genera, by the very fact that the mode of causing is changed, the notion of being is also changed, which is presupposed in the cause with respect to the effect. And consequently that which is the cause of its own cause is not the cause of it according to what it has from its own cause, but according to something else; as although an end is the cause of its efficient cause, it is not the cause of it according to the exercised being of existence, which it has from that efficient cause, but as apprehended. But truly if in the same genus two things mutually effected each other, both according to the same order one would be presupposed to the other and conversely, which is repugnant, and one would cause the other according to that very being which it has from that other and conversely, and therefore it would virtually cause itself. Hence to the other part it is responded that that cause is called per accidens, because it does not immediately flow into the mediate effect; nevertheless it is the per se cause of its immediate effect, in which the other effect is virtually contained, and flows per se from that, and therefore it is equally repugnant for something to be the cause of itself in this way as if it effected itself per se and immediately.

26. Lighter objections against the aforesaid are resolved. Other lighter objections are usually made against this conclusion, because in all genera of causes it seems to suffer calumny; in efficient cause, because if two hands are warm and simultaneously touch each

other, they mutually warm and preserve each other; but if they are cold, by rubbing they mutually warm each other. In dispositions which pertain to material cause, heat truly disposes to rarity and rarity to heat. In ends, potency is for the sake of operation, and operation for the sake of potency. Finally, in formal causes, although that reciprocity is not found physically, it is found nevertheless metaphysically, while one difference contracts another and conversely can be contracted by that other, for mortal contracts rational or intellectual taken broadly, as if man is said to be living, intellectual, mortal; and, conversely, rational contracts mortal.

27. How hands rubbing each other mutually warm each other. Nevertheless, it is responded to the first that two hands, if they are equally warm, do not preserve each other by mutually acting, but by more strongly resisting the contrary, or by overcoming it. But if they are cold, they do not warm each other per se, but per accidens through the mediation of motion, and then one does not act upon the other insofar as it receives heat through the rubbing of the other, but by the power of moving and touching which it has, and in this way it is not inconvenient for two things to act mutually upon themselves, if they act per se through their own powers and not through what they mutually receive, as the stomach warms wine with formal and innate heat, and wine warms the stomach with virtual heat which it has from itself, and in this way it is not repugnant for two things to mutually effect each other; yet this is not according to the proper being through which they cause, and thus, speaking formally, an effect is not made the cause by its own effect, which we say is repugnant.

28. Whether two forms are mutual dispositions to each other. To the second instance it is responded first that dispositive cause is not properly material cause, but in a qualified sense and reductively, hence that is not so much mutual material causality as a certain mutual agreement or proportion between two forms existing in the same subject; in which there is no repugnancy. Then it is said that these dispositions are always in some way of diverse natures; as in the

example given concerning heat and rarity, heat seems to be not only a disposition, but also in some way efficient, and then rarity is not so much a preparing disposition as a consequent one, which does not have the proper nature of a cause. And we have said many similar things about these causes above, disputation XIII, section 3.

29. Two partial ends are mutually final causes to each other. Finally, the posterior part of the conclusion can be understood concerning this connection of dispositions. But it was chiefly established on account of the third instance, to which we concede that according to diverse notions of ends it is not repugnant that two things should be mutually ends to each other, as the argument proves; nevertheless that is only in a qualified sense, for those are as it were partial ends, from which one integral end coalesces, which falls entirely under one adequate intention; nevertheless for any such mutual relationship it is necessary that those ends in their genus should be in some way of diverse natures. To the fourth it is responded that here we are dealing with proper and real causes; but differences are not of this kind, but only according to reason, and even in that mode differences do not mutually contract each other per se, but at most insofar as they are conjoined in one common genus.

The Reason for Doubting Posited at the Beginning is Satisfied

30. Finally, from what has been said the reason for doubting posited at the beginning remains resolved. For if someone attentively considers what we have said, never are two causes so mutually compared that one simply presupposes the other in existing, and, conversely, even in the order of nature, for an end, as it is the cause of the agent, is not necessarily presupposed as existing; but as it is an effect, it presupposes the efficient cause as existing; form likewise presupposes matter, yet matter does not simply presuppose form, but only requires it as concomitant or consequent in the order of nature.

And thus the circle of prior and posterior in existing is easily avoided, even according to the order of nature. But in causing, according to diverse genera of causes, it has no inconvenience, because either one causality is such that it does not presuppose existence, as happens in the end, or, if it requires existence, they are not mutually causes to each other according to being simply, and thus, if being is presupposed in one cause, according to that being, it is not properly the effect of the other, but according to something which is added to it; just as we have declared in form with respect to matter, and in accidents with respect to subject; and thus all inconveniences in this mutual connection and causality of causes are easily avoided. And thus far let these things be said concerning the causes of being and concerning the first principal part of this work.

DISPUTATION XXVIII

ON THE FIRST DIVISION OF BEING INTO THE SIMPLY INFINITE AND THE FINITE, AND OTHER DIVISIONS WHICH ARE EQUIVALENT TO THIS

Connection of the present treatise with the preceding ones. This is the second principal part of this work, in which, after having treated in the prior part concerning the common concept of being and its properties, which are predicated reciprocally of it, it is necessary to descend to the definite natures of beings, insofar as the formal object and abstraction of this science permits. This cannot be done more conveniently than through the various divisions of being itself and of its members, and through their exact consideration. We have said in the preceding disputations, Disputation IV, section 4, that the first and most essential division of being is into the finite and infinite according to essence or in the nature of being, which alone is properly and simply infinite; and therefore we begin this part with this division, under which we shall comprehend certain others, which in reality coincide with this, although they are conceived and explained by us under diverse names or concepts. And since we have spoken of the divided subject of this partition in the first and second disputations, for it is being itself which is the adequate object of Metaphysics,

therefore it only remains to be seen what kind the said division is and whether it has been correctly and sufficiently presented.

SECTION I
WHETHER BEING IS CORRECTLY DIVIDED INTO INFINITE AND FINITE, AND WHAT DIVISIONS ARE EQUIVALENT TO THIS

1. Reasons that render the question doubtful. First. The reason for doubt can be that finite and infinite only have place in those things which have some latitude or extension, and therefore these are usually attributed to quantity, because in their proper natures they include a relation to some term; for the finite is said to be that which is enclosed by terms; but the infinite is that which has no term; but nothing speaks of a relation to a term except what has latitude or extension which is to be terminated; but it is not of the nature of being to have any latitude or extension; therefore neither to be enclosed by terms or not enclosed; therefore neither to be finite or infinite; therefore it is not correctly divided through these members. This is declared and confirmed, for that infinite is taken either privatively or merely negatively. In the former way nothing really seems to be infinite, for privatively only that being could be called infinite which, although it is apt to be enclosed by terms, is not actually terminated by them; but there is no being of this kind, as is evident per se, because not even God himself is infinite in this way; for he is not apt to be enclosed by terms. But if it is taken in the latter way, thus every indivisible being will be infinite, because no such being is enclosed by terms; for that which is altogether indivisible in itself is not capable of another termination.

2. Second. The second difficulty concerning this division can be that it is given through certain modes or attributes of being that are

very obscure, and which can scarcely be investigated by natural reason, at least as regards one part; but the first division of being ought to be most clear, and, if it could be done, known per se from the very terms. The antecedent is declared, for concerning God himself it can scarcely be shown and perhaps cannot be demonstrated that he is simply infinite. Then it is more obscure to explain in what such infinity consists; therefore the aforesaid division is not conveniently assigned, especially in first place and as the foundation of the others.

3. What the terms of the division under question signify. Concerning this division it must first be declared what is intended by it in the thing itself; and from this it will easily be established that the partition is excellent, placed in a convenient place and order. Therefore, as regards the matter, being is divided in this place into God and creatures; but because we cannot conceive those things which are proper to God, as they are in themselves, indeed not even through positive concepts that are simple and proper to God, therefore we use negative ones, so that we may separate and distinguish that most excellent being, which is maximally distant from others and agrees less with them than they do among themselves, from them. And in this way we construct the aforesaid division, taking something in which all created or creatable things agree among themselves, and removing that from a certain nobler being, because it has a more excellent degree of essence or entity; and in this way we reduce the entire latitude of being to those two members.

Resolution of the Question

4. The said division is good and supremely necessary. From which declaration it is established first that that division is excellent in the thing itself and most necessary. The first is evident, because that division is adequate to being; for no being besides God or creatures can be conceived, as we shall declare more in the following section. Then, because those members are maximally distant from each other,

as was declared above, in the cited disputation, section 4. And from this also the necessity of this division is established, because besides those things which have been treated in the preceding parts, nothing is common to the first being with all the others, although all the rest have many things in which they agree among themselves. For the first being has no cause, all the others have one; these can be distinguished into certain genera and species, that exists outside every genus; in all those some mode of composition is found, this is altogether simple and exists outside all composition. Therefore it was necessary to separate that first being from the others, so that with its nature explained separately, those things which are common to the others might be treated distinctly and perspicuously.

5. The said division is first and most known. And from this it is established secondly (which was also proved in the aforesaid disputation, section 4) that the aforesaid division is according to itself and in the order of doctrine first and most known, although perhaps as regards us it may not be as known as is the division of being into substance and accident or other similar ones which are nearer to the senses, and therefore are more easily known by us; but the aforesaid division, on that part by which it includes that God exists and has an essence or entity of a certain unlimited nature and perfection, is reached and declared by us with greater difficulty. Because nevertheless in delivering this science we preserve the order of doctrine, therefore we rightly establish this division in first place.

Division of Being into Being from Itself & Being from Another

6. Thirdly it is gathered from what has been said that this two-membered division can be delivered in many other ways or under diverse names and concepts, which can serve both to declare and to demonstrate it, although all coincide in the same thing, as is established from the very terms. For, by way of example, being could

be divided into that which has being from itself and that which has being from another. Augustine touches upon this division, in the book On the Knowledge of True Life, chapter 7, and to show that God exists, he establishes it in first place. For under those terms it is a most known and most evident division, because it is manifest that there are many beings which have being communicated from another, which would not exist unless they received being from another, as experience itself sufficiently proves. Again it is evident that not all beings can be of this kind, for if all individuals of some species are from another, it is also necessary that the whole species be from another, because neither does the species exist except in the individual, nor do the individuals have another connatural mode of receiving being except what the species postulates; therefore, if all individuals are such that they do not have being from themselves, but need the efficiency of another so that they may receive it, the whole species also has need and imperfection. Whence it happens that the whole cannot have being from some individual of that species, because the same thing cannot effect itself; it ought therefore to receive being from a superior being. Concerning which again it must be investigated whether it has being from itself, or from another; for if it has being from itself, the division which we intend is now complete; but if it has being from another, similarly it will be necessary that the whole species of such a being draw its origin from another superior one; but it cannot proceed to infinity, both because otherwise either the emanation of one from another would never have begun, or it would never have arrived at producing this being after infinite emanations of one from another; and also because no whole collection of effects can be dependent without supposing some thing or independent cause, as will be shown in the following disputation, section 1. Therefore it is necessary to stop in some being which has being from itself, from which all those things which only have received being draw their origin. And in this way the aforesaid division is evident, whether that being which is not from another but from itself is one, or many; for we are not now treating this, but only

that all beings are reduced to those two members, which include manifest opposition or contradiction between themselves; and therefore they cannot not be both distinct and adequately dividing being.

7. For what is said to be from itself or by itself, although it may seem to be positive, nevertheless adds only negation to being itself, for being cannot be from itself through positive origin and emanation; it is therefore said to be from itself, insofar as without emanation from another it has being, through which negation we declare the positive and simple perfection of that being which thus encloses in itself and its essence the very act of existing such that it receives it from no one, which perfection that being does not have which does not have being except by receiving it from another. And in this manner some saints are to be explained, when they say that God is the cause of his own being or of his substance or wisdom. Thus Jerome, on Ephesians 3, says: God is his own origin and the cause of his own substance. And Augustine, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, questions 15 and 16, says that God is the cause of his own wisdom, and in the seventh book On the Trinity, chapter 1, speaking of the Father, says: What is the cause for him to be, is also the cause for him to be wise. For all these expressions are to be interpreted negatively. But Lactantius does not seem to admit the aforesaid exposition, who says that God made himself, in book 1 On False Religion, chapter 7, for he even says that God made himself in time; and he takes as foundation that it cannot happen that what exists at some time did not begin; which error in this sense is so absurd that it does not need refutation.

Division of Being into Necessary & Contingent

8. Again from this other terms under which that division can be delivered are easily declared; and in the thing it is the same, although according to reason it is declared under a diverse relation or

negation; thus therefore being can be divided into that which is simply necessary, and that which is not necessary, or contingent taken broadly. In which terms it must be noted, first, that here necessary and contingent are not taken as they express the relation of an effect to a cause acting naturally or freely, or which can or cannot be impeded; for under this relation it was said concerning the necessary and contingent above in treating of causes; but necessary is taken absolutely in the nature of existing; in which way a necessary being is said to be that which has being such that it cannot lack it, to which is contrasted or opposed that being which is such that it can not be, or is such that it can be. Therefore it is established from the preceding division that there must be among beings something simply necessary, for that being which has being from itself and not from another cannot not be simply necessary, because it cannot deprive itself of its own being, as is known per se, nor can it be deprived by another, since it does not depend on another, for he who does not have being from another is conserved in being by no other; and in this sense it is said to be from itself; and therefore not being is altogether repugnant to it. And from this it further happens that, besides this being which is[34] simply necessary, there are others not so necessary, and therefore contingent, if, speaking broadly, everything that can not be is called contingent. This is proved, because besides that being which is from itself, there are beings receiving being from another; these therefore, since they do not have being from themselves, from this part it is not repugnant to them not to be; and on the other hand, just as they depend on another, from whom they receive it, so they can also not receive and consequently not be.

9. A twofold objection is satisfied. You will say: if we imagine God acting necessarily and without freedom, things emanating from him would be beings from another and yet would be necessary beings; therefore formally and from the force of the terms these two members

[34] est, 1960; alit. ens. "La palabra ens de algunas ediciones tiene difícil interpretación." CF BHF, t. IV, p. 197.

are not reciprocated. And it is confirmed, for the Word or Holy Spirit can be said to be being from another, because it does not have being except through emanation from another; and yet it is simply necessary being, because it does not proceed through free production, but natural and necessary.

10. It is responded beginning from this confirmation, since it is theological, that here being from another is not called except what is from another through true causality; for the natural light, from which we now philosophize, does not acknowledge true production and real procession without true causality, nor without distinction in essence and being between the thing producing and the thing produced. But in the divine persons there is not this mode of emanation, because it is imperfect; and therefore, just as all are true and one God, so all are one being from itself and all are essentially constituted through the essence which is its own uncaused and unproduced being, and thus any person is necessary being, not only because it necessarily emanates, but also because it is essentially constituted through being and essence altogether unproduced; for although the divine person is produced, nevertheless not its nature, but it is communicated to the person through the production of the same person. Therefore there is no reason why an argument should be drawn from that mystery to created things.

11. Even if God were to act necessarily, some beings would be non-necessary. Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 4. To the argument therefore it is said in the first place that, given that hypothesis, it still does not follow that all beings are necessary, because not all would be made by the first being alone and immediately and by total power and without resistance or impediment of another cause, from all which points it can come about that a thing, which now receives being, afterwards does not receive it, and conversely. Whence, although some philosophers erred in asserting that God acts necessarily, nevertheless none denied that there are many non-necessary beings, since this is most known either by experience itself in corruptible and successive

things. And, although from that hypothesis some being would be made necessary, nevertheless not from intrinsic necessity and quiddity like God, but only from extrinsic necessity of the agent. And therefore Avicenna, book VIII of the Metaphysics, chapters 4 and 6, said that only that being is necessary which is from itself, but not the remaining beings, even if they have necessity of being from another, who perhaps speaks of necessity not simply, but from the supposition of the action of the first cause. Wherefore finally it is said that that hypothesis is false, for that being which is from itself communicates itself outside itself not necessarily but freely; and therefore besides it nothing is simply necessary. Concerning which freedom of the first being in acting, insofar as it can be had either from the authority of philosophers or by natural reason, we shall speak later.

12. By what necessity are incorruptibles necessary. But you will object again, for incorruptible beings, even if they are from another acting freely, are called necessary beings by the Commentator, in the book On the Substance of the Orb, and book 1 On the Heavens, text 136, and book XII of the Metaphysics, text 41. Whose opinion in this part is approved by St. Thomas, q. 5 On Power, a. 3. It is responded from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 9, a. 2, and III Against the Gentiles, chapters 30 and 35, that there is equivocation in the word necessity. For it can be taken in one way for incorruptibility, in which sense incorruptible creatures are sometimes called necessary beings, because, from the time they once exist, they do not have intrinsic potency to not being, but, as much as is from themselves, they endure perpetually, which without doubt is some necessity of being, since it excludes some potency, namely the intrinsic one, to not being. Nevertheless, such beings are not simply and in every way necessary, because neither from themselves nor from their quiddity do they have being, nor from absolute necessity do they receive or conserve it. When therefore we distinguish in the present work necessary being from non-necessary, we take necessity in the former way. And for this reason no being, which is from another, is necessary simply, because,

at least through potency existing in another, it can lose being, although in itself there may not be intrinsic potency true and real to not being, which is found only in those things which have physical and passive potency to another being repugnant and incompatible with their proper being; but in others logical potency suffices, so to speak, to not being, which on their part only expresses non-repugnance, but in the extrinsic cause expresses potency to suspend the action by which it confers being. Thus therefore it is established that this division is the same as the preceding, although in the former way it is given under notions more known and which suppose fewer principles.

Division of Being into Being through Essence & Being through Participation

13. Moreover the same division is usually delivered under these terms, that being is one thing through essence, another through participation, which in reality are equivalent to the preceding ones, for being through essence is said to be that which through itself and from the force of its essence essentially has being not received nor participated from another; but being through participation is said conversely to be that which does not have being except communicated and participated from another. From which declaration of terms it is established that this division is equipollent to the preceding ones. Whence St. Thomas, II Against the Gentiles, chapter 15, says that God is being through his essence, because he is being itself; and book III, chapter 66, argument 6, says that God alone is being through his essence; but the rest are through participation, because in God alone being is his essence, that is, of his quiddity, so that the essence of God, as it is of God, cannot even be conceived by the mind, if it is understood only as being in potency and not as being in act; therefore it is the same to be being through essence as to have being from oneself and from one's essence, to which being through participation is contrasted in the opposite way. Whence it happens that by the same

discourse it must be proved that there is this twofold degree or order of beings, by which we proved that there is some being which is from itself, superior to all which have being from another. For just as among beings which have being from another there is no proceeding to infinity, so neither among beings through participation. Whence it is necessary that being, which is such through participation, be reduced to another which has being without such participation; but if that has other being also participated in another way, or by another genus of participation, that will have to be referred to that; and thus finally, lest we proceed to infinity, we must stop at some being which is being through essence. Nor conversely can all beings be such through essence, both because being through essence is simply necessary being, since it is of its essence to be actually; but it is established that not all beings are necessary; and also because being through essence is or can be only one, as we shall see later.

Division of Being into Uncreated & Created

14. Furthermore this division is usually delivered under these terms: being is either uncreated or created, which members bear immediate opposition before themselves, and in the thing coincide with the preceding ones and differ only, especially from those first ones, namely from itself and from another, because those words are more general, for they are taken from relation to dependence in common; but these are more special, taken from the peculiar action or dependence of creation; because nevertheless creation is the first emanation from another with dependence on it, and general in some way to all beings which depend on another, as was said by us above, therefore in reality these members coincide with those. For it is necessary that being which is from itself and not from another be uncreated; for if dependence is simply denied of something, it is also necessary that this dependence in particular, namely creation, be denied; and also conversely, if being is uncreated, it is necessary that it

be from itself and not from another, because the first emanation with dependence on another and as it were the foundation of others is creation; therefore that which has being without creation, it is necessary that it have being altogether independent and consequently that it be being through essence and not from another. Wherefore, by which discourse it is proved that there is some being from itself and independent, it is also proved that there is some uncreated being, both because these two are the same in the thing, as I have shown, and also because the same form of argument can easily be applied. Because, if some created beings are given, lest we proceed to infinity it is necessary to stop at some uncreated from which those emanated. But that some created beings are given must be proved from this that the first and fundamental dependence of all things is creation, which was declared and proved in the preceding parts. Whence, because this is not per se so evident and known as that there are beings dependent on another, therefore under these terms this division is not so known as regards us, unless the name of creation is not taken so strictly for production from nothing, but more broadly for any true effection or proper dependence; in which sense these terms differ almost nothing from the first ones, as is manifest per se.

Division of Being into Pure Act & Potential

15. The division can be fittingly understood in a twofold way under these terms. The first is explained. Moreover the same division of being can be made under these terms: being is one thing altogether actual, another truly potential, or one thing is pure act, another truly includes some potency or potentiality. This division under these words does not seem to be so apt, especially to be placed first in order, because of a certain obscurity of the terms; nevertheless in the thing it is excellent and the same as the preceding. For in the first place it is established that those members include immediate opposition and contradiction, for to be in act and to be in potency, taken with

proportion (as they must be taken) and with respect to the same thing, import privative or contradictory opposition. But actual and potential being can be said, either in order to the being of actual existence, or in order to some passive potency, which properly is potency including imperfection and is ordered to the composition of some imperfect being which for that reason is called potential, for active potency as such neither includes imperfection, nor is ordered from itself to some composition of that whose it is, and therefore being is not denominated potential from it. The first relation of these terms therefore is most proper and according to it the given division seems chiefly to be understood; for thus it is perspicuous and easy from what has been said. For it is necessary that there be some being so actual in existing that according to that reason it is altogether in act and in no way in potency. This is proved, because to be in act under this relation is to exist actually; but to be in potency is to be able to exist, although it may not exist actually; but it is necessary that there be some being through essence so necessary that by no reason can it not exist, neither through intrinsic potency, nor through extrinsic, neither through physical potency, nor through that which they call logical; therefore it is necessary that such being be altogether actual in existing, that is, altogether excluding every reason and mode of being only in potency. From which it is further easy to conclude that all beings, which are not of this kind, are in some way potential, because, although they sometimes exist actually, nevertheless it is not repugnant to them sometimes to exist only in potency, either because of intrinsic passive potency, or because of extrinsic active potency alone with logical potency or non-repugnance on their part. Therefore it is established that every being is either altogether actual, or in some way potential in the aforesaid sense.

16. The second is declared. From this however it can be further inferred that also in the latter sense that division is universal and equivalent to the preceding ones, for that being which is purely actual in existing, is also in itself simply pure act, that is, in itself and in

its entity or constitution admitting no admixture of passive potency, because wherever there is some genus of passive potency, there is also some reason of material cause; but to material cause an efficient cause necessarily corresponds which operates from it or into it and reduces it to act, for passive potency as such cannot recall itself to act; since therefore from the first being, which through itself and essentially is such in act according to every perfection of itself, all effective causality concerning itself is far absent, it is necessary that it also lack all passive potency and consequently be pure act. And by similar discourse it can conversely be concluded (as many think) that every being, which is potential in order to existing, is also potential as in some way consisting of passive potency. But this needs great discussion and declaration, which we shall give below when disputing about the being and essence of creatures; now let it suffice for us that the reason made does not proceed with equal proportion, for to passive potency it is necessary that active respond, because it is necessary that it suffer from something; but to active potency, speaking simply, passive potency does not necessarily respond, because it is not necessary that the agent act in something or from something; for it can act something even from nothing; and therefore from the force of terms it does not seem necessary that every being which is potential in existing consist of passive potency; nevertheless in the thing it is true that every being of this kind is potential by reason of passive potency, whether this is because it expresses relation to it, or because by reason of it it can compose with another act, or because it itself is composed from such potency and act. But how something of these necessarily follows from prior potentiality to existing, cannot be explained briefly and as it were in passing in this place, but will be said below in declaring the proper nature and imperfection of created being; and therefore, as regards this place, the prior sense of this division delivered in the aforesaid words is sufficient and perspicuous.

The First Division is Compared with Others
& More Declared from Them

17. Finally it is permitted to gather from all that has been said that the same judgment must be made concerning this division under those terms in which it was proposed, for in the thing it is equivalent to the aforesaid ones; for that being is simply infinite which is first and is from itself through its essence; but the rest, which are beings through participation, are finite; and thus it is without doubt an excellent division, and in the thing there is no doubt that those two degrees or orders of beings are found and are maximally distinguished among themselves. And perhaps therefore this division is delivered under these terms by many, because through them it is more openly signified that those two members are maximally distant and primarily diverse, and therefore before all things are to be separated and distinguished, although otherwise it is more difficult as regards us to prove or demonstrate it, because truly it is not per se and from terms so evident that there is something infinite among beings (for concerning the finite there is no difficulty) as it is evident that there is some being independent from another. Nor is it per se known that that being which is through essence is consequently infinite. Whence concerning this matter we must treat ex professo below, demonstrating the attributes of God, insofar as they can be gathered from natural light.

18. The natures of finite and infinite are explained by analogy to quantity. Now the division is only declared by explaining the terms, which indeed were taken by us from quantity of mass, but transferred to signify quantity or degree of perfection, in which way Augustine said, book VI On the Trinity, chapter 8: In those things which are not great by mass, this is to be greater which is to be better. For we, because we do not conceive things except through the senses, apprehend and explain all other things in the manner of bodies and

through proportion to them. But in bodies we understand one to be finite in quantity, insofar as it arrives at such a term and does not extend beyond; and among finite quantities we understand one to be greater than another, because it attains a further term, and to declare the certain magnitude of a thing we use some definite measure, through whose multiplication we know the thing to be of such, lesser, or greater quantity. By similar analogy therefore we use to declare the entitative perfection and active power of things; for we apprehend in things a certain as it were latitude of perfection of being, in which there are various degrees and as it were parts of perfection, and we understand each being to be finite or limited through a certain proper degree of perfection, which is thus terminated within its perfection so that it prescind from others and includes them in no way either formally or virtually, and in this way we call all created beings limited and finite; and among them we conceive one to be greater than another, because we understand that either to participate more of these perfections, or as it were a greater part of perfection from the total latitude of being. But because all these beings participate their perfection from a certain superior being, we understand it necessary that there be a certain being in which the total perfection possible in the latitude of being is contained in some way, either formally or eminently; and this being we call simply infinite, not in quantity of mass, but in excellence of perfection. Whence this infinity does not consist in some extension not terminated, but in such perfection of being which, although it may be in itself one and indivisible, does not so prescind from other beings that it does not contain the perfections of all in some way in itself; and thus it embraces in itself not a part of perfection of being, but the whole in a certain eminent way; and therefore although in that latitude finite beings more and more perfect can be multiplied to infinity, it always surpasses all and can surpass to infinity; therefore this excellence of perfection in being and entity is declared through this infinity. Whence, just as Augustine says, VI On the Trinity, chapter 8: It is not one thing for God to be and another to

be great, but it is the same for him to be as to be great, so we can say that nothing else is it for God to be infinite than to be being itself, or to be through essence, embracing in itself whatever perfection can be participated by any being. And in this manner the declared division contains the first, highest and most essential distinction of beings, and in the thing coincides with the preceding ones, as is sufficiently established from what has been said. But that there is some being, to which the said infinity is fitting, will be demonstrated ex professo below, as I said. Now let it suffice that from what has been said it is sufficiently gathered and Augustine touched upon it, in the said book On the Knowledge of True Life, chapter 7, that it is necessary that there be some being from which as from a fountain all things flow, and therefore it is fitting that all things be contained in it; and therefore that it have not this or that perfection only, but every perfection without term. Whence also is that of Augustine, VIII On the Trinity, chapter 3: This good and that good, remove this and that and see the good itself, if you can, and you will see God, not good by another good, but the good of every good.

The Arguments Posed at the Beginning are Satisfied

19. Infinity in God is negation, not privation. To the first reason for doubt it has already been responded that these terms finite and infinite are not taken in the present case in that property in which they agree with quantity of mass, but according to a certain proportion to it; and therefore it is not necessary that being be said finite or infinite because of intrinsic extension terminated or unterminated, but because of perfection altogether prescinding from others, or not prescinding, indeed containing them. Whence to the confirmation it is responded that infinite is not said there privatively properly, but negatively, with respect to that being to which it is attributed, in which it expresses perfection not limited without any

aptitude that it be limited, insofar as it is such. Nor does it follow from this that every indivisible perfection is infinite, because, although it may be indivisible, it can be limited and have a term, not such as is usually in quantity of mass, but such as can be designated in quantity of perfection; but it can be assigned either intrinsically, which is nothing other than the very nature of the thing constituted by such a difference, which from itself has to prescind altogether from the rest; or extrinsically, and this is any other perfection and especially that which seems to be most akin and proximate, to which the other does not reach, as if we should say that the rational degree is the term to which the sensitive degree does not arrive.

20. To the second difficulty it is responded that this division is not assigned as more known to us, but as first in itself, that is, as declaring the highest distance of one being from another and the first or extreme degrees of being; and therefore, although it may have some difficulty, it was necessary to premise it before others and to declare it in various ways.

SECTION II

WHETHER BEING IS SUFFICIENTLY AND ADEQUATELY DIVIDED BY FINITE AND INFINITE AND OTHER EQUIPOLLENT MEMBERS

1. The first reason for doubt. This question is usually treated principally because of relative beings, which, as such, seem to be neither finite nor infinite. Not infinite, as is manifest in itself. Nor finite, because they have neither quantity of mass nor of perfection. This difficulty is usually pressed most urgently in divine relations, because if they express no perfection, then there is already given a middle term between those two members; but if they do express some perfection, it is also necessary that this not be finite, because it is in God; nor even infinite, because otherwise it could not be multiplied.

2. The second reason. Second, the division of being into created and uncreated is not adequate; therefore neither is this one which we are treating, since they are equipollent among themselves. The antecedent is clear first in the very divine relations themselves, which are neither created beings, as is evident, nor according to their proper formal accounts (rationes) can they be called uncreated beings, since under that precise formal account they are not God, nor do they include the divine essence. Second, the same antecedent is clear in Christ, who cannot be called uncreated being, since he was produced in time, nor even created, since he is God and was not made from nothing. Third, an argument can be taken for the same conclusion from those beings which neither have being from themselves, and therefore cannot be called uncreated, nor even have being through creation so that they might be called created. This can be urged most especially in certain beings or modes of beings which cannot come to be through creation, such as, for example, motion, inherence and similar things.

3. The third reason. Third, the division of being into necessary and non-necessary does not seem adequate, especially because of the free acts of the divine will, for they are neither necessary simpliciter, because this is repugnant to freedom, nor can they be called non-necessary or contingent, otherwise they would be something created and would be accidental to God. And this argument can be made regarding the other partitions touched upon above, because such an act can neither be called uncreated being, because it is not entirely independent, since it could absolutely not be, nor is it created, since it is in God. And for the same reason it is not being by participation, because it is within God, nor even can it be called being by essence, because it is not essentially God, since it could not be.

Scotus's Opinion is Examined

4. This question is theological to a great extent, as can easily be understood from the proposed difficulties. But nevertheless it ought not to be omitted in this place, both because it is necessary for the completion of the doctrine and for exhausting, so to speak, the entire object of metaphysics; and also because we intend in this science to treat metaphysical things in such a way that we open all the foundations necessary for theological matters. In this question, therefore, Scotus, Quodl., 5, in solut. ultim. argum., considers that this is not an adequate division of being, but that it is rather a subdivision of being, which should first be divided into quantitative and non-quantitative being, and again quantitative being into finite and infinite; whence a third member could be added to the superior division, namely being which is neither finite nor infinite. And Lychetus defends the same opinion there, and In II, dist. 1, q. 4 and 5, where he also suggests a fourth member, for being (he says) is of a certain kind that includes perfection and includes no imperfection, and this is infinite being; another kind includes perfection with imperfection, and this is finite quantitative being; another is being that includes neither perfection nor imperfection, and this is properly non-quantitative being, neither finite nor infinite; finally another includes no perfection, but does not exclude all imperfection, and he considers this sort to be created relation; which he also thinks is comprehended under quantitative being, even if it includes no perfection, but only imperfection. This plainly involves a contradiction in terms, as is declared by Scotus himself in the aforementioned Quodl., for there he declares quantitative being to be that which has some quantity of perfection; therefore what includes no perfection cannot truly be called quantitative being.

5. Various divisions of being devised by Lychetus are disapproved. The objection is resolved. From this another contradiction is gathered in the statements of this author, for it is contradictory to be non-quantitative and to be finite, because according to their doctrine, finite and infinite presuppose quantity;

whence they infer that divine relation is not infinite being, because it is not quantitative; by parity of reasoning therefore they should infer that created relation is not finite, because it is not quantitative. Again from the same principle it can easily be concluded that a contradiction is involved in that member, namely, that there should be some being that includes no perfection and includes imperfection. First, because either that imperfection is privative, or merely negative. The first cannot be said, because privative imperfection is the lack of due perfection; but in such a being there cannot be a lack of due perfection, because no perfection is owed to it, because it is said to include no perfection from itself. But no greater negative imperfection can be conceived than the lack of all perfection which includes every thing that in its entity includes no perfection. Whence speaking of negative imperfection, no being can be conceived which includes neither perfection nor imperfection; therefore no being can be understood which besides the negation of all perfection expresses from itself some other imperfection. Otherwise I ask further what that imperfection might be. The same author responds that it is limitation. But against this the argument made presses, for limitation is in some quantity of mass or perfection; therefore, if such being includes no quantity of perfection, it does not have that in which it might include limitation. Perhaps it will be said to include limitation not in perfection, but in entity. But against this, for in this way even divine relation will be said to be limited in its formal entity, and consequently will be said to be finite in entity. And thus finally every being will be finite or infinite in entity, whatever may be the case regarding perfection. The first consequence (for the rest are clear) is proved ad hominem in Scotus's doctrine, because divine relation according to its formal and precise entity does not include the entity of the essence, neither eminently nor formally; therefore it is limited in its formal entity. Nor is it sufficient that it includes the entity of the essence identically, for as Scotus there contends at length, this does not suffice for it to be called infinite in perfection, although it identically includes

the infinite perfection of the essence; therefore neither will it be sufficient for it to be called unlimited in entity, that it identically includes the infinite entity of the essence.

6. Perhaps it will be said that the relation itself by virtue of its formal entity is apt to be identified with the essence, and therefore is from itself neither unlimited nor limited. But created relation is from itself incompatible with infinite entity, nor can it include that even identically; and therefore not only is it not from itself unlimited, but it is also from itself limited and finite; and this is the imperfection which it includes and in which it is distinguished from divine relation. But first of all, that aptitude, which is said to be in divine relation so that it might be identified with the divine essence, does not exclude that absolutely that relation, as regards its formal entity, is limited, since it does not include infinite entity formally, and it is simply less to be apt to be identified with infinite entity than to be formally infinite entity. And furthermore, if in created relation that limitation of entity, by reason of which it cannot be infinite either formally or identically, is an imperfection, certainly in divine relation that aptitude, so that it can be identified entirely according to reality with the divine essence, is a certain great perfection; therefore that relation, however much it may be formally prescinded, just as it is understood as such that can be identified with the divine essence, so it is understood as being of some perfection and much greater than is every created entity. Whence also conversely in created relation, by this very fact that the limitation of that to created entity is a certain imperfection in the genus of being, it is necessary that it not be a mere negation of perfection, but that it be some perfection having that negation adjoined, as we argued above. And thus finally it is concluded that it is not necessary to feign some entity lacking all perfection, which properly could be a middle term between finite and infinite being. Which we have pursued more extensively above in treating of goodness, in disp. X.

Resolution of the Question

7. This division is adequate to being however it may be expressed by the terms posited in the preceding section. It should therefore be said that the aforesaid division is sufficient and adequate to being insofar as it is being. This assertion can easily be proved from those things which were treated in the superior section, especially if this division is handed down under those names, namely, of being from itself and from another; for, since these terms include immediate contradiction, that disjunct cannot fail to belong to any being whatsoever; therefore it is an adequate and sufficient division, since nothing can be assigned as contained under the divided term which is not constituted under one or the other of the dividing members. The same is manifest regarding those two members, being necessary simpliciter or not necessary; and regarding those, created or uncreated being; but we have shown that in all these ways it is really the same division, although they are distinguished by reason through our concepts; which distinction cannot suffice so that in one way it is an adequate division and not in another. Then it is proved specially under the name of finite and infinite, for quantitative being is adequately divided into finite and infinite; but every real being, by this very fact that it is real, is quantitative with the quantity of essential or formal perfection, as was touched upon in the reasoning made a little before and was shown more extensively above in the said disputation on transcendental goodness. And this opinion will be confirmed more evidently by responding to the difficulties posed at the beginning.

The Difficulty of the First Argument is Treated

8. Created relation is comprehended under finite being. To the first reason for doubt, therefore, it must be denied that relative beings lack all perfection according to which they can be either finite

or infinite. And regarding this part there is plainly no difficulty concerning created relations; indeed we can take an argument from them, for no one will deny (as I think) that created relation, in the way that it is real being, is finite being; whence even the Scotists concede this, as we have seen; for who would deny that it is limited being and consequently finite? Therefore having finite perfection; therefore some perfection. But if someone obstinately contends that it is called finite being in entity, not in perfection, the argument can be efficaciously retorted ad hominem, because it follows from this that finite and infinite are not said immediately of quantitative being by reason of perfection, but of being by reason of entity. From which it further results that even divine relations by reason of entity as such are finite or infinite. And thus at least for this reason the division will be immediate and adequate; and the arguments will proceed against Scotus and others by which they strive to prove that divine relations are neither finite nor infinite, as we shall now see.

9. Uncreated relation is infinite simpliciter as it includes essence. Concerning divine relations, therefore, we have already responded above that they are indeed infinite simpliciter and in the genus of being, by reason of the essence which they include, and therefore under this account they are not multiplied but are one being, for of being thus infinite it is true that it cannot be multiplied; but according to their proper formal accounts in which they are opposed, they are infinite only in such a genus under the quasi-species of relation, in which way it is not repugnant for several infinites to be multiplied, because under that account they are opposed; and therefore they can be distinguished and multiplied. But someone will urge that we say whether under that latter account those relations are beings simpliciter finite or infinite, for if we concede neither of these, we now admit a middle term in that division; but we cannot say that they are beings simpliciter infinite, since under that account they are multiplied and do not include essence. But that they are finite beings seems to be repugnant to divine perfection, because, as Scotus argues

above, every finite being is as it were a part of being, for only being simpliciter infinite is like the whole of being, because it embraces the total perfection of being; therefore finite being in comparison to that is as it were a part of being; but it is repugnant to divine relation to be a part of being, both because otherwise it would be being by participation, and because what is related as a part is exceeded by that which is related as the whole; but divine relation cannot thus be exceeded by divinity, since they are really entirely the same.

10. Divine relation on the part of the objective concept necessarily includes essence. But if this argument were worth anything, it would prove not only that divine relation formally expresses no perfection, but also that it formally expresses no entity. Otherwise I will ask whether that entity is in the mode of the whole of being, or in the mode of a part. The first cannot be said, because that entity of relation as such is said not to include the entity of essence and consequently neither to contain in itself formally or eminently the whole of being. But against the second the same reasoning proceeds in the same way. Therefore in every opinion this argument must be solved. It can therefore be responded that divine relation, for example paternity, however precisely and formally it may be conceived by us, is being simpliciter infinite, because it can never be prescinded or abstracted without including in its objective concept essentially the total perfection of essence. For although our mind is said to prescind paternity in the abstract from essence on the part of the formal concept or expressed consideration, because namely through that act the mind does not consider paternity as including essence, nor essence as included in the relation, nevertheless essence cannot be so prescinded or excluded on the part of the objective concept of paternity without being essentially included in it, so that, if the mind reflects and considers what is included in that conceived paternity, it necessarily finds that the total divinity and infinity of God is essentially included there, because divinity is of the essence of all things that are in God. Whence it results that, although paternity thus

conceived as regards our mode of conceiving is related in the mode of a part, as regards the thing conceived however it is the whole being no less than the Father, just as divinity also is conceived in the mode of a part, but is the whole being equally with God.

11. The three divine relations as they include essence are one infinite simpliciter. To the argument therefore in form it is responded according to this opinion that the relations are beings simpliciter infinite, but nevertheless are not several infinites, because they do not have this infinity except as they include the essence in which they are one. Nor does it hinder, as Scotus objects, that they only include essence through identity, because they do not include it through quasi-material identity, but also through formal and essential identity, because truly divinity is of the essence of relation according to the thing conceived however it may be conceived; and this is sufficient so that no middle term is given between finite and infinite being, since there is no being which according to its total essential entity is not finite or infinite. You will say, granted that essence cannot be excluded from relation in the aforesaid sense, nevertheless it can be considered precisely by us what divine paternity has according to that only which is understood to add beyond the absolute perfection of essence, whether that is finite or infinite. I respond that that is infinite in such a genus, namely of relation or paternity, but is not infinite simpliciter in the genus of being, because this infinity cannot be added, even according to reason, beyond absolute perfection, but rather is had formally through it. Nor nevertheless should that which relation as such adds be said absolutely to be finite, because this denotes imperfection, namely limitation and contraction to simpliciter finite entity. Nor is this against the sufficiency of the given division, because its sense is that every being by reason of its entity is finite or infinite simpliciter, not indeed that the entity of each thing has from any degree or mode conceived in it that it is finite or infinite, but it suffices that it has something which contributes to constituting its finite or infinite entity. And, for the sake of greater clarity, we can distinguish

that term "finite," for it can be taken either positively or negatively; positively it signifies to be so limited in entity and perfection, that it is incapable of infinite perfection; but negatively it signifies what from itself does not bring infinite perfection, even if it is not repugnant to have it from elsewhere. Therefore that which relation as relation adds cannot be called finite positively, as the reasoning made proves, because this expresses imperfection, and because that very thing, although not from itself, can be infinite from essence; but it can be called negatively from its precise formal account not to give infinity simpliciter. Nor is this inconvenient, because it expresses no imperfection; for it is not necessary nor does it pertain to the perfection of a thing, that from any precise concept it should have total infinity simpliciter in the genus of being, but it suffices that it should have that from its adequate entity and that from some precisely conceived formal account it should have infinity in that genus. And in this way it is best understood that there is never a middle term between finite and infinite being, if they are taken with due proportion.

12. Therefore those who consider that divine relations can absolutely be prescinded from essence, so that they are neither formally included in it nor essentially include it, are necessarily forced to confess that relative entity thus precisely and formally conceived is not infinite simpliciter, as the reasoning made above proves. But when they can be asked further whether they should be called beings simpliciter finite, they should respond that they are finite negatively, not positively, according to the sense declared by us, which is further expounded in this way. For although the word "infinite" is negative, through that negation we circumscribe a certain supreme entity or excellence; therefore in respect to this positive thing, that can be called finite negatively which from itself does not bring that total excellence, although it does not exclude it nor is it repugnant to it. In this way therefore they should say that it is not inconvenient to admit something finite in God according to a concept prescinded by us.

Indeed those who think they evade this difficulty by denying all perfection to divine relations, with much greater reason it is necessary that they confess that they are finite negatively, because, if they confer no perfection, neither will they bring infinity from themselves. If therefore they do not consider it inconvenient that they bring neither perfection nor infinity, why do they regard it as inconvenient and not rather necessary that they should bring perfection infinite from their genus, but have infinity simpliciter, not from themselves, but from essence?

The Difficulty of the Second Argument is Resolved

13. Divine relation however conceived, truly uncreated being. To the second difficulty it is denied that being is not adequately divided by created and uncreated, which is almost evident, if the terms are taken with due proportion, since they include immediate contradiction. But to the first instance it is denied that divine relation is not uncreated being, even if it is conceived under any precise formal account whatever. Nor does the argument to the contrary press according to our opinion; for we consider that relation can never be so prescinded that it does not essentially include essence and consequently is God. Indeed here it can be added that relation even according to that which is understood to add to essence is from itself something uncreated, because it is such a formal account of being to which it is entirely repugnant to come to be through proper creation or effection; but either it is entirely unproduced, like paternity, or, if it is produced, or (speaking in our manner) co-produced, like filiation, that production is neither creation nor proper making, but generation or procession of far superior account; nor is such relation producible in another way, and this suffices so that under any precision or reduplication insofar as it is such it truly is uncreated being.

14. Whether Christ should be called uncreated being, or rather created. To the second instance it is responded that Christ is absolutely uncreated being, for he is God; but if limitation or determination is added as man, designating the nature or the whole composite from nature and person, thus he is created being; for under that reduplication he cannot be called God, but man and creature, since as such he truly was made and procreated in time. But to the objection suggested, because even as man he was not made from nothing, because, although humanity is from nothing, nevertheless not the whole composite, since the other extreme of the composition is uncreated, it should be responded that created being can be said in two ways. In one way, what according to its total being is produced or is producible from nothing, and in this way we concede that Christ even as man is not created being, as the argument proves. In another way that is called created being which is truly made anew and which consists of some created being, and in this way that composite is called created, and Christ insofar as he is man is created being, and in this whole amplitude created being is taken when it is adequately distinguished from uncreated being; for, if it is taken in the prior and strict way, there can be given some composite being in a certain way middle and quasi mixed from created and uncreated, which middle term however philosophy does not know, but only Christian faith teaches.

15. To the third instance it should be said that all beings outside God and all modes of beings are something created, not because all things come to be immediately and per se primarily from nothing, but because either they are so created, or because they are co-created with those things which are produced from nothing, like potencies with the soul, or certainly because they can be co-created, although perhaps de facto they are not co-created, or finally (and this comes almost to the same thing) because they come to be from those things which were created from nothing.

Section III

The Third Argument is Solved

16. In the third argument there is touched upon a most grave theological difficulty concerning the free act of God, to which we cannot now turn aside ex professo, but below, treating of the attributes of God naturally known, we shall pursue it insofar as it pertains to metaphysics. Now I say briefly that the reasons suggested in that difficulty conclude for me that a free act as free or as freely terminated to some object does not add to God something real which now[35] is in God and could not be in him; otherwise I do not see how that could be called necessary being or being by essence, since it simply could not be, and the same is true of the infinite in perfection and other similar attributes, as is proposed there. Although therefore God freely wills things other than himself, nevertheless he does not will them except through an act of will connatural and necessary to himself; for so great is the perfection of that act, that through it God can will or not will creature without any addition made in that act. When therefore there is discourse concerning the free act of God, two things are involved, according to our mode of conceiving and speaking. One is the act itself by which God wills; the other is the relation of reason to the willed object; the former is necessary being, uncreated and by essence, whence it can in no way not be in God; but the latter is not something real which can be and not be, but only of reason, and therefore it is neither created nor uncreated, nor need it be comprehended under that division, since it is not real being.

SECTION III

WHETHER THE AFOREMENTIONED DIVISION IS UNIVOCAL OR ANALOGOUS

[35] nunc, 1960; alit. non. "Aceptamos la palabra nunc en lugar de non, como aparece en otras ediciones, porque expresa con más exactitud el matiz que trata de resaltar el Eximio." Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 219.

First Opinion: That the Division is Equivocal

1. This question is usually treated in different terms: whether being is predicated analogically of God and creatures. In this matter there are three opinions, two extreme and one middle position. The first is that being is predicated of God and creatures neither univocally nor analogically, but merely equivocally. This opinion is usually attributed to Aureolus, In I, dist. 2, q. 1, but he did not assert this; rather, he only claimed that being does not express one concept or common nature (ratio) to God and creatures, which could very well be consistent with analogy, as is evident in itself. Indeed, many believe this to be of the very nature of any analogous term, as we shall immediately see. St. Thomas reports, q. 7 de Potent., a. 7, that Rabbi Moses held this opinion because, since finite being is infinitely distant from God, there can be no proportion between them that would ground analogy. Nevertheless, St. Thomas rightly refutes this position there with many arguments. For otherwise nothing could be demonstrated about God from creatures, if only names were common to them; that is, we could not use names common to God and creatures to demonstrate anything about God, because the middle term would be equivocal. But this consequence is quite absurd. Likewise, because there is some similarity between God and creature, since they are related as effect and cause; therefore especially in the notion of being, which is the first of all. Therefore, whether we consider the imposition and signification of the name, or the nature (ratio) signified by that name, it is clear that this is not a division of name only, nor is being said of God and creatures merely by chance and accident, but on account of some similarity, proportion, or agreement between them. Finally, experience itself shows that not only the name, but also the conception is in some way common in this division.

Section III

Second Opinion: That the Division is Univocal

2. The foundations of the second opinion. First. The second opinion is that being is predicated univocally of God and creatures. Scotus held this position, In I, dist. 3, q. 1 and 3, and In III, dist. 8, q. 2, and the Scotists follow and defend him in the same places. It is proved because being immediately signifies one concept common to God and creatures; therefore it is not predicated of them analogically, but univocally. The antecedent was proved by us in the first disputation of this work. The consequent is proved in various ways: First, from the definition of univocals, which Aristotle gives in the Categories: "Univocals are those of which the name is common, and the definition of substance corresponding to the name is the same"; but in the present case not only is the name common, but also the definition of substance. For this corresponds to the objective concept adequately signified by such a name; hence, if this concept is one and the same, the definition of substance of the name will also be the same.

3. Second. Secondly from the common nature of an analogous name, which agrees with the equivocal in this respect: that it is not imposed by one imposition to signify many things, but by several; the difference, however, is that in equivocals it happens by chance that one name is imposed to signify other things, but in analogous terms the imposition is first made to signify one thing, then through similarity or proportion it is extended to another; but in the present case it is not so, rather by a single imposition the name "being" signifies what it signifies, and by virtue of that imposition it applies to God and creature, because in both that common signification is found; therefore no basis for analogy can be devised.

4. Third. Thirdly this is further clarified from the distinction of analogy; for commonly a twofold analogy is distinguished: one is called by many the analogy of proportionality, and the other of proportion; but others call the former the analogy of proportion, and

the latter of attribution, which I note only because of the ambiguity of terms, for the reality is the same. This Aristotle clearly taught, lib. I Ethic., c. 6, where he calls the analogy of attribution "from one or to one," and the other he calls a comparison of relations. The former analogy, therefore, is taken from the proportion of several things in order to some terms, and consists in this: that the principal analogate is denominated such from its form considered absolutely, but another, although it receives a similar denomination from its form, nevertheless not considered absolutely, but because in relation to that form it maintains a certain proportion with the relation of the first analogate to its form; as a man is said to laugh from the proper act of laughing taken absolutely, but a meadow is said to laugh from its greenness, not absolutely, but insofar as the green meadow maintains a certain proportion to the laughing man. And because this is a proportion between two relations, it is usually called a proportion of proportions or proportionality. The latter analogy is taken from a relation to one form, which is properly and intrinsically in one thing, but improperly and extrinsically in another, as "healthy" is said of animal and of medicine and urine; this analogy is properly considered between the proper analogate and any of the rest, as between animal and medicine, or between animal and urine. But it can also be considered between the secondary significations themselves, as between urine and medicine; for both are called healthy not merely equivocally, as is clear, nor univocally either, because they do not have one completely common notion or concept; therefore through some analogy, which could indeed in some way be reduced to the former, because as medicine relates to health in causing, so urine in signifying; nevertheless in reality neither of them took this denomination from this proportion to the other, but both from attribution to the healthy animal, with which they have immediate analogy in the notion of healthy, and from this results a quasi-mediate analogy of attribution between themselves. From these things, therefore, an argument is constructed, because in being neither of these analogies is found with

respect to God and creatures. Concerning the former, it is evident, because creature is denominated being absolutely from its own existence and not from some proportion that it maintains to God's existence. Concerning the latter it is proved, because creature is not called being through extrinsic denomination from God's entity. But in those analogates of attribution the secondary is denominated extrinsically from the form that is in the first. Also for this reason in these analogates the secondary is defined through the first; but creature in the notion of being is not defined through God. Finally, both can be confirmed, because the notion of being is conceived completely absolutely and intrinsically and properly in creature; indeed, if we speak of ourselves, it was first conceived by humans in finite being rather than in infinite; therefore this name was in no way drawn by analogy from God to creatures.

Third Opinion: That the Division is Analogous

5. The third opinion denies that being is equivocal or univocal, and consequently says it is analogous and that the name of being is said primarily of God and secondarily of creatures. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 13, a. 5, and the aforementioned q. 7 de Potent., a. 7, and I cont. Gent., c. 32 et seq., which Cajetan and Ferrariensis defend at length in these places; Cajetan, de Ent. et essent., c. 1, q. 2; Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, q. 1; Soto in c. 4 Antepraed. The entire force of this opinion consists in its second negative part, namely, that this division is not univocal, for the first part, namely, that it is not equivocal, is assumed as manifest from what has been said; and from this the last part is necessarily concluded, namely, that which constitutes analogy; therefore various reasons are brought forward to confirm that part. Some are general, by which it is proved universally that being cannot be univocal with respect to any beings whatsoever, which I do not think can be effective, because nothing prevents being from being univocal with respect to some things, about which matter I

will speak below, disp. XXXII, treating of the analogy of being with respect to substance and accident, where we will examine those reasons. Other reasons are proper and peculiar concerning being compared to God and creatures. Among these the principal and fundamental one seems to be that which St. Thomas touched upon above; for when an effect does not equal the power of the cause, a name common to both is not predicated univocally but analogically of them; but creatures are effects of God, which do not equal his power; therefore they are not univocally but analogically beings with God. The major is proved, for when an effect does not equal the power of the cause, it does not receive its likeness according to the same notion (ratio); therefore it cannot have a common name according to the same notion; therefore it cannot have a univocal name, since that is of such a kind that it is predicated according to the same notion.

6. But this reasoning seems diminished and ineffective. For when it is said that an effect which does not equal the power of the cause is not similar according to the same notion, this is true of the specific and ultimate notion, not however of the common generic or transcendental notion, as is clear in all equivocal causes, of which it is true that effects do not equal the power of the causes, because they do not receive specific likeness with them, and nevertheless univocal similarity can be found in them in some common predicate; for thus fire, gold and similar bodies do not equal the power of the sun and are its effects, and nevertheless they agree univocally with it in the notion of body, substance, etc. And the reason is ready at hand, because for an effect not to equal the power of a cause, it is enough that it does not attain to its specific perfection. Therefore, that there is no univocal agreement in other predicates is not necessary in itself from the force of such causality.

7. An effect not equaling the power of the cause in that degree in which it depends on it does not agree with it univocally. It is answered that that proposition should not be understood concerning the specific, generic, or transcendental notion, but precisely and

formally concerning that notion according to which the effect proceeds from the cause. And thus it is manifest from the terms; for if an effect proceeds from a cause not only according to the ultimate notion, but also according to the common notion, and in neither does the effect equal the power of the cause, the name cannot be univocal, whether it signifies the ultimate notion or the common one, for then the same reasoning applies to both; but creature is an effect of God not only insofar as it is such a being, but also insofar as it is being, because created being according to its entire notion depends on God and under no notion does creature equal the power or essence of God; therefore under no notion can any name be predicated univocally of God and creatures. Nor do the instances adduced have place here; for fire, for example, and gold are not equivocal effects of the sun, except according to their proper notions; but according to common notions, in which they agree univocally with the sun, they are either univocal effects, or rather they are not effects per se; for, as Aristotle said elsewhere, a thing is not made per se according to that notion according to which it is presupposed on the part of the effect or subject, but only accidentally; but it is made per se only according to that notion which is not presupposed; as when air becomes water, it does not become per se an element or simple body, but water, while the other notions accompany accidentally. Thus therefore, when the sun generates fire or gold, it always presupposes the notion of being, substance and body, and therefore does not cause an effect per se according to those notions. For this reason nothing prevents them from being able to agree univocally in those notions. But truly creature is per se an effect of God not only according to a determinate notion of being, but also according to the very notion of being as such, as it is found in creature; for it is in no way presupposed in creature for God's action, but according to its entire being it flows and depends on God.

8. It is demonstrated that no creature equals God's power. The second reason is taken from the same St. Thomas and confirms the preceding, and especially shows that creature in no notion by

which it proceeds from God equals God's power, whether that notion be of being, or of substance, or any other. Because in God the notion of being is such that it essentially includes every perfection of being; but in creature it is not found thus, but defined and limited to some genus of perfection; therefore creature does not equal God, even in the common notion of being; therefore being is not predicated of God and creature according to the same adequate notion; therefore it cannot be predicated univocally. The antecedent is clarified, because God, by the fact that he is most simple being, by essence, and infinite, essentially and unitedly includes every perfection of being. Hence the very notion of being, as it is in God, essentially includes the notion of substance, wisdom, justice; and indeed (which is most important) it essentially includes existence itself completely independent and from itself, whereas on the contrary in creature the very notion of being is completely dependent and from another and in each being is limited to a certain genus of perfection. And for this reason the notion of being is said to be in God by essence, in creatures however by participation. Likewise it is said to be in him as if totally, that is, as if unitedly embracing the whole of being, in others however as if divided by parts; therefore the notion of being is found in creatures in a far inferior and inadequate manner with respect to God, and consequently it is not predicated of them univocally nor according to the same complete notion; for if God and creature were to be defined or in some way described, it would be found by a far different notion that God is being than creature.

9. The difficulty which the preceding reasons can suffer. These reasons, indeed, and similar ones, are serious and acute; nevertheless this always remains difficult in them, that they either prove too much, or are not effective, because they would prove not only that being is not univocal, but also that it does not have one common objective concept to God and creatures, which we proved in the above to be false, and many Thomists, who use those reasons, do not admit this, nor does St. Thomas himself, as I think, as I showed above. The

consequence is proved, because if the notion of being, as it is in God, essentially includes something other than as it is in creature, therefore that notion cannot be so one that it is represented by one formal concept and constitutes one objective concept; for it cannot be understood that in one concept as such there is essential variety. And it is clarified in this way, for when it is said that God includes in his essential notion the total perfection of being, but creature as it were a part and therefore does not equal it, either the discourse is about God and creature as they are beings, or as they are such beings. The latter cannot be said, because it would refer nothing to the present cause, both because now we are not dealing with such a being, nor with the community which it has as it is such, but with being as such and its community; and also because this is not sufficient to impede univocation; for in the same way we can say that animal is essentially included otherwise in man than in horse, by reason of which horse does not equal the perfection of animal as it is in man, considering namely each as it is such an animal and not precisely under the notion of animal. But if the discourse is about God and creature as being is precisely, thus it is false that something is essentially included in the notion of one and not of the other, because by the very fact that something of this kind is included, they are no longer considered precisely as they are beings, but as they are such. Or certainly, if even as they are beings they have that distinction and variety, it is impossible for them to have one objective concept.

What Kind of Analogy Can Intervene Here

10. Therefore, so that the truth of this part and the probability of the aforesaid reasons, which I think is great, may be better understood, I think we should begin from the other part affirming that being is analogous to God and creatures; for although, if it is neither equivocal nor univocal, it would follow from a sufficient enumeration of parts that it would be analogous, nevertheless it is fitting to show

and clarify this directly, so that from this the other part denying that it is univocal may be better established. But to prove this, we must inquire what kind of analogy can have place here. Some therefore think that the analogy of proportionality intervenes here. So St. Thomas thinks, q. 2 de Verit., a. 11, where he also seems to admit only that and to exclude every analogy of attribution from the aforesaid division, which Cajetan also thinks, Opusc. de Ent. et essent., q. 3. But others teach that the analogy of proportionality indeed intervenes here, not however alone, but together with the analogy of attribution. So Ferrariensis signifies, I cont. Gent., c. 34, and more clearly Fonseca, IV Metaph., c. 4, q. 1, sect. 7. The foundation can be that between God and creature in the notion of being there truly intervenes a certain proportion of two relations; for as God is compared to his existence, so in its way creature to its own. But I think it should be noted that not every proportionality suffices to constitute an analogy of proportionality; for this proportion of relations can be found between univocal things or completely similar ones; for as four relates to two, so eight to four, and as man is compared to his senses or to the principle of sensing, so horse to his own, and yet that proportion does not constitute analogy, nor any kind of common name; for the univocal name of animal or double is not taken from that comparison, but from the unity of notion found in individual members.

11. The proper analogy of proportionality is not between God and creatures. For this analogy therefore it is necessary that one member be absolutely such through its form, the other however not absolutely, but as it is subject to such a proportion or comparison to another. But truly in the present case this does not intervene, whether we consider the thing itself or the imposition of the name. For creature is being by reason of its existence considered absolutely and without such proportionality, because namely through that it is outside nothing and has some actuality; the name of being also is not therefore imposed on creature because it maintains that proportion or proportionality to God, but simply because it is something in itself

and not completely nothing; indeed, as we will say below, such a name can be understood to be imposed on created being before uncreated. Finally, every true analogy of proportionality includes something of metaphor and impropriety, just as laughing is said of a meadow through metaphorical transference; but truly in this analogy of being there is no metaphor or impropriety, for creature truly, properly and simply is being; therefore this is not an analogy of proportionality either alone, or together with analogy of attribution; it remains therefore, that if there is some analogy, it should be of some attribution; and thus St. Thomas finally taught, I, q. 13, a. 5 and 6, and I cont. Gent., c. 34, q. 7 de Potent., a. 7, and In I, in prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

12. God and creature do not express analogy of attribution to one third thing. But it remains to inquire what kind of attribution this can be. In this matter it is first of all certain that this attribution is not of many to one, that is, of God and creature to one third thing, which attribution we called above mediate, because nothing can be conceived prior to God and creature, so that through order to that both God and creature would be named beings. It is therefore an attribution of one to another. Concerning which it is again certain that this attribution cannot be of God to creature, but conversely of creature to God, because God does not depend on creature, but creature on God; nor is being said more principally of creature than of God, but conversely. In which it should be kept before our eyes what St. Thomas noted above, that this name as well as others, which are properly said of God and creatures, although as regards us they first signified creatures, or were imposed to signify those, yet as regards the thing signified they belong first and more principally to God. For men philosophizing by the light of nature first knew the existence of creatures or wisdom and other similar perfections, and therefore named them first. Hence, if we consider the mind or intention of those who imposed these names for signifying, these names first signified these perfections in creatures; nevertheless, because the names

themselves by virtue of their absolute imposition do not include in their signification created imperfections, therefore by virtue of the very things signified they first and more principally signify the same perfections existing in God, because such perfections of creatures signified through these words flow from another perfection, which most properly and most perfectly is in God.

13. How the Platonists would say God is not being, but above being. And in a similar way the absolute and common signification must be distinguished from the mode of signifying; for because we speak as we conceive, and we conceive simple things in the manner of composite ones, therefore we also name them thus, and in this way we distinguish the concrete name from the abstract, which, properly speaking, as regards this mode of signifying, have no place in God, and thus we sometimes say that God is rather existence itself than being, because being is concrete and signifies having existence, as if in some way the haver is distinguished from existence itself and through a certain participation of that is being. And as regards this mode, the signification or denomination of being belongs more properly to creature than to God. So much so that speaking in this strict sense wise men sometimes say that God is not being, but above being, as Pico della Mirandola excellently clarified, opusc. de Ente et uno, c. 3 and 4, from some Platonists, and Dionysius, c. 5 de Divin. nomin., and c. also 5 de Mystica Theolog. Augustine partly imitates this, lib. V de Trinit., c. 10, at the end; Basil, lib. V cont. Eunom., c. 13; Damascene, lib. I de Fide, c. 4; Boethius, lib. 1 de Trinit., near the beginning. Nevertheless, because that mode of signifying is not really poured back into the thing signified nor attributes imperfection to it, therefore being absolutely signifies that which is, and in this way it is most properly and principally said of God, without any order to creature; thus Exodus 3, God says: "I am who I am," where the Septuagint have ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὤν, that is, "I am being itself," because namely (as Dionysius said above), God is not in some manner, but absolutely and freely

without any limit, with all that which is being comprehended and occupied in himself.

14. The twofold mode of attribution of one thing to another. Next it should be observed that in two ways, generally speaking, some thing can be denominated through attribution to another. One is when the denominating form is intrinsically in only one extreme, but in others only through extrinsic relation, in which way healthy is said absolutely of animal and of medicine through attribution to animal. The other is when the denominating form is intrinsically in both members, although in one absolutely, in the other however through relation to another, as being is said of substance and accident; for accident is not denominated being extrinsically from the entity of substance, but from proper and intrinsic entity, which is such that it consists entirely in a certain relation to substance. Between these two modes there is manifold difference. One is that in the former attribution the name is attributed to the secondary signification only improperly and through metaphor or other figure; in the latter however it is most proper, indeed it can even be essential denomination, because it is taken from intrinsic form or from proper nature. Another is that in the former attribution the secondary analogate as such or as it is signified by such a name is defined through the primary analogate, so that it is necessary for this to be posited in the definition of that; for if you should wish to clarify what it is for medicine to be healthy, you would say it is effective or conservative of the health of animal. For since it is only extrinsically denominated such from that form, it cannot be defined except through that, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 13, a. 6. But truly in the latter attribution it is not necessary that the posterior analogate be defined through the principal one, as Cajetan noted, in the same a. 6, from St. Thomas, q. 2 de Verit., a 11. And this is proved by induction, because although wisdom is said analogically of created and uncreated, nevertheless created wisdom is not defined through uncreated; and accident, although insofar as it is accident it is defined through substance,

nevertheless not insofar as it is being. And the reason is that the form from which that denomination is taken is not extrinsic, but intrinsic, which as it is signified by that name, since it is signified abstractly and precisely, does not include in its notion the proper mode by which such a form is in any of the analogates. The third difference is that in the former attribution one common concept is not given to all analogates, because the form from which it is taken is intrinsically and properly in only one, in others through trope and extrinsic denomination; but truly in the latter attribution one common formal and objective concept is given, because the analogates are properly and intrinsically such and truly agree in such a notion, which the mind can conceive abstractly or precisely with one concept common to all. The last difference can be added, that an analogous name by the former attribution cannot be the middle term of demonstration, because it is not a middle term by reason of the name, but by reason of the concept. Hence since the name is subordinated to several concepts, it is not one middle term, but manifold and equivocal; but it is otherwise in the latter analogous terms because of the contrary reason.

15. In creatures attribution to God is not as of one not having the form intrinsically to that which has it. From these things therefore it is established that the attribution found between God and creature cannot be of the former kind, namely, in which the form to which attribution is made is intrinsically and properly in only one, in others extrinsically and through transference; for it is established that creature is not denominated being extrinsically from the entity or existence which is in God, but from proper and intrinsic existence, and therefore not through trope, but through truth and propriety it is called being. Likewise it is established that creature as it is being is not defined through the creator or through God's existence, but through existence as such and because it is outside nothing; for if relation to God is added, for example, that creature is being because it is a participation of divine existence, thus creature is no longer defined as

it is being, but as it is such a being, namely created. Finally, it has already been shown above that being is said with one concept of all things contained under it and therefore can be the middle term of demonstration, and the notion of being found in creatures can be the beginning of discovering a similar notion existing in a higher way in the creator. Nor does it stand against this that the name of being is sometimes attributed to God as singular and proper, as is clear from the cited words of Exodus 3. As also creatures are sometimes said not to be in the sight or comparison of God, Isaiah 40: "All nations are as if they were not before him, and they are reputed to him as nothing and vanity." This manner of speaking also Plato sometimes used, as Augustine reports, lib. VIII de Civit. Dei, c. 1. And he indicates in the Sophist saying that simply is that which contains all perfections and nothing is lacking to it. These things (I say) and similar ones do not stand in the way, because in them it is not signified that creatures are not truly and properly beings, but that they are infinitely distant from God, and that God in a singular and excellent manner is that which he is, and the source of all existence, from which others have that they are beings and are named, as Dionysius signified, in the cited place, and elegantly Jerome, ad Ephes. 3, treating those words: "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." Where in the same way he expounds those places of Scripture in which God alone is said to be good, or wise, or immortal, Mark 10; Luke 18; to Romans, last chapter; I to Timothy 5. And Augustine signified the same, I de Trinit., c. 1, and lib. V, c. 2, and lib. VII Confess., c. II, and lib. XII de Civit., c. 2; and Hilary, VII de Trinit., a little from the beginning.

Resolution of the Question

16. What kind of analogy creature has to God. It remains therefore that this analogy or attribution, which creature can have to God under the notion of being, should be of the latter mode, that is, founded in proper and intrinsic existence having essential relation or

dependence on God. Concerning this attribution two things must be shown. First, that such attribution truly intervenes between creature and God; second, that it suffices to constitute analogy. The former is excellently proved by the reasons adduced above from St. Thomas, the sum of which is that creature essentially is being through participation of that existence which is in God by essence and as in the first and universal source, from which some participation of it is derived to all other things; therefore every creature is being through some relation to God, namely insofar as it participates or in some way imitates God's existence; and insofar as it has existence, it essentially depends on God much more than accident depends on substance. In this way therefore being is said of creature through relation or attribution to God. This is not to be understood as if it were thought that creature, conceived under the most abstract and confused notion of being as such, expresses a relation to God; for this is plainly impossible, as the arguments made above correctly prove, since under that concept creature is not conceived as it is finite and limited being, but it is abstracted completely and only confusedly conceived under the notion of existing outside nothing. It is therefore to be understood thus, that in reality itself creature does not participate the notion of being except with a certain essential subordination to God, which is most evident in itself, since it is essentially being from another, as has also been clarified in the above.

17. True analogy of attribution is found in members intrinsically having the form. The other part, namely, that this relation and subordination constitutes some mode of analogy, is proved from Aristotle, lib. V Metaph., c. 6, where he says that those things are one according to analogy which are related as one to another; for thus Bessarion translates; but the Greek literally has "as other to other." Hence almost all expositors think Aristotle is speaking of the analogy of proportionality, in which this relates to that as another to another. Nevertheless the words can rightly be understood more generally; for both St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales and Scotus understand those

words of those analogous terms which are said in relation to one third thing, as urine and medicine are called healthy through relation to the health of animal; and for the same reason those words can be understood of those of which one is said in relation to another; for of these also it is true to say that they are so related that one is said in relation to another; thus creature is related to God in the notion of being. Hence the same Aristotle, IV Metaph., c. 2, says that being is said in many ways, truly in relation to one, and he repeats the same lib. VII, c. 4, where he generally says that all things which are said in relation to one are analogous. And in these places he comprehends the analogy of attribution of accidents to substance, which is established to be such that the notion of being properly and intrinsically belongs to all. But because accidents do not participate that notion except through relation to substance, this is sufficient to constitute analogy of attribution. Therefore by the same or greater reason it will suffice in the present case. Finally it is clarified by reason, because being itself, however abstractly and confusedly conceived, by its force demands this order, that it belong first and per se and as if completely to God, and through that descend to other things, in which it is present only with relation and dependence on God; therefore in this it falls short of the nature of the univocal, for the univocal from itself is so indifferent that it descends equally and without any order or relation of one to another to inferior things; therefore being with respect to God and creatures is deservedly counted among analogous terms. And this will be more established from the solutions of arguments. Although, to confess the truth, among those who admit one confused concept of being there can hardly be dissent in this question about the reality, but about the mode of speaking; for without doubt being has great similarity with univocal terms, since it is predicated of God and creature with one middle concept absolutely and without addition, which single agreement those considered who called it univocal, which manner of speaking Aristotle sometimes used, as is evident from lib. II Metaph., c. 1, at the end, where literally the Greek has: "But

each thing is that most of all among others, according to which univocation is present to others." Hence he concludes that that is most true or most being, which is the cause to others that they are such. Nevertheless, if the aforesaid difference and the mode by which the notion of being is found in God and in others is attentively considered, it is easily understood that it falls far short of true univocation, and constitutes as it were the first order of analogous terms.

Response to Arguments

18. The rejection of a certain response. To the foundation of the second opinion, therefore, that consequence is denied. Being expresses one concept common to God and creatures; therefore it is said of them univocally. To the first proof, some distinguish[36] concerning the concept of being; for it is taken either as it includes the proper reasons of inferiors, or insofar as it excludes or does not include them. In the former way they say being is analogous, because it includes many things having an order among themselves, and under this consideration they deny that the reason of being is the same in creature and creator; indeed, they also deny that there is one concept of being, because those members cannot be included in one concept according to their proper reasons. In the latter way, however, they concede that being is one in name, concept, and reason, yet they deny that it is univocal, because under that consideration it does not express an order to inferiors; but nothing is said to be univocal or analogous except through an order to inferiors. But this response presupposes a distinction which we reject above as useless for explaining the signification of this word "being" and the unity of its concept; for being, as including the proper reasons of inferiors, is neither signified by this word "being," nor can it be conceived by a proper and adequate corresponding concept. For being, insofar as it includes inferiors according to their proper reasons, is not being only, but is finite and

[36] See Iavel. IV Metaph., q. 1.

infinite being, substance and accident, and other things, which, just as they cannot be conceived by us in one concept according to their proper reasons, so neither can they be signified by one name; therefore that distinction concerning being including or not including inferiors has no bearing on explaining its analogy. This is confirmed and clarified, for either the discussion concerns being actually and distinctly including inferiors, and against this proceeds the reason given, that such a concept neither corresponds to this word "being," nor pertains to being insofar as it is being, but insofar as it is substance or accident, etc. Or the discussion concerns being only confusedly and as it were potentially including inferiors, and thus it is false that it does not correspond to one common concept, but to proper concepts of God and creature, of substance and accident, because it is manifestly contradictory that in a confused concept there should be included distinct conception of particular reasons of being. Finally, by the same reasoning it could be said that animal, insofar as it includes inferiors, is not univocal, that is, insofar as it is subordinated to the proper and distinct concepts of inferiors, because as such it does not have one concept; but this would be a useless and frivolous response, because neither do concepts correspond to this word "animal" as such, nor is that merely animal, but is man, horse, etc.

19. From another perspective, it also seems false what is said in that response, that being, as not including inferiors, is neither univocal nor analogous, because as such it is not compared to inferiors. For either the discussion concerns actual comparative knowledge on the part of the intellect, and this is not necessary for univocation, for the concept of man is univocal, even if it is not actually compared to inferiors through reflexive knowledge; or the discussion concerns aptitudinal comparison on the part of the objective concept itself of being not actually including inferiors, and thus it is false that it is not compared or is not comparable to them, since it is predicable of them, as is evident per se, for when we say that a creature or substance or accident is being, we do not predicate being

insofar as it actually includes inferiors, but only according to the confused reason of being; it is therefore necessary that according to that concept it be either univocal or analogous.

20. Another response to the argument. The aforesaid response is resolved. Otherwise, therefore, it can be responded that Aristotle in the Dialectics never distinguished analogates from univocals or equivocals, and therefore, since analogates are intermediate between those two extremes, they are referred back to that with which they more agree. Hence Aristotle, in the aforementioned chapter of the Antepraedicamenta, places under equivocals the analogate which signifies inferiors by several concepts, as "animal" said of the painted and the living. Thus it can be said according to those definitions that being is rather referred back to univocals than to equivocals, and so in relation to dialectical usage it can be called univocal, because it can be the middle term of a demonstration and is said simply and without addition of created and uncreated being, and is common according to name and concept. Metaphysically, however, it is analogous, because it is not in inferiors with equal disposition and order, as has been explained. But if you say that according to this response, being is equally univocal as any genus, for a genus, although it is logically univocal, can be called physically or metaphysically analogous, because inequality lies hidden in it, or because it descends to inferiors with a certain inequality of them, as is taken from Aristotle, Physics VII, text 31, and Metaphysics X, text 26, and more clearly from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, it is responded that the reasoning is not similar, for under a genus there is only inequality of perfection among the species themselves, arising only from their differences, but there is not inequality of order arising from the common generic reason itself, which of itself would demand to be first and absolutely in one species, and then in others through relation to the first, which could be called inequality of essential dependence, which is required in the community of being. And therefore, although physically and according to the being which the

species of a genus have in reality, a genus is said to be in some way analogous or equivocal, nevertheless it is not metaphysically analogous according to the objective and common concept. But being is analogous even metaphysically according to the common objective concept, although according to those dialectical definitions it seems to be comprehended under univocals. This response is therefore probable, but it favors too much the univocation of being.

21. The third and true response. The third response, therefore, is by denying that the reason of being is entirely the same in finite and infinite being, for this is being because it is from itself, but that is being because it is from another. But if you say that by these words is not explained the reason accommodated to being as such, but the proper reasons of this and that being, it is responded first that the reason of being is transcendent and intimately included in all proper and determinate reasons of beings and in the very modes determining being itself, and therefore, although the common reason as abstracted is one in itself, nevertheless the reasons constituting individual beings are diverse, and through them as such each is constituted absolutely in the being of being. Then (which pertains most to the matter), the common reason itself of itself demands such determination with order and relation to one, and therefore, although according to the confused reason it is the same as it is one, nevertheless it is not entirely the same, because it is not of itself entirely uniform, which uniformity and identity univocals require in their reason, and thus the definition of univocals ought to be explained.

22. Solution to the second argument. To the second reason it is responded that by that argument it is correctly proved that being is not one of those analogates which are said by metaphor or transference, but it does not follow from this that it is in no way analogous. For that condition of an analogous name, namely, that it not be common to many from the force of one imposition, is not of the nature of all analogates, but only of those which are said by metaphor or transference. Hence it must be carefully considered that

translative or metaphorical analogy, although it has some foundation in things, nevertheless does not entirely arise from them, but from the imposition and usage of men. But this analogy of being is entirely founded and arises from the things themselves, which are so subordinated that they are necessarily referred to one insofar as they are beings, and therefore the name "being" could not be imposed to signify confusedly that which has being, without consequently having to signify many things with relation to one, and thus it was analogous not by transference, but by true and proper signification. And hence also the third proof is left resolved, for in it analogates of attribution are incompletely enumerated. For besides those which are said of secondary significates by extrinsic denomination, there are others which are said intrinsically and properly of all significates, which have their own laws and conditions diverse from other analogates, as has been sufficiently explained.

DISPUTATION XXIX

ON N GOD AS THE FIRST BEING AND UNCREATED SUBSTANCE, INSOFAR AS HIS VERY EXISTENCE CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON

Why this disputation is placed in this position. Those who treat metaphysical doctrines are accustomed to relegate this disputation concerning God to nearly the last place, imitating Aristotle, who in book XII of his Metaphysics touched upon it, where he disputes simultaneously and almost indistinctly about God and other intelligences. Others have followed him in this as well. The reason appears to have been that, although God is most knowable in himself, nevertheless he is less known to us than material effects through which he is known by us. This reason will also be common to other intelligences as well, maintaining proportion. We, however, since in these disputations we intend to preserve the order of doctrine insofar as it is possible, dispute first concerning uncreated being before others in particular, because that is the first and principal object of this science and most worthy of all by its very nature, and knowledge of it will bring great light, so that we may be able to know other beings not only a posteriori, but also, according to our capacity, a priori. And although we know God not in himself, but from effects by natural

reason, as we now speak, nevertheless I judge it sufficient for establishing this disputation concerning God to have premised those things which we have treated in common concerning being and concerning the first division of being and concerning causes and effects. Especially since this doctrine, as it is delivered by us, presupposes from philosophy certain principles which help in knowing God, and sufficient knowledge of the terms which we can use for declaring divine perfection, at least as regards their signification or what their names mean.

Therefore this disputation fittingly falls in this place, in which we shall briefly embrace all things that natural theology teaches concerning God, abstaining from those things which are held or can be held by revelation alone; which we shall touch upon only insofar as it will be necessary for prefiguring the terminus to which natural reason can arrive. And although in God existence and what he is and what kind he is are the same, nevertheless according to our mode of conceiving we shall discourse distinctly and orderly concerning these things.

SECTION I

WHETHER SOME UNCREATED BEING CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY PHYSICAL OR METAPHYSICAL REASON

1. Two things are suggested in this title: first, whether this can be demonstrated; second, by what means, whether physical or metaphysical. These two things can also be inquired about concerning God, and in reality it is the same to seek an uncreated being and God; nevertheless, we distinguish these things for the sake of greater clarity and to complete the reasoning more conveniently, as we shall declare in the following section. Concerning the first part therefore, Aliacus, to be cited below, denied that this can be demonstrated; nevertheless

concerning this matter enough has been said in the preceding disputation; for by showing in various ways and under diverse terms the first division of being, namely into infinite or finite, created or uncreated, we have shown in multiple ways that it is necessary that there be in the universe some being which has existence from itself, so that from it the others which have received existence may flow forth. Let there be therefore a brief response to this first part: it can be demonstrated by natural reason that there is in the nature of things some uncreated or unmade being. This is proved by the reasons made there, which will be further declared and confirmed by seeking and examining the middle term of this demonstration.

Various Opinions are Reported

2. Concerning the second part therefore there are various opinions, either extremely opposed or intermediate. The first is that only by a physical means can it be demonstrated that such a first and per se necessary being is given. The Commentator holds this, in XII Metaphysics, text 5, and in I Physics, last text, who speaks generally about all substances abstracted from matter, because perhaps he thought that all immaterial substances are beings necessary from themselves. His foundation, however, is that only from the eternal motion of heaven can it be gathered that there is some eternal substance abstracted from matter. He adds that reason that no science demonstrates its subject to exist, but supposes it as self-evident or as demonstrated in another science; but God or immaterial substance pertains to the object of metaphysics; therefore they are not proved to exist by the metaphysician; since therefore it is not self-evident, it is taken as demonstrated by the natural philosopher.

3. Second opinion. The second opinion is extremely contrary, that this task pertains to the metaphysician and not to the natural philosopher. Thus holds Avicenna, book I of his Metaphysics, chapter 1, where conversely from this he concludes that God does not pertain

to the object of metaphysics, because this science proves God to exist; the same in book VIII of his Metaphysics, chapters 1 and 3. The same was held by Alexander of Aphrodisias, XII Metaphysics, text 6; and Albert the Great, I Physics, last chapter; and Scotus, In I, question 2, prologue, to 2. The foundation is that otherwise natural philosophy would be more worthy than metaphysics and the latter would depend maximally on the former, if it were to take from it knowledge of God and separated substances, even as regards the existence of their being.

4. Third opinion. The third position can be that this task can pertain to both the natural philosopher and the metaphysician separately, or to each of them in solidum. I do not find this position expressed in any author, yet it could be founded in Aristotle; for he, in book VIII of the Physics, and in XII of the Metaphysics, proved that there is in things some immobile principle separated from matter; therefore he judged this to pertain to both sciences and without dependence of one upon the other; for since metaphysics is more worthy, it cannot depend on physics in this matter. But since physics is prior in the order of generation, at least in us, it also cannot depend on metaphysics in this matter, for it completes its demonstration before metaphysics is acquired.

5. A fourth opinion can be that this task pertains to both sciences not separately, but conjointly, so that neither can complete the demonstration without partnership with the other; for physics begins, but metaphysics perfects. Thus Soncinas seems to feel, book XII Metaphysics, question 1, where although in the first conclusion he asserts that it properly pertains to the metaphysician to demonstrate that separated substances exist, immediately however in the second conclusion he adds that every middle term by which this is demonstrated is either natural, or does not conclude except by virtue of some natural middle term. Otherwise, Javellus distinguishes, in the same book, question 3, saying that to demonstrate that separated substances as such or in genus exist pertains to the natural philosopher; but to show that among them there is one first, which is

God, is the business of the metaphysician. And he adduces St. Thomas, I contra Gentiles, chapter 13, saying that Aristotle, in VIII Physics, only arrived at proving that in the motion of heaven the mover must be distinguished from the movable and that this mover is substantially separated from heaven; then however in XII Metaphysics, from this mover he proceeded further to demonstrating that God exists.

6. Judgment concerning the opinions cited. From these opinions I judge that the second is simply true and the fourth can be reduced to sound sense; for as it is asserted by its authors, it cannot be proved absolutely. But no more convenient or efficacious reason occurs for confirming our position than by the very use and quasi-experiment of the physical and metaphysical middle terms by which this is usually proved, and by examining the efficacy of each. Therefore only two physical middle terms occur which we can use for showing separated substances either in genus or in particular in the first uncreated being.

The Physical Reasons by which God's Existence is Proved are Examined

7. The first, taken from local motion, is treated at length. The first middle term is taken from the motion of heaven, which Aristotle used in VIII Physics, and he also employed it in XII Metaphysics, text 26, where from the eternal motion of heaven he arrived at demonstrating the first immobile mover. But this middle term, taken per se and precisely, is found inefficacious in many ways for demonstrating that there is in the nature of things some immaterial substance, much less for demonstrating the first and uncreated substance; and first I omit that principle on which that entire demonstration is founded: "Everything that is moved is moved by another" has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated in every genus of motion or action; for there are many things which through virtual act

seem to move themselves and reduce themselves to formal act, as can be seen in appetite or will, and in water reducing itself to pristine coldness; the same therefore can happen in local motion; and thus it can be said that heaven is moved not by another but by itself through its form or some innate power, from which such motion results, just as downward motion results in stone from intrinsic gravity. Whence it has happened that it is still under judgment whether heaven is moved by an intelligence or not. How therefore from such uncertain principles can a true demonstration be made by which God's existence is proved?

8. Then, let us posit as true that principle "everything that is moved is moved by another" (for it is indeed more probable when correctly understood), and consequently let us posit that heaven is moved by another, by what, I ask, necessary or evident consequence can it be inferred from that principle and the motion of heaven that there is given some immaterial substance? For either this is gathered from eternal motion or from motion only. If the first, the collection is primarily made from a false principle and thus there is no demonstration in the thing itself, whatever Aristotle may have thought.

9. It can be responded from Scotus and others that the motion of heaven indeed is not eternal in fact, yet it can be from itself, for since it is circular, it has neither beginning nor end from itself and therefore the mover of heaven is from itself apt to move with eternal motion, and from this it is excellently concluded that such a mover is a spiritual substance. But this response supposes something not only uncertain, but also less probable, namely that the motion of heaven could have been from eternity. For although from its specific nature it does not demand a certain beginning or terminus, and therefore could have begun before any instant and endured after any instant, nevertheless, from the generic nature of motion and successive being, eternal duration without beginning is repugnant, both because otherwise it never could have been traversed, and especially because

every creature existing from eternity must necessarily endure through eternity in that disposition in which it was created, not that it will necessarily endure thus in eternity on the posterior side, for it is established that this is not necessary, but that on the anterior side it will necessarily remain in that disposition through infinite duration and without beginning, whether that disposition be of substance or existence, or of quality or position or another of this kind, because if a thing is created from eternity in some disposition, that disposition itself is also established from eternity; therefore that disposition itself also has duration without beginning; but such duration is necessarily infinite from the other extreme; for if it is finite, so as to be enclosed by two extremes, it already has beginning and end and consequently is not eternal; if however it is said that that disposition only lasted through one indivisible instant of our time, this much more contradicts eternity, because much shorter (if it is permitted to speak thus) is such duration than any finite time; indeed that as such is not proper duration, but the beginning of duration. Whence it is rather inferred that that instant is the extrinsic beginning of immediately subsequent motion, and thus that such motion is not eternal, but temporal; because therefore a thing cannot be created even from eternity except in a certain and determinate disposition and necessarily remains in it through some infinite duration, therefore it is repugnant for motion to be eternal, because through motion a thing begins to be deprived of that disposition in which it was established. This is easily illustrated by an example in the very thing about which we are treating: let us suppose that the heaven of the sun was created from eternity; it was necessary for the star of the sun to be created in a certain and determinate place; let us suppose therefore that it was created in our hemisphere; it would have been necessary that through a certain eternity it endure in that place and in our hemisphere, because of the reason given; therefore that heaven could not have been moved from eternity, otherwise the sun would not have endured for an entire day or hour nor for any duration which could coexist with a

day or hour in that place in which it was created. For this reason therefore, to omit others, I judge that eternity is repugnant to motion, and that motion includes repugnance with a certain immutability which eternity includes, and therefore not only in fact is motion not eternal, but it cannot be; therefore from eternal motion an eternal or immaterial mover cannot be gathered.

10. You will say: granted that it is repugnant to motion to have been eternal on its part, nevertheless a mover can be understood as apt from itself to move eternally, if it did not contradict on the part of the movable or motion, and this is sufficient for the force of the inference made. But this aptitude on the part of the mover can be gathered from the motion of heaven, because it can endure eternally, since it has no contrary, nor does it demand from itself a certain time; therefore the mover, as much as is in itself, has power to move eternally; therefore equally it can do this, as much as is from itself, on the anterior side just as on the posterior side, if it did not contradict otherwise from the part of the effect. Likewise the duration of that motion so long-lasting and invariable or uniform clearly declares that its mover moves without weariness or fatigue and consequently, as much as is from itself, can always and perpetually move, and thus be immaterial. But first, the collection from posterior eternity to anterior eternity is not rightly made. For motion begun in time can therefore endure eternally, because motion which is actually posited is always finite, and all the infinity which is apprehended in future motion will never exist in the thing itself so that it would ever be true to say that the whole already exists or has existed, which will be otherwise if motion is posited as made from eternity, for already the whole of its infinity would have existed in the nature of things. Whence to have power to move always in the future is only to have power to effect motion into infinity; but to have power to move from eternity is to have power to effect infinite motion, which is very different and more repugnant. Therefore from efficacy toward that former thing, power on the part of the mover even toward this latter thing is not rightly

inferred; especially because toward that which involves repugnance in itself there is no power.

11. But come, let us grant because of that probable conjecture that the mover of heaven has power to effect eternal motion, or even let us imagine that it moved heaven from eternity in the same way and invariably; how is it rightly inferred from this that that mover is an immaterial substance? You will say, because it is not fatigued by moving. But what if someone should imagine that there is not one and the same mover, but several who move in turn, and therefore are never so wearied that they do not rest before it is necessary either to interrupt or slacken the motion? For although this is a fiction, nevertheless from the motion of heaven alone it cannot be demonstrated to be false, without weakening the inference and intended reason, as I now declare. For although it is true that the mover of heaven is not fatigued by moving, it does not follow from this that it is immaterial, but only follows both that the movable does not resist nor react while it is moved, and that the mover is eternal; but both can be true without immateriality of the mover; just as the sun, if it had been from eternity, would not be fatigued by perpetually illuminating, because it illuminates the medium without resistance or reaction. But Soncinas says above that from eternal motion it is proximately gathered that the mover is not in potency, since it is always moving in act, from Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text 30; but a being in act and in no way in potency is immaterial. But whatever may be about Aristotle's mind, about which we shall see later, that reason is very inefficacious, for it only concludes that he who always actually moves is not in potency to moving, not however that he is in no way in potency as pure act, otherwise also an angel moving heaven perpetually would be pure act. But if it is not rightly inferred to be pure act, it also cannot be inferred to be an immaterial substance, because if notwithstanding the action of moving, it can perpetually be in potency to other actions or receptions, for the same reason someone could say it is in potency to material motions or qualities,

nor from motion alone can it be shown that this is more repugnant than that. But if there is discourse about being in potency only as regards substantial being, it is true that an eternal mover is not thus in potency, yet it is not inferred from this that it is immaterial; for also an eternal movable by local motion is not thus in potency, and nevertheless it does not thereby become immaterial or incorporeal, as is established in heaven. Therefore from the eternity of motion or from the power of perpetually moving, it cannot be rightly gathered that there is an immaterial substance which moves.

12. And from this discourse it seems to be inferred a fortiori that much less can this be gathered from the motion of heaven either temporal or taken absolutely, because eternal motion is something greater than motion simply. But let us argue furthermore from proper considerations; for in two ways it can be posited that heaven is moved by another. In one way as by one impressing an internal impulse proximately active of motion, just as a heavy thing is said to be moved by its generator. In another way as by a proximate separate mover, just as a wheel is moved by a hand. For I do not think it has been demonstrated so far which of these ways is truer, although by conjecturing the latter is more probable, and because that motion does not seem necessary to heaven because of its peculiar nature; for since it is itself inanimate and always remains in its connatural place, there is no reason why it should require motion for itself; and therefore neither is an internal active impulse owed to such motion; therefore that motion is necessary for the conservation, governance and perfection of this world; and therefore it more probably comes from an extrinsic mover. Nevertheless, because this is not certain, it is necessary to speak about both members.

13. If therefore we posit that heaven is moved by another in the prior way, nothing can be proved from this; for although it is rightly inferred from this that there is another substance prior to heaven, nevertheless this is not so much proved in that way as supposed, for that mover of heaven is not said to move heaven

otherwise than because it impressed upon it an internal impulse intrinsic and connatural, which is not impressed except by a generator or by an author of nature; therefore that reasoning supposes that heaven has an author by whom it was procreated; but this is not demonstrated by that discourse nor can it be demonstrated from motion alone, but only through metaphysical middle terms, which we shall see later, for it makes no difference to the local motion of heaven whether heaven is established or is a being necessary from itself; therefore from that motion precisely it cannot be demonstrated that heaven is established by another, but at most it can immediately be inferred that it is a being imperfect from itself, since it is capable of such motion, and from this it will be able to be further gathered that it is not a being necessary from itself, because so great imperfection does not cohere with such perfection; yet this already pertains to the metaphysician, as is established from the terms themselves. Therefore from this motion by another it cannot be demonstrated that there is another substance superior to heaven, but rather this must be supposed. And much less can it be inferred that there is an immaterial substance. For if someone should imagine that heaven is established by some superior corporeal and material cause and received from the same an intrinsic impulse by which it is continuously moved, in what way could he be convinced of his error from the force of local and physical motion alone?

14. And this reasoning proceeds even if we suppose that heaven is moved by another extrinsic and proper proximate mover; for what does the motion of heaven have because of which it is necessary that that mover be immaterial? For either that is the perpetuity of motion or long duration, which of itself can endure perpetually, and this is not so, because for that similar duration and perpetuity in the mover and in its power suffices, which it could have even if it were corporeal, just as heaven itself or the sun has it. Or that would be the invariability of motion, which indicates an indefatigable power in the mover, and this at most declares that the mover is incorruptible, to

omit other things which were touched upon above; but it could be incorruptible even if it were corporeal, just as heaven itself is. Or that would be the harmony or order of celestial motions with admirable proportion and uniform difformity apt and accommodated to the conservation and government of this sublunary world, and this indeed shows quite evidently that the author of the universe is intellectual and has constituted and governs all things with supreme wisdom; yet not that the proximate mover of each heaven is intellectual; for someone could imagine that to each heaven a proportionate mover has been given acting through the mode of nature and from several movers of diverse powers that order arises. Then, although we grant that it is somehow gathered from this that the movers of the heavens are intellectual, nevertheless not incorporeal, for although angels were aerial, as many have posited, they could move the heavens, nor from the force of the motion of heaven alone can it be convinced that this is an error.

15. Some say that by the very fact that heaven has a separate mover, it is immediately concluded to be incorporeal, because heaven is the first body, otherwise one would proceed to infinity. But this proves nothing, both because it is supposed without proof that heaven is the first body, when nevertheless it can be said to be the first visible, but there are other prior invisible ones, or to be first among simple inanimate things, but there are other animate things with intellectual forms simply prior and nobler, which can be posited in finite number, and therefore it will not be necessary to proceed to infinity. But it can be pressed, for from the motion of heaven it is proved on one part that the mover is incorruptible, and on the other that it is intellectual; from this it can finally be concluded that it is immaterial, because an incorruptible body can serve nothing toward an intellectual act, and therefore there cannot be a principle of understanding naturally conjoined to an incorruptible body, and therefore, if the mover of heaven is a complete intellectual and incorruptible substance, it must necessarily be separated from matter. It is responded that this

discourse is quite probable, which we shall pursue again and more fully below in treating created intelligences; nevertheless, that discourse is not now founded on physical and local motion alone, but is partly aided from the doctrine concerning the soul, and partly and especially relies on this principle, that an intellectual form is not united to matter except to be aided by its ministry for intellectual operations, which principle is metaphysical, and thus that demonstration, whatever it may be, is metaphysical, although the way to it is prepared in some manner through physical discourses, indeed not evident ones, but at most probable, as has been declared.

16. And these things indeed proceed generally concerning substances moving the heavens; from which it is established a fortiori that from the force of the motion of heaven alone it cannot be concluded that there is given some first immaterial and uncreated being, for the motion of heaven of itself only leads up to some proximate mover of heaven, in which it does not require from itself and consequently neither shows those perfections, as we have declared; therefore neither from that motion nor from any physical effect can it be investigated whether that mover is one in all heavens or several, and if there are several, whether all are reduced to one first, on which they depend or are somehow moved and by what genus of motion; therefore much less will it be able to be gathered from the motion of heaven that there is some first being into which those perfections converge; but it will always be necessary to add some metaphysical middle term by which this is concluded.

17. Therefore what some say, that although those properties are not concluded absolutely from the motion of heaven in any mover of it, they are nevertheless concluded in that one which moves heaven from itself and by its own power, for that which moves from itself and by power entirely its own, also is from itself, and therefore is uncreated and consequently immaterial; this (I say) is not to the point; for this proof, whatever it may be, is not physical, but metaphysical, for the entire force of that proof consists in that middle term, "moving from

itself," which is not had from motion alone; for motion indeed shows in the mover a power of moving; but whether it has that power from itself or from another, and whether it operates through it with dependence or without dependence on another, is not shown from motion alone, and again how from that property of moving from itself other properties are gathered, much less can this be investigated from motion or physical middle term, but metaphysical principles must be used; of which the manifest sign is that from every effective causality the same consequence can be made to a cause efficient from itself, which from itself abstracts from physical motion and from efficiency from matter, or without it. Therefore from the motion of heaven alone there is no sufficient way for completing a demonstration of this kind.

18. Second middle term taken from the operations of the rational soul and its essence. Another middle term or another way can be taken from the operations of the rational soul and knowledge of its substance which is taken from them; for in things which concern matter, there is none either more similar to God or more immediately dependent on him in being and operating than the rational soul, and therefore by no physical middle term does it seem that God can be more known than by contemplation of the rational soul and its works; but it is established that this middle term is physical, for although the rational soul is immaterial, it is nevertheless the form of matter, and similarly its operation, although it is spiritual in itself, nevertheless depends in some way on the body, and therefore consideration of the soul conjoined to body and its operations pertains to the natural philosopher.

19. Nevertheless, this way also cannot serve for demonstrating anything about God, except by supposing something demonstrated in metaphysics, and always using metaphysical middle terms and principles for ultimately concluding the matter. For unless we suppose that the rational soul has a supreme author by whom it was procreated, similar or better perfections cannot be gathered in God from the perfections of the soul. But that the soul has a cause of

this kind cannot be gathered by the natural philosopher from the operations of the soul alone, but it is necessary to use some principle common to other agents or created effects, about which we shall see shortly. Therefore from this physical middle term, as it is physical, it is not demonstrated that there is given one uncreated being. But indeed, supposing that the soul has a superior cause of its being, which we call the first being or God, it is excellently gathered that if the soul is intellectual, free, immaterial, immortal and similar things, which speak perfection simply, much more all these are found in God; yet this very collection is founded on a metaphysical middle term and general principle, that perfections of an effect are in the principal cause in a nobler mode and especially in the first; but demonstration properly pertains to that science to which the middle term of demonstration pertains. Add that, as pertains to the attribute of immateriality, from this precise middle term it cannot be inferred that God is entirely immaterial, but at most after the manner of the rational soul. We conclude therefore that all physical middle terms are per se insufficient for demonstrating that there is some first uncreated being; indeed it has been shown in passing that per se they do not suffice for demonstrating what or what kind that being is in the way in which it can be demonstrated through effects, but this always pertains to the metaphysician. At the same time, however, it has been declared in some way how natural philosophy prepares the way in some manner and provides occasion and also furnishes certain effects by which it helps in completing a demonstration of this kind, which will be more expounded in what follows.

Metaphysical Arguments & Means Are Explained

20. It remains for us to show in the second place how metaphysics can demonstrate that there exists some uncreated being. We shall indicate this more briefly, because in the preceding disputation, section 1, nearly everything that could be said here has

been touched upon. First, therefore, in place of that physical principle: "Everything that is moved is moved by another," another metaphysical principle must be taken that is far more evident: "Everything that comes to be is made by another," whether it be created or generated, or comes to be in whatever manner. This principle is demonstrated from the fact that nothing can effect itself. For a thing that comes to be through effection acquires being; but a thing that makes or produces is supposed to have being, and therefore it involves a clear contradiction that the same thing should make itself, for before a thing exists it cannot be in formal or virtual act for making itself; and for this reason this principle is far more evident: "Everything that is produced is produced by another," than that other one: "Everything that is moved is moved by another"; for what is moved is supposed to exist, in which existence there can be understood a virtual act for moving itself; but what is effected is not supposed to exist, but rather is supposed not to exist before it comes to be; in non-being itself there cannot be power for effecting itself, and therefore that principle is evident when properly understood concerning first and true effection, so that we may now abstain from that theological question whether the same thing can exist twice and whether, once existing, it can concur in the effection of itself as existing a second time or elsewhere; for this miracle, even if it be admitted, does not weaken the principle posited, both because here we are dealing with the natural and proper effection or production of a thing; and also because that second effection in the aforesaid case does not so much deserve the name of production as of conservation, since it presupposes an existing thing.

21. Therefore, with this principle established, the demonstration is concluded thus: every being either is made or is not made, that is, uncreated; but not all beings that exist in the universe can be made; therefore it is necessary that there exist some being that is not made, that is, uncreated. The major premise is evident, since it is necessary that one of two contradictories belong to each thing. The minor premise is proved, because every made being is made by

another; therefore either that by which it was made is also made or not; if it is not made, then there is given some uncreated being, which was our intention; but if that too is made, it will be necessary that it be made by another, concerning which the same inquiry must be made further, and thus finally either one must stop at a being not made, or proceed to infinity, or commit a circle; but neither can a circle be committed, nor can one proceed to infinity; therefore one must necessarily stop at a being not made.

22. The prior part of the minor premise is declared and proved; for I call it committing a circle if someone should say that one thing is produced by another and this in turn is produced by that which it had produced, either immediately or mediately and after many generations; for thus someone could suppose that every thing is produced by another distinct from itself and none is unproduced. Therefore we say this circle is impossible and equally repugnant to that principle: "Everything that is produced is produced by another," as that the same thing should produce itself; for if one thing comes to be from another made by itself, at least mediately and as it were in virtue it effects itself. Likewise because in the thing that makes another, being is presupposed; therefore it is also presupposed that it is made, if it has being through effection; therefore it cannot be made by its own effect.

23. You will say that this argument proves that the thing which makes another, insofar as it exists when it effects that thing, is not made by the same thing which it effects, insofar as it receives being from that; nevertheless it can still be understood that that thing which effected the other loses that being which it then had, and yet is afterward reproduced either by the same thing which it had made, or by some effect of it, as for example among humans that a dead father be generated by a son, or a grandfather by a grandson or great-grandson, or after the hundredth generation; for thus the Pythagoreans could easily philosophize, who believed that the same souls return to bodies.

24. Nevertheless this evasion has no place unless at the same time a process to infinity is added, for either in those circles or conversions of generations one stops at some first producer not begotten, and concerning that one it can in no way be said that it was made by some effect of its own, because it is supposed to exist before every effect of its own. And then the argument applies to that one, because either that first author of generations is simply not made, and thus we conclude what we intend, namely that there is given some being simply not made; or that one too is made by another, and concerning that other the same inquiry returns, which will never stop until one arrives at an uncreated being. But if in those circles and conversions of generations one never stops at some first begetter, then besides the said circle a process to infinity is added and furthermore inconveniences are multiplied, namely, that through natural generations the same individuals are reproduced, and similar things, without which that process to infinity would suffice, if it could be given.

In Efficient Causes & Their Effects One Cannot Proceed to Infinity

25. It remains therefore that we prove the other part of the minor premise posited above, namely, that one cannot proceed to infinity in the emanation of one being from another, which Aristotle demonstrated in every kind of cause, Metaphysics book II, chapter 2. And the principal reason seems to be that from a process to infinity it follows that all causality is removed, because in essentially ordered causes the posterior depends on the prior and all posterior ones depend on some first one; but with a process to infinity posited, there is no first one; therefore there will be no causality. Others explain this thus, because if one proceeded to infinity, one would never arrive at an effect, since the infinite cannot be traversed. To clarify this, let us suppose that this process can happen in two ways, namely, either

ascending from lower causes to higher ones, or conversely descending from universal to proximate causes. In this latter way it is evident that one must necessarily stop at some ultimate or proximate cause to the effect, because otherwise one would never arrive at an effect; for it cannot be understood that an effect proceeds into being and does not proceed proximately and immediately from some cause. Therefore the former process upward is what has the difficulty and pertains to the present matter; in this progress therefore the reason made does not seem efficacious. For that progression to infinity can be understood either among proximate causes and more and more remote ones, which they call accidentally subordinated, and these need not concur simultaneously, indeed not even exist simultaneously when the effect is made, but in some succession, as a son is from a father, and the father from a grandfather, and so concerning the rest; or among essentially subordinated causes, which simultaneously and each in its own order immediately influence the effect, as a first and second cause. In the former way therefore it seems not to be repugnant, especially according to Aristotle's opinion, to progress to infinity, because if the world had been from eternity, a similar process would have been necessary. But this process to infinity suffices for eluding the reason made, because any thing will be said to be made by another and one will never stop at a thing not made. In the latter way, however, even if a process to infinity were given, one could arrive at an effect, because causes thus essentially subordinated do not operate successively one after another, but simultaneously; but in this way it is not repugnant for infinite causes, if they exist, to operate simultaneously. For what is said, that the infinite cannot be traversed, is true insofar as this signifies succession; for if one thing is numbered or acts after another, it will never be exhausted on that side by which it is infinite. But that a whole simultaneously or a whole multitude of simultaneously existing causes should also simultaneously act or influence the same effect, is not contrary to the nature of the infinite. Finally, whoever posits this infinite subordination of causes will deny

that all depend on some first one, whence Aristotle, while he supposes the contrary, seems to beg the question.

26. Nevertheless it can be shown evidently (as I think) that one must necessarily stop at some first cause not made, beginning from essentially subordinated causes, one of which essentially and actually depends on another either in being or also in action. First, all the reasons by which it is proved that there cannot be an actually infinite multitude in things can be adduced here, without which multitude that process to infinity in subordinated causes cannot be understood; but I omit those, both because they are general and remote, and because they are not so evident. I argue therefore in this manner from the proper nature and subordination of causes, as Aristotle argued; because it is impossible for the whole collection of beings or efficient causes to be dependent in its being and operation; therefore it is necessary that there be something independent among them; therefore one cannot proceed to infinity in that progress, but one must stop at an unproduced being, which is also independent in causing. The first antecedent is evident from the said principle: "Everything that is produced is produced by another"; for it is the same to say: everything that depends, depends on another; if therefore the whole collection of things were dependent, it would necessarily have to depend on another; but this is impossible, because outside the collection there is nothing else; but if the whole collection depended on some being comprehended within it, that too would depend on itself, which is impossible; thus therefore it is impossible for the whole collection of beings to be made, or for the whole collection of causes to be dependent in acting with that proper dependence by which a posterior cause depends on a prior one.

27. Response to the objection. You will say: does not the whole composite depend on a part, for example, on the form, and yet the form does not therefore depend on itself? It is replied first that it is one thing to speak of formal or material dependence, another of effective dependence, of which we speak; for the whole to depend on

parts is nothing other than to be composed of them, and therefore it is not necessary that the form, for example, compose itself, but only that it confer its own proper and intrinsic being to the composite; but to depend efficiently is to receive from another its own being distinct from that which is in the cause; and therefore, if some multitude according to its whole self depends effectively, it is necessary that it depend on something not comprehended in that multitude, for if it depended on something comprehended in it, either that would depend on itself, or certainly not the whole multitude adequately and according to its whole self would be dependent. But those words "adequately and according to its whole self" are purposely posited to exclude dependence in a qualified sense or according to a part, such as is, for example, the dependence of an effect on a second cause, as fire on generated fire; for the whole generated fire is said to depend on the generator, because without its action this whole truly would not have been; nevertheless that dependence is only by reason of the form and its union with matter, it is not however adequate and per se primarily or according to its whole self, because the entity of matter per se does not depend on the action of fire. When therefore we say that the whole collection of beings cannot be dependent, we understand this in this manner, namely adequately and according to its whole self; for according to a part it can be said to be dependent, because, with one part removed, that collection would not exist, speaking formally. And in this way also a collection can by reason of one part depend on another comprehended in it, as is per se known; nevertheless this will not prevent there being given in that collection some being simply independent and not made, which we intend to deduce. But truly, speaking of a collection of beings dependent according to its whole self and adequately, that is, according to all the beings which as it were compose it, thus it is impossible for the whole collection thus dependent to depend on something included in it, but it is necessary that it be outside it; whence conversely, taking the whole collection of

beings outside which there is nothing, it is impossible for that whole to be dependent, which was the proposition assumed.

28. Then the first consequence is proved, because if every being taken divisively or distributively were dependent and made, the collection of all beings would also be dependent and made, not indeed by one singular dependence or action, but by a collection of all dependencies or actions by which all beings depend or come to be; for no collection of beings can be dependent for any other reason than because there is no being in it that does not depend; therefore if the whole collection also cannot be dependent, as has been shown, it is necessary that there be in that collection some being entirely independent and not made[37]. And the same reason applies to the whole order of causes, one of which depends on another in being or effecting; for the whole collection of causes cannot be dependent, because outside it there is no cause on which it might depend, as has been declared. Nor can such mutual dependence be imagined, so that a circle is given in it, as has also been proved at length in the discourse above; for we are dealing with proper dependence, by which a lower cause depends on a higher one, so that its whole being, power and action rest in the other. Therefore it is necessary that in the whole collection of essentially ordered causes (whatever they may be) there be given some one entirely independent from another higher one, since otherwise the whole collection would be dependent, which has been shown to be repugnant.

29. Finally, from this the posterior consequence remains proved. For that there be given a process to infinity in essentially subordinated efficient causes can be understood in two ways. First, so that ascending from a proximate and particular cause to higher ones more and more perfect or universal, one never stops at any which does not depend on a higher one, and in this sense this process is evidently impossible, as the discourse just made proves, namely because otherwise the whole series and collection of causes would be

[37] See Scot., In I, dist. 2, q. 9, et lib. VIII Metaph., q. 6.

dependent; whence, to prove what we intend, it suffices that in this sense a process to infinity cannot be given in such causes. And thus proceeds Aristotle's reasoning, that all causes besides the ultimate one, which is immediately conjoined to the effect, would be middle ones and none would be first, which is impossible; for it is the same to be middle causes as to be dependent ones. And it is equally repugnant for all distributively to be dependent as for the whole collection to be dependent (as Scotus rightly noted there), for the whole collection cannot be dependent except by reason of all and each of those contained in it. And in the same sense that reasoning can easily be explained, that otherwise one could never arrive at action nor could that infinite dependence be traversed; for action ought to be begun primarily and principally from a higher cause on which a lower one depends, whence it is impossible for a lower one to begin action unless a higher one influences first, at least in the order of independence and principality; but if any cause has a higher one and one never arrives at a supreme one, there is none from which action is begun first and per se; therefore all effection will be impossible. Or otherwise, if in that way one progresses to infinity, it happens that the whole series and collection of causes is dependent; therefore it depends on some higher one; therefore action is to be begun principally from that one; if therefore there is no such cause, no action will be able to be begun. This sense therefore is both true and sufficient for us for the intended demonstration.

30. In another way nevertheless a progress to infinity in essentially subordinated intermediate causes can be devised, yet so that all are contained under some first or entirely independent one. For it is probable that between a proximate and first cause there are some universal middle causes essentially subordinated, or at least it is not repugnant for it to happen thus. Again the number of causes which can intervene between the supreme and proximate is not entirely fixed and determined, especially in relation to God's absolute power; for God can make those intermediate causes to be three, or four or more

in whatever number, even if one proceeds to infinity. From this therefore someone could proceed otherwise and say that God can establish infinite intermediate and essentially subordinated causes, on which the effects of the proximate cause depend, as for example infinite heavens or angels, and in this way a process to infinity in essentially subordinated causes under one first one is not impossible. And in this sense indeed it is difficult to prove that this process is impossible, especially from that reason that the infinite could not be traversed, or that action could not be begun. For against this the reasoning made above seems rightly to proceed, that without succession through simultaneous concurrence action could simultaneously proceed from all those causes, especially with the first one beginning the action, which could move all the others to operate or assist them, even if they were infinite. Nor is it sufficiently shown that this is impossible from the fact that between two extreme terms (such as are a first and proximate cause) there does not seem to be possible a progression to infinity or an infinite multitude of causes, since what is enclosed by terms or extremes is finite; for this is true in continuous magnitude, but not in multitude, especially when the extremes are of different natures, and especially if one of them is infinite; for thus it is certain that between the lowest angel and God infinite species of intellectual substances can be multiplied; whence, if the whole collection of those species were imagined as really posited, there would be an infinite multitude contained between those two extremes; contained (I say) not by number, but by perfection. Thus therefore an infinite multitude of essentially subordinated causes could be devised.

31. Nevertheless, whatever may be the case concerning the possibility of this fiction, it nothing hinders the intended demonstration, because it already supposes some first cause or first independent being. Then, even if that infinite concurrence of causes were possible, it would be supposed beyond all reason to be given in fact in essentially subordinated causes, because it can neither be

shown to be necessary nor can any sign or trace of such multitude or infinite influx be found in things; especially since it is very probable, as I was saying above, that there are not given causes properly essentially subordinated, that is, total in their order and immediately influencing individual actions, besides the proper or proximate cause and the first or supreme one. Finally, although that multitude of actually infinite causes from the precise nature of causing perhaps cannot be demonstrated to be impossible, from the very nature of an actually infinite multitude it is more probably impossible. That is also very difficult to understand, that in that case no created cause could be assigned as proximately subordinated to God, that is, between which and God no more perfect one intervenes, and consequently none could be assigned which would depend on God alone in acting. But these and similar things (as I see) can be objected concerning possible things or causes. Nevertheless there is not the same reason, because just as possibles are only in potency, so they can be infinite syncategorematically, as they say, or indeterminately; but truly those which are actually made must be determinate, and therefore it is impossible to understand causes actually subordinated under a first one, without there being given among them some one which proceeds proximately or depends on the first one alone, and thus there cannot be infinite ones between the first and last. Nevertheless these things immerse us in the matter concerning the infinite, which is infinite, and therefore I pass over those things, lest we be diverted from our purpose.

32. From these things it can further easily be established what should be said concerning accidentally subordinated causes; for the same distinction must be made in response, for if an infinite process is understood, not contained under one superior cause independent of such a series of causes, that progress to infinity is plainly impossible, which can be shown by the same reason proportionally applied, because if there is no human being who does not depend and has been made, therefore the whole collection of human beings or the whole

human species depends and has been made; therefore it is necessary that it depend and be made by another superior cause not contained within the human species; therefore, even if the series of humans proceeding among themselves within their species be imagined to be infinite, nevertheless, taking the whole collection, it is necessary to have a superior cause. And thus progressing, either from one individual to another, or from one made species to another made one, finally it will be necessary to stop at a thing entirely not made.

33. This reasoning is still more evident when this process in accidental causes is among individuals of the same species, for if one such individual is such that it does not have being from itself unless it receives it from an agent cause, it cannot happen that another individual of the same species has being from itself entirely independent and not communicated by some agent cause; for to have being from oneself or only from another are differences or modes of being more than generically diverse; for if corruptible and incorruptible being differ essentially and generically, as Aristotle testifies in Metaphysics X, much more made and unmade being, dependent and independent, for the latter is simply necessary, but the former by no means, as has been declared in the superior disputation; since therefore individuals of the same species are of the same essence, it cannot happen that one has received being and not another; therefore it is necessary that the whole species and the whole collection of individuals have received being; therefore from another not contained in that species; therefore one cannot proceed to infinity in these individuals in dependence or emanation of one from another, but one must necessarily stop at something not dependent nor emanating from any individual of that species, and consequently neither from the whole species, because a species does not act except through individuals. And then one must proceed further concerning that superior cause, asking whether it is simply independent, for if it is such, it is that uncreated being which we seek; but if it is dependent, inquiry must be made concerning another cause on which it depends,

until one stops at a cause entirely independent, because one cannot proceed to infinity, for the reason given, that the whole collection of causes or things cannot be dependent.

Concerning Accidentally Subordinated Causes

34. But truly a process to infinity in accidentally subordinated causes, flowing or depending from one superior cause, according to Aristotle's opinion, not only is not repugnant, but is even necessary for perpetual succession and duration of generations, and according to the opinion of many Catholics, although it is not necessary nor given in fact, it is nevertheless possible. Which, although we admit, nothing hinders our demonstration, because in this process a superior cause is supposed either simply not made or at least not made in such a manner, nor contained in such a series of generations, from which it is easy to arrive at a cause simply not made, by the same form of argument, as has often been said and done.

35. But I (to say this in passing, which is to be treated more extensively elsewhere) think that even in this way it is impossible to proceed to infinity, even in accidentally subordinated causes and flowing from another superior one. Which I briefly declare thus in the human species, and the reasoning is the same concerning the rest; for if the human species is such that it could not exist in the nature of things except by receiving that from a superior cause, for example God, therefore it is necessary that it received it in some certain and determinate individual, which individual proceeded from that superior cause alone and not from another individual of that species. The reason for the prior part of this consequence is that actions are about singulars, and therefore a species cannot come to be except in some certain and definitely individual; for a vague individual is not perfectly singular, but in some part is something common and confused. But the reason for the posterior part is that when an individual proceeds from another individual of the same species, that

is not the first effection of such a species in the nature of things, because it is already supposed to be made in another individual from which the other proceeds; therefore in that emanation in which such a species is first made in the nature of things, it is necessary that that individual in which it comes to be does not proceed from another individual of the same species, but from that superior cause alone on which the species depends. Again, for such a process to infinity to be given, it would be necessary for that species to have been produced from eternity, at least in that individual which proximately and immediately flows from God alone or that superior cause, because a succession of generations cannot be infinite on the prior side unless it is from eternity, as is per se known.

36. From these principles, however, it is openly concluded that one cannot proceed to infinity in these accidentally subordinated causes. First indeed, because when one proceeds to infinity in this way, a first cause in that order can never be assigned, from which the rest have emanated; but truly in this series of accidentally subordinated causes one necessarily arrives at the first human being, for example, from whom the generation of human beings began, namely that one who was procreated not by a human being, but by a superior cause.

37. Second, because from that human being whom we imagine produced by God from eternity, another human being could not have been generated from eternity; he therefore necessarily had to be generated in time, and consequently the succession of human beings cannot be infinite, since they began to multiply in time. The consequence is per se known, and the antecedent is proved, because the human being produced from eternity could not, as soon as he was created, generate another, for human generation requires succession; but he himself would have been procreated simultaneously and without succession, nor could he have been produced otherwise from eternity; therefore it is necessary that a human being begotten by another human being, even one existing from eternity, be posterior to that one in duration. Either therefore he is posterior by finite duration,

or by infinite duration. The first cannot be said, otherwise either neither would be from eternity, which is contrary to the hypothesis, or there would be only finite distance between eternity and time, or both would be eternal and nevertheless one anterior to the other by finite duration, all of which involve clear and open repugnance; for if the duration of one human being exceeds the duration of another only finitely, and that which is lesser is finite, the other which exceeds is also necessarily finite and consequently not eternal, because if finite is added to finite, infinite does not result, but it remains finite and enclosed by terms; but if both are infinite, it is impossible for one to exceed the other on that side by which it is infinite, because if both are infinite, both are eternal, both without beginning; how therefore is one anterior to the other and by finite excess? Therefore there is manifest repugnance in all these things, and therefore it is impossible for a human being created from eternity not to precede a human being begotten by him by infinite duration, and therefore a series of generations proceeding from him can never be infinite, and conversely ascending from any human being generated in time through all his progenitors, who are accidentally subordinated causes, one cannot progress to infinity.

38. I omit another reason touched on above, that a successive thing cannot be eternal; I also omit others which are usually made in the matter of the eternity of the world, which are probable, yet do not equally demonstrate; I finally omit the response of some who think they overturn the discourse made by denying that, in that case in which human generations were eternal, it would be necessary for some determinate human being to be created by God from eternity or certainly some (which amounts to the same), from whom or from which the rest trace their origin who were procreated through human generation; for this response both cannot be conceived in mind and has been sufficiently refuted from what was said above. Whence an infinite progress in human generations cannot be understood, never coming to some human being who is as it were the first parent of the

rest, unless by positing the human species not produced by a superior principle; because if it was produced, truly it necessarily had to be produced in some determinate individual; but that consequent is not only erroneous in faith, but also evidently false, as has been proved. Thus therefore it remains proved (in whatever way we progress from effects to causes, and from proximate to remote causes, essentially or accidentally subordinated) that one must necessarily stop at some cause not made, either in such a manner, if progression is made only in a determinate order, or simply unproduced and which absolutely is an uncreated being, if ascent is made simply in the whole order of causes, or in the whole universe.

39. Furthermore I gather from the demonstration made that such an uncreated being must necessarily be some substance; for substance is by its nature prior to accident and accident is always founded in substance, whence it cannot happen that an accident be the first uncreated or unmade being, because whatever such thing is supposed to be, it necessarily must be in some substance; therefore much more the substance itself will be uncreated and not made. Thus it is manifestly proved by the discourse made that that being which has being from itself without effection or dependence on another must be a substance; but whether in such a substance there can be understood some accident, which consequently would also be uncreated, as existing in an uncreated substance, we shall say later when inquiring into the divine attributes, and likewise we shall see later how it can be demonstrated that this uncreated substance is immaterial; for from the discourse made so far alone, taken from the connection and subordination of causes, it does not seem that it can be immediately gathered that that uncreated substance is entirely immaterial and incorporeal.

40. Indeed it could very well and easily be inferred from what has been said that this first substance cannot be material as a composite from this matter of generable and corruptible things; for all things which are composed from this matter necessarily require an

efficient cause, because this matter does not have from itself any innate form, since of itself it is subject to change by any form; whence it necessarily receives form from some efficient cause, which is the cause of the whole composite from such matter and form; since therefore every such composite has been made, it is rightly concluded that that being which does not have an efficient cause is not composed from this matter; but whether matter itself has been made or not cannot be defined from the aforesaid discourse alone. Again, whether that uncreated substance can be material as consisting of other matter, or even whether it can be corporeal, as a simple substance subject to quantity, as Averroes thought concerning heaven, and finally whether heaven itself, which is believed to be ingenerable and incorruptible, is a made substance or not, I do not think can be defined from the aforesaid discourse alone; but one must progress further, using other principles, as we shall see later; therefore so far only has it been demonstrated that there is some uncreated substance and immaterial in the said sense.

What Should Be Thought About the Opinions Related Above

41. Finally, from what has been said, the truth of the second opinion related above is established, and consequently it has been shown that the first and third are absolutely false, insofar as they agree on this point, namely, that through a purely physical medium it can be demonstrated that an uncreated substance exists abstracted from all material things. However, regarding that point on which the third agrees with the second, namely that a metaphysical demonstration is by itself sufficient for this purpose, it speaks truly; for this is what has been demonstrated by us through the very use and examination of both methods. The fourth opinion, however, if it understands that metaphysical demonstration depends by itself and intrinsically on some purely physical principle or medium, as Soncinas and Javellus

think, is also false, for the discourse we have made has no dependence on the aforementioned points. Whence it is also established that what Javellus says involves a contradiction, namely that it pertains to the physicist to demonstrate that the first substance exists, but to the metaphysician to demonstrate what it is. This is so both because the metaphysician does not receive his primary subject from the physicist, and especially because we cannot demonstrate that God exists without demonstrating in some way what He is, as will become clearer from what follows; for by demonstrating that certain attributes belong to a certain being, which is the principle of other things, we demonstrate that God exists. The first and most essential of these attributes is that which we have demonstrated thus far, namely, to exist from itself and without efficient causation from another, and all other things can be demonstrated almost insofar as they have connection with this, as we shall see. Hence it pertains especially to him to demonstrate what God is, to whom it pertains to demonstrate that He is a being from Himself or through His essence and not from another, and conversely, he properly demonstrates that God exists who demonstrates that there is in the nature of things some uncreated being; for physics and metaphysics cannot divide these functions among themselves, but this entire undertaking belongs to metaphysics. Physics, however (and in this sense that fourth opinion would be true and would not disagree with the second), in some way prepares the way and disposes toward completing the aforementioned demonstration, both because from motion and sensible effects we ascend to considering the nature of effect and cause according to themselves, and from dependence in motion to dependence in being and origin through which we arrive at the first uncreated being; and also because, if not by entirely evident discourse, at least by the most probable reasoning we arrive through the physical way to a mover of the heaven separated from it, from which the metaphysician more easily proceeds to inquire not now into the first mover of the heaven, but into the first maker of things, taking proportional principles that

are so much more evident as they are more abstract, as we have sufficiently declared.

42. To the foundations of the Commentator it is replied: to the first, that Aristotle in the Physics did not sufficiently demonstrate that God exists or the proper attributes of God from motion alone, which has been shown in part and will be demonstrated in part in what follows, but there he showed with sufficient probability that there is a first unmoved mover. In Metaphysics II, however, he correctly taught and proved that there is no infinite regress in efficient causes, from which principle it is evidently concluded that it is necessary that there be some being that was not made. To the second it is replied that metaphysics, since it is the supreme science, can prove that its object exists, especially since the discussion concerns not the adequate but the primary object and concerns a posteriori demonstration, about which we spoke above in the first demonstration.

SECTION II
WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED A POSTERIORI THAT GOD EXISTS, BY SHOWING THAT ONLY ONE UNCREATED BEING EXISTS

1. Although it has been evidently proven by the discourse made in the preceding section that not all beings can be made, but that some being exists that is not made, nevertheless it has not yet been concluded by that reasoning that this being is one and not plural. For someone could say that indeed everything that is made is made by another, and that in this progression one must stop in each order of things at some principle that is not made, yet not at one and the same principle, but at several according to the diversity of things and species. In this manner some of the pagans posited different principles

for different things, such as one god of grain, another of wine, etc. Even some heretics posited one principle of spirits and another of bodies, or one of good things and another of evil things, which they called the supreme good and evil, like the Manicheans and similar groups. According to this false error, no being, even if it were uncreated, would be the true God according to what we intend to signify by this word. And perhaps it was in this sense that the fool said in his heart: "There is no God," which Cicero attributes to Diagoras in book I De Natura Deorum; and Augustine in book III Contra litteras Petiliani, chapter 21; Lactantius in book I, chapter 2; Theodoret in book III De curandis Graecorum affectibus. But if we shall show that this uncreated and per se necessary being can be only one in number according to nature and essence, it will plainly follow that it is the first cause of all other things that are or can be, and therefore that it is God and consequently the true God. Therefore the demonstrations that are customarily brought forward by philosophers and theologians to prove the unity of God from the infinite perfection of the divine nature, although they are otherwise excellent, as we shall see later, nevertheless cannot serve us now, because they presuppose as already proven that God exists in the nature of things, that is, some being of infinite perfection in essence and nature, which we have not yet proven, but only that there exists a per se necessary being, namely one having existence from itself.

2. And perhaps for this reason there were not lacking even among Catholics and theologians who said that it cannot be demonstrated that God exists, such as Peter of Ailly in book I, question 3, articles 2 and 3, where first he strives to respond to the demonstration by which it is proven that there exists some being from itself and uncreated; but he says nothing apparent or plausible to which one ought to respond. Then he says that although it may be conceded that it is demonstrated that there exists some being from itself, nevertheless it is not demonstrated that this being is only one, and therefore neither can it be demonstrated that God exists. Indeed

he says that, although it be demonstrated or admitted that there exists some uncreated being which is the first efficient cause of all things that are made, nevertheless it does not evidently follow that this being is God; because it does not follow from this that it is the first cause of all things that exist, since someone could say that there exist several unmade beings and among them there exists another superior being which, although it is not efficient, is nevertheless the end of another uncreated being, and by the same reasoning several uncreated beings could be imagined having no order of cause among themselves, just as there are two angels, which some have posited as per se necessary beings. Rabbi Moses was also of this opinion, namely that it cannot be demonstrated that God exists, in book VI of his Philosophy, chapter 6, and some philosophers as well, as St. Thomas mentions in book I Contra Gentiles, chapters 11 and 12, and in De Veritate, question 10, article 12.

3. Others, however, from an extremely contrary foundation, also said that it cannot be demonstrated that God exists, because this is self-evident. Anselm seems to have been of this opinion in the Proslogion, chapters 2 and 3, and in the book Contra insipientem. And this is suggested in the Commentaries attributed to Jerome on Job, chapter 36, concerning those words: "All men see God," and on Psalm 95, in those words: "He has corrected the world, which shall not be moved." John Damascene also favors this in book I De Fide, chapters 1 and 3, where he says that knowledge of God is naturally inserted in men; but this is so explained by St. Thomas above and in part I, question 2, article 1, that something is naturally inserted in man from which he can arrive at knowledge of God, and Jerome can be explained in the same way. Concerning Anselm, however, St. Thomas admits that he was of that opinion, whom Abulensis followed in Exodus chapter 6, question 2. But that this opinion is also false will be established from the discourse of this section, as we shall note at its end.

Resolution of the Question

4. Therefore it must be said that it can be evidently demonstrated that the being which is per se necessary is the source or efficient cause of other things and therefore is only one; and thus it is evidently demonstrated that God exists. In order that this assertion and the connection between its parts may be understood, it is necessary to presuppose what all understand by the name of God. For although God, on account of his simplicity and infinity, cannot be defined nor even exactly described by us, who conceive him imperfectly, nevertheless, so that we may be able to reason about him, it is necessary at least to preconceive and presuppose what is signified by this word. However, in explaining the signification of this word, two extremes must be avoided: one is that we should not place in such a description all the conditions or attributes of God, both because otherwise it could never be concluded that God exists unless first all the attributes of God were demonstrated of some being, which is contrary to everyone's custom and conception; and also because there are many properties of God which are much more difficult to know than that God exists.

5. The other extreme is that we should not accommodate this name to any property which seems to be proper to God, as, for example, it is proper to God to be the most worthy among all beings; therefore some say that by the name of God nothing else is signified than the most perfect being of all. But this is not sufficient for declaring the nature or signification of God; for even if someone imagined that there existed in things only this corporeal world and that in it the heaven or man was the noblest of all beings, he would not immediately think that heaven or man was the God of this world, unless he believed that other properties of God existed in them. Similarly it can be attributed to God that he is the prime mover of heaven; nevertheless it will not therefore be correctly said that by the

name of God is signified only the prime mover of heaven, as such, because, if he had nothing else than being the prime mover of heaven, he would not therefore be God. And I say the same concerning this attribute which is to be a necessary being or a being from itself, because this attribute also taken by itself is not sufficient for fulfilling the concept which we intend to signify by the name of God; for, as I was saying a little before, if there were several per se necessary beings, none of them would be such a being as we intend to signify by the name of God. Therefore this name signifies a certain most noble being which both surpasses all other things and from which, as from a first author, all other things depend, which therefore must be worshipped and venerated as the supreme divinity; for this is the common and as it were primary concept which we all form of God upon hearing the name of God. And therefore to demonstrate that God exists it is not sufficient to show that there exists in the nature of things some necessary and self-existing being, unless it is also proven that this being is unique and such that it is the source of all being, on which depend and from which receive existence all things that in any way participate in existence itself. But when this is demonstrated, it is sufficiently shown that God exists; for his other attributes which have necessary connection with such a being are to be demonstrated afterwards.

6. How much certainty is in the preceding assertion. The assertion thus declared has seemed to theologians not only true, but also so certain that they condemn the doctrine of Ailly as erroneous. And not undeservedly, for it conflicts with the opinion of Paul in Romans 1: "What is known of God is manifest to them; for God has manifested it to them." But he calls "known of God" that which can become known about him by natural light, which must at least be that he exists, for if this is unknown, nothing at all will be known about God. But explaining this mode of manifestation he adds: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power

and Godhead; so that they are without excuse, because when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God." From these words it is manifestly gathered that such knowledge of God can be had from creatures as renders men inexcusable if they either do not assent that God exists or neglect to worship him. But that such knowledge is in itself evident does not seem to be so openly gathered from those words; for often lesser knowledge than evident knowledge suffices to oblige a man and to render him inexcusable unless he acts according to it. Nevertheless, if Paul's words are attentively weighed, they sufficiently indicate evident knowledge, such as these: "It is manifest in them" and "being understood they are clearly seen." And there is a similar testimony in Solomon, Wisdom 13, where those who are ignorant of the true God are reproved: "Vain," he says, "are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and who could not out of the good things that are seen know him that is, neither by attending to the works did they acknowledge who was the workman"; and below: "For by the greatness and beauty of the creature the creator of them may clearly be seen." The same is indicated by those words of Psalm 18: "The heavens declare the glory of God," as Chrysostom expounds at length in homilies 9 and 10 to the people. And in the same sense Gregory explains those words of Job 36: "All men see him, every one beholds afar off," in book XXVII of the Moralia, chapter 2; and finally the Fathers of the Church think the same, whom it now seems alien to the metaphysical undertaking to cite; nevertheless I shall suggest some testimonies by proving the assertion placed with reason, which cannot be better shown than by bringing forward the demonstrations by which the said truth is proven.

First Demonstration That God Exists

7. Two principal ways therefore occur for showing this. One is entirely a posteriori and from effects; the other is proximately a priori, although remotely it is also a posteriori, as I shall explain later.

The prior way is more customary among the holy Fathers, and more consonant with Paul and Solomon in the places cited, and is chiefly signified in those words of the Wise Man: "By the greatness and beauty of the creature," that is, by the greatness and beauty or loveliness of creatures. From these words we can form a reasoning in this manner, for although individual effects taken and considered by themselves do not show that there is one and the same maker of all, nevertheless the beauty of the whole universe and the wonderful connection and order of all things that are in it sufficiently declare that there is one first being, by which all things are governed and from which they draw their origin. St. Thomas touched on this reasoning in book I Contra Gentiles, chapter 13, from John Damascene, book I De Fide, chapter 3; and Gregory in book XXVI of the Moralia, chapter 8; and Chrysostom in homily 4 on Genesis; and expressly Dionysius the Areopagite in chapter 7 De Divinis nominibus says that God is known from the most orderly disposition of all creatures; which Augustine also used in book XI De Civitate Dei, chapter 4; and Justin, when asked in question 16 to the Gentiles: "How can it be known whether God exists at all?" elegantly and briefly responded "from the concretion, constitution and stability of things that exist." Hence Eusebius of Caesarea excellently says in book VII De Praeparatione Evangelica, chapter 2: "Just as a house cannot be made without an artificer or cloth without a weaver, so neither can this universe exist without an author." But Gregory of Nazianzus in oration II De Theologia uses the example of a cithara or its most orderly and beautifully constituted harmony. For just as this could not be understood without some author or artificer, so neither could the most fitting constitution of this universe exist without God. Finally, the Philosopher suggested this reasoning in book XII of the Metaphysics, chapter 2, in those words: "For in what way will there be order, if there does not exist something perpetual, separate and permanent?" And he pursues this more broadly in chapter 10, where he also uses the example of a house and family rightly ordered and the

example of an army, which cannot be ordered without a leader. He had touched on the same in book I, chapters 3 and 4.

8. Evasions of the reasoning made. But in order that the force of this reasoning may be more clearly seen, it must be more fully examined. For someone could say that from this effect at most it is obtained that there is one governor of all things, but not a creator. Then he could say that this being is one not by nature or entity, but by agreement, as if several artificers came together to construct one building. Moreover this discourse has no place in purely spiritual things, for concerning them it is not evidently established to us how much connection they have, either among themselves or with other things of this visible world. Finally, if someone imagines that besides this visible world there exists another having no connection with this one and that its creator is also an uncreated being, yet distinct from him who created and governs this world, he could not indeed be convinced by the aforesaid reasoning; therefore from the effects which we experience we cannot sufficiently convince that there exists only one uncreated being which is the principle of all other things that exist in reality, whether in this world or in another. From the exposition of these points, therefore, the force of the said reasoning seems to depend, so that it comprehends all beings universally and concludes that among all there is only one first being and source of others; for such a being we call God.

The First Evasion Is Refuted & the Emanation of the Entire Sensible World from One Efficient Cause Is Shown

9. To the first objection or rather evasion, therefore, I prefer to respond first with the words of Lactantius in book I De falsa religione, chapter 2: "There is no one so rude, of such wild customs, who lifting his eyes to heaven, although he does not know by whose God's providence all this which is seen is governed, does not nevertheless understand that there is some providence from the very

magnitude, motion, disposition, constancy, utility, beauty, and moderation of things; nor can it happen that what consists by wonderful reason should not be instructed by some greater design." In these last words he elegantly indicates that from governance is rightly gathered creation, because the universe cannot be governed except by him by whose counsel and power it was established. For it consists in a wonderful way and by reason and is conserved by a wonderful connection and succession of things, because it was so instructed by a most wise artificer, as was fitting for such governance and conservation. Thus therefore from the connection and mutual operation of things in the universe is gathered not only one governor of the universe, but also its maker.

10. This is further declared briefly by discoursing through all the things from which this universe consists. And first concerning all the species of generable and corruptible things, it was shown above that it cannot be thought that they have existence from themselves through the mere succession of one individual from another, but it is necessary that each species in some individual be effected by some superior cause. This becomes evident at least concerning composites themselves and concerning material forms from what was said in the superior section; concerning prime matter itself, however, the reasoning made there does not proceed; nevertheless proof is taken from what was said above concerning creation in disputation XXII, namely, because to be from oneself is the greatest perfection; therefore if this does not belong to form nor to the substantial supposit, much less can it belong to prime matter.

11. The objection is satisfied. Also, because if no substantial form is innately from prime matter of itself without any efficient action, neither can prime matter itself have actual entity from itself not received from some agent, because by its nature it demands form and depends on it; therefore it does not demand existence except in the composite and under form; therefore it cannot have existence from itself and expect form from an agent. The consequence is clear,

because if it exists from itself, it necessarily exists even if the agent effects nothing; but the agent could effect no form, since it makes it freely, as we shall say later. Indeed if matter had existence from itself, it would necessarily be eternal; but an extrinsic agent could not have induced some form of corruptible things into it from eternity, unless perhaps through infinite duration it conserved in it the form which it had induced into it from eternity, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section; but no one of sound mind can imagine that the author of this lower world (whoever he may be) is necessitated to induce into matter from eternity some certain form, which he would conserve in it through infinite duration; nor did any philosopher, even among those who thought the world to be from eternity, imagine that this lower corruptible world was eternal in such a way that it endured in some or certain determinate individuals first through eternity before generations and corruptions began to occur in it. If therefore no form taken determinately is necessarily in matter, therefore none is necessarily made in it by an agent, especially from eternity; therefore neither can matter itself have necessary and eternal existence from itself. You will say that this reasoning proceeds by supposing that matter by its nature depends on form, which however is not evident. I respond that even setting aside rigorous dependence, by this very fact that matter by its nature demands form and cannot exist without it except in a most preternatural state (which no one can deny), it is sufficiently concluded that it is entirely alien to the nature of matter to have existence from itself and to expect form from an agent. Just as in the matter of the soul philosophers correctly teach that it is not natural for the rational soul to exist before the body, because by its nature it demands to exist in the body, although it does not depend on the body; hence, although it can remain outside the body, it is nevertheless then in a preternatural state. By this argument it is also correctly concluded that the rational soul does not have necessary and eternal existence from itself.

12. From the aforesaid is elicited the proof of the conclusion concerning sublunary things. From these things, therefore, it is correctly gathered that all things contained under heaven are procreated by some superior author. Hence first it follows that the four simple elements were made by one and the same author, namely by him by whom they are so disposed and ordered as was expedient for the conservation and government of the whole universe. For just as they were created for this end, that is, for the good of the universe and also for the generations of mixed bodies, as I shall say immediately, so they were created in that proportion which would be consonant with the end; in proportion, I say, not only of magnitude, but also of quality and natural agreement or diversity; it was therefore necessary that the same being be the author of all, otherwise that proportion and connection could not fall under one intention. Then it is also gathered that the same one who was the establisher of the elements was also not only the governor, but also the establisher of the mixed bodies which are generated from the elements. It is not indeed necessary that all mixed bodies were immediately produced by the author of the universe alone; indeed, if this is understood concerning production through proper and immediate creation, it is not only not necessary, but not even true, for even according to divine Scripture, God produced mixed bodies from elements previously created, which production could not properly be creation, since it was from presupposed matter. Rather even concerning the elements themselves it is not established that all were immediately created, or whether one was first created and the rest afterwards formed from it, and although the former is more probable and more consonant with sacred history, nevertheless it cannot be demonstrated by reason; nor does it matter to what we are doing, provided it is established that one and the same is the author of all these things.

13. But if that concerning mixed bodies is understood in this way and under this breadth, namely concerning production whether through proper creation or from another body previously created,

there is still need of distinction and declaration, for it can be understood either of production which is made by God alone immediately, or which is made through secondary causes. Again among these mixed bodies some are so imperfect that they can be made by occurring general causes without the concurrence of a particular cause of the same nature, to which this office belongs per se and as if by appointment. And in this way are produced not only mixed bodies which are properly called imperfect or meteorological, which are more frequently generated in the second region of air, but also metals which are produced in the bowels of the earth by the power of the sun, and many living things and imperfect animals. And concerning all these it cannot (as I think) be shown by another evident reason that they are immediately produced by the first cause or universal author, except by that by which it was shown in the superiors that the first cause concurs immediately with secondary causes in all their actions and effects, because it is not fitting that the first cause should apply greater concurrence, since in universal created causes or in the concurrence of several causes there is sufficient power for producing these effects with the general concurrence of the first cause. But to the matter or demonstration which we intend, this mode of emanation of these things from the same author by whom the elements were made suffices. Indeed in rigor it would suffice to demonstrate that these effects do not have another first author who is an uncreated being besides him who procreated the elements and other things of the universe, whether they proceed from him immediately or mediately, namely because the proximate cause of those effects emanated from that first being.

14. But other mixed bodies are so perfect that they cannot be made immediately by heaven or other general created causes without the proper and determinate concurrence of a proximate cause of the same nature; for thus man is not generated except by man and lion by lion and so concerning other perfect animals, and in certain trees and plants we see the same occur; for wheat does not arise except from

wheat, and in perfect trees the same seems to be experienced. In these things, therefore, it is much more evident that their procreation must be referred to some superior author, because neither could the whole species emanate from itself or be from itself, as was shown above; nor in all these visible causes is there sufficient power for introducing species of such things into the universe. But that the same being is the first author of all these things, whether they are compared among themselves or with the elements, is established from their connection among themselves, whether in reason of matter, or in reason of efficient or final cause. For the elements are so constituted that from them these mixed bodies can conveniently be produced, or nourished or conserved, so much so that they have been somewhat changed from their own natural places for the convenience and utility of mixed bodies. And among the mixed bodies themselves some serve others as food or for other utilities and almost all serve man, for whom they can be understood to have been established proximately either from the things themselves and their diverse qualities and various properties most accommodated to human uses, which properties they received from their first establishment; it is therefore an evident sign that all these things are not only governed by the same author but also established by him. This is also declared by the very beauty of the universe, for which without doubt such varied procreation of mixed bodies is ordered and so ordinately disposed, that it could not happen by chance or fortuitously by diverse authors, but by one and universal author, who intended this most beautiful machine of the universe.

15. Whether heaven is animated and by what soul some have believed. The assertion is proven concerning celestial bodies. It remains to speak concerning celestial bodies, whose origin seems naturally more obscure, because they are incorruptible. Hence many among the pagans believed it to be clear that heaven had no beginning, as Justin reports in his response to the fifth question proposed to the Gentiles. Nevertheless that heaven also is made can be shown first from its imperfection; for heaven is a being more imperfect than man;

since therefore man has existence only from a superior cause, how can it be thought that heaven has existence from itself? You will say first that it is not sufficiently established that heaven is more imperfect than man, for many thought it to be animated by an intelligent soul. It is answered that concerning proper animation through information there was scarcely any philosopher who thought heaven to be animated; for we find no indication or work of life in that body, for illumination and all influences are natural actions; but local motion by itself alone and especially non-progressive motion is no indication of life, since it can be made by impulse either natural or extrinsic. Those therefore who called heaven living or animated spoke by reason of the intelligence moving heaven, which, because it assists it and in some way uses it for acting, according to a certain metaphor was called its soul. But those who asserted this in a more proper sense spoke improbably. Against one who would nevertheless persist in that opinion, the reasoning made would not be efficacious, but then one would have to philosophize about heaven in the same way as about other intelligences, concerning which I shall speak immediately. And in almost the same way it must be met if someone says that man is superior to heaven only by reason of the intellective soul, and that concerning this it is not sufficiently established that it is made; for it must be said that it is sufficiently established that the intellective soul is made, both by the general reasoning by which this can be shown concerning intelligences; for since the soul is less perfect than the intelligences, if these are made, much more so is the soul; and by special reasoning, because since the soul itself is the form of the body and exists not so much for itself as for the whole composite, nor can it naturally exist before the body, nor have existence from itself, if the composite itself needs an efficient cause, as we declared a little before.

16. Finally, someone can say that although the celestial body is less perfect as to the grade of being, it is nevertheless more perfect in mode, since it is incorruptible, and therefore it can happen that even in the perfection of being from itself it surpasses man, although it is

surpassed in essential grade. I respond that this is impossible and that there is a far different nature of one and the other attribute, for that a thing be incorruptible can come either from the absence of a contrary, or from the condition of matter or some simplicity of the thing; hence this property does not always indicate the supreme or greatest essential perfection of a thing. But truly to be from oneself and that singular necessity of being, which comes from independence from every efficient cause, is a manifest indication of a most eminent perfection not only in mode, but also in the grade of being itself, because through this perfection a being is more distant from nothingness or from non-being than through any other perfection which prescind from this. Also, because such a being has less potentiality, since it cannot even be in objective potency. And finally such a being does not fall under the dominion of another. Hence in a singular and supreme way it is (so to speak) of its own right and subject to no other. All these things without doubt indicate a far more excellent perfection and therefore it cannot happen that an inferior thing in the grade of being should have this perfection, which a superior cannot attain.

17. And hence is confirmed this reasoning taken from the imperfection of heaven; for heaven is a material being, or (to speak beyond every opinion) corporeal, extended, quantified, in which property, namely of quantity and extension, it has agreement of the same nature with inferior bodies and is in passive potency, at least to motion and some accidental perfections, and needs motion, at least so that it can be applied to acting in various places. Indeed it is impotent to move and apply itself in such a way, unless it is moved by another. Who therefore believes that that exists from itself which both needs motion and cannot have it from itself? Such great perfection, therefore, as is being an independent and necessary being without being in objective potency, plainly repugnates to a being having so many imperfections as are seen in heaven. Heaven is therefore not an unproduced being, but made.

18. But it remains to be proven further (and simultaneously this very thing will be confirmed) that it has the same author of its being as the elements and other inferior bodies have, which will easily be done by pursuing and applying the discourse made concerning the connection and proportion of these bodies among themselves. For it is first evident that the celestial bodies among themselves have the highest proportion and due subordination, not only in figure, position and place, but (what most pertains to the matter) also in motion and influence, as is necessary or fitting for the stability[38] and good government of the whole universe. It is therefore a manifest sign both that all the heavens were established by the same author and that he is not other than the establisher of the whole universe or than him who procreated the elements and other inferior bodies. The consequence is proven as to the prior part of the consequent, because it cannot be understood either that this disposition and order of the heavens happened by chance, or that the heavens were first established by some private agents and afterwards were so disposed and ordered by some superior agent who procures the good of the whole universe. For both the most beautiful and most fitting variety and disposition of the heavens in magnitude as well as figure and power evidently declares the wisdom of the establisher, who from the intention of some end and universal advantage so disposed them, and the very stability and nature of the heavens sufficiently declares that they received that disposition not after nature, but with nature itself, especially as to those four properties which we have numbered, namely magnitude, figure and position and innate power of influencing, for concerning motion there is another account, because it is necessarily posterior, at least by an instant, and comes more extrinsically. The fabricator of the universe is therefore not to be imagined in the manner of human artificers, who coordinate things subsisting from elsewhere according to an end preset by themselves and thus compose an artificial thing; but as a different kind of artificer, who in establishing the heavens,

[38] stability, 1960; habilitatem, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. IV, p. 289.

gave them a nature accommodated to such disposition and order which he procreated simultaneously with them.

19. And hence the other part of the consequent is further easily persuaded, namely that on account of the same reasoning and connection of those superior bodies with inferior ones, it must necessarily be admitted that the condition of all is the same. This is further declared in this way: for the constitution of the universe from heavens and sublunary bodies can be understood in two or three ways. First, that the heavens already existing either from themselves (which has already been disproven) or from some efficient cause, by their own power and efficacy established all inferior things and conveniently fitted them for the constitution and conservation of this inferior world. And this way is incredible per se. First, because this inferior world could not be made except through creation; but no body can have natural power of creating, as was said in the superiors. Indeed, even if we imagined that God first created matter, the heavens could not immediately produce from it all the elements so distinct and disposed as the nature of them or the utility and beauty of the universe requires. For since the heavens act naturally and, as far as is from themselves, in the same way, if they are applied with the same proximity or distance and with the same course, they could not from the same matter equally indifferent from itself effect such varied and ordinate effects. It is therefore evident that this was not the work of nature alone, but of an intelligence having most eminent and multiple power as to efficacy and discretion of operating according to an intended end. Then because the heavens by themselves alone can scarcely effect anything without the concurrence of inferior bodies; for they must send ahead light or other influence proportioned to themselves, and for perfecting effects they always require some cooperation of inferior causes. An argument for this is that the sun, which among all stars seems most efficacious, can least procreate crops without rain and disposition of earth, or effect anything similar by itself alone. Add that there are some effects in these inferior things

which cannot be made by the heavens without univocal agents, as was seen above.

20. In another way, however, it can be imagined that with the heavens already existing and so disposed by their efficient cause, another agent entirely distinct effected the inferior world and disposed it in a way convenient and accommodated, so that it could be fostered and governed by the superior world. And this way is also improbable per se, for if this is understood to have been done as if by convention and agreement of both agents, this pertains to the second objection to be treated immediately; but if the discourse is (as is signified in the said words) that the author of the heavens in creating and disposing them in such a way did not look with his mind and intention to the advantage and utility of the inferior world, this is manifestly false, as can sufficiently be established from what was said; for the very disposition and influence of the heavens proclaims that they were established in ministry to all nations, as Scripture speaks. This is also manifested by their most ordinate motions, which are so wonderfully distributed with a certain uniform difformity, that they serve every use necessary to the inferior world, namely for the variety of times, for the generations and corruptions of things and finally, so that they may be for signs, and seasons, and days and years. Nor does it matter that these motions are added to the heavens after their creation, and that (as is probable) they are made by movers distinct both among themselves and from the establisher of the heavens, because nevertheless the heavens are established apt and accommodated to such motions, as their figure and influence declares; it is therefore a sign that they were established with that respect and intention. Hence, although they have their proximate movers, nevertheless these are not independent of the first establisher and governor, and they move according to his command and intention, as expedites the good of the whole universe and the convenient use of inferior bodies. Most excellently therefore and quite evidently from the fabric and constitution of this universe and the connection, proportion and

subordination of its parts, it has been inferred that there is one author of the whole universe.

The Second Evasion is Excluded & the True Unity of the First Author of the Entire Universe is Demonstrated

21. But now a second evasion occurs, for this unity can be understood in two ways: first, through the natural and simple unity of the same cause; second, through aggregation and agreement of many. We therefore intend the former unity; for it is necessary for concluding that God exists. The argument already made, although it demonstrates unity, nevertheless does not seem to demonstrate it so perfectly. For it is founded principally on this, that the entire universe as one adequate effect ought to have fallen under the intention of one agent. But this could have been true even if many agents concurred as partial agents, provided they agree as one toward producing one adequate effect, just as many craftsmen work toward one building. Therefore, in order that we may exclude this fiction and demonstrate from this effect the true unity of the first agent, it is necessary first to suppose that such a cause must necessarily be intellectual, which will also be demonstrated a priori below and is evident from what has been said about the structure and arrangement of the universe, and is also clearly concluded from one effect, namely man, and finally is also principally necessary according to that fiction; for two partial causes lacking knowledge, and especially if they are of different natures, cannot by themselves and from intention agree to produce one adequate effect, unless they are subordinated to some superior cause, of which they are as instruments or tools.

22. What absurdities follow from the assertion of multiple causes of this world without subordination. Hence it must be further noted that the agreement of those multiple partial causes for founding the universe can be conceived in two ways. First, that all of them are subordinated to one superior cause from which they have received

their being. And this meaning, although it contains false and erroneous doctrine, nevertheless poses no obstacle or relevance to the matter we are now treating; for according to that meaning, only one uncreated being is already admitted, from which the rest proceeded, and this entire world drew its origin primarily from it, which is sufficient for us to prove that God exists; for we call that first being God. Whether it produced the world immediately through itself, or through a lower cause subordinated to itself, one or many, which is touched upon in the aforementioned meaning, pertains to another question about creation, which we have treated above and will occur again now. Therefore, it can be understood in another way, that multiple causes agreed to produce this world without subordination either among themselves or to another superior, but with a certain equality regarding independence in their being and acting, although perhaps regarding the production of effects one contributed more or even produced better effects than another. For it must necessarily be said that one made the heavens, another fire or water, or in some other similar manner. And this is the meaning of that error, which by declaration alone without other refutation immediately appears improbable and ridiculous in itself, because those principles are multiplied in vain and without foundation, and it is necessary that each of them be imperfect and insufficient for its effect, or that others be superfluous and consequently impossible.

23. First. Second. I therefore argue in this manner, for either each of those causes requires the partnership of others, because it is powerless without others to produce the entire universe, or because, although individually they could produce the whole and would be equal in power from themselves, nevertheless they wished to divide this effect among themselves. If the first is said, it follows first that each of the other causes taken by itself is very imperfect and limited in power. Whence it follows second that it is also powerless for that effect which is attributed to it; for such an effect could not have been made except by creation, for example, any heaven and any element, which

includes total and primary production. But it has been shown above that for creating in such a way as a principal cause, simply infinite power is required. It has also been shown that a cause having the principal power of creating can create whatever is creatable. But in the said causes there is said to be limited power and defined to one or another effect; therefore that power is not creative; therefore it is not sufficient for the first production of the universe even partially, unless creation of matter has first been supposed for its action. But if all matter was first created by some agent, with it some form was concreated, because matter does not come to be by itself, but with the whole that is created; therefore he is the first founder of the universe, whom we call God.

24. Third. Third, it follows from that error that the aggregate of all those causes is finite in power, imperfect in wisdom, changeable with various wills. From which it follows that providence and governance of the universe depending on it cannot fail to be very imperfect and deficient in many things and very alien from infinite wisdom and power, which the structure and governance of the universe sufficiently indicates. The consequence is declared, for first, since each of those causes is finite in power, no infinite power can coalesce from all of them taken together, unless perhaps those partial causes are said to be infinite in multitude, which indeed cannot be said of those which actually produced the things of the universe; for, since these are finite in multitude, the multitude of causes cannot be infinite, unless it is said that many or even infinite ones concur simultaneously to produce individual things; how absurd and ridiculous this is, is evident in itself. Nor would it be less improbable to say that such causes, capable of producing the things of the universe in this way, are infinite, even if not all actually operate; for, to omit the common arguments that can be made against this infinite, also that it is fictitiously and without foundation imagined, if it can be gathered from no operation; also that that infinite multitude serves nothing for founding the universe, as it has been made, since not all of it

contributes to it; besides all these things (I say), there is not in that entire defined aggregate of causes infinite power of acting and perfect from every part, because this perfection consists more in intension than in multitude.

25. Then a similar argument can be made about wisdom, which is the most well-known perfection of an intellectual thing and commensurate with the perfection of being; but if power is limited and imperfect, so also is essence; therefore also wisdom. Whence it could easily be thought about such partial causes that each of them ignores many things, and especially future things which depend on the wills of others; what kind of providence, therefore, could come from such causes, even if they are imagined to all consult together among themselves and mutually help each other and one supply the imperfection and weakness of another? What shall I say about their wills? For they would be plainly changeable, since they would be finite; therefore they could easily disagree among themselves and one act beyond or against the will of another. Whence Justin Martyr rightly said to the matter we are treating, in his Exhortation to the Gentiles, that the rule of many is exposed to wars and dissensions, but the empire of one is free from these inconveniences. And Athanasius said to the same effect in his Oration against Idols: Where there is no prince, there disturbance arises; whence it is concluded that a multitude of gods is a nullity of gods. And Cyprian, in his book On the Vanity of Idols: For divine empire (he says) let us borrow an example even from earthly things. How has a partnership of rule ever begun with faith, or ended without bloodshed? And Plato, in the Politicus, beyond the middle, said that the administration of many is weak and infirm in all things. For which reason, from Aristotle's Ethics VIII, chapter 10, and the opinion of all philosophers, monarchical government is preferred to all others. For which reason the same Aristotle rightly concludes in book XII of his Metaphysics: Beings do not wish to be badly governed. A plurality of principates is not good. Therefore one prince. Therefore the governance and providence of the

universe would be very imperfect if it depended on many heads and many finite and changeable wills without subordination to some supreme power, supreme wisdom and immutable and supremely good will.

26. Add that the things of the universe are so disposed and connected among themselves, that some altogether need others either for their conservation, or for performing their actions; all also intend the integrity and conservation of the entire universe, so that they sometimes abandon their own advantages to protect it, as water ascends to fill a vacuum, and earth occupies a higher place than water contrary to its natural condition, as is the more received opinion. But if (as others wish) water simply stands out, that is more wonderful, that it always contains its swelling waves, lest it overwhelm the beauty of the earth and all its inhabitants. Which therefore of those partial causes will be sufficient to protect and conserve its own proper effect? None surely. But it would be necessary for the author of mixed things or animals to ask the lord of waters to contain them, lest they destroy his effects; and in this manner each would request the help of another, so that it could protect or conserve its effect. And similar inconveniences and absurdities can easily be devised, because truly that which coalesces from many imperfect things cannot fail to be imperfect. Therefore so wonderful a structure and wonderful composition and order of diverse things cannot be conceived without one supreme architect.

27. But if someone chooses the other part of the dilemma posited above and says that there are indeed multiple first principles of the things of the universe, but each sufficient by itself to govern the whole and equal in power and perfection, etc., against this there is first that it is said without foundation that such causes have divided among themselves the production of the universe by parts; for from what effect is this gathered? or, if it is not gathered, who revealed this? Again, the arguments made absolutely conclude that there is necessary one adequate cause intending by itself the entire universe and

attending to its benefits, and that partial causes do not suffice, whether such they are from impotence, or from will. Moreover, against him who would feign this, there should be sufficient reason that he would introduce so many principles superfluously and without reasonable motive. For, if each of those causes is posited as sufficient to produce and govern the entire universe as it now is and according to every perfection that can be desired in it, why are many such first causes feigned? or from what effect can such multitude be found or believed? Perhaps someone might respond that such multitude is not posited because of effects, because it is necessary for such and so great an effect, but because it pertains by itself to the perfection of things that things so perfect be multiplied. But on the contrary, for rather the unity and singularity of that nature pertains maximally to its perfection and that of others. This must be proven ex professo below in treating the unity of God, and will also be touched upon in a later point of this section. And now it is briefly declared, pursuing consideration of that first being under the aspect of cause and according to relation to this adequate effect, which is the entire universe, in which consideration and aspect we now insist. Therefore if this universe had multiple first principles, none of them would have perfect dominion over the entire universe and consequently none of them could perfectly govern it; for, if one of them wished to corrupt or annihilate something, with another unwilling it could not, because it could be sufficiently conserved by that one alone. And similarly, if one of them wished to excite winds or rains, with another resisting it could not, because they would be at minimum of equal power, and thus concerning others; therefore it pertains to the perfection of such a cause, as it is a cause and mistress of its effect, and to the perfect governance of the same effect, that such causes equal among themselves not be multiplied. Hence Aristotle rightly concluded book XII of his Metaphysics with the words cited a little before. Hence also is that common saying of Homer, book II of the Iliad: Many ruling is evil: let there be one king.

28. Whence Lactantius rightly, in book I On False Religion, chapter 3, first disproves the multitude of princes and governors of the universe who divide offices among themselves, because it is necessary that they be weak, since individually they could not sustain the helm of so great a mass without the aid of the rest. Then he proves that there cannot be many such as we want one to be, because the power of individuals (he says) will not be able to proceed further, with the powers of the others opposing them; for it is necessary that each either cannot transgress his limits, or if he has transgressed, he drives another from his boundaries. And Jerome, in epistle 4 to Rusticus, with various examples, both natural and political, shows that a kingdom cannot hold two and that power is impatient of a partner.

29. One could only devise and say this to be true in those who can have repugnant wills; but that these governors or procreators of the world have wills altogether concordant. But he who thinks thus, to defend perfect dominion or government of the universe, why does he not rather understand one will only, on which all things depend and are governed? For, as St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 103, a. 3: That which is one by itself can be the cause of unity more fittingly than many united, whence a multitude is better governed by one than by many. Then those wills would be concordant either from necessity of nature or from free agreement. The first cannot be understood, unless those wills lack freedom and always operate from necessity of nature, which cannot be thought about the first principle, as I will show below. But the assumption is evident, because, if each will is free and neither has efficacy over the other, but each is absolute and independent, by what necessity of nature can it happen that what one wills the other wills? Much less can this be certain and infallible through free agreement, because there is no greater reason why one should consent to another, than conversely; nor why one should begin and another obey; therefore such concord will be as if happening by chance and for the same reason discord could often intervene.

The Third Objection is Met & the Efficient Cause of Intelligences is Treated

30. What we have said thus far evidently (as I think) proceeds concerning that first being, which is the cause of this visible universe which we experience, and therefore we can easily philosophize and discourse from it; but then the third objection occurs, because from this effect and unity of the universe we cannot prove that intelligences and spiritual things do not have being from themselves, or that they are created by the same author by whom the universe was made. Because from the effects of the visible universe we cannot show that intelligences were either made, or have any connection with the other things of the universe, by reason of which it would be concluded that they were made by the same author by whom the universe or celestial bodies were made. It is added that for this reason some of the philosophers thought that intelligences are beings necessary by themselves and were produced by none, which opinion many attribute both to Aristotle and the Commentator, as Gregory, In II, dist. 1, a. 1, who nevertheless did not think differently about intelligences than about the heavens, as we will say.

31. To this difficulty it must be said that it is one thing to inquire absolutely and simply whether intelligences are beings necessary from themselves and dependent on another in their being and what can be demonstrated about this absolutely by natural reason, another thing to inquire what can be immediately gathered about this from the effects which we experience in the universe; and this latter question alone is what pertains to the efficacy of the present argument. Where first it would have to be inquired whether from natural effects we can know that there are any separate substances or superior to all sensible things besides one first, which we have shown to be necessary for the production and governance of this visible world, and then whence they are or what origin they have. For indeed,

if there are no effects in nature from which such substances are known, it will not be possible to elicit immediately from effects whether they are produced or unproduced. For let us grant that there are some such substances, which have no operation in bodies which we experience, in what way therefore will we be able to elicit immediately from effects whether such substances are from one first substance or not, and whether they are equal or inferior? I always add immediately, because from the properties of God which we elicit from his effects, we can afterwards reason whether such properties are so proper to one substance, that they are incommunicable to others, and in this way mediately indeed from effects, but proximately a priori it can perhaps be demonstrated, if there are other intelligences besides the first, that they are effectively from the first and that it alone is from itself, concerning which we will speak in the following section.

32. Therefore the general question whether such substances exist is to be treated afterwards ex professo in the proper disputation which we will institute concerning them; now I briefly say that from the effects alone which we experience it is not sufficiently evidently shown that they exist; but if this is to be proven by some metaphysical means, it will be rather from their cause than from effect; and thus in the way in which it is demonstrated that they exist, it is simultaneously demonstrated that they have being received from the first being. Again I assert that from effect or physical motion some conjecture is made that such substances are in the nature of things, in that they move celestial orbs; nevertheless that this is only a probable reason, not demonstration, as I will show below. Finally I say, in the way in which these substances can be investigated from effects, they are not known as existing from themselves, but as having origin effectively from the same first cause which produced the universe. And in this way it is probable that Aristotle and other philosophers knew intelligences to be effectively from God. For St. Thomas indicates that Aristotle thought thus, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, and lib. VIII Phys., and XII Metaph.; and Scotus In II, dist. 2, and Quodl., VII, near the end; and they prove

ex professo Soncinas, XII Metaph., q. 16; Iavel., q. 28; Cajetan, de Ente et essent., c. 5, q. 10, where he more directly proves this to have been the opinion of the Commentator. But Javellus thinks rather that the Commentator erred in this and thought differently from Aristotle, which does not matter much; nevertheless from the discourse and reason which we will immediately subjoin, perhaps it will be established which of these is truer. Avicenna also, IX of his Metaphysics, chapter 4, expressly posits that all things, both corporeal and immaterial, emanated from the first being, not however immediately, but that the first intelligence flowed immediately from God, and from the first intelligence emanated the second, and thus up to the last, from which the universe was immediately made, which doctrine is established to be Platonic, and nearly the same is held in the name of Aristotle, in book III On the More Secret Part of Divine Wisdom, chapter 2. Nevertheless that mode of emanation, just as it is altogether false, as is easily established from what was said above about creation, so also it has no indication in all the effects or motions, which we experience in the heavens or elements or in ourselves, and therefore that doctrine is now to be omitted, concerning which much has already been said above and something will be said in what follows.

33. Therefore the assertion posited is proven, because in the universe there is no effect or motion from which we can gather that intelligences exist, except the motions of the heavens; but this effect with the same certainty or conjecture or probability by which it indicates that intelligences exist, indicates them as subordinated and thus as effected by the same author of the universe; therefore. The major is established, both from Aristotle, VIII Physics, and XII Metaphysics, where from the motion of heaven he ascends to contemplation of intelligences, nor does he ever find elsewhere any other way of showing this genus of beings to be in the world, and later philosophers have almost imitated him; and also because, discoursing through all the effects of the universe, none is such that this genus of

beings is necessary for it. For, for the production of the entire universe, both regarding simple bodies and regarding the perfect species of mixed things, the power of the first author suffices; for alterations, generations and corruptions and changes of elements, the power of proximate and universal or celestial secondary causes suffices, with the general concourse of the first cause. Therefore if in any matter these effects can depend on intelligences, it is only insofar as they depend on the motion of heaven and through that mediation on the mover of heaven.

34. Only there seem to be indeed effects which men experience in themselves and which can be called moral rather than physical, because they do not pertain nor are ordered to physical generations and alterations which happen in the universe, but to the morals of men. Such are interior locutions or motions by which we are induced to good or evil, which are known by almost manifest experience to come from some superior cause or spirit, and often also it happens that such locutions or apparitions are visible, concerning which many things are also found among philosophers, who call these spirits sometimes genii, sometimes demons and gods. Nevertheless this effect either does not sufficiently show that there are superior spirits distinct from human souls and from the first cause, or, if it indicates them, it simultaneously indicates that they are created. For first, it is not altogether evident that these interior motions or locutions come proximately from an extrinsic intellectual agent and not rather from the internal force of the soul itself, through mediating objects which occur. Then, although we grant that such motions are sometimes of such a kind or happen in such a way that, if they are rightly considered, it can be sufficiently understood from them that they come from an extrinsic spirit, nevertheless, if the effect is good, it can be immediately from God, and thus it frequently happens in internal motions and locutions; for, that these sometimes come from good angels, is established for us more by revealed doctrine than by experience. But if this became known to some philosophers, perhaps

by some tradition or communication with the faithful of their times, for example, the Hebrews, they achieved it, perhaps from sufficient revelation of the angels themselves. This knowledge pertains to discipline and some human faith rather than to invention and science from effects, which we now treat. But if the effect is evil or inducing to moral evil or to deception, thus it cannot be immediately from God, who is supremely good, nevertheless it is not evident that it cannot be from separated human spirits. And, although we grant that sometimes such is the effect that it sufficiently shows it to be from a superior and more efficacious spirit, nevertheless it simultaneously indicates that spirit to be created, for, since it is evil, it will be changeable and deficient from good, because evil is nothing but defect of good, as we showed above; but nothing is changeable and defectible, unless what is created; therefore they are created spirits. From the very malice of such spirits also the best deduction can be made, which Augustine often indicates when acting against the Manicheans; for, if these evil spirits are made evil by defecting from good, this very thing indicates their good nature; for it would not be evil for them to defect from good, unless their very nature were good; but it cannot be the supreme good, otherwise it could not decline from good; therefore it is good by participation; therefore it is effectively from the supreme good. Therefore, omitting this moral effect, which does not pertain to physical or metaphysical consideration, from natural effects there is none which leads us to any knowledge of intelligences, except the motion of heaven.

35. It remains to prove the other proposition assumed, namely, just as from this effect we gather that intelligences exist, so also it must be gathered that they are from the founder of the universe. First, because they pertain no less to the constitution of this universe than the other things of which it consists, since without their action neither could this world naturally be conserved, nor could there be generations and corruptions in it; therefore from whom is the whole, from him is also this part of the universe. Second, because the

intelligence moving heaven so moves as expedites the good of the universe, and for this end it perseveres in that motion perpetually and without variation; therefore it is a sign that it is procreated by the same founder for this end and destined to this office. Again this is also a sign that this intelligence moves for an end intended by the author of the universe, and consequently moves for the very author of the universe, that is, either so that it may obey his command, or so that it may minister to him or cooperate to attain the end intended by him, or be assimilated to him in acting and benefiting; therefore it is a sign that this intelligence is subordinated to the very first cause and depends on it and consequently is made by it. And the Philosopher signified this discourse, XII Metaphysics, text 36, when he said that there is one immobile mover, on which all other intelligences depend, because all pertain to the order of the universe and thus all are moved by the first mover, at least as by an appetible end, but he himself is the immobile mover.

36. You will say that hence only other intelligences are held to regard the first as an end, but not as efficient cause. It is responded that from the final cause the efficient is gathered, because whatever has a final cause, also has an efficient, as was said above and will occur again below. Then it is said, according to the discourse which we have pursued in this entire argument, that from the connection of these intelligences with the universe the emanation of them from the same author from whom the universe emanated is gathered. For it is not to be thought that the author of the universe could not have founded it complete and absolute with all its causes, among which these intelligences hold a very principal place. Nor is it likely that, after the heavens were founded, he summoned ministers from elsewhere as it were to use for moving them, and did not rather by his own power and faculty lead them from non-being to being just as the heavens themselves, since there is no greater difficulty in one than in the other; finally, because, if intelligences were beings as necessary from themselves as God, they would not be under his dominion and

consequently would not be subject to his command; in what way therefore could God efficaciously use them for the ministry necessary to the universe? Therefore from such ministry it is rightly gathered that these intelligences are creatures subject to the author of the universe and produced by him.

The Fourth Objection is Answered

37. The fourth objection was, because besides this universe it can be thought that there is another made by another first being not made. To which perhaps the Philosopher would respond that it is impossible for another universe to be given, because of the reasons which he has in I On Heaven, chapters 8 and 9; nevertheless those reasons ought to be of no moment with a Christian philosopher; for there is no doubt that God could have made multiple worlds, which if he had made, in them clearly all of Aristotle's conjectures would fail, by which he wishes to conclude either that in this universe is all the matter from which simple or mixed bodies can consist, or that the elements of this universe cannot remain quiet in their places, if another universe existed. Nevertheless he accomplishes nothing, for first there could be another universe consisting of simple bodies diverse in species, either regarding species or forms, or even (which is less certain) regarding physical genus or prime matter. Then, although it is not established that there is other matter besides that which is in this universe, because we have no indication of other matter, and therefore no philosopher can affirm that it exists, nevertheless in truth and (so to speak) positively there is no means to demonstrate that all matter of corporeal things which is in the nature of things is in this universe. Finally, regarding what pertains to places or motions of elements, since these must be taken from the natural order of those bodies among themselves, the bodies of each world (if there were two) would remain quiet in their places and would naturally move to save the due order among themselves; but the bodies of distinct worlds

would not have order among themselves and therefore neither would desire to be under or above another. It must therefore be said that he who would feign another world to exist in order to avoid the force of the argument made, would indeed say nothing impossible or implying contradiction; nevertheless rashly (to omit the error against faith) he would affirm that which can come into suspicion by no reason or conjecture, and therefore that evasion is not philosophical. I confess nevertheless that from this and the preceding objection it is proven that the argument made to prove that there is only one unproduced being and all other beings are made by it does not conclude absolutely about all beings, but only about those which can fall into human knowledge through discourse or natural philosophy; and therefore, so that the argument may conclude universally, demonstration a priori is necessarily to be applied, which we promised in the second place and will pursue in the following section.

SECTION III
WHETHER IN SOME WAY IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED A PRIORI THAT GOD EXISTS

1. To speak of the other way of proving the proposed truth, it must be supposed that, speaking absolutely, it cannot be demonstrated a priori that God exists, because neither does God have a cause of his being through which he might be demonstrated a priori, nor, if he had one, is God known by us so exactly and perfectly that we might attain him from proper principles (so to speak). In this sense Dionysius said, chapter 7, De Divinis nominibus, that we cannot know God from his proper nature. Although this is truly so, nevertheless, after something about God has been demonstrated a posteriori, we can demonstrate a priori one attribute from another, as if from immensity, for example, we conclude local immutability; for I suppose that for reasoning a

priori in a human way, a rational distinction between attributes suffices.

Resolution of the Question

2. In this way, therefore, it must be said that, having demonstrated a posteriori that God is a necessary and self-existent being, from this attribute it can be demonstrated a priori that besides him there cannot be another necessary and self-existent being, and consequently that God exists. You will say: therefore from the known quiddity of God it is demonstrated that God exists, because the quiddity of God is that he is a necessary and self-existent being; but this is plainly contradictory, because the question "what is" presupposes the question "whether it is," as Saint Thomas rightly noted for this purpose, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. I respond that, formally and properly speaking, the existence of God is not demonstrated through the quiddity of God as such (which the argument correctly proves), but from a certain attribute which in reality is the essence of God, but is conceived by us more abstractly as a mode of uncaused being, another attribute is inferred and thus it is concluded that that being is God. Hence, to conclude in this way that God exists under the aspect of God, it is presupposed to be proven that there exists a certain being that is necessary per se, namely from its effects and from the denial of an infinite regress. And thus, what is first proven about this being is that it exists; then that it is intrinsically necessary; hence that it is unique in such a nature and mode of being, and therefore that it is God. And in this way the question "whether it is" is in some sense defined before "what is." Although, as I was saying above, in God these questions cannot be completely separated, because both the existence of God is the quiddity of God and the properties of that existence, by which it can be shown that that existence is proper to God, constitute (so to speak) the very quiddity and essence of God.

Section III

Why a Being Necessary Per Se Cannot be More Than One: First Demonstration

3. It is difficult, however, from the fact that there is one being necessary from itself and per se, to deduce effectively that it cannot have another similar in that property. Soncinas, XII Metaph., q. 17, proves this by this reasoning: because existence belongs per se primo to the unproduced being; but it cannot belong per se primo to two; therefore there can be only one unproduced being. The major seems self-evident, because an unproduced being does not have existence accidentally but essentially, nor does it have existence through another, since it is completely independent; therefore existence belongs to it per se primo. The minor is evident, because that is said to belong to something per se primo which belongs to it adequately, so that it always and per se belongs to it and to no other except to that one, or by reason of that one or through that one as medium. Hence, I Poster., text. 11, a predicate belonging per se primo is called universal, because it belongs not through another and adequately. This reasoning is taken from Saint Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 15, although he uses different terms, saying that existence belongs to God according as he himself is; nevertheless it is the same thing, as is evident from Aristotle, in the place cited.

4. It seems, however, that in this reasoning the principle is begged in the first place; for when it is said that existence belongs to God per se primo, that particle "primo" can be taken either negatively or positively; in the former way the sense is that existence belongs to God in such a way that it belongs to no other first. And in this way the proposition is self-evident, supposing that God is his existence through essence, and in this sense alone is that proposition proven by the reasoning made, namely, that God has existence not accidentally nor through another. Nevertheless, in this sense that principle does not suffice for inferring that no other being has existence from itself,

because, even if not first, nevertheless it could have existence equally primo. Therefore in the latter way that principle must be taken and the sense will be that existence belongs to God before every other being, so that it belongs to none equally primo. And in this way the principle is begged in that reasoning; for this itself is what we are inquiring; nor is that proposition sufficiently proven in that sense by the superior discourse. For, from the fact that existence belongs to God not accidentally nor through another, at most it can be inferred that it belongs to no other before him, not truly that it belongs to him before others. Perhaps it will be said that that principle is assumed in the prior sense; but in the other proposition it is subsumed and proven that what belongs to something per se primo in this way cannot belong to another except through that thing.

5. Against this, however, it is objected secondly and especially, because in all those terms, namely, to belong per se primo and through another, a great equivocation seems to be committed. For in two ways something can belong to many through something else that is prior: in one way really and through true effective causality, as shining, for example, can be said to belong per se primo to the sun alone among all the stars; in another way, according to reason only without physical causality, but only metaphysical reason, in which way the capacity to laugh belongs per se primo to man, and through him to Peter and Paul. If therefore in the present case that subsumed proposition is taken in this latter way, as it is truly taken by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, it is indeed true and is correctly proven by the reasoning made there, nevertheless it is not to the point, because here we inquire about the effective emanation of one from another, whence in a proportional sense the prior proposition could be denied, as I will now say. If however that proposition is taken in the prior sense, it will be found false, as is evident in the said example about man, or in that about the triangle which Aristotle brings forward; for, although having three angles equal to two right angles belongs per se primo to triangle, it does not belong to isosceles effectively through triangle. And thus,

one who believed there to be two unproduced beings would indeed say that existence belongs per se primo to each according to reality, because to neither through the other nor to both through another effectively, and in this way it would not be inconvenient that the same predicate belong per se primo to two things, because it is not necessary that such a predicate be universal or adequate with respect to all and each to which it belongs per se primo in the said way. According to reason, however, one who thus opined would deny that existence belongs per se primo to God as God is, or as such a being is, but to an unproduced being as such, whose nature (given that hypothesis) according to the intellect would abstract from this or that unproduced being, and through that according to the same rational distinction existence would belong to this or that unproduced being. Hence, when in that discourse it is said that existence does not belong to God through another, if it is understood, that is, through an efficient cause, it is true and is correctly proven from the fact that it is an unproduced being; if however it is understood, that is, not through another more abstract nature according to the precision of the intellect, thus that proposition will be denied by one who has posited two unproduced beings; nor in that sense can it be proven by the discourse made.

6. And the difficulty is further declared; for, so that the reasoning may proceed equally and without equivocation, one must speak of existence and being, or that which is, with proportion. Either therefore there is discourse about such determinate existence as is in reality, or about existence as such according to reason abstracted. In the former way it is true that this particular existence which is in God belongs per se primo to God as God is, and belongs adequately and is formally in nothing except in him, or in that supposit which is God, but participatively is in nothing except through him. From this, however, it cannot be effectively inferred that no other existence can belong per se primo to another being; for another existence can be thought really distinct from the existence of God and not participated

from him. Nor does it appear how from the said discourse this is proven impossible. If however there is discourse about existence as such and abstracted according to reason, thus the subject or quasi-subject of it, to which it is adequately compared and belongs per se primo posterioristically, will be denied to be this singular being which is called God, because it is not necessary that a common nature be predicated per se primo of a singular thing. Hence, if existence is taken most abstractly as it is something analogous to unproduced and produced existence, it does not seem to belong per se primo to God, or to unproduced being, but to being as such, as it is also something analogous to being through essence and participated being. If however existence is taken less abstractly for unproduced existence, thus it will already be said to be something common according to reason, and therefore not to be compared per se primo and adequately to this being which is this God, but to unproduced being, which is also posited to be common according to reason to several unproduced beings, indeed even univocal, if one proceeds consistently according to that hypothesis. Which, although it is false and similarly false are the things which follow from it, nevertheless this itself does not seem able to be convinced by that discourse whose efficacy we are inquiring into.

7. Perhaps it will be said that in that reasoning being is supposed to be analogous, and therefore existence itself cannot be reduced to a common nature to which it belongs per se primo, but to some singular thing, and from this it is consequently inferred that it cannot belong to others formally and according to reason, and therefore it is correctly concluded that it belongs through that thing effectively. Likewise it can be said (which comes to almost the same thing) that that reasoning supposes that in God a quasi-generic and specific nature, common and particular, cannot be abstracted, and therefore it is the same whether something belongs to God as such a being is, or as an unproduced being is. Nevertheless, this response does not seem to provide efficacy to the reasoning made nor to satisfy

for a double cause. The first is because (to omit what is said about the analogy of being being under opinion, which is enough to weaken the force of demonstration) the analogy of being properly declared supposes the emanation and dependence of all beings from God, as is evident from what was said above about the analogy of being to God and creatures; therefore, if the aforesaid reasoning supposes the analogy of being with respect to God and all others which have existence, it supposes what is to be proven, namely, that nothing has existence except through dependence on God. The other cause is because, even given the analogy, it is not proven from the analogy that emanation follows, but only inequality. Hence it could easily be said that, although existence according to its principal and primary signification belongs per se primo to God alone, nevertheless according to some less principal nature it belongs to other unproduced beings, because it is not necessary that in analogous terms the secondary signification effectively remains from the primary. Finally, because, although being is analogous with respect to uncreated and created being, or substance and accident, nevertheless it could be responded that it is univocal to several unproduced substances, just as in fact it is truly univocal to created substances compared only among themselves. Hence what was said, namely that in God there is no common nor particular nature, if it is understood about a common analogous nature and abstractable according to our reason, is false. If however about a univocal nature, although it is true in reality, nevertheless perhaps it would be denied by one who posited several unproduced beings, and therefore it should not be supposed in the aforesaid reasoning, lest the principle be begged.

Second Reasoning why Beings through Essence Cannot be Several

8. To all these things it can be responded by adding another reasoning from Saint Thomas, I cont. Gent., c. 42, reasoning 7, where

he argues thus: If there are two of which each is necessary to be, it is necessary that they agree in the intention of the necessity of being; it is necessary therefore that they be distinguished by something that is added either to both or to one, and thus it is necessary that either one or both be composite; but nothing composite is necessary to be through itself. And thus he concludes that there cannot be several of which each is necessary to be. This discourse, however, is also very difficult; for, if it proved anything, it would also convince that there is not given one concept of being or substance common to God and creatures. Likewise that whole discourse can be applied to the three divine persons, insofar as they agree in the nature of person; for by a similar argument it could be concluded that they would be composite from the common intention of person and something added in which they are distinguished. But if, notwithstanding the number of three persons, someone denied that there is given an intention of person common to them, by the same reasoning, even if several unproduced beings were admitted, the intention of necessary being common to them would be denied. Or conversely, if (which is more probable) the divine persons are understood to agree in the common nature of person and to be distinguished in their properties without composition which derogates from their simplicity, because that commonality is only through abstraction and precision of mind, and the determination is not through proper composition even of reason, but through simple quasi-transcendental modification, thus in the same way it could be said about two unproduced beings, insofar as they would agree in the common nature of necessary being and would be distinguished in their proper entities. Indeed, even if it were admitted that either both or one of those beings is properly composite by composition of reason, such composition does not seem to be formally repugnant with the necessity of being, because it does not include proper real potentiality nor real dissolubility of those things from which such composition is made. For, since in reality they are not distinguished but only by reason, they are not properly united in

reality but are one, whence neither are they separable in reality, but can only be distinguished by mind, which is not repugnant to the necessity of being. And in this way and by the aforesaid example of the agreement and distinction of the divine persons, many reasonings which are usually made in this matter seem to be enervated and are touched upon by Saint Thomas in the aforesaid places and in many others in books I and II cont. Gent., which, although they are very subtle and metaphysical and apt for persuading a well-disposed intellect, are nevertheless difficult for convincing one who is obstinate and resisting.

Third Reasoning for the Same

9. Of this kind also seems to be that reasoning which in the tenth place, in c. 42, lib. I cont. Gent., the same holy Doctor puts forward, namely: A being which is necessary per se has the necessity of being insofar as it is this singular; therefore it is impossible for beings necessary per se to be several; therefore there cannot be several unproduced beings; therefore whatever exists draws its origin from one unproduced being. The first consequence is evident, because the singularity of a thing is not communicable to another; and therefore, what belongs to something insofar as it is this singular signate, is not multiplicable. The remaining inferences are self-evident. The antecedent is proven because, if a necessary being does not have the necessity of being insofar as it is this singular individual, therefore this singularity is not per se necessary to a necessary being as such; therefore it depends on something else, or comes from elsewhere. But this involves a contradiction; for a being necessary per se must maximally be such insofar as it is singular, because it is not an actual being except insofar as it is singular; therefore singularity itself must maximally belong from intrinsic necessity and not from elsewhere nor dependently on another. But if singularity belongs from the intrinsic necessity of being, it cannot be multiplied, just as, if man from the

intrinsic nature of man necessarily brought with him the singularity of Peter, he could not be multiplied.

10. It is indeed an excellent and subtle reasoning; but someone persisting in the prior solutions could respond that this singular being, which is unproduced, has the necessity of being as to its whole singular entity and that as such is not communicable to another, nevertheless conversely it does not convert, nor does necessary being as such necessarily postulate this singularity, but can have several and in each singular necessary being have the singularity of that one, not from elsewhere nor dependently on another, but from its intrinsic entity and nature, not as common, but as proper. For that commonality or agreement which is only according to reason can often be founded in the singular entities themselves and in the properties which they have even as they are singular. Just as to be an incorruptible being by its nature belongs to an angel even according to each singular nature, although this does not arise from singularity alone, but absolutely from the whole nature and essence. Thus therefore it could be said about several unproduced and singular beings as to the necessity of existing absolutely.

Fourth Reasoning for Proving the Same

11. Nevertheless that reasoning is greatly approved by me, which I propose in this way. Because wherever a common nature is multiplicable according to diverse singular natures, even if it is not necessary that singularity be distinguished in reality itself from the common nature, nevertheless it is necessary that it be in some way outside the essence of such a nature; for, if it were essential, truly such a nature would not be multiplicable, as was said above, treating of the principle of individuation; but in an unproduced being it cannot be understood that singularity is outside the essence of its nature; therefore it is impossible that such a nature be multiplicable. The minor is proven, because in an unproduced being it is necessary that

the very existence of existence be of its essence; for in this consists the intrinsic necessity of being, that from the force of its essence it has existence, so that it is essentially its existence; but existence is only of a singular thing as it is singular; therefore it is necessary that the singularity of such a nature also be of its essence, and consequently that such a nature not be multiplicable. And this itself is what Saint Thomas says, that that being which is unproduced, or which is absolutely necessary or which is essentially its existence, is not this singular being through anything outside its essence, even according to reason, because unless it included singularity in its essential concept, it would not include necessary existence in its essential concept, because actual existence includes singular existence.

12. Aureoli's objection against the aforesaid reasoning of Saint Thomas. You will say (as Aureolus objects, In I, dist. 3) that by this reasoning at most it is proven that there cannot be two unproduced beings distinguished by number alone; not truly that they cannot be specifically or essentially distinct; for thus many Thomists say that angelic natures are essentially individual and therefore cannot be multiplied numerically, and nevertheless they are multiplied according to species. I respond first that it is most probable that no nature which is properly specific and has a common genus with another is essentially individual, both because by the very fact that it is a specific nature it is of itself potential, and therefore there is no reason why multiplication by number should be repugnant to them; and also because, if composition from genus and specific difference is not repugnant, there is no reason why composition from species and individual difference should be repugnant to it. Then it is said that from the reasoning made with proportion applied it is concluded that intrinsic and essential necessity of being is repugnant to the multiplication of such a nature even with essential diversity, as Saint Thomas signified in the same chapter, reasoning 8. Because, just as in the essential concept of that nature which is necessarily from itself singularity is included, so also the whole essence of such a singular

nature is included; therefore it is impossible that this essence of a necessary being be one thing and another, whether in singularity, or in essential nature. Hence, just as it cannot be understood that such a nature becomes singular through something added that is outside its essence even according to reason, so it cannot be understood that it is as it were constituted in such a species through something added to this common nature of necessary being, which is even according to reason outside its essence as such. For, by the very fact that necessary being is understood, just as singular being is necessarily understood, so also it is understood as having the whole essence necessary for being; and therefore it cannot be constituted in this or that essential nature through something added, even according to reason. A being necessary per se therefore cannot truly be conceived as common whether specific, or generic, or analogous, but only as singular; and therefore it can in no way be multiplied.

13. From this last reasoning the first is strengthened. But if this reasoning is solid, as it truly is, from it the first reasoning takes its force, which is founded on the fact that existence belongs to God or to necessary being per se primo, or according as he himself is. For it is understood to belong to that one per se primo not under some common nature, but as this singular being is, so that, when it is said that existence belongs to this being not accidentally nor through another, the sense is not only not through another, that is, not through another efficient cause, but also not through any common nature or one abstracting from singularity; but this to be true is sufficiently proven by the superior discourse. And certainly it seems evident from the proper nature of existence itself, for it belongs first and per se to a singular thing, not to a common one; hence, even in those beings or natures which have received existence, it cannot be communicated per se primo to a common nature, but to a singular one; therefore that thing which essentially and according as it itself has existence, has that proximately and immediately as such a singular thing is and not according to any common nature; therefore existence belongs per se

primo to such a being, excluding every medium whether of an extrinsic agent, or of a common formal nature, on account of which according to itself and abstractly taken it would be necessary for it to be.

14. But from this principle thus explained it is optimally inferred that existence cannot belong to any being, except through effective emanation from the first unproduced being. For, although that relation or predication according as he himself does not always require this relation of efficient cause between that which is such per se primo and the rest which are such through that one as medium, nevertheless when that prior thing is a singular thing and completely distinct from others and extrinsic to them, no other nature of medium or participation can be devised. And therefore the examples about common natures to which something belongs per se primo do not obstruct, as for man to be capable of laughter and for triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles; for those are as it were a formal medium, because common nature is compared as form to the particular. In the present case, however, the being through essence to which existence belongs per se primo is a certain singular being, which cannot be a formal medium nor the form of others; and therefore existence cannot belong to the rest through that one, except as through an efficient medium. For the nature of final cause is not per se sufficient, because a final cause does not proximately give existence, but moves an agent metaphorically so that it gives existence; and therefore its causality alone is not sufficient so that those things which are secondarily beings have existence through that one which per se primo and according as he himself has existence. And from these things it is easy to respond to the difficulties touched upon concerning the aforesaid reasonings.

Fifth Reasoning

15. We can finally add another reasoning, which both suffices per se and confirms the preceding, namely, because, if there were two unproduced beings, either they would be of the same species, or of diverse species. Neither can be said; therefore. The first part of the minor is proven, because a supremely abstract being cannot be multiplied according to number, because every numerical multiplication is made through matter or in relation to it. But this proof is not efficacious, because although this is true about physical and natural multiplication of individuals, nevertheless not absolutely about every possible or entitative multiplication of singular things. A better proof is that which is taken from the preceding discourse, because a nature which is essentially singular cannot be multiplied according to number; but the nature of God or of a being necessary per se is essentially singular; therefore. Another proof that should not be despised can be given, because the multiplication of individuals is accidental, and where it is possible, it can as far as it is from itself proceed to infinity, because there is no greater repugnance that those two individuals be possible than three or four or in any other number; for there is no reason for necessarily stopping at some one, since they maintain no per se order, but multiplication of another happens to any of them; if therefore two unproduced beings distinguished by number alone were possible, three and four and so on in any number would also be possible. But however many were possible, that many would necessarily exist, for in these things that axiom is maximally true: In eternal things to be and to be able are the same; for, if they are beings necessary per se, there is not in them to be able to be, but to actually be; therefore we could not stop at some finite number of such beings. For in those individuals which have a cause, although from themselves they can be multiplied to infinity, they are stopped at some certain number as to actual existence, either from the will of the cause, or from virtue and mode of acting successively or from subject matter; but in those beings which would have existence from themselves without cause, they could in no way be stopped at a certain number,

because a greater number would not be more repugnant than a lesser one, and by the very fact that it would not be repugnant, it would actually exist. But no one will admit that there are actually infinite unproduced beings; therefore one must stop at one single unproduced being.

16. The posterior part about specific diversity was proven above, responding to Aureolus and declaring the force of the superior reasonings. Now indeed it must be proven by another dilemma. For either those beings would be equal in perfection, or not; neither can be said; therefore. The first part of the minor can be proven first from the received opinion of philosophers, that there cannot be two essences specifically distinct and equal in perfection; for as Aristotle says, X Metaph., text. 5, differences dividing a genus are always compared as privation and habit, because one is always less perfect and for that reason is compared to privation; whence also arose that axiom that species are like numbers. The reason seems to be because, if they are equal beings, they are equally distant from non-being; whence therefore can they have essential diversity or dissimilitude? And certainly in all things essentially diverse which we experience, this inequality seems to be found; and therefore that principle is very probable. Nevertheless it is not evident, for, although two things are equally distant from non-being, they seem to be able to be dissimilar in nature; for the relation of equality is different from the relation of similarity. Hence in divine relations paternity and filiation, as they are relations, are dissimilar or disparate, as they call them, and nevertheless in perfection and relative entity as such they are considered equal, not only as they include essence, in which they are the same, but also according to their proper relative natures in which they are distinguished. In this way therefore someone could contend that it is not repugnant for two unproduced essences to be given that are dissimilar and equal.

17. Although (to say this in passing) the reasoning is far different in this regard in relatives and absolutes, for relations have

diversity from formal terms with the nature in which they are founded; and therefore diversity with equality can more easily be understood in them, because equality arises from the degree of entity, but diversity from mutual relation. But truly in absolute beings, such as those unproduced beings would be, it can hardly be conceived in what they would be dissimilar, if they were equal, and according to that whole which they would have in themselves, necessary per se. And in these there is also a special reason, because to be a being from itself or necessary and independent formally and according to precise concept is the greatest of all perfections. Indeed it necessarily includes in some way every other perfection, as will be declared below; but each of those beings according to its proper and quasi-specific nature would include this perfection, which would necessarily be of the same nature in each; therefore in them diversity of perfections with equality cannot be understood. Here also the reasoning made about the infinite multitude of such natures has place, because, if they were equal and dissimilar, they would also have no order among themselves, but would equally divide whatever common nature could be conceived for them; therefore, if they could be multiplied in some number, also in whatever number; for there would be no reason for stopping at some certain number, nor could repugnance be assigned on account of which that number could not be increased; and therefore it would be necessary for the multitude of such natures to be infinite.

18. Nor is it laborious to apply these and similar reasonings to proving the other part of the dilemma, namely, that neither could those beings be several and unequal in perfection. First, because, by the very fact that such beings according to their proper natures agree in the supreme perfection of being from themselves, which formally or eminently includes all others, as I will show below, inequality among them cannot be understood. Second, because, either among them there would be given one supreme being more perfect than the rest absolutely and simply, or not; if there is not given one, therefore there is no terminus in that multitude, but it is plainly infinite. And even

with that posited and actually existing, it is plainly unintelligible that in it there is not some being more perfect than all the rest, since all are said to be unequal in perfection. Again from this it necessarily follows that any of those beings is finite in entitative perfection, since any is surpassed by another, indeed even by infinite others; therefore that whole multitude would also be imperfect, since it coalesces from imperfect things, and in that whole there cannot be infinite intensive perfection, but only infinite multitude of finite perfections; but it is repugnant that there not be among beings something of infinite intensive perfection, as was touched upon above treating of creation and we will also say below. Indeed this reasoning taken from infinity would suffice for demonstrating what we intend; nevertheless we omit it, because it assumes two principles to be proven below, namely, from the fact that some being is from itself and essentially its existence, it follows that it is infinite simply in the genus of being and such infinite beings cannot be multiplied, which two things must be demonstrated in the following disputation treating of the divine attributes.

19. But if in that multitude there is given one supremely perfect and surpassing the rest, nevertheless it would not be infinite, both because the reasonings made would proceed, and also because no reason can be given why beyond that there cannot be given another more perfect being necessary per se. For whence will the whole latitude of beings be limited to that finite degree? And the reasoning made above about multiplication to infinity of such beings is added; for, even if they were essentially diverse and unequal in perfection, there would be no reason for stopping at some finite number, because, although there would seem to be some per se order among distinct essences, nevertheless also in this order one can proceed to infinity, as is evident in possible creatures; therefore it is necessary that in that whole latitude of beings there be given one infinite and more perfect than all the rest. That supreme being therefore, more perfect than the rest and infinite simply, we call God, and from this same perfection of his we gather that the other beings

which are numbered with him are effectively produced by that infinite being. First indeed, because infinity belongs to the first being by the very fact that it is a being in act through essence; for from this it has that it in some way closes in and contains the whole of being, because it has nothing whence it might be limited, nor from which it might participate this part of being (so to speak) rather than another; therefore, conversely, by the very fact that the remaining beings do not have supreme perfection and totality of being (so to speak), it is a manifest sign that they are not beings through essence completely unproduced, but are beings through participation, receiving existence from that first being.

20. Second, because in this way it is understood that there is a per se order in the whole latitude of beings, either through subordination of them among themselves or at least through reduction of all to one, so that they are not rashly and by chance infinitely multiplied. Which the theological example correctly declares (by which at the same time we respond to philosophers, lest they think that the reasonings by which we prove the unity of uncreated being disprove the Trinity of persons); for in divine things, although the Catholic faith posits a multitude of persons, nevertheless not without the order which they call of origin, so that both ascending there is a stop at some completely unproduced person, which is the source of the others; and descending, there is some reason founded in the very nature of such a being on account of which multiplication is made up to the ternary number and not further, because namely in a purely intellectual nature there is no other mode of internal operation or emanation except through intellect and will. But if in God persons could be multiplied unproduced, plainly infinite persons could be multiplied; and therefore neither does faith admit several unproduced persons, nor does reason permit them, nor at all several beings without reduction to one first, from which the rest emanate.

21. Third, this very point can be proven from the efficacy of that first infinite being; for if it is first and infinite, it will be the cause

of all other things, according to that common axiom which is believed to be taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 4: "The maximum in each genus is the cause of all things that belong to that genus," which is especially understood concerning efficient cause, when in that most perfect thing there is sufficient power for the production of others. However, in this proof, first of all, the text of Aristotle from which that principle is said to be taken is not correctly adduced. For, as we noted in our commentary on that text, Aristotle does not say that everything which is maximally such is the cause of other things, but conversely, that what in some order is the cause of other things is maximally such. From this principle, however, the other cannot be inferred, because a universal affirmative proposition does not convert simply; therefore, although what is the cause for others to be such is maximally such, it does not follow that everything which is maximally such is the cause of other things. Furthermore, that principle taken in itself is not so evident that a demonstration can be constructed from it. Indeed, Durandus (In II, dist. 15, q. 3) and Aureolus (cited by Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 1) have taught that it is not true. For man, although he is the most perfect of all animals, is not on that account the cause of the others, nor is whiteness the cause of the remaining colors, even if it should be the most perfect color; hence also Cajetan (I p., q. 2, a. 3) thinks that axiom, understood concerning proper cause and especially efficient cause, is neither necessary nor true. Others, however, explain it concerning cause broadly speaking, so as to include an extrinsic exemplar, which can be called a measure rather than a cause, in the way that Aristotle, in Metaphysics X, said that the first in any genus is the measure of other things. According to this interpretation, however, it will only be possible to infer from that principle that, since among beings some are more and others less perfect, there is given some most perfect thing which is the measure of others, because by approach to or departure from it they are judged more or less perfect. From this, however, it cannot be concluded that this being alone is unproduced and is the efficient cause of all other things.

The Same Truth is Confirmed from Aristotle's Position

22. Therefore Aristotle, in the cited passage, rather assumes that there is given some being which is the cause of all others, so that from this he may conclude that it is most true and most perfect, which should be noted in passing so that it may be established that Aristotle had attained this truth. For he openly says that this first being is not only the cause of corruptible and contingent things, but also of those things which always exist, under which he seems to comprehend the heavens and the intelligences. Nor can that passage be explained as concerning only final or exemplary causality, as Jandun there, q. 5, and Gregory, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, contend, both because Aristotle openly puts forward an example of efficient cause; and also because in the present matter final causality is not separated from effective causality, as was touched upon above and will be more fully declared immediately. Nor does it present an obstacle that Aristotle seems to speak of effects which univocally participate in the nature of the cause; for this is what he says: "Of which something is the cause, the same thing agrees both in name and in nature"; where another translation has "according to which univocation is present in others." This, I say, does not present an obstacle, but rather from this passage it is gathered that the analogy of being to the first being and other things does not exclude some unity of nature or concept together with unity of name; and therefore it is sometimes comprehended by the Greeks under synonymous terms, as Fonseca also noted there. Therefore Aristotle only adds that particle in order to exclude equivocal effects, which in no way agree with the cause in name and nature; for in those cases it is not necessary that the cause be maximally such formally, but eminently.

23. Aristotle's passage is explained. Only this could introduce scruple or doubt, that Aristotle concludes in the plural that the

principles of those things which always exist are most true, whence he seems to hold that there are given several first unproduced principles of eternal things, as Jandun and Gregory expound and attribute to Aristotle above. These, by "those things which always exist," understand the motions of the heavens; by "their principles," however, all separate substances, which they think according to Aristotle are unproduced. But from that passage this certainly cannot be gathered; for Aristotle had also spoken earlier in the singular, saying that thing is most true which is the cause for posterior things that they be true, and each thing is maximally such which is the cause for others, etc., which the Commentator noted was said on account of the first cause, and immediately he says absolutely and indefinitely that those things which always exist have their origin from the first principle; but that locution in teaching doctrine is equivalent to a universal. And therefore it is limited by some without cause to celestial bodies, so that Aristotle would have held that the heavens, even if they are eternal, have a cause not only of their motion, but also of their being, while the intelligences are called several unproduced principles. But this is attacked by the same reasons. And furthermore because according to Aristotle there is the same reason in this respect for celestial body and the intelligence moving it, because they have among themselves the greatest proportion in eternity or necessity of being. Likewise because heaven is altogether ingenerable according to Aristotle. Others therefore think that Aristotle spoke in the plural on account of prime matter, which they suppose according to Aristotle to be unproduced and to be in its own genus a principle of other things. But this is not correctly said, otherwise Aristotle should also have concluded that prime matter is maximally being and that it is the principle of all things which always exist; but both are false and against his doctrine. Therefore Aristotle put that plural for the singular, either on account of the eminence of the first cause, or because in the first cause several first reasons of causes come together; for it is the first final, efficient and exemplary cause. Therefore he understands these causes by the

name of principles; which nevertheless in reality are nothing but one first cause. And let these things be noted in passing concerning that opinion of Aristotle. Now truly in the matter itself we shall attempt to prove that in the first being it correctly follows from the fact that it is the maximum being that it is the cause of all others, even though this does not follow universally; therefore we shall accomplish this in the following discourse.

Whence it Follows that What is the Maximum Being is the Cause of All Others

24. Let there be therefore another argument, for the first unproduced being is of the highest and infinite perfection; therefore it is most powerful for acting; therefore it can produce all things which participate in or have being; therefore it produces all things which exist, nor is anything besides it unproduced. The first antecedent is taken from the preceding discourses, by which it was shown that one must arrive at some unproduced being more perfect than others. That it is infinite, however, was partly proven, because being through essence itself has nothing from which it might be limited; partly it can be gathered from what was said above concerning creation, which we showed to be possible for the first being and to require infinite power for it, and thus the first consequence was also proven. The second, however, is usually proven in this manner, because every power has some adequate object; and the higher and more universal a power is, the more universal object it has; but the active power of the first being is the highest and most universal that can be, since it is proportioned to its perfection; therefore it comprehends under its object every being; therefore every being is producible by that power, and consequently there is no possible being which is not producible by that power; therefore there is no being necessary through itself besides the first being itself; for it is repugnant that a necessary being be producible by any power.

25. Against this argument, however, objection can be made, because it is not of the nature of active power, however supreme and infinite, that it comprehend every being under its object, otherwise it would also comprehend the first being itself; therefore some limitation on the part of the power itself must be added, which is not sufficiently declared by saying that object is possible being; for either that possible is taken merely positively, or as it comprehends the necessary under itself, and thus it also comprehends God, for what exists can also be, according to the rules of dialecticians; or it is taken as it includes the privation of necessity of being, and thus the principle is begged while it is said that every being other than the first being is possible; for this is what comes into question, namely, whether there is something necessary. Therefore whoever might suppose such intrinsically necessary beings besides the first, would consequently say the adequate object of this power is makeable being. For what more universal productive power can be conceived than that which extends itself to everything makeable? But such power would not extend to necessary beings, because those are not producible.

26. The aforesaid argument is defended. But nevertheless the stated argument, which is taken from St. Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 15, can be defended in many ways from the same doctrine, especially arguments 3, 4, 6 and 7. First indeed, because it pertains to the perfection of the first being that it contain virtually or eminently all entityness; therefore the first being existing from itself is powerful for effecting all entityness distinct from itself; therefore it is repugnant to the perfection and omnipotence of the first being that besides itself there be something unproduced and altogether necessary. Whence, although it is true that the adequate object of divine power is creatable or makeable being, nevertheless it pertains at the same time to the perfection of that power that every being which is not itself be makeable by itself, as being contained eminently in itself. This can be declared from the contrary, for it pertains to the perfection of that power that it can reduce to nothing any thing distinct from itself,

otherwise it would not have full dominion over all things; therefore it is repugnant to the perfection and universality of that power that some being besides itself be simply necessary and independent. And it is confirmed and declared on the part of those very beings distinct from the first, whatever they may be; for it was shown that no being distinct from the first can be equal in perfection and essence, but is necessarily inferior to it, from which it necessarily happens that every such being is finite and imperfect; therefore on the part of that being it is not repugnant that every such being be makeable, because the imperfect always draws its origin, as to what it has of perfection, from something more perfect. And similarly participated being draws its origin from being through essence, nor can any reason be given why it would be repugnant to such being to be makeable; indeed this is much more conformable to its imperfection and limitation than that it be simply necessary being; therefore every being of this kind is included under the object of the effective power of the first being, and therefore there is no necessary and uncreated being besides itself.

Final Argument from the Causality of the End

27. The final argument can be taken from the causality of the ultimate end, for among things there is one most perfect being which is the ultimate end of all others; therefore that very thing is the first efficient principle of the rest, and thus it alone is uncreated and the true God. The antecedent is admitted by almost all philosophers, for at least in the genus of end they do not deny that there is order between the secondary intelligences and the first. And the same reason holds for any other beings whatsoever; for all things imitate the first being itself and intend to be assimilated to it, and those which can attain it in some way, as intellectual beings are, have their beatitude placed in it, nor do they rest until they arrive at it, as we experience in ourselves. Finally, there would be great imperfection and confusion of things, if there were not order among them; therefore it is necessary that all

things be referred to some one ultimate end. But if there is some ultimate end of other things, it cannot be except the first and highest being. Concerning which matter we have said more above, disp. XXIV. The first consequence, however, is proven, because whatever has a final cause, has an efficient one; for as Aristotle testifies, the end is that for the sake of which something is made; for the end moves the efficient cause to act.

28. An evasion that weakens the aforesaid argument. But someone could respond that it is one thing to have an end and another to have a final cause; for end as such only expresses the notion of a terminus, but final cause expresses the notion of a principle and mover; but it can be understood that some thing have an end in the prior way, but not however a final cause properly and strictly speaking, and then the inference from end to efficient cause will not be valid. And in this manner some philosophers seem to have understood the nature of end among the proximate movers of the sphere and the first immobile mover, without effective emanation. For although they supposed that secondary intelligences exist from themselves and necessarily, nevertheless they believed that they are carried by a quasi-natural impulse toward the first intelligence as toward an end or terminus of their natural perfection. But if someone should insist, because it is repugnant to have this relation to another as to an end without dependence on it, but all dependence is repugnant with necessity of being, because if one thing depends on another, therefore if that is removed from the middle, this also will be taken away, and consequently it will not be simply and intrinsically necessary, they respond that from the relation of one thing to another as to a terminus or end there does not follow proper dependence, but only necessary connection of one thing with another follows, such as is wont to be between relation and terminus without proper dependence of one on the other, as we are bound to say between Father and Son in divine matters. Nor is that conditional "if one is removed, the other is taken away" against intrinsic necessity of being, when that other thing which

is posited in the conditional is also necessary from within; for, although the conditional is true, nevertheless, just as the antecedent is impossible, so also the consequent, and therefore the opposite of each can be simply and intrinsically necessary.

29. It is refuted. But although this evasion has a certain appearance of probability, in truth it is not really probable. First, because it involves repugnance that some thing be from itself and through itself and yet not be for itself but for another, because it is no lesser perfection to be from itself than to be for itself, therefore without cause the prior perfection is attributed to some being, to which the other is denied. Likewise because a nature which has being from itself is an absolutely absolute thing and needing nothing in order to be; therefore in its being it cannot include relation to another as to an end. Finally it is declared a posteriori, for a thing which is terminated toward another as toward an ultimate end loves itself and its whole being on account of that end; but a thing which has being from itself has no reason to refer that being to another, on account of which it would love itself alone or principally. Furthermore, from that response occasion is taken for denying all final causality and operation for the sake of an end; for similarly someone could say that all things tend by natural inclination toward their ends as toward certain termini without causality of the end; but this is most absurd; for although all things have these natural inclinations toward their ends, nevertheless, this very constitution of theirs declares that they are not from themselves, but have been established by a superior agent and have received propensities toward their ends.

30. Still someone can say, granted it is true that whatever has a final cause has an efficient one, nevertheless these causes do not always coincide in the same thing; for health is the end of walking, for example, but it is not however the efficient principle of it; thus therefore it can be said that God is the end of intelligences, although he is not the efficient cause. Especially since it can be said that secondary intelligences are not so much in being as in operating for

the sake of the first as for the sake of an end, and thus not so much their substance as their operation has a final cause, and has also an efficient one, although not the same one; for the efficient cause of operations is the substance of the intelligence operating, but the end is the superior and first intelligence. It is responded, beginning from this last part, that this evasion has no place according to the opinion of philosophers who posit that intelligences are beings necessary from themselves; for they consequently say that the operation of intelligence is its substance. For they think, and indeed consequently, that they are pure acts, since they think they are their own being through essence; therefore, if the operation of intelligence is ordered toward God as toward an end and its operation is its substance, it is necessary that the substance also be ordered toward the end. But if operation necessarily has an efficient cause, because it has a final one, the same must necessarily be said of the substance itself; just as the substance cannot be the efficient cause of itself, so neither of its operation, since the substance itself is posited to be its operation. Finally, given the true opinion that in secondary or created intelligences operation is distinguished from substance, it must necessarily be said, if the operation of intelligence is for the sake of God as end, that the substance also is ordered toward the same end, both because such substance is for the sake of its operation; and also because it does not attain or achieve its end except through operation; therefore not only the operation, but also the substance itself was instituted for the sake of such an end.

31. And hence it happens that it cannot refer itself to itself as to the efficient cause of its being, just as its operation, because operation already presupposes the being from which it can effectively flow; but the being itself does not presuppose itself nor the substance itself; and therefore finally it is concluded that that substance must be reduced to another efficient cause, which cannot be other than the first being itself, toward which it is ordered as toward the ultimate end. Therefore, although the thing which is an end is not always also the

efficient principle, especially when the end itself is to be produced through action and is the end quo, or for the sake of which, nevertheless, often the end and efficient coincide in the same thing, especially when the end is cui, or qui; for thus everyone operating for himself operates in some way, and consequently is simultaneously both efficient and end of his operation; in the present case therefore, from the fact that God is the ultimate end, it is excellently inferred that he is the first principle of all things, both because he is an end not to be effected but to be obtained, imitated or honored by his effects; and also because the institution of things toward such an end cannot be referred to another cause. For either that cause would be within the order of things effected, and thus it also would be made for the sake of that end, and its cause would have to be sought; or it is outside that order, and thus it cannot be other than the ultimate end itself. And this is per se consonant with reason, because God is not an end for whom some utility is sought through action, but who intends to communicate his goodness to others, and whom all other things desire in some way to achieve or imitate, as St. Thomas rightly says, I, q. 44, a. 4, and therefore God is not an end except as the first cause operating for the sake of communicating his goodness. And in this way also the end excellently corresponds and is proportioned to the principle; for the order of agents follows the order of ends and therefore to the supreme agent the supreme end also corresponds, and thus in the present matter, from the fact that all things are ordered toward God or toward the first being as toward the ultimate end, it correctly follows that he himself is the first principle of all things.

Conclusion from All That Has Been Said

32. From all these things therefore it has been sufficiently demonstrated that God exists. For although perhaps some arguments from these things which have been touched upon, taken by themselves and individually, may not so convince the intellect that a perverse or

ill-disposed man could not find evasions, nevertheless both all the arguments are most efficacious and especially taken together they most sufficiently demonstrate the aforesaid truth. To which we shall add below some of those by which the unity of God is wont to be shown. But if anyone also attentively considers the adduced arguments, he will find that in this part also there is place for what was said in section 1, namely, just as the task of proving that there is given some uncreated being belongs to the metaphysician, although the natural philosopher in some way begins or prepares the way for such demonstration, so also to prove that that unproduced being is only one and is the principle of all the rest which exist and thus is the true God, is also the work of the metaphysician; for the demonstration is perfected through metaphysical means. This indeed is per se manifest in the posterior mode of proceeding, which we said is in some way a priori, since the most powerful and almost the whole force of the demonstration rests on the perfection of being through essence itself. But in the prior genus of demonstration, since it seems to be taken from sensible effects, something seems to be participated in or taken from natural philosophy and therefore in that also it is true that philosophy prepares the way and assists toward that mode of demonstrating; the proper medium of that demonstration, however, is truly metaphysical, namely, the unity of end and mutual connection or subordination, which is found in all things existing in the nature of things. For this reasoning is most abstract and most universal, and therefore per se pertains to metaphysics, although for applying it to singular things it often uses the ministry of philosophy.

The Second Opinion Related in the Superior Section is Rejected

33. Finally, from all that has been said it can be established by a most evident experience how alien from truth is the opinion related above, which asserted that God's existence is so known per se that it

could not be demonstrated for that reason. For it is established from what has been said that great consideration and speculation is needed to persuade this truth efficaciously; how therefore can this truth be thought to be known per se? Therefore St. Thomas wisely, I, q. 2, a. 1, having presupposed the distinction which is handed down in I Posterior and is broadly expounded concerning a proposition known per se, either in itself only, or in itself and to us, affirms that God's existence is known per se in itself, because to be through himself and without medium belongs to God and is of the primary concept and nature of God. But he denies that it is known per se to us, because we neither conceive the essence of that being as it is in itself, nor from the terms themselves is it evident to us that in the order of effects and causes one must stop at some uncreated being, much less is it known per se that such a being cannot be except one. Whence many gentiles doubted about this truth or even denied it, and up to the present day many not only gentiles but also heretics, after hearing the voice of the Gospel, labor under the same folly and are atheists, and some even faithful and learned deny that this truth is evident; but these things do not happen in matters known per se to us. And in this opinion, besides Hervaeus, Capreolus and other Thomists, St. Thomas agrees, In I, dist. 3; Durandus, q. 3; Richard, q. 2.

34. Others truly, although they embrace the latter part of that opinion, which is sufficient for us, nevertheless deny the former, because they do not admit that distinction, nor that any proposition is known per se in itself, which is not known per se to us, as Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2; Ockham, dist. 3, q. 2; Gabriel, q. 4; Henry, in Sum., a. 22, q. 2. Nevertheless, the said authors labored undeservedly in a dialectical matter, concerning which there can hardly be controversy in reality. For who would doubt that there are certain truths immediate in themselves, which we can understand only through some medium? Certainly quantity, for example, being accidental entityness, if it is true, is true without any medium between predicate and subject, and yet is not known by us except through media and

very extrinsic ones. Since therefore a proposition known per se and immediate are the same, it cannot be doubted that many things are known per se in themselves which are not known per se to us. But if Scotus and others say they are not speaking of things, but of propositions, which intrinsically express order to our concepts, which cannot be distinguished according to themselves and as to us, we shall respond that they labor in equivocation, because we do not treat of signs themselves, but of the thing signified, nor of formal concepts, but of objective ones, and into these the given distinction falls excellently. For often those things which are presented to our concepts have immediate and thus per se known connection, although, as they are presented to our formal concepts and are denominated by them, their connection is not immediately known to us. Therefore that distinction is excellent and most fittingly applied to the present matter, as has been sufficiently declared.

35. I would add, however, although strictly speaking it is not known to us that God exists as altogether evident, nevertheless this truth is so consonant with natural light and the consensus of all men, that it can hardly be ignored by anyone. Whence Augustine, tract. CVI in John, treating those words: "I have manifested your name to men," says: "Not that name by which you are called God, but that by which you are called my Father. For by which God is said, to all creatures and to all nations, before they believed in Christ, this name could not in every way have been unknown." But this knowledge of God can be understood in two ways: in one way, under some confused and common notion, as under the notion of some superior divinity, which can help us or make us blessed or something similar, which concept, although it applies to the true God, can nevertheless also be applied to false gods, and perhaps in this way Cicero said, lib. I de Nat. Deorum, that there is no nation which does not have some prenotion that God exists. In another way it can be understood of knowledge of the true God through the concept of the supreme being, than which nothing greater can be, and which is the principle of all others, and in this way

Augustine seems to speak in the cited place. Whence he adds: "For this is the power of true divinity, that it cannot be altogether or entirely hidden from a rational creature already using reason; for except a few in whom nature is too much depraved, the whole human race confesses God to be the author of this world." And in the same sense Tertullian said, in Apology, c. 17, and Cyprian, de Idolor. vanit.: "The height of crime is to be unwilling to know him whom one cannot be ignorant of"; and in the same sense others whom I cited above said that knowledge of the true God is naturally implanted in men.

36. But this knowledge neither arises in all from demonstration, because not all are capable of it, nor from evidence of terms alone; for, although we grant that by the name of God is signified a being necessary through itself than which nothing greater can be thought, as Anselm wants, and he took from Augustine, lib. I de Doctr. Christ., c. 7, nevertheless it is not immediately evident whether the significate of that word is some true thing, or only something feigned or excogitated by us. Therefore from a twofold source this knowledge could arise: first, from the greatest proportion which this truth has with human nature; for when this truth is proposed and the terms are explained, although it does not immediately appear altogether evident, nevertheless it immediately appears per se consonant with reason and is most easily persuaded to a man not altogether perversely disposed. Because nothing appears in that truth which would be repugnant or would render it difficult to believe; and on the contrary there are many things which immediately incline to assenting to the truth; many things, I say, not only metaphysical or physical, but also moral, nor only external, but also internal. For if man reflects into himself, he knows that he is not from himself, nor does he suffice for himself unto his perfection, nor do all the creatures which he experiences satisfy him; indeed he recognizes in himself a nature more excellent than those, although imperfect in its degree, because he knows himself weak and infirm both in knowing the true and in loving the good. Whence with the easiest effort man persuades

himself that he needs a superior nature from which he draws his origin and by which he is ruled and governed.

37. Second, this general knowledge is founded on the tradition and institution of elders both of children by parents, and of the unlearned by the more learned. From which also a general sense among all nations became widespread, and it was received, that God exists; whence this knowledge for the most part seems to have been through human faith especially among the common people, rather than through evidence of the matter; it seems nevertheless to have been with a certain practical and moral evidence, which could suffice for obliging both to assent to this truth that God exists, and also to worship him. And according to these things all the things which are said by teachers concerning knowledge of God naturally implanted are easily understood.

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